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No. 13522 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, ROBERT DEE CLOSE, a/k/a BOBBY DEE CLOSE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowtone. Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Terence M. Swift argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Sheri Sprigg argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Charles Bradley argued, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana - Submitted: Decided: ~iled: FEB 9 - 1981 - November 26, 1980 FEBgn?!#I M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a judgment e n t e r e d on a j u r y v e r d i c t i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, Montana. On J u n e 3, 1976, t h e j u r y found d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of t h e f o l l o w i n g c r i m e s , a l l a r i s i n g o u t of one incident: Count I , d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 45-5-102, MCA; Count 11, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , s e c t i o n 45-5-303, and Count 111, r o b b e r y , s e c t i o n 45-5-401, MCA. MCA; On J u n e 1 0 , 1976, t h e c o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o one hundred y e a r s p u r s u a n t t o t h e v e r d i c t i n Count I ; f o r t y y e a r s p u r s u a n t t o Count 111; and d e a t h by hanging p u r s u a n t t o Count 11. In a d d i t i o n , t h e s e n t e n c e s pronounced on Counts I and I11 were o r d e r e d t o be s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y . I n May 1979 t h i s C o u r t o r d e r e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o r e s e n t e n c e d e f e n d a n t f o r h i s c o n v i c t i o n of a g g r a v a t e d k i d napping (Count 11) f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o v i s i o n under t h a t s t a t u t e was found t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t complied and r e s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t , under Count I1 o n l y , t o t h e t e r m of f i f t y y e a r s t o be s e r v e d c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h t h e p r e v i o u s s e n t e n c e s o f f o r t y y e a r s and one hundred y e a r s . On J u l y 7, 1974, a c a r n i v a l promoter named B i l l y J o e H i l l d r o v e t o B i l l i n g s , Montana, i n a 1968 w h i t e - c o l o r e d , f o u r - d o o r C a d i l l a c sedan. A t t h e t i m e he was c a r r y i n g between $1200 and $1400 i n c a s h . H i l l was o b s e r v e d i n t h e Rainbow B a r from 9:30 a.m. u n t i l 7:00 p.m. of t h e b a r . on J u l y 8, 1974, by Frank P i r t z , t h e owner T h a t a f t e r n o o n he was o b s e r v e d w i t h s e v e r a l I n d i a n s , a s h e e p h e r d e r and a younger, "cowboy-type" man. H i l l k e p t f l a s h i n g a l a r g e r o l l of money and d i d s o t o such a n e x t e n t t h a t P i r t z c a u t i o n e d him t o s t o p . H i l l l e f t the Rainbow Bar by h i m s e l f a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7:00 p.m. The "cowboy-type" young man w i t h him a p p a r e n t l y had l e f t t h e s a l o o n a b o u t 4:00 p.m. Between 8:00 t o 9:00 p.m. t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r Bar. on J u l y 8 , two men came i n t o The b a r t e n d e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e o l d e r of t h e two men had on c r a n b e r r y - c o l o r e d matching s h i r t . man. t r o u s e r s and a She i d e n t i f i e d a p i c t u r e of H i l l a s t h i s The younger man's s h i r t was hanging o u t , h e looked l i k e a cowboy and wore e i t h e r a b l a c k o r d a r k brown h a t . The b a r t e n d e r i d e n t i f i e d d e f e n d a n t i n t h e courtroom a s t h e younger man. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e two men remained i n t h e b a r f o r a b o u t two h o u r s and t h e n l e f t t o g e t h e r . The b a r t e n d e r f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e younger man made two t e l e p h o n e c a l l s w h i l e i n t h e b a r . The b a r t e n d e r l a t e r f u r n i s h e d a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e younger man t o t h e p o l i c e from which a composite drawing of t h e s u s p e c t e d murderer w a s made by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r . H i l l ' s c a r was o b s e r v e d by Deputy S h e r i f f Dean Mahlum a t a b o u t 9:45 p.m. pants. n e a r t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r Bar w i t h two occu- Mahlum d e s c r i b e d t h e two o c c u p a n t s of t h e w h i t e C a d i l l a c a s follows: "The d r i v e r o f t h e v e h i c l e was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 23 t o 24 y e a r s of a g e , 5 ' 1 0 " t o 5 ' 1 1 " t a l l , 165 t o 170 pounds. H e was wearing a f e l t t y p e cowboy h a t , e i t h e r d a r k brown o r b l a c k , t h e brim was r o l l e d i n on it. He had a l i g h t c o l o r e d s h i r t which was unbuttoned down t h e I f r o n t and a l s o p u l l e d o u t o f h i s p a n t s . b e l i e v e he had on b l u e j e a n s and b o o t s . The I o t h e r s u b j e c t was a n o l d e r gentleman. d i d n ' t g e t a s good a l o o k a t t h i s gentleman. H e had on a l i g h t c o l o r e d s h i r t , maroon p a n t s , b o o t s , and a l s o a w h i t e h a t , w e s t e r n t y p e . " According t o t h e b a r t e n d e r , H i l l r e t u r n e d t o t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r Bar a l o n e a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1:45 a.m. on J u l y 9. He s t o o d a t t h e b a r and o r d e r e d a can of b e e r . He took o n l y a b o u t t h r e e d r i n k s of t h e b e e r and walked o u t . A t about 7:30 a.m. on J u l y 9 , R a n d a l l Groom d i s c o v e r e d t h e body of a man l y i n g on t h e ground n e a r a w h i t e C a d i l l a c . He walked c l o s e t o t h e body, t h e n g o t back i n t o h i s p i c k u p and w e n t home where he c a l l e d t h e Yellowstone County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e a t a b o u t 8:00 a.m. Groom w a i t e d a few m i n u t e s and t h e n d r o v e back t o t h e s c e n e . When he a r r i v e d , a d e p u t y s h e r i f f had a l r e a d y a r r i v e d . The v i c t i m was l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s B i l l y J o e H i l l . N o money was r e c o v e r e d from h i s p e r s o n a l p o s s e s s i o n . R a n d a l l Groom t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d i s c o v e r e d t h e body w h i l e e x e r c i s i n g h i s dog. H e s t a t e d t h a t h e went t o t h i s a r e a q u i t e o f t e n t o e x e r c i s e h i s dog, even though i t i s a b o u t t h r e e m i l e s from h i s home. R a n d a l l Groom i s t h e s t e p f a t h e r of Ed C l o s e , t h e S t a t e ' s main w i t n e s s . He ada- mantly d e n i e d , however, t h a t h i s s t e p s o n had c a l l e d him t h a t morning, even though Ed C l o s e l i v e d j u s t down t h e r o a d from where t h e body was found. Groom s t a t e d t h a t i t was months a f t e r t h e murder t h a t he f i r s t l e a r n e d t h a t h i s s t e p s o n knew a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e crime. