REECE v PIERCE FLOORING

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No. 80-463 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 MICHAEL L. REECE, Plaintiff and Appellant, PIERCE FLOORING, a Montana Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone. Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Charles E. Snyder, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole Montana & Dietrich, Billings, Submitted on briefs: June 17, 1981 B)CT Decided: -. QG7 Filed :- J 1 3 1981 C h i e f ~ u s t i c eF r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e Court. Mr. I n an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f Yellowstone County g r a n t e d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f d e f e n d a n t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s . case-in-chief p l a i n t i f f M i c h a e l Reece a p p e a l s . Reece, a b u i l d i n g c o n t r a c t o r w o r k i n g u n d e r t h e b u s i n e s s name of M E n t e r p r i s e s , had b e e n a c u s t o m e r o f P i e r c e F l o o r i n g & R s i n c e 1972. On A u g u s t 1 6 , 1 9 7 7 , Reece owed P i e r c e F l o o r i n g $ l r 2 0 1 . 2 0 f o r c a r p e t i n s t a l l e d a t 807 S a d d l e f o r c a r p e t i n g i n s t a l l e d a t 134 Lantana Drive. rive and $ 1 , 3 7 2 . 8 0 Reece owed P i e r c e F l o o r i n g a t o t a l o f $ 2 , 7 4 4 . 5 6 o n t h e two a c c o u n t s , i n c l u d i n g interest. B e f o r e Reece l e f t f o r v a c a t i o n on A u g u s t 1 6 , 1 9 7 7 , h e wrote a c h e c k to P i e r c e F l o o r i n g and a s k e d h i s m o t h e r t o d e l i v e r i t f o r him. I n t e n d i n g t o p a y o n l y t h e amount owed o n t h e S a d d l e D r i v e a c c o u n t b u t n o t r e c a l l i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a m o u n t , h e wrote o u t a b l a n k c h e c k t o P i e r c e F l o o r i n g , n o t i n g as a m e m o "807 Saddle Drive." H e t h e n a s k e d h i s m o t h e r to f i n d o u t t h e amount owed o n t h e S a d d l e D r i v e a c c o u n t , f i l l i n t h a t amount o n t h e c h e c k , and g i v e it t o p i e r c e F l o o r i n g . When R e e c e ' s m o t h e r went t o P i e r c e F l o o r i n g , s h e t a l k e d t o a n e m p l o y e e a t t h e f r o n t d e s k and a s k e d how much was owed o n t h e Saddle Drive account. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Reece's m o t h e r , s h e was t h e n t o l d t h a t s h e would h a v e t o p a y t h e e n t i r e a m o u n t f o r b o t h t h e S a d d l e D r i v e and t h e L a n t a n a D r i v e a c c o u n t s o r e l s e P i e r c e F l o o r i n g would p l a c e l i e n s o n t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s . C o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e p o s s i b l e l i e n s , Reece's m o t h e r made t h e c h e c k o u t f o r $2,744.56 t h e e n t i r e amount owed o n b o t h a c c o u n t s to P i e r c e F l o o r i n g r a t h e r t h a n j u s t t h e amount owed o n t h e S a d d l e Drive account. The c h e c k was r e t u r n e d f o r i n s u f f i c i e n t f u n d s . Reece's mother t o l d h e r son about t h e circumstances surrounding h e r d e l i - v e r y o f t h e c h e c k when h e r e t u r n e d from v a c a t i o n i n e a r l y September. H e knew t h a t t h e c h e c k had n o t c l e a r e d when he r e c e i v e d h i s b a n k s t a t e m e n t i n mid-September . From m i d - S e p t e m b e r t o h i s a r r e s t on November 2 7 , 1 9 7 7 , Reece made no f u r t h e r c o n t a c t w i t h P i e r c e F l o o r i n g and t o o k no a c t i o n t o p a y h i s a c c o u n t . On S e p t e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 7 7 , P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f i l e d l i e n s o n b o t h t h e S a d d l e D r i v e and t h e L a n t a n a D r i v e p r o p e r t i e s . In e a r l y O c t o b e r t h e c h e c k was r u n t h r o u g h a s e c o n d t i m e and r e t u r n e d a g a i n f o r i n s u f f i c i e n t funds. P i e r c e F l o o r i n g made s e v e r a l a t t e m p t s t o c o n t a c t Reece b u t f a i l e d . d i s c o n n e c t e d i n mid-October R e e c e l s b u s i n e s s phone was and h i s home phone was u n l i s t e d . P i e r c e F l o o r i n g t h e n m a i l e d t o Reecels home a d d r e s s a c e r t i f i e d l e t t e r n o t i f y i n g Reece t h a t c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n may be i n i t i a t e d b y P i e r c e F l o o r i n g i f t h e c h e c k w a s n o t made good w i t h i n f i v e d a y s , as p r o v i d e d i n s e c t i o n 45-6-316, MCA. The r e g i s t e r e d l e t t e r was r e t u r n e d t o P i e r c e F l o o r i n g marked " r e f u s e d . " Reece t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e