OLDENBURG v COUNTY OF FLATHEAD
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No. 83-389 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1984 HENRY OLDENBURG, Plaintiff and Appellant, COUNTY OF FLATHEAD, by and through its Board of County Commissioners, Defendant and Respondent, and CROP HAIL MANAGEMENT, INC., Intervenor and Defendant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead, The Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Sherwood & Englund, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Ted 0 Lympus, County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana . ihsh, Jellison, OIBrien and Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on Briefs: November 10, 1983 Decided: February 2, 1984 - Clerk Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Appellant appeals from the ruling of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, dismissing his action and quashing a writ of certiorari challenging the Flathead County Commissioners' authority to make an extension of approval of a preliminary plat sixty days after the original approval period expired. He claims this violated subdivision law as provided in Section 76-3-610, MCA. We affirm the District Court. On October 27, 1981, the Board of County Commissioners of Flathead County gave a preliminary one year plat approval to the Eagle Bend Subdivision. Oldenburg cast the opposing vote on the three member commission. On December 27, 1982, the developer of Eagle Bend, Crop Hail Management, requested an extension to the preliminary approval as provided in Section 76-3-610, MCA. On January 14, 1983, the Commissioners granted the extension of preliminary approval until October 27, 1983. On January 24, 1983, Oldenburg filed a complaint and an application for a writ of certiorari, alleging the Commission lacked the authority to grant the extension. On April 6, 1983, the court dismissed the action and quashed the writ of certiorari. It found Section 76-3-610, MCA ambiguous and reasoned Oldenburg's statute would lead to interpretation of the inequitable, unjust and unlawful results. Appellant raises two issues on appeal. (1) Did the court err in applying a statutory construction which emphasizes the standard of impact of a regulatory statute upon the regulated entity? (2) Does Section 76-3-610, MCA preclude the County Commissioners from granting an extension to the preliminary plat approval after the time period has run for the original preliminary plat approval? We will address these issues in reverse order. Appellant argues that this statute should be interpreted to mean that if the preliminary approval period expires, then the governing extend that approval. body loses jurisdiction to He contends the language "shall be in full force for one year ,I limits the commissionls authority ' to grant an extension to only that period. The language, "at the end of" means by or before the period in question and not after that time. We disagree. The general rule for statutory interpretation is that "The the legislative intent controls, Section 1-2-102, MCA. intention of the legislature, must first be determined from the plain meaning of the words used, and if interpretation of the statute can be so determined, the courts, may not go further and apply any other means of interpretation." v. Hubbard (Mont. 1982), 649 P.2d State 1331, 1333, 39 St.Rep. 1608, 1611; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co. (1968), 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660. We find Section 76-3-610, MCA, clear and unambiguous. "Where, as here the language of unambiguous, direct and certain, the the statute statute is plain, speaks for itself and there is nothing left for the court to construe." State v. Hubbard, supra, State v. Roberts (Mont. 1980), 633 P.2d 1214, 38 St.Rep. (1981), reads as follows: 1551. Section 76-3-610(1), MCA "Upon approving or conditionally approving a preliminary plat, the shall^ provide the governing body subdivider with a dated and signed statement of approval. This approval shall be in force for not more than 1 calendar year. At the end of this period the governing body may, at the request of the subdivider, extend its approval for no more than 1 calendar year, (Emphasis added) . . ." The ambiguity. phrase in question "at the end of" lacks "At," being the key word, is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed. (1979), as follows: ". . . as used to fix a time, it does not necessarily mean eo instante or the identical time named, or even a fixed definite moment. Often expresses simply nearness and proximity, and consequently may denote a reasonable time." (Emphasis added) We hold that the statute permits county commissioners to grant an extension to the preliminary approval within a reasonable time of the expiration of that period. Appellant offers some cases to support his conclusion that the extension expiration date. can be made only on or before the These cases however, all involved contract disputes and not statutory interpretations. We decline to discuss the other second issue is dispositive. of the District Court. We concur: s,4g,&!, Chief Justice Jy issue because the We therefore affirm the ruling
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