SAMPSON v SNOW
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No. 81-177 IN THE SURPEMF, COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 ARTHUR SAMPSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs . JAYNE SNOW, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula. Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Williams Law Firm, Missoula, Montana Submitted on briefs: July 2, 1981 Decided : Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d the Court. t h e Opinion of T h i s a c t i o n i n v o l v e s an a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t t r i e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of S t a t e o f Montana, jury t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of the i n and f o r t h e C o u n t y o f M i s s o u l a . delivered a special Plaintiff-appellant verdict for the The defendant. f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l which was d e n i e d , and t h i s a p p e a l r e s u l t s . On J u l y 1, 1 9 7 6 , a p p e l l a n t a t t e m p t e d t o make a l e f t t u r n from t h e n o r t h b o u n d l a n e o f R e s e r v e S t r e e t , C o u n t y o f Missoula, Road. into t h e westbound Respondent, attempted turning. t o pass They markings lane of traveling t h e Wheeler on Reserve north Village Street, a p p e l l a n t on t h e l e f t collided. prohibiting a s h o r t l y a f t e r 10:OO a . m . , A t t h e t i m e of There pass, were and the a s a p p e l l a n t was no signs collision or road occurred on a c l e a r d a y , and on a d r y r o a d . t h e a c c i d e n t , a p p e l l a n t was e n g a g e d i n his duties as a r u r a l mail carrier for t h e United S t a t e s Postal Service. H e turned north onto Reserve S t r e e t a f t e r making a s t o p , and t r a v e l e d a t a b o u t t h i r t y m i l e s p e r h o u r behind an a s p h a l t t r u c k . accident, left turn Wheeler According t o h i s v e r s i o n of a p p e l l a n t checked indicator V i l l a g e Road about h i s mirror 100 to 150 intersection. He and turned yards on h i s before testified the that the he s l o w e d down a s h e a p p r o a c h e d t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and m o t i o n e d an ice cream d e l i v e r y t r u c k , which was s t o p p e d on Wheeler V i l l a g e Road w a i t i n g t o t u r n n o r t h o n t o R e s e r v e S t r e e t , e n t e r t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and t u r n . The Wheeler V i l l a g e Road i s s l a n t e d s o a s t o make a t u r n g r e a t e r After the ice cream truck a p p e l l a n t began h i s t u r n . had to cleared t h a n 90 d e g r e e s . the intersection, H e was moving a t from f i v e t o t e n miles an hour, when he was hit on the side of his car by respondent's vehicle. The first contact occurred toward the rear of appellant's vehicle and respondent's vehicle then slid along the side of appellant's vehicle. According to respondent, she was traveling on Reserve Street at thirty-five to forty-five miles an hour, accelerated to fifty miles an hour to pass a truck, and then returned to the northbound lane Wheeler Village Road intersection. as she approached the After that pass, she saw a car and a truck well ahead of her. She testified that she approached the vehicles at approximately forty to forty-five miles an hour and decided to pass them. She accelerated to fifty to fifty-five miles an hour and began her pass approximately 100 feet behind the appellant's vehicle, which was near the intersection. She intended to pass both appellant and the truck in front of him. Respondent testified that appellant did not signal for a left turn; that she did not see the ice cream truck turn onto Reserve Street; and that appellant was traveling between thirty and thirty-five miles an hour at the time of the impact. The visibility was clear for three miles south of the intersection according to the testimony of respondent. There was conflict in the respondent's testimony over whether appellant turned into her or she hit appellant. Appellant argues that respondent's testimony was that he turned while safely out in front of her. Testimony also was given that when respondent got out of her vehicle, the first thing she said to appellant was, "You doff, you cut right in front of me." Photographs of the vehicles introduced at the trial showed the left pushed o u t , The front bumper of appellant's vehicle was b u t t h e l e f t f r o n t h e a d l i g h t was n o t damaged. greatest f r o n t fender damage just to appellant's i n f r o n t of vehicle was t h e l e f t door. the left The p h o t o - g r a p h s a l s o show t h a t t h e r i g h t f r o n t g r i l l o f r e s p o n d e n t ' s v e h i c l e was p u s h e d i n and t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t damage t o h e r v e h i c l e was on t h e r i g h t f r o n t f e n d e r i m m e d i a t e l y a b o v e t h e wheel. T h e r e w e r e some s c r a t c h e s a l o n g t h e r i g h t s i d e o f h e r v e h i c l e which was 1972 J e e p Commando. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e two p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e a c c i dent, two w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e c o l l i s i o n . Brooks, who appellant the ice cream slowed and motioned testified Brooks that appellant turning left, testify, from drove however, the several but Postal days Brooks that in a Service after did the truck, him not accident Street. indicated h e was to conducted that Reserve recall statement who testified into somehow Bruce how. an an occur red He did investigator investigation that appellant signaled. The other witness was d r i v i n g a bread d e l i v e r y t r u c k t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t . Frank Hazelbaker, toward who was the intersection a t H e t e s t i f i e d he d i d n o t s e e t h e c o l l i s i o n o c c u r b e c a u s e he was l o o k i n g a t a p a s s e n g e r a t t h e time. H e did hear the c o l l i s i o n , after the collision, vehicle airborne. and at saw t h e s c e n e a n i n s t a n t that time saw respondent's H e n o t e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s t u r n s i g n a l was on w i t h i n f i v e s e c o n d s a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n . He t e s t i f i e d , however, he d i d n o t s e e a p p e l l a n t ' s t u r n s i g n a l b e f o r e t h e c o l l i s i o n b e c a u s e r e s p o n d e n t ' s v e h i c l e was i n h i s way. Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n : Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r 1. that t h e mere fact that an in instructing the jury accident occurred, considered a l o n e , does n o t r a i s e a l e g a l i n f e r e n c e of negligence? Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o s e t a s i d e 2. t h e v e r d i c t on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d i d n o t j u s t i f y it? The f i r s t i s s u e concerns t h e g i v i n g of No. 32 o v e r a p p e l l a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n . Instruction This i n s t r u c t i o n reads: "The mere f a c t t h a t a n a c c i d e n t h a p p e n e d , considered alone, does not give r i s e t o l e g a l i n f e r e n c e t h a t i t was c a u s e d by n e g l i g e n c e o r t h a t any p a r t y t o t h i s a c t i o n was n e g l i g e n t or otherwise a t fault." Appellant's o b j e c t i o n was instruction is evidence negligence of accident. t o a jury, given. inappropriate made where beyond on the there the mere is grounds the substantial happening of an The g i v i n g o f t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n c a n be c o n f u s i n g and i n t h e f u t u r e we recommend t h a t i t n o t b e W e f i n d , h o w e v e r , no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r n e c e s s i t a t i n g r e v e r s a l b e c a u s e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was g i v e n i n t h i s c a s e . Appellant argues that this i n s t r u c t i o n h a s been e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e d i n c a s e s i n which r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r i s a p p l i c a b l e . H e l m k e v . Goff ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1131, 36 S t . R e p . F o u n d a t i o n (1978 ) 1647. 1104, , Mont. and Hunsaker Mont H e l m k e involved a . , v. Bozeman , 597 P.2d Deaconess 588 P.2d 493, 35 S t . R e p . s i n g l e c a r a c c i d e n t i n which t h e p a s s e n g e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f , was i n j u r e d . The c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on b o t h o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e and r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r . The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o gave a "mere h a p p e n i n g " i n s t r u c t i o n . This Court held t h a t a r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r "mere happening" instruction are so i n s t r u c t i o n and a incompatible as to r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l b e c a u s e t h e j u r y may c o n s i d e r i t s e l f f o r e - closed from c o n s i d e r i n g pening of t h e evidence provided the accident i t s e l f . by t h e hap- Appellant argues here t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h e Court is whether t h e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n Helmke s h o u l d b e e x t e n d e d t o o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s . Respondent argues instruction that the is clearly law g i v e n statement of correct in an in the ordinary negligence c a s e a n d s h o u l d be a l l o w e d . T h i s Court has d i s c u s s e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , o r one l i k e i t , i n numerous n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s f r o m a t l e a s t 1 9 1 5 t h r o u g h 1976 i n a v a r i e t y o f f a c t u a l t e x t s . ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 167, 545 P.2d 1074; Community H o t e l ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 0 Mont. v. Shaughnessy (1972), Flansberg v. P.2d Negaard 446 263; P.2d (1967), 436; D i n g w a l l Co. v. Johnson 332, v. 435 Service 307, 1141; F r i e s 496 P.2d Feda P.2d 460 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 2 Mont. 47, 369; 127, 1159; 53, Protestant ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 5 Mont. Flying 502 P.2d Bozeman ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 4 Mont. E s t a t e of MacDonald 1 5 0 Mont. Co. Campbell v. 327, 1 5 9 Mont. Montana Power v. See Erickson v. P e r r e t t Episcopal Jackson v. Church William 399 P . 2 d 236; Stocking ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 3 Mont. 61, 387 P.2d 3 1 2 ; W y r i c k v . H o e f l e ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 6 Mont. 172, 346 P.2d 563; S t a t e v. B a s t ( 1 9 4 4 ) , 1 1 6 Mont. 3 2 9 , 1 5 1 P.2d 1 0 0 9 ; B a a t z v . Noble ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 1 0 5 Mont. ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 1 0 1 Mont. 187, 59, 69 P.2d 53 P.2d 579; Cowden v . 98; Mellon v. Kelly (1935), 99 Mont. 1 0 , 4 1 P.2d 49; L e s a g e v . L a r g e y Lumber Co. 99 Mont. 3 7 2 , 43 P.2d 1 5 0 , 11 P.2d (1935), 8 9 6 ; A u t i o v . M i l l e r ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 92 Mont. 1 0 3 9 ; a n d Lyon v . C h i c a g o , M . ( 1 9 1 5 ) , 50 Mont. Crippen 5 3 2 , 1 4 8 P. & St.P. Ry. Co. 386. Respondent n o t e s t h a t i n none o f t h e s e c a s e s s t a t i n g the general applicable. rule was the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur I t h a s been o n l y r e c e n t l y t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s i d e r t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f a "mere happening" properly instruction instructed in on Bozeman a case the where d o c t r i n e of Deaconess jury the also is res ipsa loquitur. Hunsaker v. Hunsaker, t h i s Court considered a c a s e involving c l a i m s of medical malpractice. of professional instruction Foundation, supra. In The C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t i n t h e c o n t e x t malpractice, a "mere fact of an injury" e v e n w h e r e --- i p s a l o q u i t u r res is proper, is i n v o l v e d b u t i m p l i e d t h a t s u c h a n i n s t r u c t i o n would n o t be proper i n an o r d i n a r y r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r t y p e o f c a s e . This explicit in implication v. Helmke in our Gaff, Hunsaker supra, o p i n i o n was made where t h e Court con- s i d e r e d t h e p r o p r i e t y o f a "mere h a p p e n i n g " i n s t r u c t i o n i n a res ipsa loquitur case involving professional, negligence. only The C o u r t , simple, i.e., not in a closely divided o p i n i o n , h e l d i t was n o t p r o p e r t o g i v e a "mere h a p p e n i n g " i n s t r u c t i o n i n a r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r c a s e because t h e r e , the p e c u l i a r n a t u r e o f t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s a l l o w t h e j u r y t o i n f e r n e g l i g e n c e from t h e happening of the accident itself. Thus, the i n s t r u c t i o n and t h o s e on t h e d o c t r i n e o f "mere happening" res ipsa loquitus were t o t a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e . W n o t e t h a t n e i t h e r Hunsaker n o r Helmke o v e r r u l e a n y e prior c a s e s on on r e p r e s e n t a break the i s s u e of negligence. Nor do t h e y i n o u r l o n g s t a n d i n g t r a d i t i o n a l law t h a t t h e mere h a p p e n i n g o f an accident, considered alone, does n o t g i v e r i s e t o an i n f e r e n c e t h a t i t was c a u s e d by n e g l i gence. The c a s e s simply recognize t h e obvious--that res a - i p s a l o q u i t u r c a s e is an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e . Appellant has s t a t e d the issue, "The q u e s t i o n p o s e d by t h i s c a s e i s w h e t h e r t h