STATE v HART
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No. 80-101 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A F OTN 1980 STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , SHIRLEY BUSBY H R a / k / a AT SHIRLEY A N CHITTENDEN, N E D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: District Court of t h e Sixteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f C u s t e r . Honorable A l f r e d B. Coate, Judge p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : M o r r i s o n Law O f f i c e s , M i s s o u l a , Montana W i l l i a m Rossbach a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana F o r Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana K e i t h D. H a k e r , County A t t o r n e y , M i l e s C i t y , Montana J. D e n n i s C o r b i n a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , M i l e s C i t y , Montana Submitted: Decided: November 1 7 , 1980 ~~~ 3 0 1381 J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Mr. Defendant a p p e a l s a C u s t e r County D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n v i c t i o n , by a j u r y , of t h e f t by a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , f o r which s h e r e c e i v e d a f i v e - y e a r s e n t e n c e and was o r d e r e d t o make p a r t i a l restitution. Three women e n t e r e d Mann C r e d i t J e w e l e r s i n M i l e s C i t y , Montana, on t h e a f t e r n o o n o f May 2 4 , 1979. The o n l y employee i n t h e s t o r e a t t h e t i m e w a s a c l e r k , June Carranza. Carranza t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e t h r e e women came i n t o t h e s t o r e a t a b o u t t h e same t i m e b u t t h e n s e p a r a t e d . Two o f t h e women, who a s s o c i a t e d o p e n l y and were c l e a r l y t o g e t h e r , asked t h e c l e r k t o show them some r i n g s i n a d i s p l a y c a b i n e t . The t h i r d woman, i d e n t i f i e d by C a r r a n z a a s d e f e n d a n t S h i r l e y H a r t , browsed t h r o u g h o u t t h e s t o r e . She asked t o l o o k a t some w i n e g l a s s e s , which C a r r a n z a handed t o h e r . ( F i n g e r p r i n t s on t h e w i n e g l a s s e s were l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d i n c o u r t a s t h o s e of S h i r l e y C h i t t e n d e n , a l s o known a s S h i r l e y H a r t . ) From t h e w i n e g l a s s e s , d e f e n d a n t went t o t h e cuckoo c l o c k s and a s k e d t h e c l e r k a series o f q u e s t i o n s a b o u t them, d i s c o v e r i n g t h a t t h e key and a box f o r t h e c l o c k s h e was i n t e r e s t e d i n w e r e downstairs. H a r t t o l d t h e c l e r k t h a t s h e would need t h e box b e c a u s e s h e wanted t o m a i l it. C a r r a n z a t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h a t p o i n t d e f e n d a n t engaged i n a s h o r t , i n a u d i b l e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h one of t h e two women, a l t h o u g h from t h e t i m e t h e t h r e e women e n t e r e d t h e s t o r e , H a r t had shown no s i g n of a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r two women. A f t e r t h i s b r i e f c o n v e r s a t i o n , no f u r t h e r c o n t a c t was made between H a r t and t h e o t h e r women. As C a r r a n z a and d e f e n d a n t d i s c u s s e d t h e c l o c k , t h e o t h e r women l e f t t h e s t o r e and looked t h r o u g h t h e s t o r e window a t t h e i t e m s displayed. C a r r a n z a t h e n went down i n t o t h e basement t o s e a c h f o r t h e key t o t h e c l o c k and a box i n which t o m a i l i t . Once d o w n s t a i r s , C a r r a n z a h e a r d t h e sounds of r u n n i n g f e e t from t h e s t o r e above and t h e sound of what seemed t o be t h e bumping of g l a s s . She abandoned h e r s e a r c h f o r t h e key and box and r a n back u p s t a i r s t o f i n d d e f e n d a n t w a i t i n g a t t h e t o p of t h e s t a i r s . Testimony g i v e n by t h e owner of t h e s t o r e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e area i n which H a r t was s t a n d i n g w a s t h e o n l y a r e a i n t h e e n t i r e s t o r e where t h e s t a i r s t o t h e basement c o u l d be watched. H a r t was on t h e main f l o o r of t h e s t o r e d u r i n g t h e d i s t u r b a n c e which b r o u g h t J u n e C a r r a n z a r u s h i n g back u p s t a i r s , b u t made no mention t o h e r of any irregularities. C a r r a n z a informed d e f e n d a n t t h a t s h e c o u l d n o t f i n d t h e box f o r t h e c l o c k b u t t h a t h e r b o s s would be back a t 3:30 p.m. and he c o u l d c e r t a i n l y h e l p h e r . H a r t told the c l e r k t h a t s h e had some shopping t o do a t P e n n e y ' s and t h a t