MARRIAGE OF SELL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 81-42 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LARRY KENNETH SELL, Petitioner and Respondent, and CAROL JEAN SELL, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Darrell S. Worm, Montana Legal Services, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent: Patrick M. Springer, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on briefs: Decided: May 15, 1981 ' JIII~~~S~O Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. The Flathead County District Court entered a decree of dissolution following a petition by husband, Larry K. Sell, and a trial without a jury. Carol Jean Sell, respondent and appellant, appeals from provisions of that decree relating to the distribution of marital assets. The parties were married from July 20, 1971, until the dissolution of the marriage on May 9, 1980. They had one time child who dissolution. was eight From 1971 years to 1980 old at there the were of several separations of unknown duration, but the final separation occurred in July 1979. Petitioner-respondent is employed by the Anaconda Copper Company with take-home wages of about $1,200 a month. The wife was working as a motel maid at the time of the dissolution and has had experience working as a licensed practical nurse. The major marital asset is a home purchased by the parties in December 1976, after they had been separated for several months. contributed At the time of purchase, the appellant $1,000 contributed $850. to the downpayment, and the husband The wife's contribution was from a sale of her former home. The parties lived until July 1980. unfinished. For in the home from December 1976 When they moved three years into the home it was they made substantial improvements to the home, most of the work being done by the husband. to The materials used to make the improvements came approximately devoted at least $5,500. 1,500 Petitioner hours in testified labor to that make he the improvements. In addition, he was a s s i s t e d by h i s f a t h e r who d i d n o t g e t any c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r h i s work. sharp disagreement over assisted in the worked about claims she improvements. one-half helped planned t o sell property the extent as very t o which is There the appellant S h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had much as her The little. husband, while parties he eventually . the house and p u r c h a s e a bigger piece of Due t o t h e i m p r o v e m e n t s p l u s a g e n e r a l i n f l a t i o n i n property values in the area, the property increased in v a l u e from t h e o r i g i n a l p u r c h a s e p r i c e o f $ 2 8 , 0 0 0 t o a v a l u e s e t by t h e t r i a l j u d g e a t $ 5 5 , 0 0 0 . upon by b o t h p a r t i e s . T h i s p r i c e was a g r e e d The n e t v a l u e o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , d e t e r m i n e d by s u b t r a c t i n g t h e v a l u e o f o t h e r d e b t s f r o m t h e e s t a t e , is $21,000. The m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t t o d i s t r i b u t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court c o n s i s t s of t h e following: t h e f a m i l y home, $ 5 5 , 0 0 0 ; p r o c e e d s from t h e s a l e o f a 1 9 7 6 Vega, $ 1 , 5 0 0 ; a V e n t u r a camper, valued a t $58,000. the house and $1,500. The t o t a l a s s e t s t h e r e f o r e were Debts of other and, the marital debts estate, consolidated owing on into home r e f i n a n c i n g , were $ 3 4 , 0 0 0 , l e a v i n g $ 2 4 , 0 0 0 i n n e t a s s e t s . Two i s s u e s a r e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t : ( 1 ) Does t h i s C o u r t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e a p p e a l ; and ( 2 ) d i d t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse its discretion in apportioning the marital p r o p e r t y of t h e p a r t i e s ? The f i r s t i s s u e stems from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r entered on f i n d i n g s of September 12, 1980. The f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f order modified the l a w more t h a n f i f t e e n days a f t e r submission of a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s t - t r i a l motions. By e x c e e d i n g t h e t i m e p e r i o d mandated by R u l e 5 9 , M.R.Civ.P., the District Court divested itself of jurisdiction d e t e r m i n e t h e m o t i o n , and i t s o r d e r was a n u l l i t y . Brute S t e e l Building, I n c . v. Bass ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 616 P.2d appeal 380, from untimely 37 the St.Rep. second under 1670. decree, Rule 5, The based j u r i s d i c t i o n