STATE v BUCKMAN

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NO. 80-284 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O M N A A F OTN 1981 THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , VS. JOSEPH R B N BUCKMAN, U E D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f C a s c a d e . H o n o r a b l e J o h n McCarvel, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : M a r c i a B i r k e n b u e l , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana F r e d Bourdeau, County A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana J. S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : A p r i l 8 , 1 9 8 1 Decided: g-. PC l/e r ki mLa 4L PL / L 4 JUL 2 Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e Court. Buckman a p p e a l s C a s c a d e C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C o u r t convictions for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault . D u r i n g t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s o f O c t o b e r 2 9 , 1979, d e f e n d a n t Buckman was o b s e r v e d i n t h e p a r k i n g a r e a o f Heritage Inn patrolman i n Great F a l l s , stopped and Montana. questioned Walker A defendant, the Security whereupon d e f e n d a n t drew a handgun o u t of h i s p o c k e t and f i r e d a s h o t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e patrolman. During Mahon, this approached g o t o u t of the f o r c e d Mahon incident a milk truck, the security patrolman's truck, into driven car. Buckman. he encountered by L y l e the security car holding A s Mahon Defendant the pistol to Mahon ' s h e a d . Soon appeared officers. thereafter the on another as did scene, Defendant Buckman Walker Security officer several Great F a l l s police ordered Mahon to tell the o f f i c e r s n o t t o a p p r o a c h t h e s e c u r i t y c a r o r h e would k i l l him. For twenty minutes, the security car. d e f e n d a n t h e l d Mahon c a . p t i v e i n He t h e n s u r r e n d e r e d and was t a k e n i n t o custody. Defendant Buckman raises three issues for this C o u r t ' s review: 1. two Was d e f e n d a n t c o n v i c t e d o f , separate offenses arising v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 46-11-502, 2. out a single act in MCA? Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l t o f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s of s e c t i o n 46-14-202, 3. of and s e n t e n c e d f o r , MCA? Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f a d e f e n d a n t who is a c q u i t t e d by r e a s o n o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t ? S e c t i o n 46-11-502(1), p r o v i d e s t h a t a p e r s o n may MCA, n o t be c o n v i c t e d o f two o f f e n s e s t h a t a r e p a r t o f transaction if is one o f f e n s e included in the t h e same other. An i s d e f i n e d a s o n e which " i s e s t a b l i s h e d "included offense" by p r o o f of t h e same o r l e s s t h a n a l l t h e f a c t s r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e commission o f the offense charged." Section 4 6 - 1 1 - 5 0 1 ( 2 ) ( a ) , MCA. Buckman a r g u e s t h a t i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e same f a c t used t o e s t a b l i s h t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t c h a r g e is a l s o used to establish physical the force additional restraint element is fact a shield or of use, or to to use, kidnapping. aggravated necessary threat An prove the aggravated is, t h e purpose t o hold t h e v i c t i m kidnapping charge--that as by hostage. Therefore, he concludes, the a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t c h a r g e i s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e same o r l e s s than all the kidnapping facts charge, required to prove i t must be considered and the aggravated an included o f f e n s e a s charged i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . The another multiple question under of when t h e t e r m s of convictions or an offense is included in a statutory prohibition against punishments for the same act has been c o n s i d e r e d and e v a l u a t e d u n d e r two b a s i c t e s t s c i t e d by defendant, but the defendant's reliance State on C a l i f o r n i a and I l l i n o i s . a c c u r a t e r e c i t a l of the properly case law takes from err in imposing Arizona, with Oregon, W h i l e t h e s e d e c i s i o n s may be a n law in those jurisdictions, c u r r e n t Montana s t a t u t e s and c a s e l a w , not issue sentences against under t h e t r i a l judge d i d defendant on both c h a r g e s o f which he was c o n v i c t e d . I n S t a t e v. Close (1981), . Mont , 623 P.2d 940, 38 S t . R e p . 1 7 7 , 1 8 9 , we f o u n d t h a t s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA, is m e r e l y a c o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s t a n d a r d e n u n c i a t e d i n B l o c k b u r g e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 284 U.S. 1 8 0 , 76 L.Ed. See a l s o S t a t e v. 605 P.2d , Mont. 306. 