VERSLAND v CARON TRANSPORT
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA SHARON R . VERSLAND, Individually, as Personal Representative of the Estate of BERT MARTIN VERSLAND, Deceased, et al., Plaintiff, -vsCAROTd TRANSPORT, Defendant. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: FOR COUNSEL: For Plaintiff: Richard W. Anderson argued; Anderson, Edwards & Plolloy, ~illings,Montana: Donald Molloy argued, Billings, For Defendant: Herbert I. Pierce, 111, argued, Crowley Law Firm, Billings, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed: 01:i L I 1 ~ 8 3 Clerk May 31, 1983 Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. The United States District Court for the District of Montana has certified this action to this Court for a determination of three issues. The following facts were stipulated for certification. On October 7, 1980, Bert Ma.rtin Versland was driving a New Holla.nd bale wagon Highway 191. in a northerly direction on Montana Near his home, approximatley eighteen miles north of Big Timber, a collision occurred between the bale wagon and Martineau. the defendant's semi-truck driven by Richard Bert Versland was killed in the collision. Sharon Versland, the plaintiff, witnessed part of the collision and then saw her husband's body at the scene. At the time of his death, Bert Versland was married to Sharon Versland. He was the stepfather of Michelle Louise Jones Marie and Laura Korpela, children by prior marriages. Sharon Versland's minor The children were not adopted by the decedent but lived with him and were dependent upon him for support. On November 25, 1980, Sharon Versland filed a complaint against defendant in United States District Court for the District of Montana. In the complaint and her more definite statement, she seeks relief in her own behalf, as personal representative of her husband's estate, and as custodian and next friend of the two minor children. In addition to a claim for her husband's wrongful death, Versland seeks to recover for the shock, fright, mental pain and suffering which she claims were caused by seeing pa.rt of the collision and then accident. seeing her husband-'s body at the scene of the The defendant, Caron Transport, filed a motion seeking to dismiss Sharon Versland's claim for emotional shock and mental anguish on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendant al-so challenges the right of the nonadopted minor stepchildren of Bert Versland to state a claim for the loss of consortium and support of Bert Versland. The parties agree three issues materially affect the case and therefore the United States District Court for the District of Montana has requested this Court to accept jurisdiction and decide these issues of state law: 1. Whether under Montana law a spouse may recover for the emotional trauma caused by witnessing a collision which causes the infliction of death or injury of the other spouse; 2. the Whether under Montana law a spouse ma.y recover for negligent infliction of emotional trauma caused by witnesssing a collision which causes the infliction of death or injury to the other spouse; and 3. Whether under Montana law the nonadopted minor stepchildren of a decedent may state a claim for the deprivation of the decedent's consortium and support when they had been supported by received into decedent's family and were the decedent as if he were the natural or adoptive father. Counsel for the plaintiff does not address issue number one in either the brief or in oral argument. Counsel for defendant defines the first issue to mean that plaintiff is asking this Court to hold that there is strict liability in infliction of emotional distress cases. We are somewhat at a loss as to the precise meaning of the first issue; however, assuming defendant's interpretation is correct, this Court can find no rational basis, no overriding interest and no existing authority liability for the for extending a blanket of strict infliction of such emotional distress. Issue No. 2 asks whether a spouse may recover for the negligent infliction of emotional trauma caused by witnessing a collision which causes the infliction of death or injury to the other spouse. This issue has been addressed by many courts in many jurisdictions. Early courts denied recovery of damages for emotional trauma if there was no physical impact with the plaintiff. Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co. (1896), 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354. Later the impact rule was replaced with the "zone of danger" rule. Under this rule, a plaintiff could recover if he were located within the zone of defendant's negligent conduct and feared for his own safety. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. (1963), 59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513. In Dillon v. Legg (1968), 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, the California Supreme Court abandoned the zone of danger rule and allowed recovery for emotional trauma suffered by a mother who witnessed her daughter killed by a motorist as she crossed a street. danger, the court Although the mother was not in physical held it reasonably foreseeable that negligent operation of a motor vehicle that causes injury to a child will cause mental distress to a parent who witnesses the accident. The Dillon court stated: "Since the chief element in determining whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case. Because it is inherently intertwined with foreseeability such duty or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a case-by-case basis. We cannot now predetermine defendant's obligation in every situation by a fixed category; no immutable rule can esta.blish the extent of that obligation for every circumstance of the future. We cam, however, define guidelines which will aid in the resolution of such an issue. Dillon, 441 P.2d 912, 920. . ." In establishing guidelines, the California Supreme Court stated: ... .. [in] determining . whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will take into account such factors as the following: I1 "(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only Dillon, 441 a distant relationship." P.2d 912, 920. Since Dillon, many limitation created a of courts have zone-of-physical-danger zone-of-psychic-danger rejected and the prior instead limitation have which is reflected in the first two elements of the Dillon test. The New York Court of Appeals recognized in 1961 that using the impact rule to bar a.11 claims of psychic trauma absent actual physical impact was arbitrary. N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729. Battalla v. State (19611, 10 The court chose instead to rely upon competent medical proof and the jury's historic ability to weed out fraudulent claims. 