a s t o t h e second d e c r e e . (1980)~ , Mont. Appellant on M.R.Civ.P., that order, we and that this I notice of was have no See P r i c e v . Zunchich 612 P.2d 1 2 9 6 , 37 S t . R e p . argues Marvel Mont. original to 1058. is c u r e d defect by the a p p e l l a n t having lodged an a p p e a l t o t h e f i r s t d e c r e e . W e agree. long The n o t i c e o f a p p e a l t o t h e f i r s t d e c r e e was f i l e d its after entry. However, the clerk of court i n a d v e r t e n t l y f a i l e d t o f i l e and s e r v e t h e n o t i c e o f e n t r y of judgment o f t h e f i r s t d e c r e e . begin the time for n o t i c e of S i n c e t h e r e was no d a t e t o t h e a p p e a l t o be filed, the n o t i c e was n o t u n t i m e l y . The t i m e t o a p p e a l , t h e r e f o r e , d i d not M.R.App.Civ.P., expire, and R u l e 5, was n o t v i o l a t e d . T h i s C o u r t c a n assume j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e a p p e a l . v . S e d i l l o ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 7 Mont. 1 0 1 , 535 P.2d The f i r s t and s e c o n d d e c r e e s d i d tially, and Respondent the reasons for the Haywood 1014. not appeal vary were substan- identical. is n o t p r e j u d i c e d by a s u r p r i s i n g s h i f t i n t h e s u b s t a n t i v e n a t u r e of t h e a p p e a l . W e appeal, now turn whether our there attention was an to abuse the of main issue d i s c r e t i o n by on the D i s t r i c t Court i n apportioning t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . Appellant recognizes that the District Courts have b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n u n d e r Montana l a w i n d i s t r i b u t i n g m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y b u t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s d i s c r e t i o n i s n o t unbounded. She a r g u e s t h a t under s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, the District C o u r t c a n n o t a c t a r b i t r a r i l y and m u s t c o n s i d e r a l l c r i t e r i a under the statute so that t h e r e w i l l be a j u s t , and r e a s o n a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n . equitable This Court has a l i m i t e d scope o f a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w and w i l l n o t i n t e r v e n e e x c e p t when t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h a s d e p a r t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y f r o m t h e norms o f equity. I n Re M a r r i a g e o f H e r r o n 608 P.2d 97, (1979)I 37 S t . R e p . Mont Appellant here . 387; , alleges In 600 P.2d that the s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h e norms o f Mont. (1980), Re Marriage of 1183, Jacobson 36 S t . R e p . District Court I 1773. departed e q u i t y and a s k s t h a t t h i s Court intervene. In 421, In 567 P.2d Mont. 451, appeal in Re Marriage of Berthiaume (1977), 1 3 8 8 , r e l y i n g on P o r t e r v . P o r t e r ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5 473 P.2d cases 538, we s e t t h e s t a n d a r d o f involving abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . claims that "arbitrary" review on the District Court T h e s e r e a s o n a b l e and u n d e r s t a n d a b l e g u i d e l i n e s were f o l l o w e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . nothing 1 7 3 Mont. in the District Court's There is determination, and we f i n d no e r r o r . T h e r e was no q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e bulk of personal property of c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d . t h e p a r t i e s nor w i t h t h e The o n l y q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n s t h e h o u s e . The v a l u e s o f t h e h o u s e , t h e c a r and t h e camper w e r e a g r e e d t o by s t i p u l a t i o n . of A p p e l l a n t t a k e s no i s s u e w i t h t h e v a l u e t h e c a r o r t h e camper, and f o r a l l i n t e n t s and p u r p o s e s is s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e g r a n t t o h e r o f downpayment on t h e h o u s e . t h e balance of her The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i v i s i o n o f t h e h o u s e , t h e r e m a i n i n g a s s e t , on o t h e r t h a n a 50-50 i s c l a i ' m e d a s e r r o r by a p p e l l a n t . basis T h i s C o u r t i n I n Re M a r r i a g e of Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 598 P.2d 1 1 2 0 , 36 S t . R e p . 1525, noted: " A 1 t h o u g h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may e q u a l l y divide the marital assets, such a d i s t r i b u t i o n i s n o t mandated by s e c t i o n 40-4202, MCA. S e e Kuntz v . Kuntz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont., 662. Section 5 9 3 P . 