had n o t r e c e i v e d t h e r e g i s t e r e d l e t t e r s i n c e he d i d n o t r e c e i v e h i s m a i l a t h i s house a d d r e s s b u t a t h i s p o s t o f f i c e box. On O c t o b e r 2 5 , Ron P i e r c e , g e n e r a l m a n a g e r o f P i e r c e F l o o r i n g , s i g n e d a n " ~ n v e s t i g a t i v eForm f o r Bad C h e c k s and F o r g e r i e s " w h i c h was t h e s t a n d a r d form u s e d b y t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r or n o t t o p r o s e c u t e a bad c h e c k c h a r g e . One q u e s t i o n a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e c h e c k was g i v e n i n payment f o r a n e x i s t i n g d e b t , to which P i e r c e F l o o r i n g r e p l i e d "yes." The d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y who s u b s e q u e n t l y d e c i d e d to p r o s e c u t e t h e c a s e , t e s t i f i e d a t t h e t r i a l t h a t h e would h a v e r e j e c t e d and p r o b a b l y d i d r e j e c t t h e case a t t h a t t i m e b e c a u s e of t h e a f f i r m a t i v e answer to t h e e x i s t i n g d e b t q u e s t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , o n November 1, a c o m p l a i n t w a s f i l e d i n t h e J u s t i c e C o u r t o f Y e l l o w s t o n e County o n t h e c h a r g e o f i s s u i n g a b a d c h e c k ( f e l o n y ) i n t h a t M i c h a e l R e e c e " w i t h t h e p u r p o s e to s e c u r e p r o p e r t y , to w i t : l i e n w a i v e r s on real e s t a t e and f i x t u r e s " i s s u e d t h e check. The r e c o r d is u n c l e a r a s to how t h e d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y came to t h e b e l i e f t h a t l i e n w a i v e r s had b e e n g i v e n i n e x c h a n g e f o r f u l l payment. The d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d h a v e come from e i t h e r l a w e n f o r c e m e n t p e r s o n n e l o r from a n e m p l o y e e o f p i e r c e F l o o r i n g , b u t he c o u l d n o t remember why he t h o u g h t l i e n w a i v e r s h a d b e e n g i v e n t o Reece. On S u n d a y , November 2 7 , 1 9 7 7 , Reece w a s a r r e s t e d i n h i s home. H e w a s booked and k e p t i n t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y j a i l u n t i l he a r r a n g e d b a i l o f $2,800. On December 1, 1 9 7 7 , t h e c o m p l a i n t was d i s m i s s e d by t h e d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t new e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t it was n o t i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e to p r o s e c u t e . T h e r e a f t e r Reece f i l e d a c i v i l a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e cution against Pierce Flooring. 6 , 1980. I t came o n f o r t r i a l o n O c t o b e r A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s case-in-chief the District Court granted P i e r c e F l o o r i n g ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t as f o l l o w s : "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . W e l l , g e n t l e m e n , o n t h e a u t h o r i t y t h a t ' s b e e n c i t e d to m e , t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f l a c k o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e is a q u e s t i o n o f l a w t o be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e Court--and t h a t s p e c i f i c a l l y is Wendel v s . M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e I n s u r a n c e Company, 8 3 Montana 252--I t h i n k t h e C o u r t i s c o m p e l l e d t o g r a n t t h e m o t i o n and d i s m i s s t h e c o m p l a i n t i n t h i s c a u s e , and i t is SO o r d e r e d . " P l a i n t i f f Reece a p p e a l s p r e s e n t i n g e s s e n t i a l l y t w o i s s u e s f o r review: (1) Is p r o b a b l e c a u s e a q u e s t i o n o f l a w t o be d e t e r m i n e d by the Court? (2) I f n o t , is t h e e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t to c r e a t e a j u r y i s s u e on p r o b a b l e c a u s e ? In a c i v i l action f o r malicious prosecution, the p l a i n t i f f m u s t a l l e g e and p r o v e (1) t h a t a j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g w a s commenced and p r o s e c u t e d a g a i n s t him, ( 2 ) t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n st i g a t i n g , prosecuting o r continuing such proceeding, ( 3 ) t h a t t h e r e w a s l a c k o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e for d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t s , ( 4 ) t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a c t u a t e d b y malice, ( 5 ) t h a t the j u d i c i a l proceeding terminated favorably f o r p l a i n t i f f , a n d ( 6 ) t h a t p l a i n t i f f s u f f e r e d damage and t h e amount t