e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n H e l m k e s h o u l d be e x t e n d e d t o o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s . " that is n o . negligence would be Such a n in this extension state unacceptable would Our a n s w e r t o change the in a very fundamental hold that the to "mere law way. of It happening" i n s t r u c t i o n i s a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e b u t t h e n h o l d t h a t t h e j u r y s h o u l d n o t be i n f o r m e d a s t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r r u l e o f law. Here jury that the they challenged instruction could neither find does driver not tell negligent. the It merely s t a t e s t h a t t h e jury cannot i n f e r t h e negligence of e i t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t from t h e s i n g l e f a c t t h a t t h e two c o l l i d e d on a highway. I n l i g h t of instructions and t h e f a c t s of the jury's t h i s case, the other jury special verdict, it is c l e a r t h a t t h e g i v i n g o f t h e "mere h a p p e n i n g " i n s t r u c t i o n h e r e was reversible not/error. T h i s i s a c l a s s i c p a s s i n g and t u r n i n g c a s e . It i s c l e a r from t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e a r e a where t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d was s t r i p e d t o a l l o w p a s s i n g and t h a t no s i g n s o r m a r k i n g s w e r e p r e s e n t t o p r o h i b i t passing. i n t o which By t h e u n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e t h e roadway plaintiff was intending to t u r n was simply a p r i v a t e d r i v e w a y , open t o t h e p u b l i c u s e , w i t h n e i t h e r t h e s t a t e n o r t h e c o u n t y h a v i n g any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n it. Thus, appellant i t i s c l e a r t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had a r i g h t t o p a s s at the particular time and p l a c e and a l s o t h a t a p p e l l a n t had a r i g h t t o make a l e f t t u r n i n t o t h e d r i v e w a y . The j u r y was e x p l i c i t l y and c o m p l e t e l y i n s t r u c t e d on t h e v a r i o u s d u t i e s i n c u m b e n t on e a c h d r i v e r turning situation. There were no i n a passing- objections to these i n s t r u c t i o n s made on a p p e a l . In particular we note t h a t t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d on t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f the passing driver : ". . . no v e h i c l e s h a l l be d r i v e n t o t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e c e n t e r o f t h e roadway i n o v e r t a k i n g and p a s s i n g unless such o v e r t a k i n g o r p a s s i n g can be completed without interfering with the s a f e operation any v e h i c l e o v e r t a k e n . " Instruction of No. 1 5 . . . . . . . . . . ". . . when a v e h i c l e is t r a v e l i n g a t a s l o w r a t e o f s p e e d and i n d i c a t e s a l e f t t u r n by a n a u t o m a t i c s i g n a l 1 0 0 f e e t o r more b e f o r e turning, the d r i v e r of the following vehicle must y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way t o t h e t u r n i n g vehicle." I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 6 . "The d r i v e r o f a motor v e h i c l e i s presumed t o s e e t h a t which he c o u l d s e e by l o o k i n g . He w i l l n o t be p e r m i t t e d t o s a y t h a t h e d i d n o t s e e what h e m u s t h a v e s e e n had h e l o o k e d . The d u t y t o k e e p a l o o k o u t i n c l u d e s a d u t y t o see t h a t which i s i n p l a i n s i g h t . " Instruct i o n No. 20. . . . . . . "A p e r s o n o p e r a t i n g a vehicle s h a l l d r i v e i t i n a c a r e f u l and p r u d e n t manner and he s h a l l d r i v e i t s o a s n o t t o unduly o r unreasonably endanger t h e l i f e , limb, property, or other r i g h t s of a person e n t i t l e d t o t h e use of t h e s t r e e t o r highway. . .. "The d r i v e r o f a v e h i c l e s h a l l d r i v e a t a n a p p r o p r i a t e r e d u c e d s p e e d when a p p r o a c h i n g Instrucand c r o s s i n g a n i n t e r s e c t i o n t i o n No. 1 0 . . . ." H e r e , t h e j u r y was a l s o p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d i n d e t a i l a s t o t h e d u t i e s of the turning driver. In addition, the j u r y was g i v e n a l l t h e s t a n d a r d i n s t r u c t i o n s on n e g l i g e n c e , violation of statutes and proximate cause. The j u r y was c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t y i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e a c t s and omiss i o n s of