ROY v NEIBAUER

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No. 80-434 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 ROB ROY, individually and as guardian ad litem of HEATHER ROY, Plaintiff and Appellant, WALTER NEIBAUER, Defendant and Respondent. 1 from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Regnier and Lewis, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: , Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, Great Falls, Montana Thomas Boland, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on briefs: December 30, 1980 oecided Filed: ;, * :ggj Clerk R 9B 1cJ81 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a summary judgment order entered by the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District. Plaintiff-appellant, individually and as guardian ad litem of his daughter Heather, sued defendant-respondent Walter Neibauer and defendant John Carlson for injuries received by Heather in August 1978. After extensive discovery, respon- dent Neibauer filed a motion for summary judgment. District Court ruled in favor of that motion. The Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court in September 1979. Roy v. Neibauer (1980), - Mont. St.Rep. 897. , 610 P.2d 1185, 37 We dismissed the appeal without prejudice because it was taken prematurely. Subsequently, appellant dismissed all complaints against defendant John Carlson and again appealed the order of the District Court. Walter Neibauer purchased a duplex on August 19, 1978. Two separate tenant families resided in the duplex pursuant to a preexisting lease, the Rob Roy family and the John Carlson family. The Carlsons owned a small cocker spaniel dog, and their lease expressly allowed them to maintain the dog on the premises. On August 27, 1978, or eight days after Neibauer acquired the duplex, the Carlson dog bit Heather Roy in the front yard of the duplex on the Carlsons' lawn area. Rob ROY, as guardian ad litem for his minor daughter, filed a complaint against both the dog's owner and the owner of the duplex. Two issues are raised on this appeal: 1. What duty, if any, did Neibauer, as owner and landlord of a duplex, owe to ROY, a tenant, for injuries r e c e i v e d on t h e d u p l e x ' s f r o n t lawn from a dog owned and h a r b o r e d by a n o t h e r t e n a n t , C a r l s o n , when Neibauer purchased t h e duplex s u b j e c t t o t h e Carlson l e a s e allowing Carlson t o have t h e dog, and when t h e dog i n j u r e d t h e Roy c h i l d b e f o r e Neibauer c o u l d have l e g a l l y t a k e n any s t e p s t o remove t h e dog from t h e p r e m i s e s o r t o o t h e r w i s e c o n t r o l t h e dog? 2. When a r e d e p o s i t i o n expenses properly taxed a s c o s t s i n f a v o r of t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n summary judgment cases? The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t s i n c e Montana l a w and t h e C a r l s o n l e a s e r e q u i r e d Neibauer t o g i v e C a r l s o n a t l e a s t f o u r t e e n d a y s t n o t i c e t o remove t h e dog, and s i n c e t h e dog i n j u r e d t h e c h i l d only nine days a f t e r Neibauer's purchase, r e s p o n d e n t , a s a m a t t e r of l a w , had no d u t y t o p r o t e c t Roy from t h e dog s i n c e h e had no l e g a l remedy t o remove o r c o n t r o l t h e dog. I t i s a n e l e m e n t a r y p r i n c i p l e of l a w t h a t b e f o r e a c l a i m f o r r e l i e f c a n be made a g a i n s t a d e f e n d a n t f o r n e g l i gence, t h e e x i s t e n c e of a d u t y by t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e p l a i n t i f f must b e shown, a l o n g w i t h t h e b r e a c h of t h a t d u t y and a r e s u l t i n g i n j u r y . 309, 292 P. Kakos v. Byram ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 88 Mont. 909; J a c k s o n v . William Dingwall Company (19651, 1 4 5 Mont. 127, 399 P.2d 236. The e x i s t e n c e of a d u t y i s a m a t t e r of l a w t o b e d e t e r mined by t h e c o u r t and n o t t h e j u r y . Kakos, s u p r a . Here, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e c i d e d a s a m a t t e r of l a w t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d no d u t y from r e s p o n d e n t t o a p p e l l a n t s i n c e respond e n t had no c o n t r o l o v e r t h e dog o r t h e r i g h t t o d i s p o s e of t h e dog p r i o r t o t h e c h i l d ' s i n j u r y . W e agree. Since t h e r e was no d u t y , t h e r e c o u l d be no n e g l i g e n c e , and a p p e l l a n t ' s c l a