s h e would r e t u r n . m i n u t e s b e f o r e 3:20. When d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e s t o r e it w a s The t h e f t was r e p o r t e d a t 3:25. C a r r a n z a had informed H a r t t h a t h e r employer would be back w i t h i n t e n m i n u t e s , y e t d e f e n d a n t c h o s e t o l e a v e and n o t return. The c l e r k f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t h u r r i e d away a f t e r l e a v i n g t h e s t o r e . C a r r a n z a t h e n went t o c l e a n t h e d i s p l a y c a s e s and d i s c o v e r e d t h a t two d i s p l a y t r a y s o f r i n g s w e r e m i s s i n g from t h e f r o n t window where t h e two women had j u s t been examining the rings. When p o l i c e a r r i v e d , s h e gave a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e t h r e e women and d e s c r i b e d what had t r a n s p i r e d . Latent f i n g e r p r i n t s were t a k e n from t h e d i s p l a y c a s e and from t h e wineglasses. The p r i n t s on t h e d i s p l a y c a s e were t h o s e of Donna S t a n d l e y (a/k/a Donna H a r r i s ) and Mary Gunsch; t h o s e on t h e w i n e g l a s s e s were t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s of S h i r l e y C h i t t e n d e n (a/k/a S h i r l e y H a r t ) , t h e d e f e n d a n t . Two of t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d t o d e f e n d a n t ' s e i t h e r p r i o r o r s u b s e q u e n t a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r two women s e e n i n Mann C r e d i t J e w e l e r s on May 2 4 , 1979. The e x a c t d a t e of t h e meeting between t h e s e t h r e e women was n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d by any w i t n e s s , b u t t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s p l a c e d a l l t h r e e i n t h e home of D i x i e S t r i d on o r n e a r t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t . S h i r l e y H a r t p r e s e n t s f o u r i s s u e s f o r o u r review: 1. Did s h e r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l ? 2. Did t h e p r o s e c u t i o n adduce s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o prove t h e elements of t h e charge, thereby j u s t i f y i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t s d e c i s i o n t o deny h e r motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and t h e s u b m i s s i o n of t h e c a s e t o t h e j u r y ? 3. Were h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s v i o l a t e d by h e r a b s e n c e d u r i n g t h e peremptory c h a l l e n g e s t a g e of j u r y s e l e c tion? 4. Was t h e j u r y p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d ? FAIR TRIAL H a r t a s s e r t s t h a t s h e d i d n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l and t h a t h e r due p r o c e s s r i g h t s w e r e v i o l a t e d by t h e c o n d u c t of t h e p r o s e c u t o r and t h e e r r o r s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Defendant f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n d e l i b e r a t e l y i n t r o d u c e d t h e t e s t i m o n y of Maryona Johnson, knowing t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y w a s l i k e l y t o be p e r j u r e d . To show t h e a s s o c i - a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t and t h e two o t h e r women, t h e S t a t e c a l l e d Johnson t o t e s t i f y t h a t i n l a t e May o r J u n e s h e saw S h i r l e y H a r t a t D i x i e S t r i d ' s house w i t h two women whom s h e d i d n o t know and t o whom s h e was n o t i n t r o d u c e d . Johnson was h o s t i l e and u n c o o p e r a t i v e t h r o u g h o u t h e r t e s t i m o n y . She was e v a s i v e a s t o t h e d a t e of t h e e n c o u n t e r a t S t r i d ' s house. H a r t c o n t e n d s t h a t J o h n s o n ' s t e s t i m o n y was more p r e j u d i c i a l t h a n p r o b a t i v e and s e r v e d t o deny h e r r i g h t t o a f a i r trial. According t o H a r t , t h e manner i n which J o h n s o n ' s t e s t i m o n y was d e l i v e r e d was s o c o n f u s i n g and e v a s i v e t h a t i t gave t h e a p p e a r a n c e t h a t s h e was a t t e m p t i n g t o p r o t e c t someone. Defendant s u b m i t s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r r e a l i z e d t h e p r e j u d i c i a l i m p a c t of t h e t e s t i m o n y , i n s o f a r a s it i m p l i e d t h a t Johnson w a s t r y i n g t o p r o t e c t d e f e n d a n t , and w i l l f u l l y continued h i s examination t o strengthen t h a t impression. T h i s C o u r t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t t r i a l s be conducted w i t h " d i g n i t y , o r d e r , and decorum." I l l i n o i s v. A l l e n ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 U.S. 25 L.Ed.2d 353. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, The p r o s e c u t o r h a s a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o see t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of a c r i m i n a l c a s e i s f a i r and j u s t ; he must be i n t e r e s t e d i n j u s t i c e , n o t j u s t c o n v i c t i o n s . v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. Berger 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314. See a l s o t h e Code of P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , EC 7-13. Misconduct by t h e p r o s e c u t o r may form t h e b a s i s o f a new t r i a l where t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a c t i o n s have d e p r i v e d a d e f e n d a n t of a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l . ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. S t a t e v . Bain 23, 575 P.2d 919. During h i s opening s t a t e m e n t , t h e p r o s e c u t o r t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t he would p r o v e t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s i n M i l e s C i t y on o r n e a r t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t . H e s a i d he would e s t a b l i s h t h a t f a c t by t h e t e s t i m o n y o f two o f h e r f r i e n d s , one of which w a s Maryona Johnson. and u n c o o p e r a t i v e . A t t h e o u t s e t Johnson was e v a s i v e She a d m i t t e d t h a t s h e had s e e n d e f e n d a n t i n t h e company of two women a t S t r i d ' s house i n May o r J u n e of 1979. Defendant o b j e c t e d t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a t t e m p t t o elicit a more cogent testimony on the grounds that the prosecutor was attempting to impeach his own witness. he trial judge properly overruled the objection since under the rules of evidence an attorney can impeach any witness. Rule 607, Mont.R.Evid. A party does not vouch for his or her witnesses, except for expert and character witnesses, because a party's witnesses are not chosen but are those persons who happen to be present and see the events which give rise to the case. Mont.R.Evid. Commission Comment to Rule 607 Under the facts as they exist before us, we can determine no prosecutorial misconduct or prejudicial error to defendant with respect to Johnson's testimony. Defendant claims secondly that the prosecutor deliberately introduced testimony to impeach a defense witness on matters which were known to him to be improper, incompetent, and collateral. In the trial court, Hart originally gave notice that she planned to call certain alibi witnesses. Hart's counsel withdrew that defense and moved the court for an order limiting the prosecutor from inquiring into any matters concerning that defense. The court ruled that the prosecutor would not be allowed to exceed the scope of direct examination. Defense called Sandy Karst to testify about defendant's physical condition during the spring of 1979. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked Karst whether she had previously made any statement that she was with defendant at defendant's home in ~illingson May 24, 1979. Over objection, Karst replied that she had. ~efen- dant deems this an improper attempt to impeach a witness and violative of the court's order to stay within the scope of direct examination. The State counters that defendant made her physical condition at the time of the theft an issue. On cross- examination, the prosecution attempted to determine if the witness's testimony related to defendant's condition on the day of the theft. To this extent the cross-examination was properly within the bounds of the court order. Since our decision in Kipp v. Silverman (1901), 25 Mont. 296, 64 P. 884, we have consistently determined that cross-examination should be allowed an extended range rather than a limited one. Further, the latitudes of cross-examination are deter- mined by the trial court. It is not within the authority of this Court to disturb the District Court's ruling unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Gallaher (1978), 177 Mont. 150, 580 P.2d 930, 35 St.Rep. 848. See also State v. Babella (1978), 177 Mont. 275, 581 P.2d 838, 35 St.Rep. 985. We respect the District Court's judgment in the conduct of the trial and do not find that its discretionary powers were abused. Defendant further argues on appeal that the court erred in its decision to call Bob Lucas, president of the First Security Bank in Miles City, to the stand to clarify the testimony of Maryona Johnson. Hart claims that Lucas' testimony was completely collateral and wrongfully prejudiced her case. The court, however, felt compelled to call Lucas to verify Johnson's testimony once her credibility had been called into question, especially in view of the fact