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s stepson's knowledge of t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h i s o f f e n s e were f i r s t d i s c o v e r e d by him a b o u t one month b e f o r e t r i a l . An a u t o p s y was performed by D r . Gordon Cox, a B i l l i n g s pathologist. Dr. Cox t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e v i c t i m d i e d from m u l t i p l e s e v e r e blows t o t h e head, b o t h f r o n t and back, w i t h r e s u l t i n g b r a i n damage. H e t e s t i f i e d t h e wounds t o t h e d e c e a s e d ' s head w e r e i n f l i c t e d , i n h i s o p i n i o n , by a l o n g , r e l a t i v e l y narrow, b l u n t o b j e c t . Dr. Cox f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t from p h o t o g r a p h s , two of which w e r e p h o t o g r a p h s of t h e d e c e a s e d ' s c a r t a k e n o u t s i d e h i s p r e s e n c e , h e concluded t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d was s i t t i n g i n t h e p a s s e n g e r s i d e o f t h e a u t o m o b i l e when t h e i n j u r i e s t o t h e f r o n t o f t h e head w e r e i n f l i c t e d . The t h r u s t of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e was t h a t B i l l y J o e H i l l was robbed of t h e money h e was c a r r y i n g and l a t e r k i l l e d by d e f e n d a n t , Bobby Dee C l o s e . The S t a t e ' s main w i t n e s s e s were Ed C l o s e and h i s w i f e , J o y c e . Ed C l o s e i s t h e s t e p s o n of R a n d a l l Groom and a c o u s i n of d e f e n d a n t , The e s s e n c e of h i s t e s t i m o n y was t h a t he a t t e n d e d a f a m i l y p i c n i c n e a r Big Timber, Montana, on J u l y 4, 1974. T h i s p i c n i c was a l s o a t t e n d e d by David C l o s e , t h e second d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s m a t t e r and t h e u n c l e of Ed C l o s e and t h e d e f e n d a n t , Ed t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h i s p i c n i c , David C l o s e used a p i c k t o a s s i s t a v e h i c l e a c r o s s a d r y c r e e k bed and broke t h e h a n d l e n e a r t h e p i c k head. After breaking t h e p i c k h a n d l e , David t o s s e d i t i n t o t h e back of a p i c k u p owned and d r i v e n by Ed. Defendant Bobby C l o s e d i d n o t a t t e n d t h i s picnic. Upon r e t u r n i n g t o B i l l i n g s a f t e r t h e p i c n i c , Ed d r o v e t o D a v i d ' s house and unloaded D a v i d ' s b e l o n g i n g s . Ed could n o t remember i f t h e broken p i c k h a n d l e w a s unloaded a t D a v i d ' s house; however, h e found t h e m e t a l p i c k head i n h i s p i c k u p when he g o t home. H e removed i t from t h e t r u c k and p u t i t i n a box of junk i n h i s g a r a g e . The p i c k head w a s l a t e r d e l i v e r e d t o a u t h o r i t i e s i n F e b r u a r y 1976. Ed C l o s e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had c e r t a i n c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h d e f e n d a n t r e g a r d i n g t h e d e a t h of H i l l . The f i r s t such c o n v e r s a t i o n o c c u r r e d a t h i s house when d e f e n d a n t t o l d Ed and h i s w i f e J o y c e a s f o l l o w s : "A. Well, he t o l d m e t h a t he r u n a c r o s s t h i s guy on t h e s o u t h s i d e , h e had a l o t of money, throwing i t a r o u n d , buying everybody d r i n k s , and t h a t h e had d e v i s e d some k i n d of a p l a n w i t h Uncle Dave t o g e t h i s money. And t h e y , Bobby and t h e man, went t o d i f f e r e n t b a r s around town d r i n k i n g and t h e y wound up down by t h e r i v e r and t h a t Uncle Dave was t h e r e and Uncle Dave g i v e him t h i s c l u b and s a y s , 'Here, Bobby, t h i s i s your t r i c k , you do i t . ' Bobby t o l d m e h e h i t t h e man once and t h e man woke up and wanted t o know what was g o i n g on and Bobby g o t s c a r e d , Uncle Dave took t h e c l u b and f i n i s h e d i t . "Q. Did h e , and r e f e r r i n g t o M r . H i l l , d i d he u s e any name o r job o c c u p a t i o n ? A . I t h i n k he t a l k e d a b o u t him a s a c a r n i v a l worker. " Ed went on t o t e s t i f y t h a t a t a s u b s e q u e n t c o n v e r s a t i o n d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d , " t h e y would n e v e r f i n d i t , " meaning t h e c l u b which w a s used a s a murder weapon. A second c o n v e r s a t i o n took p l a c e a t David C l o s e ' s b i r t h d a y p a r t y on J u l y 1 2 , 1974. Ed t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e b i r t h d a y p a r t y a t D a v i d ' s home t h e c l u b was mentioned a g a i n . According t o Ed C l o s e : "A. W e l l , Bobby had q u i t e a b i t t o d r i n k and h e had been o u t s i d e and he come i n w i t h a , I d o n ' t know, a jug o r a b o t t l e of some k i n d and b r o k e i t o v e r t h e t a b l e . Of c o u r s e g l a s s f l e w e v e r y d i r e c t i o n and t h e w i f e and Sharon were t r y i n g t o c l e a n i t up and Uncle Dave g o t mad and went i n t h e bedroom and come o u t w i t h t h i s p i e c e o f a c l u b and shook i t a t Bobby and asked him i f he would l i k e some of t h i s ? "Q. He a s k e d him i f h e would l i k e some of t h a t , and what d i d Bobby D e e s a y o r do? A . I don't t h i n k Bobby s a i d a n y t h i n g . " Ed C l o s e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he managed t o g e t t h e c l u b from David and took i t home w i t h him. H e burned i t t h e n e x t morning b e c a u s e h e s u s p e c t e d t h a t i t w a s t h e c l u b used i n t h e murder. A t t r i a l he compared t h e c l u b he took from David t o two p i c k h a n d l e s , i n t r o d u c e d f o r d e m o n s t r a t i v e p u r p o s e s o n l y , and s t a t e d t h e y w e r e s i m i l a r e x c e p t t h e one t a k e n from David was o l d e r and w e a t h e r b e a t e n . On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , Ed C l o s e a d m i t t e d t h a t he was f i r s t i n t e r r o g a t e d by law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s d u r i n g t h e summer of 1974 and t o l d O f f i c e r S k i l l e n he knew n o t h i n g o f the c r i m e . L a t e r , Ed was p u t under o a t h and sworn s t a t e - ments w e r e g i v e n t o t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y . J o y c e C l o s e , E d ' s w i f e , t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e was f i r s t q u e s t i o n e d by law e n f o r c e m e n t p e r s o n n e l i n F e b r u a r y 1976. A t f i r s t , J o y c e d e n i e d s h e had any knowledge of t h e c r i m e and s h e was q u e s t i o n e d s e p a r a t e l y from h e r husband. She was l a t e r p l a c e d under o a t h and gave t h e s t a t e m e n t i n c r i m i n a t i n g defendant. J o y c e d e s c r i b e d t h e p i c n i c on t h e 4 t h of J u l y