STATE v GOULD

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 84-135 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A F OTN 1985 STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vs- JAMES DAVID GOULD, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis & C l a r k , The H o n o r a b l e Thomas O l s o n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . APPEAL FROM: COUNSEL O RECORD: F For Appellant: R o b e r t J . Emmons a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana F o r Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , K e l e n a , Montana P a t r i c i a S c h a e f f e r argued, A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , Helena Mike McGrath, County A t t o r n e y , H e l e n a , Montana Submitted: Decided: , I Filed: 1s "! f985 March 21, 1985 J u l y 1, 1985 Mr. J u s t i c e F r e d J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . Following a one-car accident, defendant, James David G o u l d , w a s c h a r g e d w i t h n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e and d r i v i n g u n d e r the influence was killed. of alcohol. A Lewis and Gould's companion, County D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u r y Clark The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e t u r n e d g u i l t y v e r d i c t s on b o t h c h a r g e s . sentenced the negligent homicide c h a r g e w i t h a l l b u t 6 months county j a i l t i m e sus- pended Gould and prisonment to 3 imposed a and a years Dawn C l o u g h , $1,000 $300 fine imprisonment on fine. He received 30 d a y s i m - on DUI charge. Defendant the We affirm. appeals. The d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n a d m i t t i n g i n t o e v i - 1. dence the defendant's statements that he was driving the vehicle? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 3 9 , a s t o w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t ' s admis- sions w e r e competently given? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n a d m i t t i n g t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e which c o n t a i n e d a s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d was a passenger i n t h e vehicle? 4. Were the defendant's admissions corroborated by s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence? 5. proposed Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 33 a n d 41, r e l a t i n g t o t h e proof required t o e s t a b l i s h t h e corpus d e l i c t i ? 6. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 11, w h i c h i n s u b s t a n c e r e q u i r e d t h e j u r y t o f i n d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was t h e driver of the vehicle? 7. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o d i s m i s s t h e c h a r g e s a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e on t h e g r o u n d s that there was no evidence independent of defendant's admissions to show he was the driver? 8. Did the District Court err in deleting a portion of defendant's proposed instruction no. 14 relating to the use of circumstantial evidence? 9. Did the District Court err in admitting expert testimony regarding defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident? 10. Did the District Court err in allowing evidence of the use of marijuana by the defendant and the decedent on the day of the accident? 11. Are §S 45-5-104 and 45-2-101 (37), MCA, unconstitu- tionally vague? 12. Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's proposed instructions no. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 38, which instructed the jury in substance that a guilty verdict on negligent homicide required a finding of "conscious" disregard of the risk? 13. Did the District Court adequately instruct the jury that the .10 presumption of intoxication applied only to the DUI charge? 14. Did the District Court err in denying defendant's post-trial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial? Because of the extensive factual arguments, we will set out the facts in some detail. On December 5 , 1982, Dawn Marie Clough, 20 years of age, was killed in a single-vehicle accident. The defendant's theory of this case is that Ms. Clough was the driver of the vehicle, which was owned by defendant, and that he was a passenger at the time of the accident. The time and details of various circumstances are contested. have We completed a full review of the t r a n s c r i p t , d e p o s i t i o n s and d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e . The defendant's quence of e v e n t s : testimony indicated the se- following h e had worked t h e d a y b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t . l a s t e d u n t i l 2 : 30 a.m. H e a t t e n d e d a p a r t y which on t h e d a y H e picked up M s . Clough a t h e r p a r e n t s ' home i n G r e a t F a l l s a r o u n d 10:OO a.m. and d r o v e t o w a r d H o l t e r of the accident. Lake, where t h e y planned t o go f i s h i n g . b e e r s between the Oasis hours G r e a t F a l l s and Wolf Bar in Wolf d u r i n g which Creek, the H e drank about f i v e Creek. where they defendant drank They s t o p p e d a t stayed two o r two about three Black He then drove h i s pickup t o t h e r e c r e a t i o n a l Velvet d i t c h e s . s i t e a t t h e f a r end o f H o l t e r Lake, where t h e y s t a y e d d u r i n g t h e afternoon. They That a f t e r n o o n , l e f t the b e t w e e n 5:00 lake just he drank about five beers. b e f o r e d a r k , w h i c h would h a v e b e e n and 6:00 p.m. H e d r o v e t h e 18-mile winding d i r t r o a d b a c k t o Wolf C r e e k , w h e r e t h e y a g a i n v i s i t e d t h e O a s i s Bar. D e f e n d a n t may h a v e h a d t h r e e B l a c k V e l v e t d i t c h e s a t the bar. (The b a r t e n d e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e s e r v e d t h e c o u p l e two r o u n d s , b u t M s . Clouqh d i d n o t d r i n k h e r s and t h e d e f e n - dant drank a l l four drinks.) t h e e n t i r e day. Bar p.m. and, in They s t a y e d more t h a n a n h o u r a t t h e O a s i s different Defendant H e d i d n o t e a t any food d u r i n g testimony, left the bar around 7:00 l e f t t h e b a r u p s e t o v e r a n a r g u m e n t h e had g o t t e n i n t o a b o u t a p o o l game. H e d r o v e away f r o m t h e O a s i s B a r , b u t t h e n p u l l e d o v e r and s t o p p e d and t u r n e d t h e d r i v i n g over t o Ms. Clough w h i l e h e t o o k a nap. H e n e x t remembers waking up i n t h e h n s p i t a l . While defendant testified that he remembered very few d e t a i l s o f t h e e v e n i n g , h e s t a t e d t h a t h e was " p o s i t i v e " t h a t he turned t h e d r i v i n g over t o Ms. bar, he was wearing a large Clough. parka and When h e l e f t t h ~ a large pair of i n s u l a t e d b o o t s which w e r e l a c e d up and t u c k e d u n d e r h i s p a n t legs. After parka. not the accident, h e was found without boots or D e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h i s e v i d e n c e shows t h a t h e w a s driving the vehicle and corroborates his testimony of s t o p p i n g and t a k i n g o f f h i s c l o t h i n g . S c o t t O'Connell, Creek, testified as t h e b a r t e n d e r a t t h e O a s i s B a r i n Wolf follows: t h e d e f e n d a n t and M s . a r r i v e d a t t h e b a r b e t w e e n 5 : 0 0 a n d 6:00 was unable to stand OIConnell f e l t drink. that well or defendant to p.m. Clough The d e f e n d a n t shoot pool should n o t have very well. a n y more to The d e f e n d a n t became a