MARRIAGE OF HILL
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No. 81-275 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: ZELDA SANGRAY HILL, Petitioner and Appellant, and ROBERT A. HILL, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Christensen and McLean, Stanford, Montana Jack M. McLean argued, Stanford, Montana For Respondent: Graybill, Ostrem, Warner and Crotty, Great Falls, Montana Leo Graybill, Jr. argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: Decided : January 12, 1982 M4 j . 5 a I '2 Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n the Court. is an This Court, appeal frorn delivered the Opinion wife District a judgment of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e of Montana, County, a r i s i n g o u t of a d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage. was g r a n t e d a d i s s o l u t i o n of of Cascade Appellant m a r r i a g e on O c t o b e r 21, 1976, with t h e q u e s t i o n o f d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y reserved. On December property 17, 1980, was h e l d e n t e r e d judgment in a the hearing District d i s p o s i n g of on the Court, the marital disposition The trial of judge assets, and from for District t h a t judgment w i f e a p p e a l s . The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e : 1. Court Was t h e r e sufficient to find respondent that evidence husband the owned one-half i n t e r e s t a s a t e n a n t i n common i n t h e " G a l l o d a y P l a c e " ? 2. Court to Was find there that s u f f i c i e n t evidence the property known as for the the District "Richardson P l a c e " had a f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f $160,000 a s of t h e d a t e o f t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage? Was t h e r e 3. Court had a to find fair that market sufficient the property value of evidence for the District known a s t h e "Home P l a c e " $260,00I?I as of the date of for the District d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e ? 4. Court Was t h e r e to conclude respondent received sufficient that the from h i s evidence remainder father's interest e s t a t e was which a vested remainder s u b j e c t t o divestment? 5. Should a v e s t e d r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r p u r p o s e s of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n ? 6, Court Was t h e r e sufficient evidence for the District t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e "Woodbury P l d c e " s h o u l d n o t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e ? 7. Did from support the the District Court appellant's err share of i n deducting the child marital assets when r e s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o p e t i t i o n f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t ? Respondent Montana, on and June 14, appellant 1959. were Three married children in were Geyser, born as i s s u e of t h e m a r r i a g e , b u t t h e i r c u s t o d y is n o t i n d i s p u t e . The d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s ' m a r r i a g e was g r a n t e d O c t o b e r 21, 1976, w i t h t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y r e s e r v e d . Respondent is a most o f t h e p a r t i e s ' farrner and c a t t l e seventeen-year a ranch near Raynesford, his rancher. marriage, During t h e y l i v e d on Montana, which r e s p o n d e n t f a r m s i n conjunction with mother, Anna LeRoy H i l l . The r a n c h h a s a l w a y s been a f a m i l y o p e r a t i o n . Respondent i n h e r i t e d a one-fourth i n one-half of his parents' ranch and Hill, his remainder brother interest pursuant to a decree of d i s t r i b u t i o n e n t e r e d on O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1 9 5 8 , a b o u t e i g h t m o n t h s prior two to the parties' separate parcels Richardson Place, Place which appellant 1,199 acres. known on about the Respondent This property existed as Respondent's contains resided marriage. the Home and the b r o t h e r r e s i d e d on t h e Home 2,956 acres. Richardson and Place in Respondent Place h i s brother which each and contains worked the p a r c e l o f l a n d on which h e r e s i d e d , On chased, July 25, 1963, respondent and his brother pur- a s t e n a n t s i n common, a b o u t 795 a c r e s o f l a n d known a s t h e Galloday Place. on a l l o f The l a n d was f i n a n c e d by a m o r t g a g e t h e l a n d owned by t h e H i l l s , i n c l u d i n g Anna and LeRoy H i l l . At the t i m e of the dissolution respondent operated t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e a s h i s own p r o p e r t y . that LeRoy, while the husband's Appellant t e s t i f i e d brother, had a one-half i n t e r e s t i n t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e , i t was i n o r d e r t h a t o n e d a y the husband would have and G a l l o d a y P l a c e s t h e Richardson and h i s b r o t h e r would h a v e t h e Home P l a c e . Appellant a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r o t h e r d i d n o t have a n y t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e b u t was h e l p i n g pay f o r i t s o h e c o u l d g e t t h e Home P l a c e . In addition, a q u i t c l a i m deed Federal to testified their was m o r t g a g e d their to two s i s t e r s s i g n e d i n t e r e s t s over to their mother. t h i s was d o n e a s a c o n v