MARRIAGE OF NENEMAN
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No. 84-503 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 IN RE THE MAR.RIAGE OF ADRIENNE Petitioner, Counter-Respondent and Appellant, and JOHN F. NENEJ%Ml, Respondent, Counter-Petitioner and Respondent. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable Thomas McKittrick, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Hartelius 6 Ferguson; Channing Falls, Montana ,T. Hartelius, Great For Respondent : Lawrence Anderson, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on Briefs: April 18, 1985 Decided: July 2 5 , Filed: "' " , +&I$$ Clerk 1985 Mr. J u s t i c e F r e d J . Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t . The judgment Cascade in County favor of wife appeals. District Court entered t h e husband on August 31, a default 1984. The W e reverse. The i s s u e s on a p p e a l a r e : Should t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s e n t r y o f d e f a u l t judg- 1. ment b e s e t a s i d e ? Was 2. the motion to set a s i d e t h e default judgment timely f i l e d with t h e D i s t r i c t Court? 3. Was t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t t i m e l y f i l e d ? John and Adrienne Neneman w e r e m a r r i e d in 1953. The C a s c a d e County D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d a d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e i n August 1 9 8 1 , r e s e r v i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r f u r t h e r proceedings. T r i a l on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p r o p - e r t y was s e t f o r S e p t e m b e r 11, 1984. The wife's second attorney petitioned the court to w i t h d r a w and t h e w i f e a t t e n d e d t h e h e a r i n g on t h e p e t i t i o n . The c o u r t g r a n t e d c o u n s e l p e r m i s s i o n t o w i t h d r a w on J u l y 2 3 , 1 9 8 4 , f i x e d a S e p t e m b e r 11 h e a r i n g d a t e a n d a d v i s e d t h e w i f e t o g e t a lawyer. The c o u r t s t a t e d : " [TI h a t ' s a l o n g t i m e t o h a v e t h e s e c a s e s pending. And I t h i n k what I would d o , i f I w e r e i n y o u r p o s i t i o n , I would s t a r t i m m e d i a t e l y t o knock on d o o r s and f i n d y o u r s e l f a lawyer. And you c a n t e l l t h a t l a w y e r -e- d o - a v e a S e p t e m b e r - w h 11th date and you h a v e a l a w y e r by t h e n . that dat "Okay. J u s t f o r t h e r e c o r d , --- e w e h a v e h e r e t o f o r e -e t - - - - i r m d a t e and I s - is a fe x ~ e c t - i - e a d ~ o wroceed a l l ~ a r t e s o be r - t t I on S e p t e m b e r 11." ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) - - 7 A f t e r t h e h e a r i n g b u t on t h a t same d a y , o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l hand d e l i v e r e d a n o t i c e t o t h e w i f e r e q u i r i n g h e r t o a p p o i n t another attorney. That n o t i c e s t a t e d : "TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED PETITIONER and COUNTER-RESPONDENT ADRIENNE M. NNM N EE A * "PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS of M.C.A. S37-61-405, the Respondent and Counter-Petitioner herewith gives you notice to appoint other counsel in this cause or appear in person in this cause on or before August 6, 1984. "DATED this 23 day of July, 1984." The husband filed a motion for default judgment, and on August 14, 1984, the District Court granted the motion without a hearing. The court ordered the husband's counsel to prepare a judgment to be entered. The husband's application for entry of default judgment stated in pertinent part: ... . . . was "1. The [wife's] counsel permitted to withdraw as counsel Petitioner on July 2 3 , 1984. for "2. On July 23, 1984, pursuant to the provisions of MCA S37-61-405, the Respondent and Counter-Petitioner [husband] gave the Petitioner and Counter-Respondent [wife] notice to appoint other counsel in this cause or appear in person in this cause on or before August 6, 1984. .. "3. Th.e . [wife] has failed to a w ~ o i n t counsel in this cause - and has otherwise failed to appear in person in this cause on or bFfore August 6, 1984 to advise the Court that she intended to proceed without counsel in this cause." (emphasis added) L L No copy of this application was mailed to the wife, and no response was filed on her behalf. The court entered judgment based upon the husband's application. The notice of entry of judgment was filed and mailed to the parties on August 31, 1984. Fourteen days later on September 14, the wife filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. A hearing was s ~ t for September 17 and then reset for October 11, 1984. At the request of the husband's counsel, the court ordered the hearing continued until November 26, 1984. The wife filed a notice of appeal to this Court on October 24, 1984. S h o u l d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s e n t r y o f d e f a u l t judgment b e set a s i d e ? S e c t i o n 37-61-405, MCA s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : ... "When an a t t o r n e y ceases t o a c t a s s u c h , a p a r t y t o a n a c t i o n f o r whom he was a c t i n g a s a t t o r n e y m u s t , b e f o r e any f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s a r e had a g a i n s t