MATTER OF M C v DEPARTMENT OF INS
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No. 83-459 IN THE SUPREPlE COURT OF THE STATE OF I"I0NTANA 1984 IN THE biATTER OF THE PETITION OF M.C., Petitioner and Respondent, DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS, et a1 . , Respondents and Appellants. APPEAL FROf4: District Court of the Third Judicial District, In and for the County of Deer Lodge, The Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Nick A. Rotering, Dept. of Institutions, Helena, Montana (argued) For Respondent: James Dorr Johnson, Warm Springs, Montana (argued) Submitted: Decided: Clerk zaarcl~15, 19 84 June 2 8 , 1984 Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Court. This case comes on appeal from an order of the District Court, Third Judicial District, Deer Lodge County, holding that Section 53-21-130, MCA is unconstitutional. We reverse that part of the order declaring Section 53-21-130, MCA, unconstitutional. However, we also hold the State did not adhere to the procedural safeguards set forth in Section 53-21-130, MCA, and affirm the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus by the District Court. M.C. is a sixteen-year-old juvenile who was committed to the custody of the Department of Institutions under the M.C. Youth Court Act on December 16, 1982. placed at the Pine Hills School for boys. was initially On February 17, 1983, he was transferred from Pine Hills School to Warm Springs State Hospital pursuant to his signing a voluntary admission to that facility. In early March of 1983, M.C. gave notice to the Warm Springs staff that he wanted to be released from his voluntary admission. At that time, the Department petition of Institutions filed a for involuntary commitment under the Mental Health Act. the matter came on for hearing on March an When 25, 1983, the Department of Institutions failed to file a professional status report. As a result, the District Court dismissed the petition and ordered M.C. returned to Pine Hills School. On May 24, 1983, the Superintendent of Pine Hills School asked the Department of Institutions to return M.C. to Warm Springs State Hospital under the provisions Section 53-21-130, MCA, (ten-day transfer statute). of It was not until mid-June, 1983, that M.C. was actually transferred to Warm Springs. On June 29, 1983, M.C. filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that his transfer from Pine Hills School to Warm Springs under the ten-day transfer statute was an unconstitutional violation of his right to due process. After a hearing on the matter, the court concluded that the habeas corpus remedy was proper and the parties stipulated to application of the Montana Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The District Court held the ten-day transfer statute was unconstitutional because the statute allowed M.C. to be transferred for ten days to Warm Springs without a prior due process proceeding illness. finding serious mental The District Court also held that the full due process protections of Title 53, Chapter 21 applied to M.C. From the order of the District Court the Department of Institutions appeals arguing the ten-day transfer statute is not violative of either the federal or state constitutional right to due process. The statute at issue in this case is 53-21-130, MCA, which provides: "Transfer or commitment to mental health facility from other institutions. No person who is in the custody of the department for any purpose other than treatment of severe mental illness may be transferred or committed to a mental health facility for more than 10 days unless the transfer or commitment is effected according to the procedures set out in this part. However, proceedings for involuntary commitment may be commenced in the county of the mental health facility where the person is, in the county of the institution from which the person was transferred to the mental health facility, or in the county of the person's residence. Notice of a transfer shall be given immediately to any assigned counsel at the mental health facility and to the parents of minors, Section or g u a r d i a n s , f r i e n d s of respondent, c o n s e r v a t o r s , a s t h e c a s e may b e . " The S u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f transfer indicates the s i t u a t i o n or does to M.C. not Warm transfer for show Springs. was was M.C. this Nothing made any c o m p e l l i n g that utilized Pine H i l l s because statute in of the an reason. any record emergency Also, afforded to the record due process p r o t e c t i o n s upon e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e t e n d a y p e r i o d . The extent of the procedural safeguards due an i n d i v i d u a l d e p e n d s upon t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h h e w i l l s u f f e r a grievous McGrath loss. Joint Anti-Fascist ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 3 4 1 U.S. Refugee 123, 7 1 S.Ct. Committee 624, 9 5 L.Ed. v. 817. T h u s , t h e c o u r t d e c i d e s w h a t p r o c e s s i s d u e by b a l a n c i n g t h e individual's state's interest G o l d b e r g v. L.Ed.2d i n t e r e s t i n avoiding t h e detriment against t h e i n summary i n f l i c t i o n Kelly ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 U.S. 254, of that 90 S . C t . 1 2 5 4 , 63 L.Ed.2d the District J o n e s ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 445 U . S . C o u r t r e l i e d upon V i t e k v . of 1 0 1 1 , 25 287. I n holding the s t a t u t e unconstitutional, S.Ct. detriment. 552. 