and h e r o b s e r v a t i o n of a p i c k and p i c k h a n d l e . She a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had a t t e n d e d t h e b i r t h d a y p a r t y on J u l y 1 2 , and t h a t a c o n v e r s a t i o n , p r i o r t o t h e p a r t y , had o c c u r r e d . s t a t e d i n d e t a i l what w a s s a i d by d e f e n d a n t d u r i n g t h e conversation a t t r i a l : "Q. What d i d t h e d e f e n d a n t , Bobby Dee C l o s e , s a y He s a i d h e w a s i n t h e t o you a t t h a t time? A. S t a n d a r d Bar d r i n k i n g , and h e had r u n a c r o s s t h i s man t h a t w a s a l s o i n t h e S t a n d a r d , and t h i s man had a l o t of money, h e was buying t h e b a r d r i n k s . I n f a c t he had a r o l l of money t h a t h e threw a t a p r o s t i t u t e down t h e r e i n t h e S t a n d a r d . She p i c k e d i t up and threw i t back a t him and s a i d t h a t money i s g o i n g t o g e t your t h r o a t c u t . And Bobby s a i d t h a t h e went t o t h e phone, c a l l e d h i s u n c l e , David C l o s e , and t h a t h e had went w i t h t h i s man t o a c o u p l e o t h e r b a r s , t h e C r y s t a l , I b e l i e v e he mentioned, and t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r , and t h e n went on o u t t o t h e g r a v e l p i t s . When h e w a s o u t t o t h e g r a v e l p i t s , Dave was t h e r e . Bobby h i t t h e man o v e r t h e e y e and t h e man woke up, p u t h i s hands up l i k e , 'What's g o i n g o n ? ' and Bobby g o t s c a r e d and t h a t was when h i s u n c l e took o v e r , Dave. W e l l , b e f o r e t h a t , when h e went o u t t o t h e g r a v e l p i t s and Dave was t h e r e , Dave handed him a c l u b and s a i d , 'Bobby, t h i s i s your t r i c k , do your t h i n g . ' And t h a t ' s when Bobby h i t him o v e r t h e eye and t h e man had woke up and t r i e d t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f and t h e n Bobby g o t s c a r e d and t h a t ' s when Dave took o v e r . She "Q. A. But h e d i d s a y he s t r u c k t h e man, r i g h t ? Yes, h e h i t him o v e r t h e eye. "Q. Did h e t e l l you how many t i m e s h e s t r u c k One t i m e . " him o v e r t h e eye? A. J o y c e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t a n argument developed a t t h e b i r t h d a y p a r t y between David C l o s e and d e f e n d a n t . During t h e argument David went i n t o t h e bedroom and came back w i t h a c l u b , h e l d i t up, shook i t a t d e f e n d a n t , and s a i d , "Do you want some of t h i s t o o ? " D a v i d ' s w i f e t o l d Ed t o g e t t h e c l u b and do something w i t h it. Ed g o t t h e c l u b , t o o k i t o u t s i d e and p u t i t i n h i s p i c k u p t r u c k . J o y c e went on t o t e s t i f y t h a t d e f e n d a n t a t t h e f i r s t c o n v e r s a t i o n t o l d h e r t h a t David C l o s e had h i t t h e v i c t i m i n t h e back of t h e head when h e " t o o k o v e r . " Expert witnesses t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t defendant's f i n g e r p r i n t s were found b o t h i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e v i c t i m ' s car. One of them, a p r i n t of d e f e n d a n t ' s l e f t thumb, was found on t h e i n s i d e r e a r of t h e l e f t r e a r d o o r window o f t h e victim's car. One of t h e f i n g e r p r i n t e x p e r t s t e s t i f i e d on r e b u t t a l t h a t t h e p r i n t was of t h e i n s i d e o f t h e l e f t thumb, toward t h e f i n g e r s . (Defendant i s l e f t handed.) The d o o r on which t h a t p r i n t a p p e a r e d was p a r t i a l l y u n l a t c h e d when t h e v i c t i m ' s body w a s found. There w a s a l s o t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e ments t o l a w e n f o r c e m e n t a u t h o r i t i e s b e f o r e h e became a s u s p e c t i n t h e case. About s i x weeks a f t e r t h e c r i m e , on August 2 6 , 1974, h e spoke w i t h O f f i c e r S k i l l e n , who t e s t i fied: "He s a i d t h a t h e had been i n t h e b a r s on t h e s o u t h s i d e , h e t h o u g h t t h a t h e had s e e n t h e H e mentioned person described a s t h e victim. s e e i n g t h e v i c t i m w i t h a man w i t h a b e a r d and h e s a i d t h e l a s t t i m e he saw him h e was i n t h e company of some c o l o r e d p e o p l e . " ~ f t e h i s a r r e s t on F e b r u a r y 2 7 , 1976, d e f e n d a n t t o l d t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t h e had l e f t H i l l i n h i s c a r on t h e n i g h t of t h e crime. Defendant w a s t h e o n l y d e f e n s e w i t n e s s . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had met H i l l f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a t a b o u t 3:00 o r 4:00 p.m., on J u l y 8 , 1974, i n t h e Rainbow Bar. remained t h e r e f o r a b o u t t h i r t y - f i v e Defendant t o f o r t y minutes. Defendant m e t H i l l a g a i n some t i m e l a t e r t h a t e v e n i n g i n a b a r n e a r t h e Greyhound Bus Depot. H i l l came i n w i t h two o t h e r men sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. H i l l remained a t t h i s b a r f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y an h o u r , a p p a r e n t l y d r i n k i n g b e e r and p l a y i n g p o o l . H i l l and d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h i s b a r t o g e t h e r and went t o s e v e r a l o t h e r b a r s on t h e s o u t h s i d e of Billings. They d r o v e t o t h e s e b a r s i n t h e d e c e a s e d ' s a u t o - m o b i l e , w i t h d e f e n d a n t d r i v i n g and H i l l s i t t i n g i n t h e f r o n t passenger s e a t . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t H i l l c o u l d walk, b u t he was i n t o x i c a t e d . According t o d e f e n d a n t t h e y remained a t t h e S t a n d a r d Bar f o r two and one-half t o t h r e e hours. Defendant and H i l l l e f t t h e S t a n d a r d Bar and d r o v e i n t h e d e c e a s e d ' s a u t o m o b i l e t o the S i l v e r Dollar B a r . Defendant a g a i n d r o v e w i t h H i l l s t i l l occupying t h e r i g h t f r o n t s e a t . The d e c e a s e d was a b l e t o g e t i n t o t h e c a r by h i m s e l f . They parked H i l l ' s c a r n e a r t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r Bar and d r a n k b e e r t h e r e f o r one t o two h o u r s . A t this time, defen- d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he ( d e f e n d a n t ) was " p r e t t y i n t o x i c a t e d . When t h e y l e f t t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r B a r , d e f e n d a n t h e l p e d H i l l i n t o h i s c a r by p l a c i n g him i n t h e p a s s e n g e r s i d e . Defen- d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s w a s t h e l a s t t i m e h e saw H i l l , who a p p a r e n t l y had p a s s e d o u t i n t h e f r o n t s e a t of h i s c a r . I' Defendant s t a t e d he d i d n o t d r i v e t o t h e g r a v e l p i t area where H i l l ' s body was found and he d i d n o t r o b o r