1 0 0 0 , 1009-1010, 299, 52 S . C t . Coleman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 36 S t . R e p . 1134. In Blockburger, t h e Court ruled: "The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e i s t h a t where t h e same a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of two d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s , t h e t e s t t o be a p p l i e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e two o f f e n s e s o r o n l y o n e , i s w h e t h e r e a c h p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r e s p r o o f o f a f a c t which t h e o t h e r does not." 284 U.S. a t 304. (Emphasis added. ) The a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e Blockburger analysis t o the s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n h e r e make i t c l e a r t h a t d e f e n d a n t c o u l d properly be convicted charged. As conviction for and defined sentenced for both offenses in section 45-5-202(1)(c), MCA, a aggravated assault requires that a (1) p u r p o s e l y caused reasonable a p p r e h e n s i o n of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i n a n o t h e r ( 3 ) by u s e person of a weapon. kidnapping knowingly As or applicable requires or knowingly proof purposely and (2) proof in that this the without case, person lawful aggravated charged (1) authority (2) r e s t r a i n e d a n o t h e r p e r s o n (3.) by u s i n g o r t h r e a t e n i n g t o u s e p h y s i c a l f o r c e ( 4 ) with t h e purpose of holding t h e v i c t i m a s a s h i e l d or hostage. S e c t i o n 4 5 - 5 - 3 0 3 ( 1 ) ( a ) , MCA. Under t h e s e s t a t u t e s t h e c h a r g e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t may be p r o v e d w i t h o u t a showing o f to hold another as a hostage offense of aggravated victim's apprehension of or r e s t r a i n t or the intent shield. kidnapping does Similarly, not entail the the s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y o r use of a weapon by t h e a c c u s e d . Thus, e a c h c h a r g e r e q u i r e s proof f a c t s which t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t ; merges w i t h or included is and s e c t i o n 46-11-502, Buckman MCA, case. maintains c o n v i c t i o n of provides It established by in the other that the neither offense under Blockburger MCA. also prohibits therefore, of that section both offenses when 46-11-502(4), in the present offense is a p e r s o n may n o t more be than same t r a n s a c t i o n , c o n v i c t e d o f more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e i f one "the offenses differ o n l y i n t h a t one i s d e f i n e d t o p r o h i b i t a d e s i g n a t e d k i n d o f conduct generally i n s t a n c e of and the such conduct. other " to prohibit a specific Buckman a r g u e s t h a t a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t p r o h i b i t s t h e u s e o f f o r c e g e n e r a l l y and a g g r a v a t e d is kidnapping defined to prohibit the use of such force s p e c i f i c a l l y t o r e s t r a i n a p e r s o n f o r p u r p o s e s of a h o s t a g e H i s conclusion is t h a t s i n c e t h e a s s a u l t charge or shield. prohibits a general prohibits the same c a n be s u s t a i n e d . The section behavior behavior and the kidnapping specifically, charge o n l y one c h a r g e W disagree. e conduct pertinent prohibited to this by case the is aggravated causing a assault reasonable a p p r e h e n s i o n of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i n a n o t h e r by u s e o f a weapon. prohibited Section by 45-5-202(1)(c), the aggravated MCA. kidnapping The conduct statute is r e s t r a i n i n g a n o t h e r by u s i n g o r t h r e a t e n i n g t o u s e f o r c e o f any kind. Section 45-5-303(1)(a), MCA. Aggravated k i d n a p p i n g i s , t h e r e f o r e , n o t m e r e l y a more s p e c i f i c f o r m o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , b u t an e n t i r e l y s e p a r a t e c r i m e , w i t h i t s own s p e c i f i c e l e m e n t s d i f f e r i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h o s e i n the aggravated a s s a u l t s t a t u t e . Buckman n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e of s e c t i o n 4 6 14-202, MCA, mandates e i t h e r t h e appointment of a specific p s y c h i a t r i s t o r t h e r e q u e s t t o h a v e o n e d e s i g n a t e d by Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l whenever t h e r e is reason t o doubt a defendant's or mental fitness disease or to proceed defect of a reason to defendant believe that otherwise will become a n i s s u e i n t h e c a s e . S e c t i o n 46-14-202, provides: MCA, "When there is reason to doubt the d e f e n d a n t ' s f i t n e s s t o proceed o r reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t m e nt a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t of t h e d e f e n d a n t w i l l o t h