PONDEROSA v MCBRIDE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 81-297 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F 1981 PONDEROSA PINES RANCH, a Mont. c o r p . , INC., P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , STANLEY W. McBRIDE, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e E i g h t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f G a l l a t i n , The Honorable W. W. L e s s l e y , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : Landoe, Brown, P l a n a l p , Kommers & L i n e b e r g e r , Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: B e n n e t t & B e n n e t t , Bozeman, Montana S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : Decided: Filed: MAR 2 5 1982 December 3, 1 9 8 1 March 25, 1982 Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court. Ponderosa Pines Ranch, Inc. appeals from a judgment in the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, dismissing its complaint seeking cancellation of a land sale contract with Stanley ~cBride. On July 24, 1978, the parties entered into a sales contract under which McBri.de was to purchase a tract of land from Ponderosa. The contract provided: "Time is of the essence of this contract. In the event the buyer shall fail to pay any installment as and when due, the Seller shall, 45 days or more thereafter, have the right to cancel this contract by notice thereof mailed by registered or certified mail to the Buyer . ." . On February 6, 1981, Ponderosa filed its complaint alleging that McBride was a year behind in his monthly payments and that he had been sent notice of the default. Ponderosa demanded that the District Court order the cancellation of the contract, remove the contract as a cloud on Ponderosa's title, require McBride to vacate the premises, and decree that Ponderosa had title to the property. On February 24, 1981, McBride filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that. the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The motion was not accompanied by a brief and was not ruled on by the District Court. On March 4, 1981, McBride filed a notice of tender with the District Court, accompanied by a certified check for $5,308.48, representing the full sum due and owing plus interest. That same day McBride filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that all sums due and owing Ponderosa had been tendered by deposit with the Clerk of the District Court. The motion to dismiss included notice to Ponderosa that McBride would present the motion to the District Court on March 16, 1981, at 10:OO a.m. No brief was filed by McBride in support of this motion to dismiss. The hearing was held as scheduled on March 16, 1981. McBride's counsel was present, but neither Ponderosa nor its The District Court granted McBride's counsel attended. motion to dismiss on March 18, 1981, and ordered: (1) that Ponderosa's action be dismissed with prejudice; (2) that the amount tendered by McBride be delivered to Ponderosa in satisfaction of all amounts due and owing Ponderosa in the transaction; and, (3) that Ponderosa deliver to McBride a warranty deed to the property. Ponderosa moved to amend its complaint on April 2, 1981, and a hearing on the motion was held on April 13, 1981. The District Court did not specifically rule on this motion, but the amended complaint was never filed. At the hearing, Ponderosa indicated that it had not been served with a copy of the District Court's order of March 18, 1981. Ponderosa subsequently submitted an affidavit to that effect, and on April 16, 1981, filed a motion to set aside the order of the court and allow plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The motion was argued on May 11, 1981. In an order filed May 12, 1981, the District Court denied Ponderosa's motion. The order contains the following statement: "The Court does not file a Memorandum here. The Defendant's brief in opposition sets out in chronological order the events concerning the matter before the court. It also cites the law, and I think properly the conclusion, therefore, I do not file my own Memorandum in this instance." Ponderosa appeals from the dismissal order of March 18, and from that portion of the May 12 order refusing to set aside the dismissal. The i s s u e on a p p e a l i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n dismissing Ponderosa's complaint o r i n subsequently r e f u s i n g t o s e t a s i d e i t s judgment o f d i s m i s s a l . W find e t h e r e a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s i n t h e record t o determine whether o r n o t McBride i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f from f o r f e i t u r e under s e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA. W e t h e r e f o r e remand t h e c a s e f o r a h e a r i n g on t h e q u e s t i o n of whether McBride's a c t i o n s constituted a "grossly negligent, willful, o r fraudulent breach of duty. " S e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA, d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s appeal. c i t e d by b o t h p a r t i e s , i s The s t a t u t e states: - " R e l i e f from f o r f e i t u r e . Whenever by t h e t e r m s of an o b l i g a t i o n a p a r t y t h e r e t o i n c u r s a f o r f e i t u r e o r a l o s s i n t h e n a t u r e of a f o r f e i t u r e by r e a s o n o f h i s f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h i t s p r o v i s i o n s , h e may b e r e l i e v e d t h e r e f r o m upon making f u l l compensation t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y , e x c e p t i n c a s e of a g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t , w i l l f u l , o r fraudulent breach of duty." T h i s s t a t u t e h a s proved a p o p u l a r s o u r c e of l i t i g a t i o n i n Montana. F r a s e r v . Edmisten ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. - 616 , P.2d 360, 37 S t - R e p . 