h e r e o f . McGuire v. A r m i t a g e ( 1 9 7 9 ) , St.Rep. 189. Mon t . I 6 0 3 P.2d 2 5 3 , 36 2142; S t e p h e n s v. C o n l e y ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 48 Mont. 3 5 2 , 1 3 8 P. The i s s u e s i n t h i s a p p e a l c o n c e r n t h e t h i r d e l e m e n t l i s t e d above. I n t h i s case t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d t h a t l a c k o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e was a q u e s t i o n o f l a w t o be d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e c o u r t o n t h e b a s i s o f o u r 1928 o p i n i o n i n Wendel v . M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e I n s u r a n c e Co., 8 3 Mont. 2 5 2 , 272 P. 245. T h i s was e r r o r . W e acknowledge t h e e x i s t e n c e of an i s o l a t e d g e n e r a l state- m e n t i n Wendel t o t h a t e f f e c t : "Therefore, i n actions for malicious p r o s e c u t i o n s , t h e real c o n t r o v e r s y i s , g e n e r a l l y , upon t h e q u e s t i o n o f malice and w a n t o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e . The b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g t h e s e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s rests upon t h e p l a i n t i f f , and w h e t h e r t h e r e was a w a n t o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e is p u r e l y a q u e s t i o n o f law." Wendel i n v o l v e d a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n a c t i o n by a d i s c h a r g e d employee a g a i n s t h i s former employer f o l l o w i n g d i s m i s s a l of a l a r c e n y p r o s e c u t i o n i n s t i g a t e d by h i s former employer. A jury v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f t h e d i s c h a r g e d e m p l o y e e was r e v e r s e d o n a p p e a l on t h e ground t h a t t h e u n c o n t r o v e r t e d f a c t s e s t a b l i s h e d p r o b a b l e c a u s e as a matter o f law. I n t h a t c o n t e x t where t h e f a c t s o f t h e l a r c e n y were u n d i s p u t e d and t h e c r i m i n a l c h a r g e was d i s m i s s e d f o r f a i l u r e of t h e s t a t e to d i l i g e n t l y p r o s e c u t e t h e same, t h e q u e s t i o n of p r o b a b l e c a u s e became a q u e s t i o n of l a w f o r the court. W e e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s r u l e g e n e r a l l y to a c t i o n s f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n h o l d i n g t h e r u l e p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e o n l y w h e r e t h e r e is no c o n f l i c t i n t h e e v i d e n c e on t h e i s s u e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e and s u c h u n c o n t r o v e r t e d e v i d e n c e a d m i t s of o n l y one c o n c l u s i o n on t h a t i s s u e . The c a s e s o f Orser v. S t a t e o f Montana ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 1 2 6 , 582 P.2d 1 2 2 7 , and 3-D Lumber C o . v . B e l g r a d e S t a t e ~ a n k ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. 4 8 1 , 487 P.2d 1 1 3 6 , a r e s i m i l a r to Wendel. In b o t h cases t h e e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g to t h e p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e was u n d i s p u t e d and a d m i t t e d o f o n l y o n e conclusion. Under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e i s s u e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e became a q u e s t i o n o f l a w f o r t h e c o u r t . Any a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h a t p r i n c i p l e t o cases i n v o l v i n g c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e o n t h e i s s u e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e is e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e d . P u u t i o v. Roman ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 7 6 Mont. 1 0 5 , 2 4 5 P. 5 2 3 e x p r e s s e s t h e c o r r e c t r u l e i n m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n cases. There t h i s Court reversed a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t f o r t h e defendant s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w i n t h i s language: " I t is s e t t l e d i n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n , and elsewhere generally, t h a t a cause should never b e w i t h d r a w n from t h e j u r y , u n l e s s t h e c o n c l u s i o n n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s , a s a matter o f l a w , t h a t a r e c o v e r y c a n n o t be had upon a n y v i e w w h i c h c a n r e a s o n a b l y be t a k e n o f t h e f a c t s which t h e evidence tends t o e s t a b l i s h . A motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t is i n e f f e c t a d e m u r r e r to t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s