b u s i v e , u s i n g f o u l l a n g u a g e a n d p i c k i n g f i g h t s , a n d a s a r e s u l t was a s k e d t o l e a v e . Several O'Connell people asked t h e defendant t o l e t t h e g i r l d r i v e . himself discussed with t h e defendant whether he should d r i v e , and t h e defendant a t one p o i n t a g r e e d t o l e t Clough d r i v e . The c o u p l e w e n t o u t s i d e , b u t t h e n came b a c k i n t o l o o k defendant's dant's drove c a r keys. belt. f o u n d them u n d e r d e f e n - The d e f e n d a n t g o t i n t o t h e d r i v e r ' s away t o w a r d curred A bar patron the entrance to 1-15. s e a t and The a c c i d e n t o c - 8 m i l e s n o r t h o f Wolf C r e e k on 1 - 1 5 . was n o t for The b a r t e n d e r a b l e t o s a y s p e c i f i c a l l y what t i m e t h e c o u p l e l e f t the bar. J i m Adams w a s a t t h e b a r a t t h e same t i m e a s d e f e n d a n t and testified Bar a t 6:45 unequivocally or 7:00 p.m. that t h e couple Adams had l e f t t h e Oasis earlier offered Ms. C l o u g h a r i d e home t o G r e a t F a l l s i f t h e d e f e n d a n t r e f u s e d t o let her drive. Robert Sturm, a construction n o r t h on 1-15 w i t h t w o c o - w o r k e r s 5, 1982, witnessed t h e a c c i d e n t . saw d e f e n d a n t ' s traveling at worker who was driving o n t h e e v e n i n g o f December In h i s rear-view mirror, he p i c k u p e r r a t i c a l l y a p p r o a c h i n g from b e h i n d , about 65 to 70 m i l e s per hour. Defendant's pickup passed so close to a f r a i d t h e y would t o u c h . Sturm's vehicle that Sturm was However, S t u r m d i d n o t see who was d r i v i n g b e c a u s e i t was d a r k a n d h e w a s b u s y d r i v i n g . After S t u r m saw t h e v e h i c l e veer t o t h e defendant's pickup passed, r i g h t a s i f t o t a k e a n o f f ramp a l t h o u g h o n e w a s n o t t h e r e . The p i c k u p t h e n v e e r e d t o t h e l e f t a c r o s s t h e n o r t h b o u n d l a n e i n t o t h e c e n t e r median, southbound lane. the vehicle. did a s o m e r s a u l t and landed i n t h e see t h e c o u p l e t h r o w n f r o m Sturm d i d n o t When h e a n d h i s c o - w o r k e r s ran t o t h e scene, t h e y f o u n d t h e two o c c u p a n t s l y i n g on t h e r o a d . K e v i n O ' C o n n e l l was t h e i n i t i a l p a s s e r b y t o r e n d e r f i r s t aid. His first course at Montana that the aid training consisted State University d e f e n d a n t was in shock, in but of a 1976. came one-quarter testified He around somewhat a f t e r h e became w a r m e r . J a c k S h a m l e y , a d e p u t y s h e r i f f s t a t i o n e d a t Wolf C r e e k , was the f i r s t l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r t o a r r i v e on t h e s c e n e . H e s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t r a t i o n a l a t f i r s t , b u t was l a t e r a b l e t o answer Shamley's q u e s t i o n s a s t o where h e d i d o r did not hurt. in shock, but S h a m l e y t e s t i f i e d h e t h o u g h t d e f e n d a n t was found no "overwhelming evidence" of shock. James T a n n e h i l l was t h e f i r s t highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r t o H e received a r r i v e a t t h e scene. 15 m i n u t e s l a t e r . and a r r i v e d a c a l l a t a b o u t 7:30 H e determined t h a t M s . p.m. Clough was d e a d a n d f o u n d t h e d e f e n d a n t l y i n g on t h e r o a d w a y c o v e r e d w i t h b l a n k e t s and c o a t s . on M s . asked Clough's the feet, driving Tannehill f a c i n g away f r o m h e r . d e f e n d a n t who owned r e p l i e d i t was h i s . was but D e f e n d a n t was l y i n g w i t h h i s h e a d the the vehicle. Tannehill The d e f e n d a n t Tannehill t h e n asked t h e defendant i f h e vehicle. testified that The these defendant are routine q u e s t i o n s asked a t t h e scene of an a c c i d e n t . answered yes. investigative Highway P a t r o l O f f i c e r Gene T i n s l e y a r r i v e d a t t h e s c e n e H e was d i r e c t e d shortly a f t e r Tannehill. t o stay with the victims while T a n n e h i l l conducted t h e a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T i n s l e y was w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t i n u o u s l y f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y During t h a t t i m e , 30 t o 35 m i n u t e s . with the defendant in order to he conversed constant3y keep the defendant awake. T i n s l e y a s k e d t h e d e f e n d a n t whose v e h i c l e it w a s a n d who was driving. The d e f e n d a n t r e p l i e d i t was h i s v e h i c l e a n d h e was driving. T i n s l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t seemed a b l e t o understand Tinsley his questions testified condition that impaired h i s to and he did respond not believe appropriately. the defendant's a b i l i t y t o communicate, although he agreed t h a t defendant appeared "a l i t t l e confused." O f f i c e r T i n s l e y t r e a t e d Gould f o r s h o c k a s s u c h a c c i d e n t victims are observed Tinsley routinely no g r o s s noted treated. symptoms o f that In Gould's shock and t h e d e f e n d a n t was the into ambulance. Defendant's found no i n j u r i e s . f a c i n g away Clough and d i d n o t change h i s p o s i t i o n Tinsley case, from M s . before being position is loaded significant because he a r g u e s t h a t h i s l a c k o f competence i s demonstrated by t h e f a c t t h a t h e w a s l y i n g w i t h h i s h e a d on M s . Clough's f e e t , b u t was u n a w a r e o f w h e r e s h e w a s . The Donald ambulance Fleming, arrived ambulance at the scene attendant and around 8:15 certified p.m. medical t e c h n i c i a n , r o d e w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e ambulance from t h e s c e n e t o G r e a t F a l l s and checked h i s v i t a l s i g n s . d e f e n d a n t was p r e s s u r e was normal ra n g e . i n i t i a l l y placed a couple consistently t h e ambulance, 1 0 0 and h i s p u l s e was 6 0 , h i s blood which i s w i t h i n t h e I n o r d e r t o complete h i s forms, Fleming asked t h e d e f e n d a n t who was d r i v i n g . in in When t h e of that different he was Fleming phrased t h e q u e s t i o n s ways. driving. The defendant Fleming also responded testified that the defendant's physical r e s p o n s e s w e r e good. Be was to able condition and neurological The d e f e n d a n t h a d f a i r l y good r e c a l l . answer simple a d d r e s s a n d t e l e p h o n e number. questions such as his name, About 1 5 m i n u t e s a f t e r d e f e n - d a n t was p l a c e d i n t h e ambulance, h i s b l o o d p r e s s u r e was 120 and h i s p u l s e was 8 2 . These v i t a l s i g n s remained s t a b l e f o r t h e rest o f t h e t r i p , which t o o k a b o u t 4 5 m i n u t e s . When t h e y w e r e a b o u t 10 m i n u t e s f r o m G r e a t F a l l s , F l e m i n g a g a i n a s k e d t h e d e f e n d a n t who was d r i v i n g . The d e f e n d a n t s a i d t h a t h e was let driving pickup. and that he never else anyone drive his Fleming t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e i n t e r i o r o f t h e ambulance was h e a t e d a n d t h a t w h a t a p p e a r e d t o h a v e b e e n s h o c k symptoms could have been the r e s u l t of t h e defendant l y i n g on c o l d pavement. The defendant's a d m i s s i o n s was trial. competency disputed On a p p e a l , of h i s condition. in the a t the suppression