i m a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t f a i l e d , r e g a r d l e s s of whether r e s p o n d e n t had knowledge of any d a n g e r o u s p r o p e n s i t i e s o f t h e dog. Respondent Neibauer purchased t h e d u p l e x s u b j e c t t o a preexisting lease. The l e a s e s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l o w e d C a r l s o n t o own and h a r b o r a dog. The l e a s e f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d , i n a p a r a g r a p h d e s i g n a t e d a s " N o t i c e of Change," t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had t o p r o v i d e C a r l s o n w i t h t h i r t y d a y s ' n o t i c e i f respond e n t i n t e n d e d t o change t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e . Respondent c o u l d o n l y t e r m i n a t e t h e lease by p r o v i d i n g C a r l s o n t h i r t y days' notice i n writing. P u r s u a n t t o t h e l e a s e , C a r l s o n a g r e e d h e would n o t m a i n t a i n o r p e r m i t t o be m a i n t a i n e d a n u i s a n c e on t h e p r e m i s e s , s u c h a s a dog w i t h dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s . I f it was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t C a r l s o n ' s dog w a s a n u i s a n c e on t h e p r o p e r t y , r e s p o n d e n t ' s o n l y remedy was t o p r o c e e d under t h e d e f a u l t c l a u s e of t h e l e a s e which r e q u i r e d r e s p o n d e n t t o g i v e C a r l s o n f i f t e e n d a y s ' n o t i c e of t h e d e f a u l t . More i m p o r t a n t l y , b e f o r e r e s p o n d e n t c o u l d t e r m i n a t e h i s lease w i t h C a r l s o n , h e was bound by s e c t i o n 70-24-422, MCA, which states: "Noncompliance of t e n a n t g e n e r a l l y -- l a n d l o r d ' s r i g h t of t e r m i n a t i o n -- damaqes -- i n j u n c t i o n . (1) ~ x z p a s p r o v i d e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r , i f t t h e r e i s a noncompliance by t h e t e n a n t w i t h t h e r e n t a l agreement o r a noncompliance w i t h 70-24321 a f f e c t i n g h e a l t h and s a f e t y , t h e l a n d l o r d may d e l i v e r a w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o t h e t e n a n t purs u a n t t o 70-24-108 s p e c i f y i n g t h e a c t s and omiss i o n s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e b r e a c h and t h a t t h e r e n t a l agreement w i l l t e r m i n a t e upon a d a t e n o t less t h a n 1 4 d a y s a f t e r r e c e i p t of t h e n o t i c e . I f t h e b r e a c h i s n o t remedied w i t h i n t h a t t i m e , t h e r e n t a l agreement t e r m i n a t e s a s p r o v i d e d i n the notice . . ." Respondent d i d n o t p u r c h a s e t h e p r e m i s e s s u b j e c t t o C a r l s o n ' s l e a s e and t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e dog u n t i l August 19, 1978, eight days before the child was bitten. He had no opportunity to remove the dog from the premises nor did he have any control whatsoever over the manner in which Carlson handled the dog. On these facts and the statute, the Dis- trict Court correctly found that respondent had no duty to appellant to prevent Carlson's dog from injuring Heather Roy; therefore, judgment was properly entered against appellant as a matter of law. Appellant next raises the issue of when deposition expenses are properly taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing party. Respondent's memorandum of costs and disbursements included deposition expenses in the amount of $328. The depositions in question included a deposition of Rob Roy at a cost of $122, of Marney Roy at a cost of $98, of John Carlson at a cost of $70, and of Marcia Carlson at a cost of $38.75. Appellant claims that these depositions were merely discovery devices used by respondent's attorney for investigation and preparation and cannot now be properly taxed against appellant. We disagree. The District Court expressly relied on these "several depositions" in determining that summary judgment should be entered against appellant. The District Court made refer- ence to the depositions in its memorandum decision. These depositions were necessary for the disposing of this litigation by way of summary judgment and are proper elements of respondent's costs. 170, 489 P.2d 1032. Affirmed. Johnson v. Furgeson (1971), 158 Mont. We concur: P d dMl Chief ~ u s t i c e 4 .MA Justices This cause was submitted prior to January 5, 1981.

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