2 d 4 1 , 36 S t . R e p . 40-4-202 i s f l e x i b l e and i t v e s t s a good d e a l of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court. I n Re M a r r i a g e o f J o r g e n s e n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont., 590 P.2d 6 0 6 , 609, 36 S t . R e p . 233, 237. W have e s t a t e d , b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e , t h a t e a c h c a s e must be looked a t individually, with an eye t o its unique circumstances. J o r g e n s e n , 590 P.2d a t 609; Cook v . Cook ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 159 Mont. 9 8 , 495 P.2d 591. " The record here indicates that the District Court made e v e r y e f f o r t t o comply w i t h a l l p r e v i o u s p r o n o u n c e m e n t s in marital cases. the District By Court i t s p r e t r i a l o r d e r d a t e d J u n e 1980, specifically directed the parties to submit information concerning: "a. The n e t w o r t h o f t h e p a r t i e s a s o f t h e f i l i n g of t h e C o m p l a i n t . "b. Any p r o p e r t y e i t h e r c l a i m e d by r i g h t of inheritance or other q u a l i f i e d contribution. . I 1 c A l l p r o p e r t y t h a t is s u b j e c t t o distribution, including the values thereof. "d. The manner s h a l l be made." i n which said distribution T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was p r e s e n t e d by b o t h p a r t i e s by way of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, c o m p l y i n g w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f I n Re M a r r i a g e o f M c G i l l (198o)t - Mont . - 609 P.2d , 278, 37 S t . R e p . 578. D i s t r i c t C o u r t c h o s e t o a d o p t i t s own f i n d i n g s o f conclusions of law, rather than those The f a c t and s u b m i t t e d by e i t h e r p a r t y , which i n d i c a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s of a t its decision. s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, i n mind in arriving Appellant a l l e g e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s discretion general in distribution ways. factors First, enumerated of the in the marital court failed section assets to in two address the 40-4-202, with MCA, s p e c i f i c i t y i n f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w drawn from t h e evidence before Second, it. the D i s t r i c t Court a c t e d s o a r b i t r a r i l y t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of s a i d m a r i t a l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s was p e r se i n e q u i t a b l e . a s s e t s under find otherwise. the court's that the intervention. , Mont. The c o u r t ' s d i r e c t i v e s t o t h e p a r t i e s and f i n d i n g s of what dated f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f District Court did does See I n Re Marriage of 608 P.2d 9 7 , 37 S t . R e p . A review of law We July 1980, and Herron warrant (1980), 387. the findings of 16, not l a w show f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f the order modifying the f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 8 0 , w h e t h e r taken together or separately, and when reviewed with the r e m a i n d e r o f t h e t o t a l r e c o r d , show t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y gave c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e elements s e t f o r t h i n Jorgenson failed to and cases "articulate" cited each therein, item even if separately the court within its f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . While housewife, there is no question that appellant, as acquired a vested i n t e r e s t i n the property, a the c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t t h e w i f e " d i d n o t c o n t r i b u t e by work o r labor any a p p r e c i a b l e e f f o r t s i n improving t h e property." The reside with t h e husband d u r i n g record indicates that appellant did t h e e n t i r e time p e r i o d not in which t h e improvements t o t h e p r o p e r t y w e r e made. T h i s c a s e is n o t u n l i k e our r e c e n t d e c i s i o n wherein the appellant husband claimed to have made equal contributions to the "house" and therefore deserved one-half of the marital estate. Mont. , In Re Marriage of Nunnally (1981), 625 P.2d 1159, 38 St.Rep. 529, 531. There we found the case reflected a careful and conscientious consideration of the appropriate factors and affirmed the District Court. We find the same result should be reached here. Affirmed. We concur: %ti he J Chief ustd & d e w
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