s t r i k e t h e deceased. Defendant a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e d i d n o t a t t e n d t h e 4 t h of J u l y p i c n i c ; t h a t h e n e v e r saw a p i c k h a n d l e s u c h a s t h e one t h a t was d e m o n s t r a t e d i n t h e courtroom. H e d e n i e d Ed and J o y c e C l o s e ' s t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t s which t h e y a l l e g e d he had made t o them r e g a r d i n g t h e homicide. He d i d a d m i t a t t e n d i n g t h e b i r t h d a y p a r t y on J u l y 1 2 , 1974, and f i g h t i n g w i t h h i s Uncle David. He s t a t e d t h a t David C l o s e had t h r e a t e n e d him w i t h a h a n d l e from a bathroom p l u n g e r . Claim f o r M i s t r i a l The f i r s t i s s u e d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n f i n d i n g t h a t a m i s t r i a l was n o t m a n i f e s t l y n e c e s s a r y when a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s f l a s h e d p h o t o g r a p h s b e f o r e t h e j u r y which were l a t e r n o t admitted . The S t a t e ' s f i r s t w i t n e s s was D r . Gordon Cox, a B i l l i n g s pathologist. Dr. Cox performed t h e a u t o p s y on H i l l and t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e c a u s e of d e a t h . The S t a t e moved t o have c e r t a i n p h o t o g r a p h s of t h e body a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e d u r i n g D r . Cox's t e s t i m o n y , and d e f e n s e c o u n s e l v o i r d i r e d . On v o i r d i r e c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e S t a t e a s k e d D r . Cox t o i d e n t i f y f o r t h e r e c o r d t h o s e p h o t o s which would a s s i s t t h e j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y and f i n d i n g s . The p a t h o l o g i s t r e p l i e d , " [ t l h i s one I t h i n k , d e f i n i t e l y , " a t which p o i n t defendant's counsel objected, s t a t i n g , ". . . I move f o r m i s t r i a l on b e h a l f of t h e d e f e n d a n t f o r t h e s e p i c t u r e s have been r e p e a t e d l y f l a s h e d b e f o r e t h e e y e s of t h e j u r y The c o u r t o v e r r u l e d - t h i s motion and c o n t i n u e d t h e t r i a l . . . ." The c o u r t c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d t h e motion f o r m i s t r i a l . The t e s t f o r d e c l a r i n g a m i s t r i a l was s t a t e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . P e r e z ( 1 8 2 4 ) , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580: ". . . t h e law h a s i n v e s t e d C o u r t s of j u s t i c e w i t h t h e a u t h o r i t y t o d i s c h a r g e a j u r y from g i v i n g any v e r d i c t , whenever, i n t h e i r o p i n i o n , taking a l l t h e circumstances i n t o consideration, there i s a manifest necessity f o r the a c t , o r t h e e n d s o f p u b l i c j u s t i c e would o t h e r w i s e be defeated. They a r e t o e x e r c i s e a sound d i s c r e t i o n on t h e s u b j e c t ; and i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d e f i n e a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , which would r e n d e r i t p r o p e r t o i n t e r f e r e . To be s u r e , t h e power o u g h t t o be used w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t c a u t i o n , under u r g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and f o r v e r y p l a i n and o b v i o u s c a u s e s ; . . ." The t r i a l c o u r t judge i s i n t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e w i t h c e r t a i n t y whether t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s h a n d l i n g of t h e e x h i b i t a c t u a l l y exposed i t t o t h e j u r y i n s u c h a manner a s t o r e q u i r e a m i s t r i a l . Our f u n c t i o n on a p p e a l i s t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n not granting a mistrial. 4 0 0 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. United S t a t e s v . J o r n ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , having o b s e r v e d t h e e v e n t and t h e r e a c t i o n of t h e j u r o r s , and b e i n g t h e judge most f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e and t h e background of t h e c a s e ". . . i s f a r more ' c o n v e r s a n t w i t h t h e f a c t o r s r e l e v a n t t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n ' t h a n any r e v i e w i n g c o u r t c a n p o s s i b l y b e . " Arizona v. Washington ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 4 3 4 U.S. P r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r was n o t shown. i n v o l v e d a r e n o t l a r g e blow-ups; 497, 514, 98 S.Ct. The p h o t o g r a p h s t h e y a r e normal s n a p s h o t s . I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t s u c h b r i e f e x p o s u r e t o such s m a l l photo- g r a p h s i n t h e hands of a w i t n e s s on t h e s t a n d c o u l d have s u c h a n i m p a c t as t o r e q u i r e a m i s t r i a l . A l s o , t h e photo- g r a p h s a t i s s u e a r e n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e which w e r e a d m i t t e d . Furthermore, The judge gave t h e j u r y appropriate cautionary instructions. See Arizona v . Washington, supra. There was no m a n i f e s t n e c e s s i t y t o o r d e r a m i s t r i a l , and t h e e n d s of p u b l i c j u s t i c e w e r e n o t d e f e a t e d by c a r r y i n g the t r i a l t o a f i n a l verdict. W e f i n d no e r r o r . E x p e r t Testimony Next d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n o v e r r u l i n g h i s o b j e c t i o n t o t e s t i m o n y of t h e p a t h o l o g i s t e x p r e s s i n g h i s o p i n i o n a s t o how t h e f a t a l blows were a p p l i e d . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n n o t s u s t a i n i n g h i s o b j e c t i o n because t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s conclus i o n was based on p h o t o g r a p h s t a k e n o f t h e a u t o m o b i l e o u t s i d e t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s presence. "This Court i s n o t obligated t o r e f u t e a l l . . . al- l e g e d e r r o r s where t h e e r r o r s a r e b a l d a s s e r t i o n s , a b s e n t any s p e c i f i c argument o r a u t h o r i t y . . ." McGuinn v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 215, 581 P.2d 417, 420, 35 St.Rep. Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid., 871. states: "If scientific, technical, o r other specialized knowledge w i l l a s s i s t t h e trier of f a c t t o understand t h e evidence o r t o determine a f a c t i n i s s u e , a w i t n e s s q u a l i f i e d a s a n e x p e r t by knowledge, s k i l l , e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g , o r e d u c a t i o n may t e s t i f y t h e r e t o i n t h e form of an opinion o r otherwise." ". . . The competency of a w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y a s a n e x p e r t i s a question f o r the t r i a l court's discretion. . ." State v . P a u l s o n ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 310, 538 P.2d 339, 342-343. The c o u r t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n . A m e d i c a l d o c t o r h a s s p e c i a l knowledge r e g a r d i n g anatomy and i n j u r i e s t o t h e human body t h a t q u a l i f i e s him o r h e r t o g i v e a n o p i n i o n a s t o t h e c a u s e of t h e i n j u r i e s . b e l l (1965) , 146 Mont. 251, 405 P . 