e n i e n c e t o t h e Land Bank t o o b t a i n t h e l o a n and t h a t have still property A t t h a t time respondent's buy more l a n d . Respondent i n 1972 t h e equitable i n t e r e s t s coming the to sisters them. The m o r t g a g e o f a l l t h e H i l l l a n d s was i n c r e a s e d a g a i n when t h e b r o t h e r purchased o t h e r l a n d s . T h i s c a s e was some f o u r y e a r s i n coming t o t r i a l . was n o t u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t t r i a l j u d g e ready the case for It i n s i s t e d and s e t t i m e periods to trial that tried. One of t h e p r o b l e m s a t t r i a l a r o s e from a n o r d e r o f it finally was t h e c o u r t , i s s u e d November 1 4 , 1 9 8 0 , s h o r t e n i n g t h e t i m e f o r response t o a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s concerning t h e r e a l property husband in which the claimed an interest and a r e q u e s t f o r a l i s t o f e x h i b i t s and p e r m i s s i o n t o e n t e r upon tile p r o p e r t y f o r timely complied trial. At trial, inspection with, purposes. causing T h i s o r d e r was n o t appellant problems at the r e s p o n d e n t i n t r o d u c e d h i s 1976 income t a x r e t u r n i n t o e v i d e n c e , and a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s s h e d i d n o t h a v e time t o inspect it. the lateness of its Appellant a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t because of submission, she could not properly cross-examine r e s p o n d e n t on t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e r e t u r n . Subsequently, to take a p p e l l a n t requested t h e D i s t r i c t Court judicial notice in a c r e s of interest 2,270 t h e Woodbury P l a c e . of respondent's land claimed one-half a c q u i r e d i n 1972 known a s However, no f i n d i n g s o f f a c t o r c o n c l u - s i o n s o f l a w were made r e g a r d i n g t h i s p r o p e r t y . Respondent d i d n o t p e t i t i o n D i s t r i c t C o u r t , however, s i o n s of 31, deducted The i s s u e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u - l a w on t h e m a t t e r . 1981, f o r c h i l d support. $7,126 The judgment for child e n t e r e d on March s u p p o r t payments from a p p e l l a n t ' s p r o p e r t y award. The District Court found i n a r i t a l e s t a t e t o be $30,432.51, appellant's share of the l e s s $7,126 f o r c h i l d sup- p o r t and $ 1 , 1 2 5 f o r a p p r a i s a l . The evidence first for the owned a o n e - h a l f the Galloday is issue District whether Court there to find was that sufficient t h e husband e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y known a s Place. The G a l l o d a y Place was purchased in 1 9 6 3 and r e c o r d e d i n t h e names o f r e s p o n d e n t and h i s b r o t h e r A s previously noted, a s t e n a n t s i n common. testimony indi- c a t e d t h a t t h e r e c o r d owners of t h e H i l l p r o p e r t i e s a r e n o t always t h e e q u i t a b l e owners. claimed their t h e i r mother Land Bank. of remainder to assist The r e s p o n d e n t ' s s i s t e r s q u i t - interest in certain properties i n g e t t i n g a l o a n from t h e F e d e r a l While t h e r e s p o n d e n t i s t h e l e g a l o n e - h a l f the property appellant, he as a to tenant considered in himself common, the according owner of the owner to the entire property. The G a l l o d a y P l a c e c o n s i s t s o f 795 a c r e s . Place, which was p a r t of The B l a c k t h e o r i g i n a l Galloday Place, con- s i s t e d of f i v e a c r e s . The r e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t w h i l e t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e was b o u g h t by him and h i s b r o t h e r t o be h e l d i n common o w n e r s h i p he times listed it in previously noted, a partnership, does his farm the financial property i n t h i s family ranch, was n o t it has at However, statement. and as o p e r a t i n g much l i k e uncommon when b o r r o w i n g from a bank t o i n c l u d e a l l t h e H i l l f a m i l y l a n d which was t o s t a n d good f o r t h e l o a n . A l l t h e H i l l l a n d s were farmed t o g e t h e r , and e a c h p l a c e made a c o n t r i b u t i o n whenever p o s s i b l e t o t h e payment on the respondent Federal argues, Land the t r i a l Bank mortgage. c o u r t had Therefore, reasonable evidence b e f o r e i t on which i t c o u l d draw i t s c o n c l u s i o n , The division acted rule of Montana marital or On r e v i e w , arbitrary or the our review whether the employment bounds Kuntz v . 4 1 , 36 St.Rep. is without exceeded circumstances. for cases arbitrarily, judgment P.2d in Kuntz of of property District of reason a Court conscientious i n view of ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 237, the 593 662. the court's beyond reason f i n d i n g s do n o t a p p e a r t o be concerning this issue. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s a p p e a r t o be s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n tial credible evidence, and the f i n d i n g s of the District Court concerning t h e Galloday Place a r e s u s t a i n e d , I s s u e s two the and three, evidence t o support t h e v a l u e of the concerning t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of the District Court's properties known f i n d i n g s on a s t h e Richardson Place and t h e Home P l a c e , w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r . The District Court found that the Richardson Place had a f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f $160,000 a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i s s o l u t i o n and t h a t t h e Home P l a c e had a f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f $260,000 forth a t that its in time. However, findings of fact the how court the failed set worth of net to the p a r t i e s was d e t e r m i n e d , a s r e q u i r e d by N u n n a l l y v . (1981) , Mont . , 625 P.2d 1 1 5 9 , 38 St.Rep. Nunnally 529. The c o u r t found t h e f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f t h e R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e was $160,000. T h i s v a l u e was b a s e d e n t i r e l y upon t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s testimony of per a c r e v a l u a t i o n . Respondent t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e p e r a c r e v a l u e o f h a y and g r a z i n g l a n d . However, no t e s t i m o n y was p r e s e n t e d a s t o how many a c r e s o f c r o p , hay o r g r a z i n g l a n d t h e r e w e r e on t h e R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e or on the arrive at Home P l a c e . for the The District only explanation Court's that valuation adopted t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s proposed f i n d i n g s of we can is that it f a c t on t h e s e matters verbatim. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y Hamilton v. 37 S t . R e p . Hamilton (1980), is c o n t r o l l i n g . 247, were a p p r a i s e d , Mont. 607 P.2d 102, I n Hamilton, Arabian h o r s e s in the property d i s t r i b u t i o n without a find- i n g a s t o t h e t o t a l number o f h o r s e s i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . This Court held t h a t t h e t o t a l number o f h o r s e s was n e c e s - s a r y t o p l a c e a v a l u e on them. The s i t u a t i o n is s i m i l a r h e r e f o r it appears t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court ignored t h e testimony of a competent property some cour t-appointed $68,000 higher appraiser, than who valued the t h e v a l u e g i v e n by the respondent. Viewing t h e t o t a l r e c o r d , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l court erred in its v a l u a t i o n of and t h e Home P l a c e . of t h e Richardson Place The c o u r t f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e number a c r e s of e a c h t y p e of tion. both l a n d which was used i n t h e v a l u a - W h i l e r e s p o n d e n t ' s E x h i b i t B r e f e r s t o 1 , 2 0 0 a c r e s on t h e r e i s no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a c r e a g e t h e Richardson Place, breakdown s o we are unable t o determine what p a r t of l a n d was c r o p l a n d , h a y l a n d , o r g r a z i n g l a n d . the As a result, we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e v a l u a t i o n s o f t h e R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e and t h e Home P l a c e a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . Respondent a r g u e s t h a t h i s remainder i n t e r e s t i n both the Richardson included as Place a part and of the Home the marital Place estate the Home divestment Place in and the and that his father, their interest in is subject to the event Elmer J. be claim t h a t h i s remainder Richardson that he Place dies before h i s mother, R e s p o n d e n t b a s e s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n on t h e wording o f of not T h i s c o n t e n t i o n is valuations are therefore not relevant. b a s e d on r e s p o n d e n t ' s should Hill. the w i l l That c o n t e n t i o n d i s r e g a r d s t h e d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n i n t h e e s t a t e of J. Elmer I i i l l , d a t e d O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1 9 5 8 , which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t p r o v i d e d : ... .. " I T I S HERE A D J U D G E D AND D E C R E E D , t h a t t h e r e s i d u e o f s a i d E s t a t e o f J. Elmer H i l l , hereinafter p a r t i c u l a r l y described. be and t h e same i s h e r e b y d i s t r i b u t e d a s follows, to-wit: ... "Real e s t a t e : To Anna Mae H i l l , f o r and during her l i f e t i m e , with f u l l c o n t r o l , use, p o s s e s s i o n , p r o c e e d s , and income t h e r e f r o m , and w i t h o u t liability for any injury, d e s t r u c t i o n , damage, l o s s o r w a s t e t h e r e t o , w i t h remainder s h a r e and s h a r e a l i k e t o R o b e r t A. H i l l [ r e s p o n d e n t ] .