him, b e r e q u i r e d by t h e a d v e r s e p a r t y , b y written notice, t o appoint another a t t o r ney o r a p p e a r i n person." The purpose of this statute i s t o n o t i f y an u n r e p r e s e n t e d p a r t y t h a t he o r s h e w i l l b e e x p e c t e d t o a p p e a r a t t h e n e x t scheduled h e a r i n g , sel. e i t h e r i n p e r s o n o r r e p r e s e n t e d by coun- This Court has s t a t e d : " W e do n o t b e l i e v e a c t u a l n o t i c e must be p e r s o n a l l y s e r v e d on t h e u n r e p r e s e n t e d p a r t y opponent. But w e d o h o l d t h e r e p r e s e n t e d p a r t y must make a p o s i t i v e showing h e h a s a t t e m p t e d t o communicate adequate notice to the unrepresented I f t h e r e p r e s e n t e d p a r t y c a n show party. h e made a g o o d - f a i t h e f f o r t t o n o t i f y t h e u n r e p r e s e n t e d p a r t y and a d v i s e him h e should s u b s t i t u t e counsel o r appear i n p and t h e n o t i c e a l s o s e t s f o r t h - erson, t h e date of t h e next hearing o r action i n t h e m a t t e r pending, then t h e y e p r e s e n t a p a r t y w i l l b e deemed t o h a v e s a t i s f i e d t h e r e q u i s i t e s o f s e c t i o n 93-2104, R.C.M. 1947 [now 5 37-61-405, MCA] Audit Inc. (Mont. S e r v i c e s v. K r a u s C o n s t . , 1 9 8 0 ) , 615 P.2d 1 8 3 , 1 8 9 , 37 S t . R e p . 1225, 1232-33, quoting McPartlin v. F r a n s e n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 1 7 8 , 1 8 5 , 582 P.2d 1 2 5 5 , 1259 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ." . Although the husband's notice to t h e wife c o u n s e l r e q u i r e d h e r t o a p p e a r on A u g u s t 6 , o r action i n t h e m a t t e r was trial September on 11, scheduled 1984. to appoint 1984, no h e a r i n g t o take place u n t i l Opposing counsel's notice s h o u l d h a v e s t a t e d t h a t t h e w i f e would b e e x p e c t e d t o a p p e a r on S e p t e m b e r 11, 1984 w i t h o r w i t h o u t c o u n s e l . husband ' s petition t h a t t h e w i f e had for default judgment A though t h e 1 accurately stated f a i l e d t o appear i n person o r t o appoint counsel on or before August 6, 1984, that date had no significance. Rule 55, M.R.Civ.P. 5 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) , M.R.Civ.P. governs s e t s out default the judgments. criteria for Rule notice and o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e h e a r d and s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : ". . . I f t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom d e f a u l t judgment i s s o u g h t h a s a p p e a r e d i n t h e a c t i o n , h e ( o r , i f a p p e a r i n g by r e p r e s e n s h a l l be tative, his representative) served w i t h w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r judgment a t l e a s t 3 d a y s p r i o r t o t h e h e a r i n g on s u c h a p p l i c a t i o n . " The husband the that the wife's failure t o appear on 1984, n e g a t e d h e r r i g h t t o receive w r i t t e n n o t i c e August 6 , of asserts application consistently held for that default Rule judgment. This Court has 55 ( b ) ( 2 ) , M.R.Civ.P. requires s e r v i c e o f a w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r judgment by d e f a u l t upon t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom t h e judgment i s s o u g h t i f he h a - - -s appeared in th - -e "When t h e action. ... [party a g a i n s t whom d e f a u l t judgment i s s o u g h t ] h a s a p p e a r e d e i t h e r i n p e r s o n o r by c o u n s e l , a d d i t i o n a l d u t i e s t h e n d e v o l v e upon the party Bank o f entitled Bozeman, The w i f e t o the N.A. judgment." (Mont. Peterson 1 9 8 4 ) , 687 P.2d 673, f i r s t a p p e a r e d i n t h i s a c t i o n when t h e p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n o f m a r r i a g e i n 1980. w i f e h a s a p p e a r e d , Rule 5 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) , M.R.Civ.P. v. Montana 677, 41 she f i l e d Since t h e r e q u i r e s 3 days w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s m o t i o n f o r d e f a u l t judgment. The failure of the husband to serve the requisite notice r e n d e r s t h e o r d e r o f d e f a u l t judgment p r e m a t u r e and v o i d a b l e . See Sowerwine v . Sowerwine ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 145 Mont. R u l e 55 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P. 81, 8 5 , 399 P.2d a l l o w s t h e c o u r t f o r good c a u s e shown t o "set a s i d e an e n t r y o f d e f a u l t a n d , i f a judgment by default has been entered, ... [to] set it aside in accordance with Rule 60 ( b ) ." Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. in pertinent part states: .. . t h e c o u r t may r e l i e v e a "On m o t i o n from a f i n a l judgment, o r d e r , party o r proceeding f o r t h e following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, o r (6) any o t h e r excusable neglect; r e a s o n j u s t i f y i n g r e l i e f from t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e judgment." ... ... It is a c l o s e q u e s t i o n whether t h e f a c t s a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a f i n d i n g of mistake, inadvertence o r s u r p r i s e under R u l e 60 ( b ) (1), M.R.Civ.P. FJe t h e r e f o r e l i m i t o u r h o l d i n g t o R u l e 6 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) , M.R.Civ.P. Appellant argues t h a t t h e e n t r y of should in itself be sufficient to a voidab1.e judgment justify relief from the A l t h o u g h some c a s e s c o n c l u d e t h a t a f a i l - d e f a u l t judgment. u r e t o g i v e n o t i c e t o t h e d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y j u s t i f i e s a vacation of the default judgment, t h e p r e f e r a b l e view i s t h a t l a c k o f n o t i c e may b e t r e a t e d a s a n a d d i t i o n a l o r a l t e r n a t i v e ground for exercising discretion set to aside a default judgment. "The p r e f e r a b l e view i s t h a t t h e l a c k o f notice does not automatically e n t i t l e t h e d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y t o r e l i e f , b u t i s merely o n e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o b e weighed by t h e court i n exercising its discretion i n 10 C. d e t e r m i n i n g a R u l e 55 ( c ) m o t i o n . " W r i g h t , A . M i l l e r & M. Kane, F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e 5 2695, a t 509 (2d ed. 1 9 8 3 ) . We entitle hold a that. party to lack of notice relief, does is but a not automatically consideration weighed by t h e c o u r t i n e x e r c i s i n g i t s d i s c r e t i o n . is consistent with our holdings i n Sikorski Sikorski v. ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. S u p e r i o r Homes, Inc. 442, 512 P.2d ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. & to be T h i s view Sons, Inc. v. 1 1 4 7 , and W i l l i a m s 38, 417 P.2d 92. The f a c t s h e r e show a r e q u e s t t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment w i t h i n setting of a 1 4 days of entry. firm t r i a l date of I n a d d i t i o n , w e have t h e S e p t e m b e r 11 w i t h a d i r e c t a d m o n i t i o n by t h e j u d g e t o t h e p a r t y h e r s e l f t h a t s h e s h o u l d have a l a w y e r by t h a t d a t e . we consideration, case justify conclude Taking a l l o f that the the facts into circumstances s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment of this under Rule 60 ( b ) ( 6 ) , M.R.Civ.P. I1 Was t h e m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment t i m e l y f i l e d with t h e District Court? Under Rule 60 ( b ) ( 6 ) , M.R.Civ.P., the wife's motion to s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment m u s t b e made w i t h i n a r e a s o n able t i m e . N o t i c e o f e n t r y o f d e f a u l t judgment was m a i l e d on August 3 1 , 1984. On S e p t e m b e r 1 4 , motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t within reasonable t i m e a 1984, t h e w i f e f i l e d h e r Clearly t h i s is judgment. a s contemplated in the rule. conclude t h a t t h e motion t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t FJe judgment was t i m e l y f i l e d . 111 Was the Under notice Rule 5, of appeal to this M.R.App.Civ.P., a Court timely p a r t y has filed? 30 d a y s to f i l e a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l a f t e r a motion t o set a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment i s d e n i e d o r a f t e r d e n i a l by o p e r a t i o n o f law. As noted above, the motion to set aside the default judgment was f i l e d o n S e p t e m b e r 1 4 , 1 9 8 4 , u n d e r R u l e s 5 5 ( c ) & 60 ( b ) , motions M.R.Civ.P. filed 60 (c), M.R.Civ.P. Rule pursuant to Rule 60 ( b ) provides "shall d e t e r m i n e d w i t h i n t h e t i m e s p r o v i d e d by R u l e 59 Rule 59 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P. requires be that heard and . . ." t h a t a h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n s h a l l b e had w i t h i n 10 d a y s a f t e r it h a s been s e r v e d . H e r e t h e w i f e f i l e d t h e m o t i o n on S e p t e m b e r 1 4 and t h e h e a r - i n g was limit. the scheduled f o r September 1 7 , w e l l w i t h i n t h e 10-day R u l e 5 9 ( d ) a l s o g i v e s t h e c o u r t t h e power to c o n t i n u e hearing for not to exceed 30 days. Here the court i n i t i a l l y c o n t i n u e d t h e h e a r i n g from S e p t e m b e r 1 7 t o O c t o b e r 1 1 w h i c h was w i t h i n the limit. 30-day However, t h e n c o n t i n u e d t h e h e a r i n g beyond t h e 30-day b e r 26. Wallinder was 17. S t - R e p . 2063. 1984, deemed denied Lagerquist on (Mont. October 1982), 17, 653 1984. P.2d 840, See 39 The w i f e f i l e d h e r n o t i c e o f a p p e a l o n O c t o b e r well M.R.App.Civ.P. Rule l i m i t t o Novem- A s a r e s u l t , t h e w i f e ' s motion t o v a c a t e t h e d e f a u l t judgment 24, the court within We the 30-day period under Rule 5, i n v i t e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c h a n g e s made i n 59 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., which became effective October 9, 1984. W e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was t i m e l y f i l e d . We set a s i d e t h e o r d e r o f default judgment a n d remand cause t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r proceedings. W e concur: / the
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