176 N.E.2d at 731-732. Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 242, In another New York case, bafferty v. Manhasset Medical Center Hospital (1980), 103 ~isc.2d 98, 425 N.Y.S.2d 244, a woman was allowed recovery for emotional distress caused by witnessing the death of her mother-in-law resulting from the transfusion of mismatched blood. The court held that since the plaintiff's presence was actually known to the hospital, the only reasonable circumscription of the extent of the duty owed to her wa-s that of a reasonable zone of danger inflicted. As within a which result of psychic trauma could be this reasonably foreseeable danger, a duty arose on the part of the hospital owing directly to the daughter-in-law. In 1979, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held. that where a mother witnessed a negligently driven automobile strike and kill her minor daughter, while not being in any physical danger herself, the mother could recover for her psychic injuries under reasons-bly the theory that such injuries would foreseeable to any tortfeasor. Sinn v. be Burd (1979), 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672. In Barnhill v. Davis (Iowa. 1981), 300 N.W.2d 104, the Iowa Supreme Court considered the traditional view, which conditioned recovery on the bystander's presence in the zone of danger but decided that the better view permitted recovery regardless of whether physical danger. the plaintiff was in the zone of Barnhill, 300 N.W.2d at 107. The Dillon requirement of presence at the scene has been expanded in some jurisdictions, including California where a mother was a.llowed to recover when she witnessed her young son being pulled from defendant's pool and participated in the attempt to revive him. later. The child died three days The court concluded that, as a matter of law, it could not say that the injuries resulting from the pool owners' negligence were not still being experienced at the time the mother arrived on the scene. Nazaroff v. Superior Court in and for Cty. of Santa Cruz (1978), 80 Cal.App.3d 553, 145 Cal.Rptr. (Tex.Civ.App. 1978), 657. See 570 S.W.2d also, 486; Landreth Grimsby v. v. Reed Samson (1975), 85 Wash.2d 52, 530 P.2d 291; Archibald. v. Braverman (1969), 275 Cal.App.2d The 253, 79 Cal.Rptr. 723. second Dillon guideline is "whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence." Dillon, 441 P.2d 912, 920. This requirement of actual observance of the event has been expanded since Dillon to include sensory perception of the accident and not just strict observance of the event. Bliss v. Allentown Public Library (E.D. Pa. 19801, 497 F.Supp. 487; Corso v. Merrill (1979), 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300; a.nd Krouse v. Graham (1977), 19 Cal.3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022. It is clear that over the years since Dillon was handed down, the requirements of presence and observation h.a.vebeen expanded and the distinctions between the two elements have blurred. We find that if a plaintiff is required to experience actual sensory perception of the accident, the requirement of proximity is necessarily satisfied. Consequently, we hold that to recover in Montana for the negligent infliction of emotional distress the first element to be considered shall be as foll-ows: Whether the shock resulted. from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous preception of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. The next element pertains to the degree of relationship between the plaintiff and the victim. Dillon requires that the plaintiff and victim be "closely related," as contrasted with the absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. This requirement has also been expanded by various jurisdictions in the years since For example, Arizona, in Keck v. ill on. Jackson (1979), 122 ~ r i z . 114, 593 P.2d 668, interpreted this requirement as including "a person with whom the plaintiff has a close personal relationship, either by consanguinity or otherwise." 593 P.2d 668, 670. Keck, The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the absence of a blood relationship between the victim and the plaintiff bystander would not foreclose recovery of damages for psychic injury, and the New York lower appellate court in Lafferty, supra, permitted a daughter-in-law to recover. hold, however, that the guideline for the We necessary relationship shall be the same as that of Dillon: Whether closely absence presence plaintiff and the victim were related, as contrasted with an of any rela.tionship or the of only a distant relationship. The third element which we hold must be considered in an action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress is: Either death or serious physical injury to the victim must have occurred as a result of defendant's negligence. Under the foreseeability test, supra, we find that it is reasonably foreseeable to a defendant that serious emotional distress to one party may arise from defendant's negligent acts inflicting serious bodily injury or death to a second party. We do not choose to limit recovery strictly to accidents wherein the victim dies. However, we do not intend that bystanders be allowed to recover even where there is severe emotional distress when the victim is not seriously injured . Whether the injury is sufficiently severe to support a claim for recovery will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis in the trial court. We note that a number of jurisdictions still require tha.t plaintiff bystander prove physical manifestations of the underlying emotional trauma. While required under Dillon, California abandoned this requirement in Molien v. Kaiser 813. Foundation Hospitals (1980), 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 ~ . 