not and a t evidence two p e r s o n s i n t h e D e f e n d a n t w a n t e d t o w a l k home. rather The g u y who And e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d b e t h e a m b u l a n c e a t t e n d a n t g a v e him a b e e r . some o f In addi- t h e witnesses characterized t h e defendant a s responding t o questions, mumbling, hearing the This evidence includes defendant's s t a t e - caused t h e a c c i d e n t b e t t e r h i d e o u t . tion, made The d e f e n d a n t p i c k e d C l o u g h u p a t 5 : 3 0 p.m. t h a n 10 o ' c l o c k . okay i f he defendant emphasizes a d d i t i o n a l ments t h a t t h e r e w e r e t h r e e r a t h e r than vehicle. time c o n f u s e d and in a unable t o converse r a t i o n a l l y , s t a t e of contends h e h a s no r e c o l l e c t i o n o f shock. The d e f e n d a n t a n y o f t h e s e e v e n t s and t h a t h e w a s t o o d i s o r i e n t e d t o l e g i b l y w r i t e h i s name on t h e blood alcohol consent form. Defendant testified t h a t he a c t u a l l y lets o t h e r people d r i v e h i s truck. at Counsel e m p h a s i z e s t h a t none o f t h e w i t n e s s e s a s k e d d e f e n d a n t , you d r i v i n g - -e-i - - t h e a c c i d e n t . " a t th t m e of trial "Were Counsel contends t h e d e f e n d a n t may n o t h a v e known t h e q u e s t i o n m e a n t a t t h e t i m e of the accident. The State presented expert testimony through William Newhouse, a f o r e n s i c s c i e n t i s t f r o m t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e crime laboratory, on the subject of blood alcohol content m e a s u r e m e n t a n d t h e symptoms a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v a r i o u s l e v e l s . A blood night of s a m p l e t a k e n f r o m t h e d e f e n d a n t a t 9:30 on t h e t h e a c c i d e n t showed a b l o o d a l c o h o l c o n t e n t o f percent. A s a m p l e t a k e n a t 9:45 content of evidence p.m. of .26 percent. the p.m. showed a b l o o d a l c o h o l upon Based circumstances .29 t h i s e v i d e n c e and t h e l e a d i n g up to the accident, Newhouse t e s t i f i e d t h a t a h y p o t h e t i c a l p e r s o n would h a v e h a d t o d r i n k a p p r o x i m a t e l y 22 d r i n k s t o r e a c h a .26 a t 9 : 4 5 p.m., a n d w o u l d h a v e had a b l o o d a l c o h o l c o n t e n t o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y . 1 0 t o .11 a t a r o u n d 7:30 p.m. Newhouse i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e s e l e v e l s w e r e a p p r o x i m a t i o n s and t h a t t h e r e c o u l d b e v a r i a t i o n among i n d i v i d u a l s . Pfaff, Dr. a forensic pathologist, was called as a H e s t a t e d u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t it was w i t n e s s by t h e defense. impossible t o c a l c u l a t e t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s blood a l c o h o l a t t h e t i m e of the accident. p e r s o n would h a v e a cumstances. based upon During what he Pfaff d i d estimate t h a t t h e average level of .15 p e r c e n t under s i m i l a r cir- cross-examination, knew about the Pfaff defendant's stated condition, d e f e n d a n t was n o t i n s h o c k when h e e n t e r e d t h e h o s p i t a l . stated that defendant's symptoms that were He probably alcohol-related. Pfaff Ms. also testified C l o u g h ' s body. r e g a r d i n g a n a u t o p s y c o n d u c t e d on No a u t o p s y w a s p e r f o r m e d u n t i l t h e b o d y was exhumed on m o t i o n o f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . P f a f f c o n d u c t e d an autopsy Clough's to determine whether any of Ms. physical i n j u r i e s t e n d e d t o i n d i c a t e w h e t h e r C l o u g h was t h e d r i v e r o r t h e passenger i n t h e vehicle. indications whether Pfaff examined also she P f a f f ' s a u t o p s y d i s c l o s e d no was the the driver medical or records the of passenger. defend3nt and concluded t h e y d i d n o t d i s c l o s e any p h y s i c a l i n j u r y i n d i c a t i n g w h e t h e r h e was t h e d r i v e r o r t h e p a s s e n g e r . The r e c o r d c o n t a i n s no o t h e r p h y s i c a l o r d i r e c t e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g who t h e d r i v e r was. O December 29, n 1 9 8 2 , d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a - t i o n w i t h n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e f o r t h e d e a t h o f Dawn Clough on December 5 , 1 9 8 2 , o p e r a t i n g a m o t o r v e h i c l e u n d e r t h e i n f l u ence of alcohol insurance. later or drugs, and The d r u g - r e l a t e d dismissed. failing portion of The c h a r g e o f to have liability t h e DUI c h a r g e was f a i l i n g t o have liability i n s u r a n c e was s e v e r e d f o r s e p a r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n . O n January 19, 1983, d e f e n d a n t moved to suppress all e v i d e n c e o f s t a t e m e n t s made a t t h e s c e n e o f t h e a c c i d e n t on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t h e was i n shock and n o t m e n t a l l y c o m p e t e n t t o i n t e l l i g e n t l y answer t h e q u e s t i o n s . was h e l d on August 1 8 , 1983. by numerous witnesses Post-hearing and were briefs A suppression hearing The h e a r i n g i n c l u d e d t e s t i m o n y the deposition submitted by of both Pfaff. Dr. parties. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t statements w e r e voluntary. defendant's account the totality considerable of length of the The c o u r t t o o k i n t o circumstances, including t i m e t h a t d e f e n d a n t was o b s e r v e d by highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r s and emergency m e d i c a l p e r s o n n e l , the fact that his statements t h a t throughout. consistent the The h e was court driver were the denied and the motion to Olson on suppress. A jury September verdicts trial was 6 through of guilty held before September 9 , on both the Judge 1983. Thomas The negligent jury returned homicide and operating an automobile under the influence of alcohol charges. Judgment was appea 1s entered January 26, 1984. Defendant . Did the District Court err in admitting into evidence the defendant's statements that he was driving the vehicle? The defendant contends that his statements that he was driving the vehicle were not competent, and the District Court erred in admitting them into evidence. The defendant argues that he was in shock and so intoxicated both at the scene of the accident and in the ambulance that he was incapable of making a voluntary statement. The defendant and legal the State essentially agree as to standards governing the admissibility determination. Section 46-13-301, MCA, in pertinent part provides: " (1) A defendant may move to suppress as evidence any confession or admission given by him on the ground that it was not voluntary. . .. " (4) [T]he prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession or admission was voluntary. " (5) The issue of the admissibility of the confession or admission may not be submitted to the jury. If the confession or admission is determined to be admissible, the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession or admission may be submitted to the jury as bearing upon the credibility or the weight to be given to the confession or admission." The standard to be applied in our review of this issue is whether there is substantial credible evidence to support the District Court's finding. As stated in State v. Grimestad (1-979),183 Mont. 29, 37, 598 P.2d 198, 203: "Smith and Lenon make it clear that the standard to be applied by the trial judge on a suppression question is 'preponderance of the evidence' but when the same q u e s t i o n comes t o u s on a p p e a l t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s and t h e w e i g h t t o be given t h e i r testimony i s f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d o u r review i s limited t o determining whether t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l credible evidence supporting t h e District Court's findings." An is admission competent and admissible where the d e f e n d a n t i s f o u n d c a p a b l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g and r e s p o n d i n g i n a n i n t e l l i g e n t manner. totality of T h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s b a s e d upon t h e t h e circumstances, which i n c l u d e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e " d e f e n d a n t ' s demeanor, coherence, c a p a c i t y t o make his faculties, f u l l use of his overall intelligence." 