ESTATE OF PELTOMAA
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No. 80-418 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 I N THE PUTTER O F THE ESTATE OF JACK LYLE PELTOMAA, D e c e a s e d . A p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of S i l v e r B o w , T h e H o n o r a b l e A r n o l d O l s e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For Appellant: W. D. M u r r a y , J r . , B u t t e , Montana For R e s p o n d e n t : N e i l J. L y n c h , Butte, Montana S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s ; Decided : Filed; 3UN 1 1 198ii A p r i l 22, f l H 1 7 18 99 1981 Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal arises from an order of the Silver Bow County District Court, the Honorable Arnold Olsen presiding, wherein the court dismissed appellant's petition for formal intestacy proceedings, after finding that appellant was not the common-law wife of the deceased, Jack Lyle Peltomaa, and had no interest in his estate. Jack L. Peltomaa died intestate on June 11, 1979. Decedent's brother, respondent herein, filed an application for informal appointment of personal representative on August 1, 1979. On the same day, letters were issued appointing respondent personal representative. Upon learning of the application and appointment, appellant, Debbie Guardipee, on March 19, 1980, filed a petition for formal determination of intestacy, determination of heirs, for supervised administration, and appointment of personal representative. In filing the petition for formal proceedings, appellant sought to have her self determined to be the surviving common-law spouse and, therefore, heir and to have herself appointed personal representative under a supervised administration of the estate. Respondent filed objections to the petition and brought to the court's attention an agreement signed by both appellant and respondent. The agreement was dated June 15, 1979, and provided: . . 'I. in view of the renunciation by DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] [appellant] in the Estate of JACK1E LYLE PELTOMAA, the PELTOMAA FAMILY conveys to DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] all of the household and personal property that may be in the possession of the PELTOMAA FAMILY because of the death of JACKIE LYLE PELTOMAA. "The PELTOMAA FAMILY will pay for any outstanding debts that DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] may have at the present time." After a hearing, the District Court denied all of appellant's surviving contentions concerning common-law her status spouse and dismissed respondent the right petition, granting informal administration of the to as her formal continue estate as the an personal representative. The main District Court decedent's issue before erred common-law in this Court failing wife. In to find this is whether the appellant the regard, appellant alleges that the existence of a marital relationship between her and the decedent is supported by the following evidence and testimony presented to the District Court during the hearing on the petition: (1) Appellant testified that she had lived with the decedent from February 1976 until his death and that she considered herself married testified that the decedent to him. Appellant further represented to others that appellant was his wife; that the decedent's aunt introduced her to some friends as Debbie Peltomaa; and that title to her car was in both appellant's and the decedent's name (the actual title was never produced at trial). (2) Respondent testified that various debts paid in behalf of appellant, in accordance with the June 15, 1979, agreement, represented monies owed by both appellant and the decedent. In particular, respondent testified that a Household Finance bill represented monies obtained by appellant and the decedent to pay for the purchase of a television and to pay for their moving expenses. Appellant also points to testimony by respondent f a m i l y have p a i d a p p e l l a n t $1,000, t h e s e l l i n g of the time of h i s d e a t h . trailer in title not was he and his p a r t i a l l y o b t a i n e d from d e c e d e n t was l i v i n g in a t the ( A p p e l l a n t a d m i t t e d , however, t h a t t i t l e t o t h e t r a i l e r was i n d e c e d e n t ' s name, s p a c e was that both their in names. appellant's although the rented Respondent name or in contends the the decedent's name. ) ( 3 ) A p e r i o d i c s t a t e m e n t from M o u n t a i n B e l l F e d e r a l Credit Union was submitted i n d i c a t i n g p a y m e n t s made on a l o a n g i v e n t o a p p e l l a n t u n d e r t h e name D e b b i e K . P e l t o m a a . ( 4 ) Appellant introduced a hospital b i l l dated April 24, 1 9 7 9 , which l i s t s a p p e l l a n t ' s (Guardipee) Peltomaa and which name a s Mrs. indicates Debbie K. t h a t Jack L. P e l t o m a a is h e r h u s b a n d . Appellant contends the b i l l a l s o shows maintained that the decedent p o l i c y on h e r a s h i s w i f e . a medical insurance (Upon e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e b i l l , h o w e v e r , we s h o u l d n o t e i t m e r e l y l i s t s J a c k P e l t o