2 d In Molien the court stated: "It supposedly serves to satisfy the cynic that the claim of emotional distress is genuine. Yet we perceive two significant difficulties with the scheme. First, the classification is both overinclusive and underinclusive when viewed in the light of its purported purpose of screening false claims. It is overinclusive in permitting recovery for emotional distress when the suffering accompa.nies or results in any physical injury whatever, no matter how trivial. More significantly, the classification is underinclusive because it mechanica.11~ denies court access to claims that may well be valid and could be proved if the plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial. .. "The second defect in the requirement of physical injury is that it encoura.ges extravagant pleading and distorted testimony. Thus it has been urged that the law should provide a remedy for serious invasions of emotional tranquility, 'otherwise the tendency would be for the victim to exaggerate symptoms of sick headaches, nausea, insomnia, etc. , to make out a technical basis of bodily injury, upon which to predicate a para.sitic recovery for the more grievous disturbance, the mental and emotional distress she endured. ' (Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts (1936), 49 Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1059; see also Anno. (1959) 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 117, fn. 18, 128 & f. 8 [suggesting that 'in most instances of severe mental disturbance some deleterious physical consequence can, with a little ingenuity, be found . . , I and that characterization of an injury as physical or mental may depend on the ingenuity of counsel in framing the pleadings] . ) " Molien, 616 P.2d at 820. . The Court reasoned that the attempted distinction between physical and psychological injury merely clouds the essential issue of proof: whether pla.intiff suffered a serious and compensable injury. In addition, we find that in light of today's more advanced state of medical science, technology and testing techniques, the traditional limitation of requiring the existence of physical injury as a condition precedent to necessary. recovery for psychic injury is no longer While physical manifestation of emotional trauma may be considered by the trier of fact along with other evidence, physical manifestations will not be required to support a prima facie case for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant argues that acceptance of bystander recovery will not further justice and that arbitary rules will not shield the defendant from unlimited defendant's arguments unconvicing. liability. We find Defendant's a-rgumentsare essentially the same as those raised by the defendan.t in Dillon, and history has shown that Dillon did not provide a basis for unlimited liability, even in those jurisdictions which have relaxed Dillon's basic requirements. state that defendant has unlimited We do not liability circumstance such as the facts of this case. in a Indeed, we specifically hold that defendant has potential liability only for injuries to others which to defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable. In summary, we hold the following to be proper elements for the courts to apply when determining a claim for dama.ges for the negligent infliction of emotional distress: The shock must result from a direct emotional 1. impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous perception of the accident, as contrasted with learning occurrence. of the accident from others after its 2. The plaintiff and victim must be closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. 3. Either death or serious physical injury of the victim must have occurred as a result of the defendant's negligence. Issue No. stepchildren of 3 asks whether decedent may the state nonadopted a claim deprivation of decedent's consortium and support. minor for the Plaintiff argues the basis for these damages is section 27-1-323, MCA: "[iln every action under 27-1-512 and 27-1-513 such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just,'' and section 27-1-513, MCA: " [wlhen the death of one person, not being a minor, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death or, if such person be employed by another person who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such other person." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff contends decedent's nonadopted stepchildren are "heirs" within the meaning of section 27-1-513, MCA, and to exclude their claim would be contrary to public policy. Heirs are those persons who are entitled to the property of a decedent under the statutes of intestate succession. 72-1-103 (18), MCA. Section A child may take from a decedent through intestate succession if the child is issue of the decedent. Section 72-2-203, MCA. lineal descendants. nonadopted Issue of a person means all his Section stepchildren of a 72-1-103 (22), MCA. Thus, decedent are not heirs defined by the intestacy statutes. as As this Court stated in Swanson v. Champion International Corp. P.2d 1166, 1170, 39 St.Rep. 639, 643, (Mont. 1982) , 646 ". . . the source of the damages recoverable in a wrongful personal to the survivors of the decedent. death action is The damages are not those of the decedent, but of the heirs by reason of his death." As the stepchildren are not heirs, they are not entitled to bring a claim for the deprivation of decedent's consortium and support. Plaintiff argues the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized stepchildren's claim for loss of consortium and support in Moon Distributors, Inc., v. White (1968), 245 Ark. 627, 434 S.W.2d 56. However, under Arkansas's wrongful death statute, beneficiaries of a wrongful death claim "are the surviving spouse of the deceased person, children, father and mother, brothers and sisters, persons standing in loco parentis to the deceased person, and persons - - -the deceased stood to whom in loco - - parentis." Ark.Stat.Ann. Section 27-908. (Emphasis a.dded.) Thus, the Arkansas wrongful death statute is drafted specifically to include stepchildren whereas the Montana wrongful death statute is not. Pla.intiff claims a stepparent who provides support to a stepchild becomes a "presumptive parent." MCA. Section 40-6-217, However, this section is not related to the wrongful death statute and only provides that "if he receives them into his family and supports them, it is presumed that he does so as a parent and, where such is the case, they are not liable to him for their support nor he to them for their services." Lastly, plaintiff argues even if the stepchildren cannot recover under the wrongful death statute, they are entitled to bring a separate action for loss of consortium. In some jurisdictions a natural child may bring a cause of action for loss of consortium. OIConnell's Sons, Inc. (Mass. See, Ferriter v. 1980), 413 Daniel ~.~.2d 690. However, these cases deal only with natural children whereas the issue certified by the Federal District Court deals only with nonadopted stepchildren. Thus, these cases are not controlling. We therefore hold that nonadopted minor stepchildren of a decedent cannot state a claim for the deprivation of decedent's consortium and support. A copy of this opinion shall be mailed to the Clerk of the United States District Court for Montana, Billings Division. % d A g * ? Chief Justice We concur: District Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison ~
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