1975), 387 F.Supp. 21.3, articulateness, h i s memory a n d United S t a t e s v . 220; Annotation, his Hollis (D.De1. 69 A.L.R.2d 361. The d e g r e e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t o x i c a t i o n a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a d m i s s i o n s d o e s n o t a l o n e d e t e r m i n e t h e competence o r admiss i b i l i t y of an admission. Mont. 285, 546 P.2d 509. See S t a t e v. Thus, Emerson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 even where t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s blood a l c o h o l a t t h e t i m e o f t h e admission i s extremely h i g h , the statements are admissible i f the evidence shows the d e f e n d a n t was c a p a b l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g i n a n See S t a t e v. i n t e l l i g e n t manner. P.2d 64 Chapman (blood a l c o h o l level . 2 7 ) . (Wash. 1 9 7 4 ) , 526 Additionally, t h i s Court has previously considered a s a relevant f a c t o r t h e trustwort h i n e s s o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s a s i n d i c a t e d by t h e " c o n t e n t o f t h e [statements] o r evidence of the reliability of 288-89, 546 P.2d s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s which c o n f i r m t h e statements." Emerson, 1 6 9 Mont. at a t 511. The s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g t e s t i m o n y a s a w h o l e i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s l y i n g on t h e c o l d p a v e m e n t a n d a p p a r e n t l y unconscious when respond to questions. covered the scene Deputy S h e r i f f help first arrived. OIConnelI. and Kevin defendant Defendant with Shamley a r r i v e d , blankets. did others By t h e d e f e n d a n t had not at the the time begun t o warm u p a n d w a s feet. able to respond While Shamley was w i t h to a request t h e defendant, t o move t h e defendant was a b l e t o r e s p o n d t o i n q u i r i e s a b o u t w h e r e h e h u r t . Highway Patrol Officer Tannehill his arrived, After T a n n ~ h i l l and o t h e r s p l a c e d b l a n k e t s u n d e r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o k e e p him o f f O I C o n n e l 1 t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f ~ n d a n twarmed t h e c o l d ground. up and began him. a f t e r t h e blankets w e r e placed talking Generally, the testimony indicates that under defendant became more c o h e r e n t and a w a r e a s h e warmed u p . The testimony ambulance of the officers d r i v e r who t r a n s p o r t e d at the scene defendant t o and the the hospital was t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s c o h e r e n t a n d a b l e t o c a r r y on a rational conversation. gross symptoms of O f f i c e r T a n n e h i l l d i d n o t observe any shock. believed He s p o n s e s w e r e l o g i c a l and r a t i o n a l . the defendant's re- O f f i c e r T i n s l e y s p e n t 30 t o 4 5 m i n u t e s c o n v e r s i n g w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t and o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o c a r r y on a n o r m a l c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h He testified t h a t defendant's re- s p o n s e s w e r e c l e a r and u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . Donald F l e m i n g , the no delay in responses. ambulance a t t e n d a n t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o to questions respond regarding h i s i n j u r i e s . Fleming a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s b l o o d p r e s s u r e and p u l s e w e r e within a normal range, and t h e d e f e n d a n t responded consis- t e n t l y when a s k e d w h e t h e r h e was d r i v i n g t h e v e h i c l e . While several witnesses have been i n shock, D r . Pfaff could have been p e r c e i v e d l i k e l y alcohol-related. sic expert, alcohol level testified could testified defendant may t e s t i f i e d t h a t symptoms w h i c h a s shock by l a y p e r s o n s w e r e more W i l l i a m Newhouse, t h e S t a t e ' s f o r e n that i f a person r e c i t e h i s name, and o t h e r s i m p l e d a t a , that a birth date, then the alcohol n o t i m p a i r e d h i s i m m e d i a t e memory. with .20 blood residence l e v e l had p r o b a b l y The a m b u l a n c e a t t e n d a n t testified that defendant recited his rlame, birth date and residence in a consistent manner. In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the District Court stated that it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's statements were voluntary. The court took into account the totality of the circumstances, including the observations of highway patrol officers and emergency medical personnel. The court noted that defendant's state- ments that he was the driver of the vehicle were consistent throughout the period leading up to defendant's hospitalization. Our review of the suppression hearing transcript indicates that there was conflicting evidence on this issue and that the trial court resolved this conflict in favor of admissibility of the statements. We conclude the transcript contains substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court on this issue. We hold the District Court did not err in admit- ting evidence of defendant's statements that he was driving the vehicle. I1 Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's proposed instruction no. 39 as to whether defendant's admissions were competently given? Defendant's refused instruction no. 39 stated: "Evidence has been admitted concerning a statement allegedly made by the Defendant. Before you consider such statement for any purpose, you must determine that the statement was given competently. In determining whether the statement was competently given, you should consider if the defendant had the capacity to be conscious of the events which occurred at the time of the alleged negligent homicide, whether he could retain those events in his memory, and whether he could recall them with reasonable accuracy " . Under S 46-13-301 ( 5 ) , MCA, the i s a 1 lowed t o c o n s i d e r jury t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e making o f t h e a d m i s s i o n a s b e a r i n g upon admission. the The c r e d i b i l i t y o r weight proposed instruction t o be given incorrectly t o the addresses t h e q u e s t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t ' s competence r a t h e r t h a n t h e w e i g h t or