[description o f R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e and Home P l a c e ] .. ." The c o n t e n t i o n s o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t i g n o r e t h e s e t t l e d law in this state. Even prior to the enactment of the Uniform P r o b a t e Code, a d e c r e e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n i s c o n c l u s i v e upon t h e r i g h t s o f d e v i s e e s u n d e r a w i l l . r e B e l l ' s Estate ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 3 4 lvlont. "A d e c r e e of 345, As stated 350, 331 P.2d d i s t r i b u t i o n i s c o n c l u s i v e upon in In 517, t h e r i g h t s of h e i r s , l e g a t e e s o r d e v i s e e s , s u b j e c t o n l y t o be r e v e r s e d , s e t a s i d e o r m o d i f i e d on a p p e a l . R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , s e c t i o n 913902; I n Re E s t a t e o f Murphy, s u p r a [other A decree of d i s t r i b u t i o n h a s cases cited]. t h e same f o r c e and e f f e c t a s d o e s a f i n a l judgment." The r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t i s c o r r e c t l y de- s c r i b e d i n t h e d e c r e e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n and c a n n o t be c h a n g e d by a c o l l a t e r a l a t t a c k i n which t h e r e s p o n d e n t s u g g e s t s t h a t the w i l l tion. required a d i f f e r e n t t y p e of d e c r e e of distribu- W therefore conclude t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court's finde i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t was a v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s u b j e c t t o d i v e s t m e n t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . The n e x t i s s u e is w h e t h e r t h e v e s t e d r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t of r e s p o n d e n t s h o u l d be f o r p u r p o s e s of included in the marital estate property distribution. t h e t i m e of At the m a r r i a g e d i s s o l u t i o n on O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1 9 7 6 , t h e r e s p o n d e n t had a remainder interest with a present value, i n t e r e s t which w i l l r i p e n i n t o a f u l l o n e - f o u r t h a property interest in a l l of t h e l a n d upon t h e d e a t h o f h i s m o t h e r . least At Kentucky, three jurisdictions, Kansas, Wisconsin and have h e l d t h a t a s p o u s e ' s v e s t e d remainder i n t e r - e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y should be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of a marital estate. A t h e c a s e o f McCain v . 896. s i m i l a r p r o b l e m was c o n s i d e r e d i n McCain ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 219 Kan. 780, 549 P.2d T h e r e , t h e c o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d owned s p e c i f i c u n d i v i d e d f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s i n two q u a r t e r s e c t i o n s o f Neither until each of these would ripen t h e termination of tract. Nonetheless, speaking of a a t h e e s t a t e of his m a i n d e r s which c o u l d be s o l d . court, into possessory interest t h e l i f e t e n a n t of interests were vested They had p r e s e n t v a l u e . remainder land. interest subject to reThe life e s t a t e , s a i d t h a t i t h e l d i n Woolums v . Kan. 722, 522 P.2d Simonsen ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 214 1321: ". . . t h e a p p e l l a n t and h e r c h i l d r e n h a v e a remainder i n t e r e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t t o a l i f e e s t a t e i n t h e mother of t h e a p p e l lant, Considering t h e age of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s mother, t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t and h e r c h i l d r e n w i l l s u r v i v e h e r m o t h e r . i s a good p r o s p e c t , B e c a u s e o f t h i s proba b i l i t y the appellant has a saleable property r i g h t of c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s e n t v a l u e .. ... "Under t h e law o f t h i s s t a t e , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a n y i n t e r e s t a p e r s o n may h a v e in property, vested or contingent, legal o r equitable , , may b e l e v i e d upon and s o l d under e x e c u t i o n . [Citing cases.] Another c a s e h o l d i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t o f a remainis s a l e a b l e is Markham v . derman , Waterman, 1 0 5 Kan. 9 3 , 1 8 1 P. 621." McCain, 549 P.2d a t 900. . . . See also: N.W.2d Jordan v. 385; Rompf v . Jordan Rompf (1969), 44 Wisc.2d (Ky. 1 9 6 8 ) , 433 S.W.2d 471, 171 879. I n a d d i t i o n , s e v e r a l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have reached t h e same c o n c l u s i o n s when c o n s i d e r i n g o t h e r f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s of marital estates, 1 6 Wisc.2d 176, 106 Neb. 689, See, Trowbridge v. 1 1 4 N.W.2d 1 8 4 N.W. Trowbridge 129; Maxwell v . 227; Hughes v . Maxwell (1921), (1975) , 132 Hughes Montana s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , p o s i n y of (1962) , in dis- f o l l o w i n g a d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e , property to " f i n a l l y , e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s t h e property and assets whenever acquired name the belonging of to and w h e t h e r husband or wife either the or or title both." both, however and is i n the thereto S e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. While the right i n t e r e s t is p o s t p o n e d , c a n be d i s t r i b u t e d . to possession of a vested future i t is s t i l l a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t t h a t S e e s e c t i o n s 70-1-315 and 70-1-317, MCA. W agree with the court e found i n McCain, that interest since such vested supra, could where it sold or be t o t h e r w i s e a l i e n a t e d , t r a n s f e r r e d o r mortgaged, t h e p r o p e r t y had a p r e s e n t v a l u e and s h o u l d be i n c l u d e d . Respondent attempts to distinguish McCain