respondent t h a t would c o n s t i t u t e negligence. It was a l s o i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e l e g a l meaning o f n e g l i g e n c e , and t h e s t a n d a r d by which i t was t o be m e a s u r e d . W h i l e t h e e v i d e n c e was in some c o n f l i c t on c e r t a i n critical points--most importantly, whether appellant had a c t i v a t e d h i s t u r n s i g n a l p r i o r t o t h e t i m e o f impact--there was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e on b o t h s i d e s w h i c h , could j u s t i f y a v e r d i c t f o r e i t h e r p a r t y . if believed, The j u r y r e t u r n e d a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t i n which t h e y a n s w e r e d "no" t o t h e f i r s t question asked, "Was t h e d e f e n d a n t n e g l i g e n t ? " specifically that r e s p o n d e n t was not They f o u n d negligent. For the r e a s o n s a b o v e g i v e n , w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e g i v i n g o f t h e instructions. The s e c o n d i s s u e is w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o s e t a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t on t h e g r o u n d s t h e e v i dence d i d n o t j u s t i f y it. The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e f o r t h i s Court i n viewing evi- d e n c e i s t h a t "where a f a c t i s s u e o r i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d b e f o r e a c o u r t s i t t i n g w i t h a j u r y , and t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e jury v e r d i c t , c l u s i v e on a p p e a l . " 588 P.2d s u c h v e r d i c t i s con- Holm v . P a r s o n s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 5 3 1 , 533, 36 S t . R e p . 11, 1 3 . Mont. , H e r e t h e r e was s u b - s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t of t h e v e r d i c t . The a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d when a p p e l l a n t began t u r n i n g l e f t o n t o t h e Wheeler V i l l a g e Road j u s t a s r e s p o n d e n t was p a s s i n g . The r e c o r d i s c l e a r t h a t t h e r e w e r e no r o a d m a r k i n g s o r s i g n s o r a n y t h i n g on t h e roadway t o p r e v e n t r e s p o n d e n t from p a s s i n g a p p e l l a n t where s h e d i d . p u b l i c highways. T h e r e was no a c t u a l i n t e r s e c t i o n b e t w e e n two Wheeler V i l l a g e Road i s a c t u a l l y a d r i v e - way a s i t i s n o t m a i n t a i n e d by t h e s t a t e o r t h e c o u n t y . p a r t i e s were w i t h i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e speed l i m i t s , All and t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t e i t h e r was d r i v i n g u n r e a s o n ably. The one s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t i n t h e e v i d e n c e was t h e issue of whether appellant activated Respondent s a i d t h a t he d i d n o t . d r i v e r of turn signal. Witness Hazelbaker, t h e bread d e l i v e r y t r u c k , d i d n o t remember his the was n o t p o s i t i v e . He s e e i n g any t u r n s i g n a l flashing but tes- t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t a t u r n s i g n a l was o n . B r o o k s , t h e d r i v e r of t h e ice cream t r u c k , t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t i n d i c a t e d he was t u r n i n g , b u t d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t t h e t u r n s i g n a l was o n . W e find t h a t respondent presented substan- t i a l evidence along with her own t e s t i m o n y which q u a l i f i e d the the case structed, for submission without to objection, jury. that The jury was "the d i r e c t evidence inof one w i t n e s s who i s e n t i t l e d t o f u l l c r e d i t i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e p r o o f o f any f a c t i n t h i s c a s e , " and "you a r e n o t bound t o d e c i d e i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f a n y number o f w i t n e s s e s n o t p r o d u c i n g c o n v i c t i o n i n y o u r minds a g a i n s t a l e s s e r number or a g a i n s t a presumption o r o t h e r evidence s a t i s f y i n g your m i n d s . " case, and under it t h e T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n is t h e law of t h e jury could believe respondent and d i s b e l i e v e a p p e l l a n t , a s it a p p a r e n t l y d i d . There being substantial evidence in the record to s u p p o r t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t , t h e judgment o f t h e l o w e r c o u r t i s a f f irmed. W concur: e ? dd , A &+ g Chieef J u s t i c e
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