c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e evidence. the issue of admissibility This inappropriately s h i f t s t o the jury. In addition, in- 8 i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury a s t o i t s r o l e i n d e t e r - s t r u c t i o n no. mining t h e weight and c r e d i b i l i t y t o b e accorded d e f e n d a n t ' s admissions. I t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t it w a s t h e e x c l u s i v e j u d g e whether s t a t e m e n t s w e r e t r u e i n whole o r i n p a r t . the a l s o i n s t r u c t e d t h e m t o view t h e a d m i s s i o n s w i t h c a u t i o n . S t a t e v. almost Lapp identical rejected the s i m i l a r t o no. 1983), (Mont. 658 P.2d i n s t r u c t i o n s were defendant's 400, 40 St.Rep considered. contention that an It In 120, This Court instruction 39 s h o u l d h a v e b e e n g i v e n t o t h e j u r y . W e h o l d t h e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t err i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 39. I11 Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n a d m i t t i n g t h e d e a t h cert i f i c a t e which c o n t a i n e d a s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d was a passenger i n t h e vehicle? The d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g p o r t i o n of t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e should have been e x c i s e d b e f o r e admission: " D e c e d e n t was p a s s e n g e r i n a p i c k - u p t r u c k which l e f t t h e roadway and o v e r turned. S h e was ejected from the vehicle. " The certificate was admitted during the testimony of the C o u n t y C o r o n e r who p r e p a r e d it i n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s o f f i c i a l The d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e w a s a d m i s s i b l e t o p r o v e t h e duties. death of Ms. Clough S 50-15-109 (4), MCA. under Rule Admission 803(9), into M.R.Evid. evidence for and that purpose does n o t r e q u i r e t h e admission of the e n t i r e death certificate. The coroner was extensively cross-examined by defense c o u n s e l a s t o t h e s o u r c e o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d on t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e with regard t o t h e decedent being a passenger. The c o r o n e r ' s t e s t i m o n y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t h e b a s e d t h e conclusion that Ms. Clough was a passenger upon hearsay s t a t e m e n t s a s t o d e f e n d a n t b e i n g t h e d r i v e r of t h e v e h i c l e . No p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n w a s l a i d f o r t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h a t p a r t of the death certificate. W e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t on d e c e d e n t was a p a s s e n g e r admission. While the certificate that should have been e x c i s e d p r i o r t o t h a t was n o t done, we conclude t h a t t h e f a i l u r e d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e error. The t e s t i m o n y by t h e b a r t e n d e r and o t h e r w i t n e s s e s e s t a b l i s h e d a s u b s t a n tial basis for concluding that decedent was a passenger. While t h e s t a t e m e n t i n t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e was o b j e c t i o n able, it confirmed in an insignificant way other evidence before the court. W e h o l d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t commit r e v e r s - i b l e error i n admitting t h e death c e r t i f i c a t e . IV Were t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s admissions corroborated by suffi- c i e n t independent evidence? The d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e S t a t e m u s t e s t a b l i s h t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t i by e v i d e n c e i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e a d m i s s i o n s on the part of t h e defendant. the bartender's The d e f e n d a n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t e s t i m o n y t h a t h e saw t h e d e f e n d a n t d r i v i n g away f r o m t h e Wolf Creek Bar s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t b e c a u s e it f a i l s t o show t h a t h e was d r i v i n g a t the t i m e of the accident. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e d e f e n - d a n t l s admissions w e r e s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d and t h a t t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t i was e s t a b l i s h e d b y i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e testimony e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e defendant left the bar 6:00 a t to 6:15 p.m. This leaves s u b s t a n t i a l t i m e unaccounted f o r p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t , which While t h e e v i d e n c e i s t o o k p l a c e a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7:00 p.m. n o t f r e e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n on t h e m a t t e r o f t i m e , substantiates 6 : 4 5 t o 7:00 findings p.m. that the defendant left t h e record the bar a t The a c c i d e n t h a p p e n e d s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , and t h e f i r s t law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r was c o n t a c t e d a t a b o u t Defendant also contends that the evidence regarding p l a c e m e n t o f h i s b o o t s a n d p a r k a i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o show t h a t h e was n o t d r i v i n g . be significant. that the That evidence does n o t i n f a c t appear t o certainly It defendant turned does not prove the driving over The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t § 45-5-111, MCA, conclusively t o Ms. Clough. is applicable. That s t a t u t e s t a t e s : " I n a homicide t r i a l , b e f o r e an e x t r a j u d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n may b e a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e , t h e s t a t e must i n t r o d u c e independent evidence tending t o e s t a b l i s h t h e d e a t h a n d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e a t h was caused by c r i m i n a l agency." (emphasis added) I t i s c l e a r from t h e s t a t u t e t h a t c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r corroboration of a confession. S e c t i o n 45-5-111, ments to R.C.M. 1947. the MCA, was e n a c t e d i n 1 9 7 3 , somewhat stricter provisions of w i t h amend§ 94-2510, Even u n d e r t h e f o r m e r s t a t u t o r y s t a n d a r d , t h i s Court has held t h a t t h e establishment o f t h e corpus d e l i c t i need n o t b e proven by i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e o f i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . v. Ratkovich (1940), 111 Mont. This Court s t a t e d i n S t a t e 19, 25, 1 0 5 P.2d 679, 682: " T h e r e m u s t b e some i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t i , b u t it need n o t o f i t s e l f b e s u f f i c i e n t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a s , once t h e independent evidence i s given, t h e confession may b e c o n s i d e r e d w i t h t h e f a c t s and circumstances i n evidence i n determining whether the corpus delicti is established. " (emphasis added) .. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e r e w a s s u b s t a n t i a 1 e v i d e n c e beyond t h e a d m i s s i o n s o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a l o n e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s t o b e viewed in a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e S t a t e . The j u d g e r e f e r r e d t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f b a r t e n d e r O ' C o n n e l l , who t e s t i f i e d a s t o h i s observations of defendant's seriously intoxicated s t a t e , his discussions with inability to drive, defendant nonetheless the and defendant finally drove the his regarding defendant's observatinns pickup away from that the the Wolf Creek Bar. W i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e g a r d t o d r i v i n g away f r o m t h e bar i t s e l f , the bartender t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant f i r s t w a n t e d t o d r i v e a n d , a f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , a g r e e d t o l e t M s . Clough d r i v e . would L a t e r h e c h a n g e d h i s mind a n d i n s i s t e d t h a t h e d r i v e e v e n t h o u g h h e h a d t o l d t h e b a r t e n d e r h e would not drive. The b a r t e n d e r saw t h e d e f e n d a n t d r i v e t h e p i c k u p away f r o m t h e b a r . An a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s o b s e r v e d t h e d e f e n - d a n t ' s t r u c k b e i n g d r i v e n i n a e x t r e m e l y c a r e l e s s and t h r e a t e n i n g manner. We hold t h a t t h e defendant's admissions with regard to d r i v i n g t h e v e h i c l e w e r e c o r r o b o r a t e d by s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence. Did proposed the District Court i n s t r u c t i o n s no. err 33 and in 41, refusing defendant's r e l a t i n g t o t h e proof required t o e s t a b l i s h t h e corpus d e l i c t i ? The d i s c u s s i o n r e g a r d i n g c o r p u s d e l i c t i i n t h e p r e c e d i n g issue is applicable here. The i n s t r u c t i o n s p r o p o s e d b y t h e defendant were: "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e r e m u s t b e independent evidence of the corpus d e l i c i t t o c o r r o b o r a t e an a d m i s s i o n , and i n a c a s e o f N e g l i g e n t Homicide, a s h e r e , such independent evidence must b e proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 3 3 "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i n a c a s e o f N e g l i g e n t Homicide, t h e r e must b e i n d e pendent evidence o f t h e corpus d e l i c t i and s u c h i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e must b e proved beyond a reasonable doubt." P r o p o s e d I n s t r u c t i o n No. 4 1 These instructions As previously are not correct mentioned, statements of Ratkovich the established law. that i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e need n o t b e s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t i beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . require that reasonable independent doubt. evidence must The D i s t r i c t C o u r t Both i n s t r u c t i o n s be proven refused beyond a the instruc- t i o n s b e c a u s e it concluded t h a t t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t j . i s n o t a q u e s t i o n t o be decided by t h e j u r y , tion for determination by the b u t i s a t h r e s h o l d ques- court. c o r r e c t a s t h e D i s t r i c t Court must is sufficient corroborative That is essentially f i r s t determine i f t h e r e evidence before ruling on the err in a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e confession o r admission. We conclude that the District Court did not r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n s 33 a n d 41. Did the District Court p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. err in refusing defendant's 11, w h i c h i n s u b s t a n c e r e q u i r e d t h e j u r y t o f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was t h e driver of the vehicle? The i n s t r u c t i o n w a s r e p e t i t i v e . instructed on reasonable doubt in The j u r y w a s a d e q u a t e l y other instructions. We hold that no error was p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. committed in refusing defendant's 11. VII t h e District Court err i n refusing t o dismiss t h e Did charges at the close of the State's case on grounds t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e i n d e p e n d e n t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s that admissions t o show h e was t h e d r i v e r ? A s discussed a t length i n t i a l evidence that he was charges t h e r e was s u b s t a n - i n d e p e n d e n t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s a d m i s s i o n s t o show driving. No T h e r e c l e a r l y was n o t a the I V above, on this further discussion is required. factual basis for the dismissal of theory at the close of the State's ca se-in-chief. VIII Did the District err Court in d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. deleting a portion of 14 r e l a t i n g t o t h e u s e of circumstantial evidence? The p o r t i o n o f t h e p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n w h i c h t h e D i s - t r i c t C o u r t d e l e t e d a n d t o which t h e d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s i s a s follows: "However, you a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t y o u a r e n o t p e r m i t t e d on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence a l o n e t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f any crime c h a r g e d a g a i n s t him u n l e s s t h e proved c i r c u m s t a n c e s n o t o n l y a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e hypothesis t h a t t h e defend a n t i s g u i l t y o f t h e crime, b u t a r e c o n s i s t e n t [ s i c ] w i t h any o t h e r r a t i o n a l conclusion." In S t a t e v. Bean Court determined properly where all ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 5 Mont. that the rejected. of the Such evidence 1 3 5 , 337 P.2d s i m i l a r proposed instruction in the is case Here, t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l d i r e c t e v i d e n c e . 930, this i n s t r u c t i o n was appropriate only is circumstantial. W e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t err i n d e l e t i n g a p o r t i o n o f d e f e n - d a n t ' s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 14. IX Did the District Court err in admitting expert testimony regarding defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident? In substance, the defendant contends that because of the conflict in the evidence between Dr. Pfaff and Dr. Newhouse, Dr. Newhouse was not qualified as an expert to express an estimate of the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident. The State points out that Dr. Newhouse's opinions were given in response to hypothetical questions as an aid to the jury. The State argues that Newhouse was qualified as an expert and points out that the court instructed the jury during the Newhouse testimony that expert witnesses may give opinions, but the jury is not bound to accept those opinions. In addition, there was substantial cross-examination of Newhouse by defendant's counsel. As we review the transcript, it appears that both experts were testifying as to hypothetical averages, which would result from drinking a certain amount of alcohol under certain conditions. The hypothetical questions were within the scope of the evidence presented. The court instructed the jury that they could reject an expert's opinion. The District Court did not err in admitting the expert testimony. X Did the District Court. err in allowing evidence of the use of marijuana by the defendant and the decedent on the day of the accident? That evidence was admissible because the defendant initially was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, even though the drug charge was subsequently dismissed. In part addition, of the the evidence res g e s t a e , was properly a s inseparably admitted intertwined as in a the events leading t o t h e accident. See S t a t e v. Trombley ( ~ o n t . 