because K a n s a s h a s n o t a d o p t e d t h e Uniform M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t . However, the Kansas statute on the division of marital p r o p e r t y is s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f Montana: "The d e c r e e s h a l l d i v i d e t h e r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y o f t h e p a r t i e s , w h e t h e r owned by e i t h e r s p o u s e p r i o r t o m a r r i a g e , a c q u i r e d by e i t h e r s p o u s e i n t h e s p o u s e ' s own r i g h t a f t e r m a r r i a g e , o r a c q u i r e d by t h e i r j o i n t e f f o r t s , i n a j u s t and r e a s o n a b l e manner I' S e c t i o n 60-1610 ( d ) , K a n s a s S t a t u t e s Annotated. ... W e including find that the respondent's District vested Court in not interest remainder erred in the m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r t h e purpose of d i s t r i b u t i o n . The n e x t i s s u e i s w h e t h e r t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i dence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o conclude t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e Woodbury P l a c e s h o u l d n o t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e marital estate. W have p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d i n s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e f a c t s e in t h i s case that one of t r i a l was r e s p o n d e n t ' s the problems that arose during f a i l u r e t o co~nply w i t h the c o u r t ' s o r d e r t o a l l o w s h o r t e r time t o respond t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . This included about which respondent's the appellant 1976 f e d e r a l income t a x complained she s u f f i c i e n t time t o p r o p e r l y cross-examine did return not or analyze. This r e t u r n c o n t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e Woodbury P l a c e . view of District the fact that Court for t h i s case nust reconsideration of be the returned have In to the a s s e t s of the m a r i t a l e s t a t e , we d i r e c t t h a t on r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p e l l a n t b e a l l o w e d t o p u r s u e examination a s t o t h e Woodbury P l a c e . We also note that t h i s C o u r t d o e s n o t condone r e s p o n d e n t ' s f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r o r a n y o t h e r f r u s t r a t i o n of Revson ( 1 9 8 1 ) , discovery. Owen v . - Mont, -, F. Buttrey & Charles A, 627 P.2d 1 2 3 3 , 38 S t . R e p . 714. The f i n a l i s s u e is w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d e d u c t ing child support from appellant's share of the marital a s s e t s when r e s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o p e t i t i o n f o r s u c h s u p p o r t , A p p e l l a n t l e f t t h e f a m i l y home i n J a n u a r y 1 9 7 3 and went t o G r e a t F a l l s where s h e a t t e n d e d a Vo-Tech months. The r e c o r d school for eleven i n d i c a t e s t h a t respondent paid f o r her t u i t i o n and e x p e n s e s and t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n r e m a i n e d on t h e r a n c h w i t h him d u r i n g the family again and home on did dissolution. not t h i s period. December return During 21, Appellant 1973, but left until several time the children that returned months the to ranch before remained the with respondent a t t h e ranch. The provides, decree among v i s i t a t i o n of of dissolution, other things, t h e minor dated that October "custody, 21, 1976, support c h i l d r e n was r e s e r v e d , " and Appellant i n h e r c o m p l a i n t a s k e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s be g r a n t e d " m u t u a l " c u s t o d y , and r e s p o n d e n t a l l e g e s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f n e c e s s a r y c h i l d s u p p o r t and c u s t o d y o f placed in reasonable parties issue. cost from majorities, The D i s t r i c t of support October 21, is $14,252. is t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of of t h e c h i l d r e n was t h e r e b y Court concluded the 1976, One-half minor through of [appellant] that, children their the respective t h i s sum, o r to of "the '$7,126' t h e support of the m i n o r c h i l d r e n from h e r s h a r e o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . " The c o u r t h e a r d no e v i d e n c e on t h e c h i l d r e n ' s f i n a n - c i a 1 r e s o u r c e s o r s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g b e f o r e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n or on the financial f a c t o r s must under be resources considered s e c t i o n 40-4-204, MCA. in of the appellant. determining W find, e child therefore, These support that the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was n o t s u p p o r t e d by e v i d e n c e and c o n s t i t u t e s an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on remand, When t h e m a t t e r comes t h e s e m a t t e r s may b e c o n s i d e r e d w i t h p r o p e r t e s t i m o n y by b o t h p a r t i e s t o a r r i v e a t an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n . The cause is remanded to the District Court with d i r e c t i o n s t o comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s o p i n i o n . W conc e
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