480, 100 The d e c i s i o n i n V i t e k a r o s e o u t l i t i g a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e 1974 c o n v i c t i o n o f L a r r y J o n e s on a c h a r g e o f robbery. J o n e s was s e n t e n c e d t o a t e r m o f t h r e e t o n i n e y e a r s a t t h e N e b r a s k a P e n a l and C o r r e c t i o n a l Complex i n L i n c o l n . E i g h t months l a t e r , while i n s o l i t a r y c o n f i n e m e n t , J o n e s s e t h i s m a t t r e s s on f i r e s e v e r e l y b u r n i n g h i s hands. pursuant mental A s a r e s u l t of t o a p r o v i s i o n of hospital. transferred The provided t h e i n c i d e n t , h e was t r a n s f e r r e d t h e N e b r a s k a Code t o t h e s t a t e provision that if under which a designated Jones physician was found t h a t a p r i s o n e r s u f f e r e d from a " m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t " that could not be given proper treatment in prison the Director of Correctional prisoner to a mental Services transfer the Jones challenged hospital. could the constitutionality of the transfer statute and States Supreme Court held that the due the United process clause guarantees a state prisoner certain procedural safeguards, including timely notice and an adversary hearing, before a state may subject him to the "grevious loss" resulting from civil commitment. Vitek, supra, 445 U.S. at 494. The Court, however, did not recognize as a matter of due process the right to appointed counsel at every commitment hearing. Vitek, supra, 445 U.S. at 497. the Court balancing in Vitek employed In making its determination, the traditional due process test, weighing the interests of the individual a.gainst those of the state. The test requires consideration of three factors: (1) the individual's interest affected by the state action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest; maintaining its and ( 3 ) the fiscal and government's in administrative objectives. Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. L.Ed.2d interest 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 18. Applying the traditional due process balancing test to the facts of this case indicates Section 53-21-130, MCA, is not unconstituional under either state or federal constitutional provisions. (1 action. The individual's interest affected by the state Under the provisions of the ten-day transfer statute a transfer to a mental institution cannot exceed ten days. At that time one of three things has to occur; first, the individual is returned to the original institution, or, second, the individual voluntarily admits himself to the mental institution, or third, the Department of Institutions may request a ninety-day involuntary commitment proceeding. In contrast, the Court in Vitek was faced with a situation in which a prisoner could possibly remain at a mental institution for the duration of his prison sentence without any procedural safeguards. Thus, Montana's ten-day transfer statute does not present contemplated by the type of "grevious loss" the Court in Vitek because procedural safeguards must be implemented after ten days. However, as previously stated, nothing in the record indicates M.C. was afforded any due process procedural safeguards upon the expiration of the ten-day period. (2) The risk of erroneous deprivation of the individual ' s interest. Under the provisions of the ten-day transfer statute there is a risk that an individual will be erroneously institution. transferred for ten to a mental However, that fact must be weighed against the State's interest in maintaining transfer days individuals in the capability to emergency situations. Significantly, at the end of ten days the individual is afforded procedural safeguards set forth in Title 53. (3) The state's interest in maintaining its fiscal and administrative objectives. Clearly, one of the purposes of the ten-day transfer statute is to segregate individuals who present an immediate danger to themselves or others. As such, the State's interest in transferring inmates for ten days is compelling. Under the statute at issue in Vitek, the State's foremost concern was the speed with which it could transfer mentally disturbed inmates to a mental institution. The N e b r a s k a D i s t r i c t C o u r t had c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h i s i n t e r e s t a s one d e s e r v i n g "primacy." Miller v. Vitek Neb. (D. 1977), 437 F.Supp 567. Similarly, transfers of Montana Moreover, d a y s may be hospital necessary for dangerous, may generally prevent Fox strong another mentally a lawsuit v. of in speedy cause an inmate f o r reason: ill to a prison a mental officials i n j u r e another (5th Cir. ten transferring inmate against inmate Sullivan interest i n d i v i d u a l s who may a speedy t r a n s f e r should a mentally disturbed See a mentally disturbed injury. potentially has 1976), inmate. 539 F.2d 1065. A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e t h r e e f a c t o r s d i s c u s s e d above i n d i c a t e s t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e S t a t e outweigh t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t r a n s f e r r e d p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 53-21-130, MCA, a s long a s t h e procedural s a f e g u a r d s m a n d a t e d by t h e s t a t u t e a r e followed. We Section reverse 53-21-130, the District MCA, Court's unconstitutional, order and declaring affirm D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s i s s u a n c e of t h e w r i t of habeas c o r p u s . W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e the ,** justices 6 -a/
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