1 9 8 0 ) , 620 P.2d 1871. 3 6 7 , 37 S t . R e p . The d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t a r g u e d t h e o t h e r crimes r u l e , b u t h a s m e r e l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was p r e j u d i c i a l . W e note t h a t a f t e r t h e evidence was a d m i t t e d , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g a v e a n e x c e l l e n t c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n , e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was o n l y t o show t h e f l o w o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h a t t h e j u r y s h o u l d n o t conc l u d e d e f e n d a n t was a b a d p e r s o n . W e hold t h a t t h e admission o f t h e evidence r e g a r d i n g t h e u s e o f m a r i j u a n a was n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . A r e §§ 45-5-104 and 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 1 ( 3 7 ) , MCA, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l - l y vague? Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e g l i g e n c e a s applied to negligent homicide is unconstitutiona1ly In p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h e code s e c t i o n s provide: "Negligent homicide. (1) C r i m i n a 1 homic i d e c o n s t i t u t e s n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e when it is committed negligently." § 45-5-104 ( I ) , MCA. " ' N e g l i g e n t l y ' -- a p e r s o n a c t s n e g l i g e n t l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o a r e s u l t or t o a circumstance described by a statute d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e when h e c o n s c i o u s 1 disregards a risk that t h r result w i l y occur o r t h a t t h e circumstance e x i s t s o r when h e d i s r e q a r d s a - k o f w h i c h ris should-be - a w a r e t h a t t h e r e s u l t w i n occur or t h a t t h e circumstance e x i s t s . The risk m u s t b e o f s u c h a n a t u r e and d e g r e e t h a t t o d i s r e g a r d it i n v o l v e s a g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n d a r d o f c o n d u c t t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n would observe i n t h e a c t o r ' s s i t u a t i o n . 'Gross deviation' means a d e v i a t i o n t h a t i s considerably greater than lack of ordinary care. R e l e v a n t t e r m s s u c h a s 'negl i g e n t ' and ' w i t h n e g l i g e n c e ' have t h e same meaning. " 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , MA C (emphasis added). vague. D e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e g l i g e n c e a s applied to negligent relying upon a statement ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. stated that i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague, homicide 27, 32, "although by this Court 591 P.2d somewhat in State in Bier I n B i e r , we 1 1 1 5 , 1118. nehul o u s v. concept, gross negligence i s g e n e r a l l y considered t o f a l l s h o r t of a reckless d i s r e g a r d f o r c o n s e q u e n c e s and i s s a i d t o d i f f e r from o r d i n a r y negligence only i n degree, n o t i n kind." Defendant because, further argues that a s a p p l i e d by t h e C o u r t , the is statute vague i t d i d n o t r e q u i r e a con- s c i o u s d e v i a t i o n from a known r i s k , and b e c a u s e t h e s t a t u t e f a i l s t o a p p r i s e a person o f t h e standard o f conduct r e q u i r e d by the statute. Defendant also argues that c a n n o t b e a s t a n d a r d d e t e r m i n e d by a j u r y , f i n e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . jury i n s t r u c t i o n no. defendant for the b u t must b e d e - F i n a l l y , defendant contends t h a t 1 5 ( a ) would a l l o w t h e j u r y criminal standard negligence a l c o h o l l e v e l was l e s s t h a n even t o convict though the blood .lo. The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e h o l d i n g by t h i s C o u r t t h a t the tort concept of gross negligence i s somewhat n e b u l o u s d o e s n o t i n a n y way s u p p o r t t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s a r e unconstitutionally vague. The State points out that the s t a n d a r d i s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e must b e s p e c i f i c enough t o g i v e f a i r n o t i c e o f t h e c o n d u c t p r o h i b i t e d and t o p r o v i d e a meani n g f u l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between c u l p a b l e and i n n o c e n t c o n d u c t . The S t a t e p o i n t s o u t t h a t it i s n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e t o l e a v e t o t h e j u r y t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n d a r d o f c o n d u c t t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n would o b s e r v e i n t h e actor's situation. The S t a t e a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s t o b e made by t h e j u r y d e f e n d a n t 1s taking into consideration the t o t a l i t y of conduct, including the speed of the vehicle, d i s r e g a r d o f w a r n i n g s t h a t h e was t o o d r u n k t o d r i v e , a s w e l l as any evidence of (W.D.N.Y. 1976), 422 1977), t h e Cir. intoxication. F.Supp. court upheld s i m i l a r t o S 45-5-104(1), Ketchum that the 934, a aff'd, Ketchum 556 F.2d negligent homicide v. Ward 557 (2d statute W e agree with t h e holding i n MCA. inability In of an attorney t o predict the outcome o f t h e j u r y d e l i b e r a t i o n s on t h e q u e s t i o n o f n e g l i gence i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r a f i n d i n g o f u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l vagueness. W e a l s o adopt t h e view e x p r e s s e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n U n i t e d S t a t e v . 314 U.S. Ragen (1942), 5 1 3 , 523: "The mere f a c t t h a t a p e n a l s t a t u t e i s s o framed a s t o r e q u i r e a j u r y upon o c c a s i o n t o determine a question of reasonableness i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o make i t t o o v a q u e t o afford a p r a c t i c a l guide t o permissible conduct. " A s w e c o n s i d e r t h e s t a t u t e s set f o r t h above, w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e i s no i n d e f i n i t e n e s s o n t h e f a c e o f t h e s t a t u t e s s u f f i c i e n t t o require a holding of unconstitutionality. a l s o conclude t h a t t h e r e unconstitutional It is difficult as to i s no b a s i s applied imagine to for present that f i n d i n g t h e same fact conduct, circumstances. which d r i n k i n g b o t h b e e r and w h i s k y o v e r many h o u r s , warnings drive, We included disregarding from s e v e r a l p e o p l e t h a t h e was t o o i n t o x i c a t e d t o and then g e t t i n g behind t h e wheel of a v e h i c l e and d r i v i n g down t h e highway a t a s p e e d c o n s i d e r a b l y i n e x c e s s o f t h e speed l i m i t , meaning a lack ordinary of could not be classed a s a gross deviation, deviation that care. is considerably greater than We conclude that the statutes the in question a r e not unconstitutional. D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n no. 15 ( a ) allowed t h e j u r y t o c o n v i c t f o r c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e m e r e l y o n some d e g r e e of intoxication. That i s not an accurate statement of t h e instruction. Instruction relied intoxication 15 c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s 39 St.Rep. any care a s defined i n other instructions. A s t h i s Court held i n S t a t e v. 1367, that must c o n s t i t u t e a g r o s s d e v i a t i o n upon from t h e s t a n d a r d o f no. 1026, Cooke criminal (Mont. negligence r e s u l t of driving a c a r while intoxicated. 