that Johnson was a major witness for the State on the issue of association. Rule 614(a), Mont.R.Evid., allows the court to call witnesses and entitles all parties to examine those witnesses. The reason for this prerogative is the usual tendency to a s s o c i a t e a n u n d e s i r a b l e w i t n e s s w i t h one p a r t y o r t h e other. Å his problem i s m e t by h a v i n g t h e bench c a l l t h e w i t n e s s t o o b t a i n h i s o r h e r knowledge of t h e r e l e v a n t facts. Commission Comment t o Rule 6 1 4 ( a ) , Mont. R.Evid. Because t h e a u t h o r i t y t o c a l l w i t n e s s e s i s e x p r e s s l y g r a n t e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t by t h e r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e , and t h a t authority is largely discretionary, we w i l l not disturb the c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t a showing o f abused d i s c r e t i o n o r m a n i f e s t p r e j u d i c e , n e i t h e r of which a r e p r e s e n t h e r e . Accord, United S t a t e s v . L e s l i e ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 542 F.2d 285 ( a p p l y i n g Rule 6 1 4 ( a ) , Fed.R.Evid., t o t h e Montana r u l e ) which i s i d e n t i c a l . Defendant H a r t c o n c l u d e s h e r a p p e a l on t h e f a i r t r i a l i s s u e by d i r e c t i n g o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s c l o s i n g statement t o t h e jury. I n t h a t statement, H a r t argues, the p r o s e c u t o r i m p r o p e r l y commented on h e r r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y during t r i a l . dates. The p r o s e c u t o r a r g u e d t o t h e j u r y : I a s k you t o r e j e c t t h o s e d a t e s . d a t e was. "The You know what t h e J u n e [ C a r r a n z a ] knows what t h e d a t e was and t h e d e f e n d a n t knows what t h e d a t e was." Defendant a s k s t h i s C o u r t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h i s s t a t e m e n t drew t h e f a c t of h e r r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y before t h e jury, thereby c r e a t i n g i n the minds of t h e j u r y t h a t s h e was n o t t e s t i f y i n g b e c a u s e of h e r guilt. W e do n o t f i n d h e r argument p e r s u a s i v e . Read i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s e n t i r e c l o s i n g s t a t e m e n t , w e do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d a t e s i s p r o p e r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a comment on d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y on h e r own b e h a l f . I t merely s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e f a c t of t h e t h e f t and t h e f a c t of d e f e n d a n t ' s p r e s e n c e i n t h e s t o r e on t h e day of t h e t h e f t had been proven. It is c e r t a i n l y improper f o r a p r o s e c u t o r t o comment on a d e f e n - dant's refusal to take the stand (Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 85 S-Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106), but this reference to defendant's knowledge is simply too remote an inference to be prejudicial error. Moreover, the District Court instructed the jury on defendant's constitutionally protected right to remain silent. Any possible error or taint caused by the prosecutor's comment was clearly made harmless by the proper instruction of the jury. SUFFICIENCY - - EVIDENCE OF THE Defendant's second contention is that the evidence adduced was insufficient to sustain her conviction of theft by accountability and that the District Court committed reversible error in submitting the case to the jury. In support of this point she argues (1) that the State failed to prove that she intended to promote or facilitate the theft; (2) that the State's proof of her association with the two principals was flawed and insufficient to prove intent; (3) that the State failed to prove that the two women seen at Dixie Strid's house were indeed the principals in the crime; (4) that the State failed to prove that Hart's fingerprints were the same as those found at the scene of the theft; and (5) that there is not sufficient evidence generally to uphold defendant's conviction. Every defendant in a criminal action is innocent until proven guilty, and it is the burden of the State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Proctor (1969), 153 Mont. 90, 454 P.2d 616. State v. But, it is the jury's purpose and duty to decide if the State has proved its case against the defendant by rendering a verdict on the facts presented. State v. Espelin (1937), 106 Mont. 231, 76 P.2d 629. his C o u r t on a p p e a l i s g u i d e d by t h e sound and w e l l - r e a s o n e d r u l e t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of d i s p u t e d q u e s t i o n s o f f a c