m a a a s t h e "responsible party or know what kind" of n e x t of insurance kin" and states: is a v a i l a b l e . "doesn' t There i s no i n d i c a t i o n on t h e b i l l t h a t a p p e l l a n t was a c t u a l l y c o v e r e d by a n i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y a s t h e d e c e d e n t ' s w i f e . ) ( 5 ) Appellant also introduced a tax return filed jointly by decedent 1978 f e d e r a l income and appellant as h u s b a n d and w i f e . Respondent evidence, claims appellant has that in still light of all the above failed to establish the e x i s t e n c e of a common-law m a r r i a g e . I n support of h i s p o s i t i o n , respondent contends t h a t h i s b r o t h e r n e v e r c o n s i d e r e d h i m s e l f m a r r i e d and was m e r e l y living with appellant. Respondent appellant only represented herself further a s Mrs. argues that P e l t o m a a when i t was t o h e r f i n a n c i a l b e n e f i t ( i . e . , i n b o r r o w i n g money o r i n filing a joint tax t e s t i m o n y used return) and i n support of own s e l f - s e r v i n g points out appellant's statements. If that the position only a r e her a p p e l l a n t had b e e n l i v i n g w i t h t h e d e c e d e n t a s h u s b a n d and w i f e f o r o v e r t h r e e y e a r s , why was s h e u n a b l e t o p r o d u c e a n o t h e r w i t n e s s t o c o r r o b o r a t e her allegations? Respondent also appellant an end; that a f t e r being indicated that arrangements renouncing testimony informed of that their appellant and to the effect that l i v i n g w i t h t h e d e c e d e n t a t t h e time o f a p p e l l a n t was n o t h i s death; notes that did she decedent's death, r e l a t i o n s h i p was a l r e a d y a t nothing signed the about June the 15 funeral agreement, any i n t e r e s t i n d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e w i t h t h e name Debbie G u a r d i p e e , n o t Debbie Peltomaa. To e s t a b l i s h a common-law m a r r i a g e i t h a s been h e l d t h a t t h e proponent must prove: ". . . t h a t t h e p a r t i e s were c a p a b l e of c o n s e n t i n g t o t h e m a r r i a g e and t h e r e was m u t u a l and p u b l i c a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l relation. The m a r r i a g e m u s t t a k e i m m e d i a t e l y and i t c a n n o t be c r e a t e d p i e c e m e a l . I t comes i n s t a n t l y i n t o b e i n g , o r i t d o e s n o t come a t a l l ; and i t s p a r t i e s must e n t e r i n t o a c o u r s e of conduct t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r e p u t e a s husband and w i f e . " I n Re M c C l e l l a n d ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 1 6 0 , 164-165, 5 4 1 P.2d 780, 783. 210, 448 P.2d v. Townsend 148; See a l s o Miller Elliot Lumber v. Co. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. Industrial Accident Board ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 1 0 1 Mont. 246, 53 P.2d 451. I n considering the t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s m a t t e r , we n o t e t h a t t h e f a c t s u s e d t o s u p p o r t t h e existence of a common-law marriage are mere isolated instances i n which a p p e l l a n t a s decedent's wife. agreement between marriage; they The allegedly represented facts appellant do not fail and to the estabish show any s p e c i f i c decedent a herself concerning continuous marital r e l a t i o n s h i p and a r e i n c o n f l i c t w i t h t e s t i m o n y p r e s e n t e d by respondent. T h i s Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held that the evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t m u s t be viewed by u s i n a l i g h t most favorable credible to the evidence prevailing consistent If findings will not be appeal. See Olson v. Westfork P r o p e r t i e s , I n c . 154, 164 Mont. of 557 P.2d findings the Court, 821; 9 0 , 519 P.2d 1 4 6 . Court's conclusion consummated, that either the on ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 171 Rose (1974), I n s o reviewing t h e proceedings w e f i n d no e r r o r t h e lower c o u r t h e r e , of disturbed M i s s o u l a v. C i t y of is there with District Mont. those party. appellant formally and or in the District the decedent informally, a never marital relationship. Appellant has contending that dismissing her rejecting is based spouse. decedent further the petition never Court was we on in appeal error for proceedings. need only i n t h e e s t a t e of in In note that t h e decedent contention t h a t she is a surviving already determined consummated acknowledging issue formal argument, s o l e l y on h e r renunciation for alleged interest Having second District appellant's appellant's a raised the agreement, a marital existence this Court that appellant relationship, of and appellant's must agree and in signed with the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a s no interest in properly the estate and find that the petition was dismissed. The order of dismissal as entered Court is a f f i r m e d . Justice We concur: by the District
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