1 9 8 2 ) , 645 P.2d can arise as a W e conclude t h a t 1 5 ( a ) i s n o t improper. i n s t r u c t i o n no. W e h o l d t h a t §§ 45-5-104 and 45-2-201(37), are not MCA, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague. XI1 Did the jury in substance homicide r e q u i r e d a in refusing defendant's 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 and 3 8 , which i n s t r u c t e d proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. the err Court District that a finding of guilty verdict on negligent "conscious" disregard o f t h e risk? Defendant s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 5 and 38 r e f e r r e d t o t h e necessity o f t h e defendant a c t i n g with a mental s t a t e a s an e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e . er. Such i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e improp- This Court has previously decided t h a t mental s t a t e is S t a t e v. K i r k a l d i e n o t a n i s s u e i n n e g l i g e n t homicide c a s e s . (1978), Cook 1 7 9 Mont. 283, 1982), (Mont. 587 P.2d 645 P.2d 1298. 1367, See a l s o , 1369, 39 S t a t e v. St.Rep. 1026, 1029. D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. to the t e r m "conscious," definition of negligence i n s t r u c t i o n s 6 and 7 , a s used in 6 , 7 and 8 r e l a t e d i n the f i r s t part of S 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , MCA. As the to t h e D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t t h e word " c o n s c i o u s l y " w a s a common word i n t h e E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e and required this Court plained. no that definition. words S t a t e v. of That common Camitsch (Mont. follows the language need holdings not 1 9 8 1 ) , 626 P.2d be of ex- 1250, 38 St.Rep. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n 563. i n making t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n . With r e s p e c t t o proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. it i n s e r t s 8, t h e word " c o n s c i o u s l y " w h e r e i t i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e . W e t h e r e f o r e conclude t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t err i n r e f u s i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s n o . 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 a n d 38. XI11 Did t h e D i s t r i c t c o u r t a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t the i n t o x i c a t i o n a p p l i e d on1.y t o t h e D U I .10 p re s u m p t i o n o f charge? The defendant argues that the instruction should have included a c a u t i o n a r y statement t h a t t h e presumption t h a t a person i s under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l i f t h e blood a l c o h o l c o n t e n t i s .10 o r g r e a t e r could n o t b e a p p l i e d t o t h e n e g l i gent homicide charge. I n s t r u c t i o n no. "blood a l c o h o l l e v e l o f 11, t h e charge The of record .lo" 19 r e f e r r e d t o the a s t h e p h r a s e i s used i n Count d r i v i n g under established the that influence the of prosecution alcohol. did not a r g u e t o t h e j u r y t h a t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n a p p l i e d i n a n y manner to the negligent observed in homicide discussing presence of t h e jury. to tie the .10 charge. the same The with District Court counsel outside so the There i s nothing i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s presumption to the charge of negligent homicide. It i s important t o note t h a t t h e evidence of defendant's i n t o x i c a t i o n went alcohol level. evidence of the f a r beyond that pertaining T h e r e was ample and defendant's to his blood significant additional intoxication, including defen- d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t h e was " p r e t t y much i n t o x i c a t e d " a t t h e b a r i n t h e evening. We jury conclude with regard that to the the court .10 adequately presumption of instructed the intoxication. XIV Did the District post-trial motions Court for a err in denying defendant's finding of not guilty or a new trial? Our discussion of previous issues clearly establishes that in light of the evidence presented, there was no basis for a finding by the judge of not guilty or for the granting of a new trial. We affirm. ~ Justic We concur: J Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting in part and concurring in part: I would hold that S 45-1-104(1.), MCA, which describes the crime of negligent homicide, is unconstitutionally vague, when considered with the definition of "negligently" set out in § 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , MCA. The statute leaves the determination of criminal conduct to a iury's perception of the standard of conduct that a "reasonable" person would have observed in the actorsr situation, and then the jury's perception of what involves a "gross deviation" from that standard. The statutory scheme is too uncertain to be upheld. We may well disapprove of the defendant's day conduct conviction for on the criminal negligent in question, homicide is but his based on formless and indistinct statutes which inadequately describe what constitutes a crime. On their face, the statutes defy containment. 7: further disagree with the holding of the majority respecting the instruction on circumstantial evidence. If we regard the statements of the defendant that he was driving as direct evidence (I do not since they are at most admissions), the corroboration for circumstantial evidence. those statements exists only in There is no other direct evidence. To be truly corroborative, the circumstantial evidence should be consistent only with the hypothesis that he was guilty of a crime, conclusion. and not consistent with any other rational The jury should have been so instructed, by the court, if the instruction offered by the defendant was not accurately stated. Th.e majority reliance on State v. Bean, supra, is faulty on two bases: such an instruction was not offered in Bean, and, if Bean is interpreted as the majority interprets it, the holding is incorrect. Whether the State undertakes to prove the guilt of the defendant by direct evidence, or indirect (circumstantial) evidence, or by a combination of direct and indirect evidence, the facts and circumstances in evidence produced by the State should be consistent with each other and with the guilt of the defendant, and. inconsistent with any reasonable theory of the defendant's innocence. That is merely another way of saying that the State must prove its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. I have other problems with the majority opinion, but these will suffice. 1 would reverse the conviction of criminal homicide against the defendant, and sustain his conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Justice

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.