e r w i s e become a n i s s u e i n t h e cause, the court s h a l l appoint a t l e a s t one q u a l i f i e d p s y c h i a t r i s t o r s h a l l r e q u e s t t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f Warm S p r i n g s s t a t e h o s p i t a l t o d e s i g n a t e a t l e a s t one q u a l i f i e d p s y c h i a t r i s t , which d e s i g n a t i o n may be o r i n c l u d e h i m s e l f , t o examine and r e p o r t upon t h e mental c o n d i t i o n of t h e defendant." In the present case defendant filed a notice of i n t e n t t o r e l y on t h e d e f e n s e o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t t o p r o v e t h a t he d i d n o t h a v e a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f mind which i s an e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f presented the t h e o f f e n s e s charged. testimony of Charles Jones, He a l s o Clinical P s y c h o l o g i s t w i t h t h e N o r t h C e n t r a l Montana Community M e n t a l Health Center. J o n e s s t a t e d t h a t h i s m e e t i n g s w i t h Buckman r e v e a l e d v a r i o u s symptoms which g a v e him r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e Buckman was s u f f e r i n g f r o m a m e n t a l i l l n e s s . D e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s t e s t i m o n y and t h e n o t i c e gave the court reason to believe that d e f e c t would be a n i s s u e i n t h e c a s e . c o u r t had o n l y two o p t i o n s u n d e r section 46-14-202, Therefore, defendant denial his MCA, of motion neither concludes, for mental disease or I n Buckman's v i e w t h e t h e mandatory language of of which were the court erred in its pursuant to the examination chosen. requirements of section 46-14-202, MCA. As a preliminary matter we note that section 46-14202(2), MCA, goes on to provide that the court may order a defendant to be committed to a hospital or "other suitable facility" for psychological examination. persuaded This Court is not that the District Court failed to fulfill any judicial function or directive in sending Buckman to the Buckman presents no evidence state prison for examination. that the prison facility is unsuitable for such a purpose. We find deficient the argument because it that the failed to court's order name a particular psychiatrist an exaltation of form over substance. no question that defendant was examined was by There is a qualified psychiatrist, who, along with a psychologist, filed a detailed report of defendant's mental condition. This issue closely resembles that posed in State v. Kyle (1980), , Mont. , P.2d 37 St.Rep. 1447, in which the defendant attacked the legitimacy of a report from Warm Springs on the ground that the order of the court appointed the superintendent to examine him, but some of the tests were actually conducted by others on the staff. This Court rejected the defendant's technical attack on the report. 37 St.Rep. at 1449-1450. We find Kyle persuasive here. statute is to have a qualified professional defendant for the purposes of evaluation. is substantially substantial The spirit of the thus, no reversible error. also State v. Olsen (1980), a a Where that spirit fulfilled, as here, we interference with examine can defendant's find no rights and, Section 46-20-701, MCA. See Mont. , 614 P.2d 1061, F u r t h e r , w e t a k e n o t e of the motion District regarding Court had mental the f a c t that, a t the time examination was denied, the of a received report the qualified p s y c h i a t r i s t and p s y c h o l o g i s t i n d i c a t i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t s u f f e r i n g from a m e n t a l disease or t h e c r i m e s were committed. A t t h a t p o i n t t h e judge "reason to doubt" defendant's r a i s e such a doubt, d e f e c t a t the time competence defendant presented or had no sanity. To t h e testimony of a p s y c h o l o g i s t who s t a t e d t h a t h e d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h some o f t h e l a n g u a g e i n t h e r e p o r t b u t who a l s o a d m i t t e d t h a t h e had n o t p e r s o n a l l y examined d e f e n d a n t . is it followed, clear o p p o r t u n i t y t o review t h e the witness, that the report did not accept Based on t h e o r d e r t h a t this judge, and who had personally the listen testimony a s c a l l i n g to the original report into question. Defendant's f i n a l issue a t t a c k s the D i s t r i c t Court's r e f u s a l o f a p r o p o s e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n which r e a d : "When a d e f e n d a n t i s a c q u i t t e d on t h e g r o u n d t h a t due t o a m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t he c o u l d n o t h a v e a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f mind t h a t is a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d , t h e c o u r t s h a l l o r d e r him c o m m i t t e d t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f Warm S p r i n g s s t a t e h o s p i t