e v i d e n c e ; i t a d m i t s as t r u e a l l m a t e r i a l f a c t s i n e v i d e n c e w h i c h t e n d to e s t a b l i s h p l a i n t i f f ' s c a u s e o f a c t i o n , w h e t h e r s u c h f a c t s be p r o d u c e d b y t h e p l a i n t i f f or t h e d e f e n d a n t . Such f a c t s , w i t h e v e r y l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e t h a t may be d r a w n f r o m them, a r e t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . The f a c t t h a t t h e testimony i n behalf of the defense pleaded is u n c o n t r a d i c t e d w i l l n o t j u s t i f y a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n favor of the defendant, i f the i n f e r e n c e s to be drawn from it a r e o p e n t o d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s b y r e a s o n a b l e men ( C i t a t i o n s omitted. ) ." The d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e j u d g e and j u r y f u n c t i o n was r e c e n t l y s u c c i n c t l y e x p r e s s e d b y t h e G e o r g i a C o u r t of A p p e a l s i n t h i s manner: "Want o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e is a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n c a u s e of a c t i o n . O r d i n a r i l y , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e is a q u e s t i o n of fact f o r j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Only w h e r e t h e m a t e r i a l f a c t s are n o t i n d i s p u t e , o r when o n l y r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e c a n be drawn from t h e evidence, d o e s t h e e x i s t e n c e of probable c a u s e become a n i s s u e o f l a w f o r t h e c o u r t to resolve." K v i t e n v. Nash ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 5 0 Ga.App. 589, 258 S.E.2d 271. We hold, therefore, that a directed verdict in a malicious p r o s e c u t i o n a c t i o n is e r r o r where t h e e v i d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g reason a b l e i n f e r e n c e s , is s u s c e p t i b l e t o d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s b y r e a s o n a b l e men when viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p a r t y opposing t h e d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . W e f u r t h e r hold t h a t under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e i s s u e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e m u s t be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n and n o t be d e c i d e d b y t h e c o u r t as a m a t t e r o f law. W e now e x a m i n e t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p l a i n t i f f to d e t e r m i n e i f t h e e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h a j u r y i s s u e on p r o b a b l e c a u s e . P r o b a b l e c a u s e means "reasonable grounds f o r s u s p i c i o n , supported by circumstances r e a s o n a b l y s t r o n g i n t h e m s e l v e s to w a r r a n t a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t a n d c a u t i o u s man i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e a c c u s e d is g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e w i t h w h i c h he is c h a r g e d . " C o r n n e r v. H a m i l t o n ( 1 9 2 2 ) , 6 2 Mont. 2 3 9 , 204 P. 4 8 9 , q u o t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l i n Orser v. S t a t e o f Montana, s u p r a . Moreover, s i n c e an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s prosecu- t i o n r u n s c o u n t e r to i m p o r t a n t l e g a l and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s , s u c h as e n c o u r a g i n g c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t t h o s e who a p p e a r g u i l t y o f a crime, it is n o t f a v o r e d b y t h e l a w and t h e b u r d e n o n t h e p l a i n t i f f is h e a v y . W e n d e l , s u p r a ; Orser, s u p r a . The u n d i s p u t e d e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f Reece w a s c h a r g e d o n t h e b a s i s o f a r e p o r t s i g n e d b y p i e r c e who i n s t i g a t e d t h e criminal proceeding. T h e r e was no f u l l d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e c h e c k to t h e p r o s e c u t o r t h e n or t h e r e a f t e r . Pierce did not disclose the following f a c t s : (1) t h a t R e e s e t s m o t h e r p a s s e d t h e c h e c k t o P i e r c e F l o o r i n g i n t h e i n c r e a s e d amount a f t e r b e i n g a d v i s e d t h a t l i e n s would be f i l e d a g a i n s t b o t h p r o p e r t i e s i f t h e c h e c k were n o t made o u t f o r t h e f u l l a m o u n t , ( 2 ) t h a t l i e n s had b e e n f i l e d a g a i n s t b o t h p r o p e r t i e s , ( 3 ) t h a t t h e r e p o r t was turned over t o the p o l i c e department a f