2d 978. S t a t e v . Camp- Dr. Cox was exceptionally qualified to give such an opinion. He was a pathologist, a specialist in the study of cause of death. In twelve years as a pathologist, he had performed about 600 autopsies, surgical procedures conducted primarily to determine the cause of death. He had the knowledge, skill, experience, training and education to qualify him to express an opinion as to how the fatal blows were inflicted on the victim from his actual observations, photographs and other tests. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the pathologist to testify and express his opinion. Witness Identification The bartender at the Silver Dollar Bar testified on behalf of the State. She stated that the victim and defen- dant had spent a couple of hours in the bar on the evening of the victim's death. Defendant objects, for the first time on appeal, to the witness's in-court identification of him. Defendant's failure to object at trial precludes him from now predicating error on the admission of this evidence. Rule 103 (a)(1), Mont.R.Evid. ; State v. Sullivan (1979), Mont. , 595 P.2d 372, 36 St.Rep. 936. Further, upon complete review of the record we find no plain error that substantially affected the rights of defendant. Counsel Misconduct During Trial While cross-examining a prosecution witness, defense counsel pursued the following line of questioning which resulted in a colloquy between counsel: "Q. I don't ask this question in a critical vein, Mr. Close, but you have been drinking before you came here to testify this morning, isn't that correct? A. No. "Q. You haven't had a drink this morning? Nothing other than coffee. A. "Q. Would you care to walk over in front of the Jurors and allow them to smell your breath? A. Yes. "Q. Would you do that please? " (Witness complying.) "Q. Would you breathe out in the presence of the Jurors? A. Yes, I did. "Q. Would you also go down by this end of the jury box and breathe to the man sitting in the end of the jury box? "MR. BRADLEY: Your Honor, I am going to object to this demonstration. "THE COURT: Sustained. "MR. WHALEN: In view of the answer, it goes to the credibility of the witness and should be allowed. "MR. BRADLEY: Have you been drinking this morning, Mr. Whalen? "MR. WHALEN: I haven't, Mr. Bradley. "MR. BRADLEY: Would you mind going up and breathing to the Jury? "MR. WHALEN: "THE COURT: "MR. WHALEN: I will be glad to do so. Now, let's desist. I have no further questions." Defendant raises the issue of whether the District Court properly handled this exchange, and, if there was any irregularity, whether it affected defendant's substantial rights. Defendant contends the court erred in not cautioning the jury with respect to alleged prejudicial comments of the prosecuting attorney. He argues that this exchange of words tended to reflect improperly upon defense counsel, his methods, tact and procedure. detriment of defendant. This, in turn, inured to the We disagree. The prosecutor's questions were totally unrelated to the defendant's guilt. They were merely a reaction to defense counsel's persistent line of questioning and were asked to demonstrate that defense counsel's questions could ". have been personally humiliating to the witness. .. It has generally been held that an appellant may not predicate error upon the prosecuting attorney's actions where such was induced or provoked by the appellant's counsel. . ." State v. Gall (1959), 135 Mont. 131, 134, 337 P.2d 932. Further, defense counsel failed to offer an appropriate cautionary instruction as required by section 46-16-401(4)(a), MCA, and the general instructions given to the jury were sufficient to cure any possible prejudice. The trial court properly handled the situation by simply ending the exchange. Any irregularity in this event did not affect defendant's substantial rights and must be disregarded. Chain - Evidence Rule of Defendant contends the District Court erred in admitting into evidence fingerprints and fingerprint testimony which allegedly was not secure from alteration or tampering prior to and during the trial. Defendant contends his conviction should be reversed because there "could have been" a master key that "could have been" used to obtain access to fingerprint evidence that was locked in the desk of a deputy sheriff. He argues the State failed to establish that the evidence had not been tampered with. The general rule concerning chain of evidence foundation is this: "The State must identify the particular exhibit as relevant to the criminal charge and must show prima facie that no alteration or tampering with the exhibit has occurred Once that has been done, the burden - proving alteration of to State v. Burtchett shifts - appellant. (1974), 165 Mont. 280, 28U, 530 P.2d 471, 475. (Emphasis added.) ... . ." Burtchett is analogous to this case. There, the defen- dant argued on appeal that the fact that several people had access to a forensic laboratory destroyed the custodial chain. This Court rejected that argument, finding the testimony of one of the chemists in the lab, to the effect that the evidence had been kept in the evidence room of the lab, was sufficient to establish the state's prima facie case. Similarly, in the present case, the deputy sheriff's testimony was sufficient to meet the prima facie test, as the record indicates. The burden shifted to defendant, who failed to show in any respect that the evidence was altered or tampered. No error. of from the Exclusion - Witnesses -- Courtroom Defendant argues the District Court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as a rebuttal witness after the same police officer violated a rule excluding witnesses from the courtroom and heard defendant's testimony. Rebuttal witnesses are not within the rule governing exclusion of sworn witnesses from the courtroom during taking of testimony. Sutterfield v. State (Okl. 1971), 489 Demonstrative Evidence Defendant contends the District Court abused its discretion in permitting the admission of demonstrative evidence into the trial. -16- The S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d s i x i t e m s f o r d e m o n s t r a t i v e purp o s e s o n l y : two p i e c e s of a wooden h a n d l e and p a r t s o f a n automobile--a c a r d o o r , a s t e e r i n g wheel on a d r i v e s h a f t , a d o o r knob on t h e c a r d o o r , and a g e a r s h i f t knob on t h e s t e e r i n g wheel. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d (1) i n a l l o w i n g t h e s e e x h i b i t s t o be a d m i t t e d ; (2) i n failing to give a cautionary jury i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t t h i s evidence w a s f o r d e m o n s t r a t i v e p u r p o s e s o n l y ; and ( 3 ) i n f a i l i n g t o f u r t h e r p o i n t o u t i n d e t a i l a l l changes between t h e e x h i b i t s and t h e o r i g i n a l i t e m s . "Generally, allowing demonstrative evidence i s within t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge, and i s s u b j e c t t o r e v i e w o n l y upon a showing of a m a n i f e s t a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . Brown v . North Am. Mfg. Co. . ." ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711, 722. An e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s case shows no a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . The t e s t i m o n y of w i t n e s s e s and com- ments of b o t h a t t o r n e y s and t h e t r i a l judge made clear t o t h e j u r y t h a t t h e i t e m s a d m i t t e d were d e m o n s t r a t i v e o n l y and w e r e n o t t h e a c t u a l i t e m s used i n t h e commission of t h e crime . F u r t h e r , d e f e n d a n t o f f e r e d no c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n concerning t h e demonstrative evidence. e r r o r on a p p e a l b e c a u s e none was g i v e n . 4 0 1 ( 4 ) ( a ) , MCA. H e cannot c l a i m See s e c t i o n 46-16- W e f i n d no e r r o r . of D o c t r i n e - Cumulative E r r o r Defendant a l l e g e s s u b s t a n t i a l e r r o r s were committed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and p r o c e dure during the t r i a l . These e r r o r s - t o t a l c o n s t i t u t e in c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r and have s e r i o u s l y p r e j u d i c e d d e f e n d a n t , according t o defendant. The " d o c t r i n e of c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r " e x i s t s i n Montana. Cumulative e r r o r r e f e r s t o a number of e r r o r s which p r e j u dice defendant's r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. S t a t e v . McKenzie 280, 581 P.2d 1205, 35 St.Rep. 759. A f t e r a complete r e v i e w of t h e r e c o r d and a p p l y i n g t h e d o c t r i n e , w e f i n d h e r e no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r a f f e c t i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of d e f e n d a n t . Merger - F e l o n i e s of Defendant n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n f o r a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g and r o b b e r y must be v a c a t e d b e c a u s e t h e s e o f f e n s e s w e r e merged f o r p u r p o s e s of punishment w i t h t h e f e l o n y murder o f f e n s e . T h i s merger, t h e r e f o r e , v i o l a t e s t h e d o u b l e jeopardy c l a u s e . W e f i n d no j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n d e f e n - d a n t ' s argument. The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d h e r e i s merely one of statutory interpretation. The d o u b l e jeopardy c l a u s e p r o t e c t s a g a i n s t b o t h mult i p l e p r o s e c u t i o n s and m u l t i p l e punishments imposed a t a s i n g l e p r o s e c u t i o n f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . v . P e a r c e ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U.S. 656. 711, 89 S.Ct. See North C a r o l i n a 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d The t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n i n g what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e same o f f e n s e d i f f e r s depending on whether t h e c a s e i n v o l v e s m u l t i p l e p r o s e c u t i o n s o r m u l t i p l e punishments imposed a t a s i n g l e prosecution. The s t a n d a r d i s b r o a d e r i n c a s e s i n v o l v - ing multiple prosecutions. Two s t a t u t o r y crimes t h a t con- s t i t u t e " t h e same o f f e n s e " f o r p u r p o s e s of m u l t i p l e p r o s e c u t i o n s do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e " t h e same o f f e n s e " f o r p u r p o s e s of m u l t i p l e punishments. 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. See Brown v . Ohio ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 2 2 2 1 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , d e f e n d a n t was t r i e d a t a s i n g l e p r o s e c u t i o n f o r a l l t h e s t a t u t o r y crimes i n q u e s t i o n . The i s s u e , t h e n , i s n o t one o f m u l t i p l e p r o s e c u t i o n s b u t of mulThe i s s u e i s w h e t h e r , under Montana's t i p l e punishments. s t a t u t o r y scheme, a d e f e n d a n t may be p u n i s h e d f o r b o t h f e l o n y homicide and t h e u n d e r l y i n g f e l o n y . The r e l e v a n t crimes and s t a t u t e s a r e d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 45-5102, MCA; r o b b e r y , s e c t i o n 45-5-401, napping, s e c t i o n 45-5-303, -502, MCA; MCA; aggravated kid- and s e c t i o n s 46-11-501 and MCA, m u l . t i p l e c h a r g e s and p r o s e c u t i o n s s t a t u t e s . A t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n i n g whether two s t a t u - t o r y c r i m e s c o n s t i t u t e " t h e same o f f e n s e " f o r p u r p o s e s of m u l t i p l e punishments was s e t f o r t h i n Blockburger v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. ". . . The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e i s t h a t where t h e same a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of two d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s , t h e t e s t t o be a p p l i e d t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e a r e two o f f e n s e s o r o n l y one, i s whether e a c h p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r e s proof o f a f a c t which t h e o t h e r does not. . ." I n Whalen v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 445 U.S. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 684, 100 S.Ct. 715, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c l a r i - f i e d t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s r u l e . The r u l e i s n o t always d i s p o s i t i v e on q u e s t i o n s o f d o u b l e jeopardy f o r p u r p o s e s o f m u l t i p l e punishments. The d i s p o s i t i v e q u e s t i o n i s whether t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o p r o v i d e f o r m u l t i p l e punishments. The Blockburger t e s t i s merely one r u l e of s t a t u t o r y cons t r u c t i o n t o a i d i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . The u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s one of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . Whalen, s u p r a . The d o u b l e jeopardy c l a u s e ". . . serves p r i n c i p a l l y a s a r e s t r a i n t on c o u r t s and p r o s e c u t o r s . The l e g i s l a t u r e remains f r e e under t h e Double J e o p a r d y C l a u s e t o d e f i n e c r i m e s and f i x punishments; b u t once t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s a c t e d c o u r t s may n o t impose more t h a n one punishment f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . . ." Brown v . Ohio, 432 U.S. a t 165. Having determined that this case turns on the permissibility of multiple punishments imposed