a l t o be p l a c e d i n an appropriate i n s t i t u t i o n for custody, care, and t r e a t m e n t . " ( S e e s e c t i o n 46-14-301, MCA) . The S t a t e objected S t a t e v. French to this ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. instruction, 196, relying 5 3 1 P.2d 373. on The o b j e c t i o n was s u s t a i n e d , and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n r e f u s e d . This Court, error that for a defect the trial person shall be in French, court acquitted committed to by to determined refuse to reason of the State that it instruct mental was the not jury disease Hospital at or Warm Springs. The C o u r t ' s r a t i o n a l e was s t a t e d a s f o l l o w s : "The j u r y ' s f u n c t i o n i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e It f a c t s r e l e v a n t t o g u i l t o r innocence. should n o t concern i t s e l f with a l t e r n a t i v e s available to the court following the verdict." 1 6 6 Mont. a t 205. Buckman begins his argument by pointing out that F r e n c h was d e c i d e d i n 1 9 7 5 b e f o r e t h e c h a n g e s i n t h e m e n t a l competency c h a p t e r of enacted i n 1979. t h e Montana C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e Code, Under t h e o l d law, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of c r i m i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y c o u l d be made i n e i t h e r o f two ways. Section 46-14-211, provided MCA, for a summary-type d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n which t h e c o u r t c o u l d e n t e r a judgment o f acquittal excluding on the ground responsibility s e c o n d method was to of mental without have the disease holding issue of a or defect trial. The mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t decided a t t r i a l along with t h e g e n e r a l i s s u e s of t h e case. The provided 1979 law repealed i n s e c t i o n 46-14-211, the summary MCA. decided a t t r i a l i n every case. determination The i s s u e m u s t now be Therefore, the jury's role i n determination of t h i s i s s u e is g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d . For that reason, Buckman Lyles v. United S t a t e s (D.C. asserts that the rule C i r . 1 9 5 7 ) , 254 F.2d 7 2 5 , which was r e j e c t e d i n F r e n c h , s h o u l d be r e v i e w e d . In Lyles, court believed t h a t t h e j u r y h a s a r i g h t t o know, and p a r c e l their of fact-finding role, the as part t h e meaning a c q u i t t a l v e r d i c t b a s e d on a n i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e . A.L.R.3d of of an S e e a l s o 11 737. Buckman f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o instruct a s t o t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e n o t g u i l t y by r e a s o n o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t v e r d i c t was p a r t i c u l a r y p r e j u d i c i a l i n t h e present case. In the prosecuting attorney's closing argument, he t o l d t h e j u r y : " I s u g g e s t t h a t you must a l s o b e a b l e t o l i v e w i t h t h e a c q u i t t a l b a s e d upon what you know t h i s man d i d , i f you a c q u i t him and t u r n him l o o s e , you m u s t a l s o be a b l e t o l i v e w i t h that." (Emphasis d e f e n d a n t ' s . ) Defendant jury's argues that misunderstanding mental disease or of this the defect s t a t e m e n t compounds not guilty verdict by and the reason that of this m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n o n l y b e p r e v e n t e d by i n s t r u c t i o n a s t o the statutory provision for commitment following such a verdict. W do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e L y l e s r u l e i s c o n s i s t e n t e w i t h Montana law o r made c o n s i s t e n t by v i r t u e o f amendments t o t h e m e n t a l that the State's competency law. comments do w e f i n d Nor i n t h i s c a s e make t h e 1979 it specially susceptible t o a Lyles analysis. We jury have c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t the function of the i n t h i s S t a t e is t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t s r e l e v a n t t o g u i l t o r innocence. S t a t e v. French, supra. Accord, S t a t e v . C a r y l ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 414, 426, 543 P.2d 3 8 9 , 396. W e reaffirm that the jury's p u r p o s e and d u t y g o no f u r t h e r and s h o u l d n o t be i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e v e r d i c t they a r e charged t o render. t o defendant, judge to t h e r e i s no l o n g e r determine the existence Although, according a provision allowing t h e of a mental disease or d e f e c t w i t h o u t a t r i a l , t h e s t a t u t o r y c h a n g e s have i n c r e a s e d the jury's r o l e on t h i s i s s u e . This contention overlooks t h e f a c t t h a t b o t h F r e n c h and C a r y l involved jury t r i a l s , n o t summary d i s p o s i t i o n s by t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e . Therefore, t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e c i t e d a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e s t a t u t e s h a s no e f f e c t w h a t s o e v e r on t h e e a r l i e r h o l d i n g s of t h i s Court on t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n . Our review of d e f e n s e summation, the theory that the record defendant's defendant reveals lawyer was that during the stressed t o the jury suffering from a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t and t h a t h e s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e be g i v e n a n opportunity f o r treatment, r a t h e r than being convicted. also pointed out s p e c i f i c a l l y t o the jury She t h a t t h e y would have t o l i v e w i t h a c o n v i c t i o n . Thus, taken in prosecutor's remark context, was nothing is it more clear than a that the legitimate response t o the e a r l i e r exhortations of defense counsel. In l i g h t of t h a t f a c t , any e r r o r c a u s e d by t h e S t a t e ' s comment is harmless made when the record entirety. Affirmed. We c o n c u r : \ I %&d'* k & C ef J u s t i c e Justices is considered in its Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , c o n c u r r i n g : I concur i n t h e r e s u l t r e a c h e d by t h e m a j o r i t y . How- ever, I t a k e exception t o t h a t language i n t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n which g i v e s s a n c t i o n t o t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y ' s c l o s i n g argument. A s pointed o u t i n t h e majority opinion, the prosecutor t o l d t h e jury: " I s u g g e s t t h a t you must a l s o be a b l e t o l i v e w i t h a c q u i t t a l based upon what you know t h i s man d i d , i f you a c q u i t him and t u r n him l o o s e , you must a l s o be a b l e t o l i v e w i t h t h a t . " T h i s s t a t e m e n t was made i n r e s p o n s e t o a d e f e n s e a r g u ment t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d be g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r treatment. The m a j o r i t y f i n d s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t e m e n t t o be a l e g i t i m a t e r e s p o n s e t o t h e d e f e n s e argument. I f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t e m e n t was made i n r e s p o n s e t o a d e f e n s e argument r e g a r d i n g t h e consequences o f a c q u i t t a l based upon mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , t h e n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s argument was improper. record, Although t h e d e f e n s e went o u t s i d e t h e t h e d e f e n s e a c c u r a t e l y informed t h e j u r y a b o u t t h e consequence of a m e n t a l d i s e a s e a c q u i t t a l . I f the prosecutor was r e s p o n d i n g t o s u c h a n argument, t h e p r o s e c u t o r f a l s e l y informed t h e j u r y t h a t such an a c q u i t t a l would r e s u l t i n t h e defendant being turned loose. Though b o t h comments went o u t - s i d e t h e r e c o r d , t h e d e f e n s e s t a t e m e n t was t r u e w h i l e t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s was f a l s e . I r e a l i z e t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t made by t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y c a n be j u s t i f i e d on t h e b a s i s t h a t a n o u t r i g h t a c q u i t t a l of t h e d e f e n d a n t would have t h e e f f e c t of f r e e i n g t h e defendant. Nevertheless, t h e statement i s misleading, and when made i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e d e f e n s e argument r e g a r d i n g m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , would t e n d t o c r e a t e a f a l s e impress i o n i n t h e minds of t h e j u r o r s . A prosecuting a t t o r n e y has a f a r d i f f e r e n t e t h i c a l r o l e than an a t t o r n e y prosecuting a c i v i l a c t i o n . The p r o s e - c u t i n g a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t s t h e p e o p l e and s h o u l d always s t r i v e t o present the case objectively. The p r o s e c u t o r ' s c l o s i n g argument i n t h i s c a s e i s improper when viewed i n c o n t e x t of t h e o b l i g a t i o n owed. Defense c o u n s e l d i d n o t move f o r a m i s t r i a l and o n l y a r g u e s err i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e consequences of a n a c q u i t t a l based upon m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r defect. Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I concur w i t h t h e a f f i r m - ing verdict. However, I do hereby i n t e n d t o e x p r e s s s t r o n g s e n t i m e n t a g a i n s t improper j u r y argument and, i f t h e p r o p e r r e c o r d i s made, w i l l t e n d t o view p r e j u d i c i a l arguments a s reversible error. I concur w i t h M r . J u s t i c e Morrison.

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