t and t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s i s t h e s o l e p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y . Mont. S t a t e v . Bubnash ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142 377, 382 P.2d 830; S t a t e v . M e s s e r l y ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 126 Mont. 62, 244 P.2d 1054; S t a t e v. Robinson ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 109 Mont. 322, 96 P.2d 265; S t a t e v . E s p e l i n , s u p r a . With r e s p e c t t o t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t , w e n o t e t h a t t h e j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d on e v e r y e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e and n o t e w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 4 : "An a c t i s done 'knowingly' i f done v o l u n t a r i l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y , and n o t b e c a u s e of m i s t a k e o r a c c i d e n t o r o t h e r i n n o c e n t reason . . ." Reviewing t h e e v i d e n c e most s t r o n g l y i n f a v o r of t h e S t a t e , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e f o r t h e j u r y t o f i n d t h a t S h i r l e y H a r t i n t e n t i o n a l l y comm i t t e d t h e c r i m e o f t h e f t by a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . Both a f i n g e r p r i n t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and a n e y e w i t n e s s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p l a c e d H a r t i n Mann C r e d i t J e w e l e r s . June C a r r a n z a t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e w a s i n t h e s t o r e a t t h e same t i m e a s t h e women l a t e r a r r e s t e d a s p r i n c i p a l s i n t h e t h e f t . The e v i d e n c e a l s o shows t h a t H a r t d i d n o t a s s o c i a t e w i t h t h e o t h e r women, e x c e p t f o r t h e b r i e f and i n a u d i b l e exchange a few m i n u t e s b e f o r e t h e t h e f t . T h i s l a c k of a s s o c i a t i o n i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t e s t i m o n y of Maryona Johnson and ~ i x i e S t r i d t h a t t h e t h r e e women w e r e a l l t o g e t h e r on o r n e a r t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t . The S t a t e proved t h a t d e f e n d a n t s e n t t h e c l e r k i n t o t h e basement f o r a key and a box f o r a c l o c k t h a t d e f e n d a n t i n t e n d e d t o m a i l , t h e r e b y c r e a t i n g a s i t u a t i o n where no one was l e f t on t h e main f l o o r of t h e s t o r e . The e v i d e n c e showed t h a t d e f e n d a n t p o s i t i o n e d h e r s e l f i n t h e o n l y area i n t h e e n t i r e s t o r e where t h e s t a i r s t o t h e basement c o u l d be watched; t h e o n l y l o g i c a l a r e a i n which a " l o o k o u t " would s t a n d t o make s u r e t h a t t h e t h i e v e s would have n o t i c e o f t h e c l e r k ' s r e t u r n from t h e basement. The e v i d e n c e showed t h a t d e f e n d a n t was i n t h e s t o r e d u r i n g t h e t h e f t . It further showed t h a t d e f e n d a n t s a i d n o t h i n g t o t h e c l e r k of a n y t h i n g u n u s u a l happening even though t h e c l e r k , w h i l e i n t h e basement, h e a r d t h e sounds of r u n n i n g f e e t and t h e bumping of glass. C a r r a n z a f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t , even i n view of t h e f a c t t h a t defendant appeared so i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e purchase of t h e c l o c k t h a t s h e wanted a box f o r i t , s h e l e f t w i t h o u t returning. Moreover, a l t h o u g h C a r r a n z a ' s employer would b e r e t u r n i n g i n a m a t t e r of m i n u t e s a t which t i m e t h e s a l e of t h e c l o c k c o u l d be made, complete w i t h box and k e y , d e f e n d a n t h u r r i e d away from t h e s t o r e and n e v e r r e t u r n e d . Hart's a c t i o n s w e r e n o t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h o s e of a g e n u i n e l y i n t e r e s t e d shopper. They were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e a c t i o n s o f a " l o o k o u t , " whose p a r t i n t h e t h e f t was t o g e t t h e l o n e c l e r k o f f t h e f l o o r of t h e s t o r e and t h e n watch t h e s t a i r s w h i l e h e r p a r t n e r s i n t h e c r i m e committed t h e a c t u a l t h e f t . W e are n o t r e q u i r e d t o d e t e r m i n e H a r t ' s g u i l t from t h e above f a c t s . When s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e i s a s s a i l e d , i t i s t h e p r o v i n c e of t h i s C o u r t t o view e v i d e n c e which t e n d s t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t and n o t second-guess t h e j u r y o r c o n c e r n o u r s e l v e s w i t h what w e may have done a s j u r o r s . 