KIENAS v PETERSON
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No. 80-100 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1981 KENNETH KIENAS, Claimant and Appellant, JAMES G. PETERSON, Employer and STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t . Appeal from: Workers' Compensation C o u r t , The H o n o r a b l e W i l l i a m E. Hunt, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: D a t s o p o u l o s , MacDonald & L i n d , M i s s o u l a , Montana r - - - - -F o r Respondent : G a r r i t y , Keegan & Brown, H e l e n a , Montana F o r Amicus C u r i a e : M a r r a , Wenz, J o h n s o n & Hopkins, G r e a t F a l l s Gough, S h a n a h a n , J o h n s o n & Waterman, H e l e n a , Montana Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, T o o l e & D i e t r i c h , B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted on Rehearing: Decided Filed: MPR 4 A fq - ke: Nov. 1 2 , 1980 :MAR 4 - 1981 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an opinion on rehearing. @ October 22, 1980, this Court issued Kienas v. State Fund (1980), Mont . I - P.2d , 37 St.Rep. 1747. There we set aside a full and final compromise settlement agreement entered into by an injured workman (Claimant Kenneth Kienas) and the Workman Compensation State Fund. The agreement was set aside because of mutual mistake of a material fact by both parties upon entering into the agreement. We remanded the case to the Workers' Compensation Court to determine the extent of the injuries that were sustained by claimant and for appropriate compensation. Subsequently, a petition for rehearing was filed with this Court on our decision in Kienas. We reaffirm our decision and will address several issues raised by the rehearing petition. Petitioner argues that the Workers' Compensation Court had no power to alter or rescind a full and final compromise settlement agreement four years after the parties had executed the same. Section 39-71-204, MCA. However, in Kienas, the Workers' Compensation Court did not set aside the agreement. This Court set aside the agreement. Our appellate power is not limited to section 39-71-204 or 39-71-2909, MCA. See sec- tion 3-2-204, MCA. It is a universally accepted tenet of contract law, statutory in our state, that consent to the contract is lacking if it is entered into through mutual mistake of a material fact by the parties. We found such a mutual mistake in the compromise settlement agreement in this case. In applying ordinary contract law to reach our result, we are not unduly broadening the possibilities of reopening workers' compensation settlements. We are s i m p l y f i n d i n g h e r e t h a t a c o n t r a c t t o s e t t l e d i d n o t e x i s t i n t h e f i r s t place. The p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g i s d e n i e d . Justice - I/+ -- J W e concur: Justices . . . - T h i s c a u s e was s u b m i t t e d p r i o r t o J a n u a r y 5 , 1981.
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