at a single criminal proceeding, we find that the dispositive issue is whether the Montana legislature intended to allow a defendant to be punished for both felony homicide under section 45-5102 (1)(b), MCA, for robbery under section 45-5-401 (1)(a), MCA, and for aggravated kidnapping under section 45-5303(l) (b), MCA, where robbery and aggravated kidnapping were the underlying felonies in the felony homicide,. Specifically, the question confronting this Court is whether the Montana legislature intended to authorize cumulative punishments for aggravated kidnapping, robbery and felony murder based on one of the other prior statutes. This is a matter of statutory construction and does not concern a constitutional question. J., dissenting). Whalen, supra, (Rehnquist, We find that the majority opinion in Whalen does not apply to this case. There are several bases for finding that the legislature did not intend to preclude punishment for both felony homicide and, in this case, the underlying felonies of robbery and aggravated kidnapping in enacting the felony murder statute . First, application of the Blockburger test to the statutes involved does not result in the conclusion that the offenses of robbery and aggravated kidnapping are the "same offense" as felony homicide. Blockburger's analysis must stand or fall on the working of the statutes alone, not on the indictment. dissenting). J., Whalen, 100 S.Ct. at 1448 (~ehnquist, Looking at the statutes, then, it is clear that proof of felony homicide will not necessarily require proof of either robbery or aggravated kidnapping. One can commit felony homicide without committing robbery, or commit aggravated kidnapping without committing felony homicide. Thus, Blockburger does not require the conclusion that felony homicide and the underlying felony merge. Section 46-11-502, MCA, is merely a codification of the Blockburger test. Mont. See State v. Coleman (1979), 605 P.2d 1000, 1009-1010, 36 St.Rep. 1134, cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 2952. The second basis for finding no merger is the history and purpose of the felony homicide provision. The history of the common law and the purpose behind laws are both important tools to be used to determine legislative intent. Whalen, 100 S.Ct. at 1449 (~ehnquist, J., dissenting). The analysis of then Chief Judge Bazelon in United States v. Greene (1973), 160 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 44-45, 489 F.2d 1145, 1168-1169, is persuasive in this regard: ". . . At common law, homicides were divided into two categories, murder and manslaughter, with murder requiring a showing of 'malice.' Any homicide committed in the course of a felony was considered murder because malice could be implied from the commission of the felony. When homicides were further subdivided by statute into first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter, the doctrine of felony murder was preserved, and the underlying felony was viewed as providing the 'premeditation' and 'deliberation' otherwise required for first degree murder, as well as malice, where necessary. "Given this rationale for the felony murder doctrine, it strains credulity to hold that the underlying felony merges into the felony murder. The statute proscribing the underlying felony--robbery, for example--is designed to protect a wholly different societal interest from the felony murder statute, which is intended to protect against homicide. The underlying felony is an essential element of felony murder only because without it the homicide might be second degree murder or manslaughter. Clearly, neither manslaughter nor second degree murder merges with any other felony like robbery or assisting a prisoner to escape." Third, the legislature found that the homicidal risk is greater when there is a commission of a felony and that the protection of the person from this increased risk warranted additional sentences. The Criminal Law Commission Comment, on which the legislature relied in enacting section 94-5102, R.C.M. 1947, now section 45-5-102, MCA, stated: "Section [45-5-102, MCA] relates only to conduct which is done deliberately; that is, purposely or knowingly. The enumerated offenses in subsection (b) broaden the old law dealing with felony-murders, R.C.M. 1947, section 942503, to include any felony which involves force or violence against an individual. Since such offenses are usually coincident with an extremely high homicidal risk, a homicide which occurs during their commission can be considered a deliberate homicide. The section is intended to encompass most homicides traditionally designated as second-degree murder. Subsection (2) changes the punishment, providing that a person 'shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term not to exceed one hundred (100) years,' thus seeking to expand the sentencing latitude of the judge." ... ... Clearly, the legislature properly allowed and broadened the law relating to cumulative sentencing in felony murder cases. The enactment of the felony murder rule is supported by appropriate references to legislative history, the trend to encompass the felony murder rule and the desire of the legislature to prevent the commission of these types of dangerous crimes. imposed it. The legislature allowed it, and the court There are no issues other than those. If a defendant wants to commit a felony, he must pay a price. If a defendant wants to commit murder in addition to the felony or in the course of committing another felony, he must pay a higher price. The legislature manifested a clear intention to serve these two different interests in enacting the statutes. Errors Committed With Regard - Instructions To Defendant raises alleged errors committed by the District Court with respect to the instructions given and refused. Defendant did not raise any objection to amended Instruction No. 1, nor objected either to the giving of Instruction No. 1 insofar as it relates to the definition of robbery nor to the refusal of State's offered Instruction No. 26, defining "bodily injury." appeal. He cannot now object on See sections 46-16-401(4)(b) and 46-20-701, MCA; McGuinn v. State, supra. Neither did defendant raise the issue of lack of sufficient evidence of bodily injury inflicted in the course of the theft. He is likewise precluded from now raising that issue on appeal. See State v. Armstrong (1977), 172 Mont. 552, 562 P.2d 1129. Further, testimony supports the conclusion that the infliction of bodily injury was an integral part of carrying out the plan to get the victim's money. It meets the re- quired legal minimum evidence to support the jury's factual finding, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Defendant failed to object to Instructions 2, 16 and 32, and, in the case of No. 16 actually concurred in the request; therefore, these instructions are not reviewable on appeal. Further, review of these instructions fails to demonstrate any error. Defendant contends the court erred in giving Instruction 14 for it does not allow the jury to consider voluntary intoxication in defendant's behalf and irresistible impulse or diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication were effectively removed from the jury's consideration* Instruction 14 does not, as defendant contends, "inform the jury that the intoxication may not be considered if it is voluntarily induced." It stated specifically: "An intoxicated or drugged condition may be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense." That sentence was added to the offered instruction to meet defendant's objection that voluntary intoxication could eliminate criminal responsibility if it rendered a defendant incapable of forming a necessary mental state. We find no merit in defendant's argument. Next, Instruction 18 does not, as defendant contends, "inform the jury that defendant, having voluntarily stopped his efforts toward the commission of any of the charged offenses, was under a duty to stop the uncle from perpetrating them." It merely states that - the law does impose if a duty which a person is capable of performing, failure to carry out that duty may be a voluntary act. It does not impose any duty. Defendant challenges three instructions regarding proof of knowledge and purpose on the basis of Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed. 2d 39. The challenge, even if it were reviewable, has no merit. The same challenge was made about substantially the same instuction in State v. Sunday (1980), Mont. I 609 P.2d 1188, 37 St.Rep. 561, and was rejected. Furthermore, this challenge was not made in the is- trict Court so the issue is not reviewable on appeal. sections 46-16-401(4)(b) and 46-20-701, MCA; McGuinn v. State, supra; State v. Armstrong, supra. See Defendant c l a i m s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n 26, d e f i n i n g "knowingly," and I n s t r u c t i o n 27, d e f i n i n g "purposely." The second s e n t e n c e of I n s t r u c t i o n 26 s t a t e s : "When Knowledge of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i s an e l e m e n t of a n o f f e n s e , s u c h Knowledge i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a p e r s o n i s aware of a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s e x i s t e n c e . " T h i s C o u r t h a s r u l e d t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e t o " h i g h probab i l i t y " i n t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t v i o l a t e Sandstrom. S t a t e v . Coleman, s u p r a . D e f e n d a n t ' s c h a l l e n g e t o I n s t r u c t i o n 27 i s s i m i l a r t o h i s c h a l l e n g e t o No. 26: "A p e r s o n a c t s p u r p o s e l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s c o n d u c t o r t o a r e s u l t which i s a n e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e when h e h a s t h e c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t t o engage i n t h a t c o n d u c t o r t o c a u s e t h a t result. " Defendant c o n t e n d s t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t a k e s t h e S t a t e ' s burden of p r o o f , beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , and r e d u c e s i t t o something less t h a n proof by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e . T h i s i s done by a s u b t l e v e r b a l m a n i p u l a t i o n u s i n g t h e words " i n f e r , " " h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y , " and " c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t . " Defendant f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n and i s p r e c l u d e d from r a i s i n g a n o b j e c t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal. H i s o b j e c t i o n i s meritless i n any e v e n t . The same r e a s o n i n g a d o p t e d by Coleman i n a p p r o v i n g t h e "knowingly" i n s t r u c t i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e "purposely" i n s t r u c t i o n . The i n s t r u c t i o n merely d e f i n e s t h e e l e m e n t of p u r p o s e f u l n e s s p u r s u a n t t o Montana l a w . That d e f i n i t i o n , r e f e r r i n g t o a defendant's "conscious o b j e c t , " i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t with modern c o n c e p t s of i n t e n t . ". . . i t i s now g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d t h a t a p e r s o n who a c t s ( o r o m i t s t o a c t ) i n t e n d s a r e s u l t when he conof h i s a c t ( o r o m i s s i o n ) s c i o u s l y d e s i r e s t h a t r e s u l t , whatever t h e l i k e l i h o o d of t h a t r e s u l t happening from h i s Coleman, 605 P.2d a t 1056. conduct; . . .: . . ." A l l e g e d E r r o r s - -e F a i l u r e - In th To Give I n s t r u c t i o n s Defendant a r g u e s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 2 r e l a t i n g t o impeachment. ~ e f e n d a n tc o n t e n d s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n t o t h e j u r y were i n a d e q u a t e and t h a t a s t r o n g e r i n s t r u c t i o n s h o u l d have been g i v e n b e c a u s e s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s of t h e S t a t e w e r e former f e l o n s , w e r e r e l a t i v e s of t h e d e f e n d a n t , and had a d m i t t e d l y i n g on p r e v i o u s s t a t e m e n t s . R e f u s a l t o g i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e same s u b j e c t i s n o t S t a t e v. S u l l i v a n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , prejudicial error. , 595 P.2d 372, 36 St.Rep. 936. - Mont. There w e r e s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g impeachment of w i t n e s s e s and t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s . These i n s t r u c t i o n s were s u f f i - c i e n t t o c a u t i o n t h e jury as t o t h e w i t n e s s e s ' testimony d u r i n g t h e t r i a l and a s t o t h e law. These i n s t r u c t i o n s , r e a d a s a whole a s t h e y must b e , f u l l y and f a i r l y c o v e r t h e s u b j e c t of t h e j u r y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a w i t n e s s ' s c r e d i b i l i t y . Mont. , See S t a t e v. Azure ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 591 P.2d 1125, 36 St.Rep. 514. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 17. This i n s t r u c t i o n would have t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t d e f e n d a n t c o u l d n o t be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c r i m e s charged i f someone else performed t h e o f f e n s i v e conduct. The p l a i n l a n g u a g e of s e c t i o n 45-2- 302, MCA, i n d i c a t e s t h i s i s i n c o r r e c t . The r u l e was p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y i n a n o t h e r instruction. Defendant' s c o n t e n t i o n i s i d e n t i c a l t o one p r e s e n t e d i n S t a t e v . Owens ( 1 9 7 9 ) , P.2d 72, 36 St.Rep. t h e present case. properly refused. 1182. Mont. 597 The same h o l d i n g i s a p p l i c a b l e i n D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n was The judgment is affirmed. wJustice We concur: This cause was submitted prior to January 5, 1981. Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents dissent later. and will file a written

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