1023, S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 278, 557 ~ . 2 d v a c a t e d 433 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 2968, 53 ~ . E d , 2 d 1089, on remand 581 P.2d 1205, v a c a t e d 99 S.Ct. S.Ct. 3103. 3094, c e r t . d e n i e d 99 See a l s o M i l e s v. Commonwealth ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 2 0 5 V a . 462, 138 S.E.2d 22. The j u r y was f u l l y i n s t r u c t e d on i t s d u t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n e v a l u a t i n g t h e e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t . I t i s reason- a b l e t o assume t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d m a t e r i a l q u e s t i o n s of f a c t r e g a r d i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t t o a i d i n t h e t h e f t which, i n o u r system of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e , a r e d e c i d e d by t w e l v e j u r o r s . F i n a l l y , t h e d e c i s i o n t o submit a c a s e t o t h e j u r y and deny a motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t l i e s w i t h i n t h e a m b i t of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s broad d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers and s h o u l d n o t be d i s t u r b e d by t h i s C o u r t on a p p e a l i n t h e a b s e n c e of a S t a t e v. Armstrong ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 149 c l e a r a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . Mont. 470, 4 2 8 P.2d 611. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n t h i s case. H a r t a r g u e s t h a t t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d no e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l t h a t t h e women s e e n a t D i x i e S t r i d ' s house were Gunsch and Harris, t h e p r i n c i p a l s of t h e c r i m e . The c o n n e c t i v e l i n k , H a r t a r g u e s , was t h e t a k i n g o f j u d i c i a l n o t i c e by t h e c o u r t of t h e S t a t e ' s p l e a d i n g s a g a i n s t t h e two women. This, s u b m i t s d e f e n d a n t , i s a f a i l u r e t o prove a n e l e m e n t of t h e crime, i.e. a s s o c i a t i o n , and i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W disagree. e F i r s t o f a l l , from t h e t e s t i m o n y of D i x i e S t r i d : "Q. Now t h e s e f o u r women, r e f e r r i n g t o S h i r l e y H a r t , Maryona Johnson and Mary Gunsch and Donna H a r r i s , how d i d t h e y a r r i v e a t your house? A . Donna and Mary went t o m house w i t h m e from y m bar. y "Q. A. D you know how S h i r l e y H a r t g o t t h e r e ? o She d r o v e m c a r o r E r n e s t ' s c a r . y "Q. Could you t e l l m e who l e f t f i r s t , S h i r l e y H a r t o r Maryona Johnson? A. I d o n ' t remember f o r s u r e , W e had s e v e r a l d r i n k s . " From t h i s t e s t i m o n y and t h a t of Maryona Johnson, w e c a n f i n d ample e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t S h i r l e y H a r t and t h e two p r i n c i p a l s , H a r r i s and Gunsch, were i n d e e d a s s o c i a t e s , a t some p o i n t n e a r t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t . H a r t ' s argument on a p p e a l , however, a s s i g n s e r r o r t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e p l e a d i n g s a g a i n s t t h e two women, c h a r g i n g them w i t h t h e a c t u a l t h e f t a t t h e j e w e l r y s t o r e on May 24, 1979. I n e s s e n c e t h i s means t h a t w h i l e t h e S t a t e may have proven t h e a s s o c i a t i o n of t h e t h r e e women, i t d i d n o t p r o v e t h a t H a r r i s and Gunsch w e r e t h e principal actors i n the theft. The t a k i n g of j u d i c i a l n o t i c e i s governed by t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f Rule 201, Mont.R.Evid.: "Judicial notice - facts. of " ( a ) Scope o f r u l e . This r u l e governs j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of a l l f a c t s . " ( b ) Kinds o f f a c t s . A f a c t t o be j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d must be one n o t s u b j e c t t o r e a s o n a b l e d i s p u t e i n t h a t i t i s e i t h e r (1) g e n e r a l l y known w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r ( 2 ) c a p a b l e of a c c u r a t e and r e a d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n by r e s o r t t o s o u r c e s whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. " ( c ) When d i s c r e t i o n a r y . A c o u r t may t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e , whether r e q u e s t e d o r n o t . " ( d ) When mandatory. A c o u r t s h a l l take judic i a l n o t i c e i f r e q u e s t e d by a p a r t y and s u