t e r P i e r c e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t Reece was n o t g o i n g t o come i n and work o u t s o m e t h i n g on t h e c h e c k . A d d i t i o n a l l y an employee of P i e r c e F l o o r i n g t e s t i f i e d by d e p o s i t i o n t h a t she k e p t P i e r c e informed of anything on t h e c a s e t h a t came t o h e r a t t e n t i o n and d i s p u t e d many o f P i e r c e ' s s t a t e m e n t s i n d i c a t i n g h i s l a c k o f knowledge on d e v e l o p m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g The b a s i s o f t h e cri- t h e p r o g r e s s of p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h e c a s e . m i n a l c h a r g e s a g a i n s t Reece was t h a t t h e c h e c k was g i v e n t o s e c u r e l i e n w a i v e r s from p i e r c e on t h e two p r o p e r t i e s . When t h e p r o s e c u t o r c o n t a c t e d P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f o r c o p i e s of t h e l i e n w a i v e r s , t h i s employee d i d n o t t e l l him t h e r e were no l i e n w a i v e r s b u t i n s t e a d wrote him a m e m o s t a t i n g : " I c a n 9t f i n d a c o p y o f t h e l i e n w a i v e r . The g i r l t h a t was h e r e b e f o r e m e would n o t a l w a y s t a k e c o p i e s of t h e l i e n waivers." T h i s memorandum was d a t e d November 4 , 1 9 7 7 , almost two m o n t h s a f t e r l i e n s had b e e n f i l e d b y p i e r c e F l o o r i n g a g a i n s t b o t h properties. W e h o l d t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t to p r e - s e n t a j u r y i s s u e on t h e p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Reece . The t o t a l e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t s a b a s i s f o r d i f f e r i n g conclusions concerning whether P i e r c e F l o o r i n g 9 s a c t i o n s were t h o s e t h a t would w a r r a n t a r e a s o n a b l y c a u t i o u s and p r u d e n t man to b e l i e v e t h a t Reece was g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e o f which he was c h a r g e d ; w h e t h e r t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e i s s u a n c e and d e l i v e r y of t h e c h e c k were f a i r l y p r e s e n t e d t o l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s ; w h e t h e r t h e c h a r g e was f i l e d to collect a p r e e x i s t i n g d e b t w i t h n o t h i n g of v a l u e g i v e n t o Reece; and w h e t h e r P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f a b r i c a t e d f a c t s to m o t i v a t e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t Reece. These a r e i s s u e s f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n by a j u r y , n o t q u e s t i o n s of l a w t o be d e c i d e d b y t h e Court. W e e x p r e s s no o p i n i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e u l t i m a t e d e t e r - m i n a t i o n o f t h e s e i s s u e s , o n l y t h a t t h e y are p r o p e r l y t o be r e s o l v e d by a j u r y . The d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and judgment a r e v a c a t e d . i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r a new t r i a l . This cause Chief ~ u s t i c e We concur: Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority here has allowed themselves the luxury of becoming involved in a morass of Red Herrings about lien waivers, etc., and uncontroverted evidence, and has totally disregarded the authority that pertains when a citizen proceeds through the county attorney rather than directly, i.e., a justice court complaint. On October 25, 1977, Ron Pierce, general manager of Pierce Flooring, signed an "Investigative Form for Bad Checks and Forgeries," the standard form used by the Yellowstone County Attorney's office prosecute a bad check charge. to decide whether The form was - - - - to filled out properly, including-one question which asked whether the - -check was given in payment for an existinq debt,- which - toPierce Floorinq replied "yes." The deputy county attorney who subsequently decided to prosecute the case testified at the trial that- would havehe ------- rejected, and probably did -reject the case, atthat time because of the affirmative -answer to the existinq debt question. Nevertheless, on November 1, a complaint was filed in the Justice Court of Yellowstone County on the charge of issuing a bad check (felony) in that Michael Reece "with the purpose to secure property, to wit: lien waivers on real estate and fixtures" issued the check. The record is unclear as to how the deputy county attorney came to the belief that lien waivers had been qiven in exchange for f u l l ~ 9 m e n t . The deputy---countyattorney testified that such information ---or could have come from either law enforcement personnel-, f r o m a n e m l --------------------------- ~--o y e eo f P i e r c e F l o o r i n g--but - he could not why -e t h o u q h t l i e n - a i v e r-----------g ------hw s had been iven t o rem mb - e- e r Reece. The c o u n t y attorney's office received a note from P i e r c e F l o o r i n g on November 8 , 1 9 7 7 , s t a t i n g t h a t c o p i e s o f a lien waiver could not attorne who s w o r e ------- y-----------o u t be found. The d e p u t y c o u n t y t h e -f f i d a- t i n s u p p o r t o f t h a v ie c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t R e e c e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h a d h e n o t b e e n --o s b u s y , h e would h a v e d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e a t t h a t t i m e o r would h a v e c o n f i r m e d t h a t l i e n w a i v e r s c o u l d n o t be f o u n d a n d t h e n would h a v e d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e . On Sunday, November 2 7 , h i s home. 1 9 7 7 , R e e c e was a r r e s t e d i n He was booked and k e p t i n t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y j a i l u n t i l he arranged b a i l of $2,800. On December 1, 1 9 7 7 , t h e c o m p l a i n t was d i s m i s s e d by t h e d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t new e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t was n o t i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e t o p r o s e c u t e . Reece p r e s e n t s e s s e n t i a l l y Whether the District Court one i s s u e f o r review: erred by granting Pierce F l o o r i n g ' s motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t Reece f a i l e d t o show want o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e on t h e p a r t o f Pierce Flooring. Reece a r g u e s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f want of probable c a u s e s h o u l d n o t h a v e been d e c i d e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a s a matter of l a w because t h e record c o n t a i n s s u f f i c i e n t proof of probable cause to submit this issue t o the jury. He a r g u e s s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t when t h e e v i d e n c e h e p r e s e n t e d is viewed i n i t s most f a v o r a b l e l i g h t i t shows: 1. Pierce Flooring's a c t i o n s were n o t those of a p r u d e n t , c a u t i o u s and r e a s o n a b l e man; 2. A l l f a c t s surrounding t h e c h e c k were n o t f a i r l y and f u l l y r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s ; 3. The c h a r g e was filed to collect a preexisting d e b t and n o t h i n g o f v a l u e was g i v e n t o R e e c e ; 4. P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f a i l e d t o make s u f f i c i e n t i n q u i r y i n t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which t h e c h e c k was i s s u e d ; a n d 5. Pierce enforcement Flooring officer and intentionally fabricated misled facts the to law motivate c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t Reece. I t is t r u e t h a t upon a m o t i o n f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t by a p a r t y , t h e e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d by t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y m u s t be viewed i n i t s m o s t f a v o r a b l e l i g h t . Northwestern , Telephone 615 P.2d cited therein. Systems, 176, 178, Nevertheless, t h e l i g h t most the record. favorable 1247, Mont. 1249, and c a s e s s u c h a r u l e d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h i s C o u r t c a n make numerous n o t s u p p o r t e d by (1980), Inc. 37 S t . R e p . See S i s t o c k v. factual i n f e r e n c e s which are Considering the evidence i n t o Reece, cannot I say that the D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n its v e r d i c t . F u r t h e r , it is a w e l l - s e t t l e d is it the function of the rule in this state that court to determine whether probable cause e x i s t s i n a malicious prosecution case; it is a q u e s t i o n of law t o be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e c o u r t . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. v. B e l g r a d e S t a t e Bank P.2d 1136, 1140; ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 83 Mont. 1 2 6 , 582 P.2d ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. Wendel 252, 1227; 263, v. 481, Metropolitan 272 P . 245, 3-D 249. Orser v. Lumber Co. 488-489, Life Ins. 487 Co. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was t h e r e f o r e a c t i n g w i t h i n i t s p r e r o g a t i v e t o d e c i d e t h i s c a s e on a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , a s a m a t t e r o f l a w , if the r e c o r d s u p p o r t s i t s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Reece f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t fa h i s p r i m a --- c i e case of malicious prosecution and, in particular, acted t h a t Reece f a i l e d t o show t h a t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g without probable cause by going to the Yellowstone C o u n t y A t t o r n e y and f i l l i n g o u t a n i n f o r m a t i o n s h e e t on bad checks . T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t want o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e i s t h e g i s t of an a c t i o n f o r malicious p r o s e c u t i o n . Armitage ( 1 9 7 9 ) , , Mont. 603 P.2d McGuire v . 253, 36 S t . R e p . 2142; W i l s o n v . G e h r i n g ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 2 Mont. 221, 448 P.2d 678; Fauver Cornner v. Wilkoske v. (1949), Hamilton 1 2 3 Mont. (1922), P r o b a b l e c a u s e means 62 228, Mont. 211 P.2d 239, " r e a s o n a b l e ground 204 for 420; 489. P. suspicion, s u p p o r t e d by c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g i n t h e m s e l v e s to warrant belief a reasonably prudent and cautious man in the t h a t t h e a c c u s e d i s g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e w i t h which he i s c h a r g e d . " C o r n n e r , 62 Mont. a t 243, 204 P. a t 4 9 1 , a s q u o t e d i n O r s e r , 1 7 8 Mont. a t 1 3 7 , 582 P.2d a t 1 2 3 3 . More- o v e r , s i n c e an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n runs counter t o i m p o r t a n t l e g a l and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s , s u c h a s e n c o u r a g i n g criminal proceedings crime, against t h o s e who a p p e a r g u i l t y of a i t i s n o t f a v o r e d by t h e law and t h e b u r d e n on t h e p l a i n t i f f i s heavy. S e e Wendel, 83 Mont. a t 262-263, a t 248; a c c o r d , O r s e r , 1 7 8 Mont. Reece, therefore, had a 272 P. a t 1 3 5 , 582 P.2d a t 1 2 3 2 . heavy burden to show that P i e r c e F l o o r i n g a c t e d w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e , and c l e a r l y h e cannot meet that heavy burden by arguing only tenuous inferences. A l t h o u g h t h e r e may b e some q u e s t i o n a s t o a f u l l d i s c l o s u r e of a l l of t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e i s s u a n c e of t h e check, i t i s c l e a r f r o m t h e r e c o r d t h a t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g was r e l y i n g-p o n t h e d e c i s i o n s made -t - e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s u a-t h - office concerniny what--information----. was important and what -----information was not important. ------- Pierce Flooring truthfully and accurately filled out the county attorney's information -sheet on which the decision to prosecute was based. Any confusion over the existence of lien waivers was eradicated on November 8, when the county attorney's off ice received the note from Pierce Flooring tnat there was no record of November any lien waivers. 27, when Reece was From November 8, 1977 to arrested, according to the testimony of the deputy county attorney in charge of the case, there was sufficient disclosure of information by Pierce Flooring to warrant dismissal of the case. As this Court noted in Halladay v. State Bank of Fairfield et al. (1923), 66 Mont. 111, 117-118, 212 P. 861, ". . .The rule is that, where the prosecutinq officer starts a criminal proceedinq upon a -full and fair statement of the facts from the the state; and so he accuser, --------- he acts for- does when he proceedsuponhis own personal knowledqe . . . "Generally, it may be said that a prosecuting officer is charged with the duty of determining when to commence a particular prosecution, and when to discontinue it. He stands upon a different footinq- - a defendant, from r who goes to- T u -- n o f the peace, swears a out a warrant, and directs the prosecutinq -------officer- see to its execution. The county to attorney in this-------------n l y-------state, not o directs under what conditions a criminal action shall be commenced, but from the time-----e g --it b i n s until it ends his supervision and control is -----complete, limited only by such restrictions as the law imposes. . . ". . . If, therefore, a prosecuting officer incorrectly determines that certain facts given to him constitute a crime and proceeds the to set o n foot necessary action, - informant is not liable, because the fault is B not his, but -that of the officer. . -(Emphasis supplied.) ." In light of Pierce Flooring's reliance on the expertise of the county attorney's office in terms of what information was important and what was not, it cannot be said that Pierce Flooring was not acting prudently cautiously and without probable cause. I would affirm the District Court's directed verdict for Pierce Flooring. Justice and

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