1607, s t a t e s : " [ w l e have c o n s t r u e d t h i s s t a t u t e t o mean ' t h a t a p e r s o n may o b t a i n r e l i e f under i t i n any c a s e where h e sets f o r t h f a c t s which a p p e a l t o t h e conscience of a c o u r t of e q u i t y ' P.2d a t 362, 37 St.Rep. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. [ c i t a t i o n omitted]." a t 1608. See a l s o P a r r o t v. Heller 212, 214, 557 P.2d 819, 820. states t h a t s e c t i o n 28-1-104 616 Fraser also " g r a n t s r e l i e f from f o r f e i t u r e s i n most i n s t a n c e s , b u t upholds f o r f e i t u r e i n t h e c a s e of a ' g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t , w i l l f u l , o r f r a u d u l e n t b r e a c h of d u t y [by t h e p e r s o n s e e k i n g r e l i e f from f o r f e i t u r e l . ' " a t 362, 37 S t - R e p . a t 1608. 616 P.2d I t i s t h e duty of t h e d e f a u l t i n g p u r c h a s e r t o show t h a t h e i s e q u i t a b l y e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f from f o r f e i t u r e and t h a t h i s b r e a c h of d u t y was n o t g r o s s l y negligent, w i l l f u l , o r fraudulent. S t a t e e x r e l . Howeth v. D. Davidson A. & Co. ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. 355, 369, 517 P.2d 722, 730; E l l i n g h o u s e v. Hansen Packing Co. Mont. 4 4 4 , 449, 213 P . ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66 1087, 1089; 19 Mont. L. Rev. 50 (1957). The r e c o r d i s d e v o i d of any p l e a d i n g o r e v i d e n c e t h a t would e n t i t l e McBride t o r e l i e f from f o r f e i t u r e under t h e statute. H e p r e v a i l e d below on t h e b a s i s o f an u n c o n t e s t e d I t i s when t h e d e f a u l t i n g p u r c h a s e r c a n motion t o d i s m i s s . make a showing t h a t he i s e q u i t a b l y e n t i t l e d t o s u c h r e l i e f and t h a t h i s b r e a c h of d u t y was n o t g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t , w i l l f u l , o r fraudulent t h a t t h e c o u r t s w i l l i n proper cases, r e l i e v e t h e d e f a u l t i n g p u r c h a s e r from t h e f o r f e i t u r e . Howeth, s u p r a , 163 Mont. a t 369, 517 P.2d a t 730. When c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e c o m p l a i n t demanding f o r f e i t u r e , McBride s h o u l d have f i l e d an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e i n h i s answer a l l e g i n g t h e r e a s o n s h e was e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f from f o r f e i t u r e under s e c t i o n 28-1-104. I n t h i s c a s e , hoisever, McBride f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s r a t h e r t h a n an answer. McBride's f i r s t motion was n o t r u l e d on by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. H i s second motion t o d i s m i s s , however, which was f i l e d s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e f i r s t , w a s set f o r h e a r i n g on March 1 6 , 1981. The motion w a s p r e s e n t e d a s s c h e d u l e d , b u t Ponderosa d i d not attend t h e hearing. The motion was g r a n t e d . two o t h e r h e a r i n g s w e r e h e l d i n t h e case. Only The f i r s t , h e l d on A p r i l 1 3 , 1981, concerned P o n d e r o s a ' s motion f o r l e a v e t o amend c o m p l a i n t . N f o r m a l r u l i n g w a s made on t h i s motion. o On A p r i l 1 5 , 1981, Ponderosa f i l e d a memorandum i n which i t x a r g u e d t h a t t h e o r d e r s h o u l d be s e t a s i d e on p r o c e d u r a l m grounds and t h a t Ponderosa s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o f i l e an amended c o m p l a i n t . f i l e d by Ponderosa. On A p r i l 1 6 , 1981, a second motion w a s T h i s one was t i t l e d "Motion t o S e t Aside Order of the Court and Allow the Plaintiff to File an Amended Complaint." memorandum. Ponderosa did not file an additional On April 21, 1981, McBride filed a brief in opposition to Ponderosa's latest motion. The brief argues: (1) that the District Court acted properly in treating McBride's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment; (2) that Ponderosa failed to appear and resist the motion; and, (3) that Ponderosa waived any right to object to the tender by failing to affirmatively state the objection. third and final hearing was held on May 11, 1981. cerned Ponderosa's second motion. The It con- The motion was denied. None of the hearings were recorded and the only evidence we have of what transpired at them are the minutes of the hearings, the briefs filed in support of the motions, and the orders of the District Court based on the hearings. Nowhere is there any evidence that McBride has satisfied the requirements for relief from forfeiture called for by section 28-1-104, MCA, and Montana case law. That is, he has neither alleged nor proved that his action did not constitute a "grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty," and he has not presented any facts which would "appeal to the conscience of a court of equity." Absent such a showing, McBride is not entitled to relief from the forfeiture clause of the contract. The case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We Concur: 1 C h i s Justice I Justices
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