p p l i e d with t h e necessary information. " ( e ) O p p o r t u n i t y t o be h e a r d . A p a r t y i s ent i t l e d upon t i m e l y r e q u e s t t o an o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e h e a r d a s t o t h e p r o p r i e t y of t a k i n g j u d i c i a l n o t i c e and t h e t e n o r of t h e m a t t e r n o t i c e d . In t h e a b s e n c e of p r i o r n o t i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e q u e s t may be made a f t e r j u d i c i a l n o t i c e h a s been t a k e n . " ( f ) Time of t a k i n g n o t i c e . J u d i c i a l n o t i c e may be t a k e n a t any s t a g e o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g . " ( g ) I n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. In a c i v i l action or proceeding, t h e c o u r t s h a l l i n s t r u c t t h e jury t o a c c e p t a s c o n c l u s i v e any f a c t j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d . In a criminal case, the court s h a l l i n s t r u c t the j u r y t h a t i t may, b u t i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o , a c c e p t a s c o n c l u s i v e any f a c t j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d . " W e c a n f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e f a c t of t h e p l e a d i n g s a g a i n s t H a r r i s and Gunsch, e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c - t i o n on j u d i c i a l n o t i c e . W e c o n s i d e r i n i t i a l l y j u s t what was j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d - - t h e Gunsch. c h a r g e s a g a i n s t H a r r i s and he f a c t of t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t t h e s e women was n o t " s u b j e c t t o r e a s o n a b l e d i s p u t e " and, moreover, t h e f a c t of t h e c h a r g e s was c a p a b l e of " a c c u r a t e and r e a d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n by r e s o r t t o s o u r c e s whose a c c u r a c y c a n n o t be r e a s o n a b l y questionedv--namely, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i l e s which c o n t a i n e d t h e o r i g i n a l c o p i e s of t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t t h e two p r i n c i p a l s . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t we a r e d i s c u s s i n g t h e f a c t o f t h e c h a r g e s h e r e and n o t t h e i r v a l i d i t y . Even i f t h e t a k i n g of j u d i c i a l n o t i c e i n any way t a i n t e d t h e f a i r n e s s of d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l , any t a i n t would be e l i m i n a t e d by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n t o t h e j u r y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t i t was a l l o w e d t o a c c e p t a s c o n c l u s i v e any f a c t j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d b u t t h a t it was n o t r e q u i r e d t o do s o . See Rule 201 ( g ) , Mont. R . Evid. Having drawn t h e j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p l e a d i n g s which had been j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d , t h e c o u r t made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was n o t b i n d i n g on t h e j u r y and t h a t t h e y c o u l d d i s r e g a r d t h e f a c t of t h e p l e a d i n g s a g a i n s t H a r r i s and Gunsch. I t was t h e n t h e j u r y ' s p r e r o g a t i v e t o a c c e p t o r r e j e c t t h e j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d f a c t s a s e v i d e n c e , and w e w i l l n o t d i s t u r b i t s d e c i s i o n . S t a t e v . McKenzie, s u p r a ; S t a t e v . S t o d d a r d ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 Mont. 402, 4 1 2 P.2d 827. A s t o H a r t ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t proof t h a t t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s found a t Mann c r e d i t J e w e l e r s w e r e h e r s , we f i n d h e r argument more s p e c i o u s t h a n r e a l . The g i s t of t h e c l a i m i s t h a t t h e ~ i s t r i c C o u r t e r r e d i n t taking j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of defendant's a l i a s e s , thereby e x p l a i n i n g why t h e name on t h e f i n g e r p r i n t c a r d was " ~ h i r l e y c h i t t e n d e n " w h i l e t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s were t h o s e of d e f e n d a n t , "~hirley Hart." The State relied on the testimony of finger- print expert, Herbert Bruning. He testified that the finger- prints removed from the glass in Mann Credit Jewelers were those of Shirley Busby Hart a/k/a Chittenden. When defendant married, she changed only her name, not her fingerprints. Referring again to Rule 201, Mont.R.Evid., we can determine that the fact of defendant's other used names is not subject to reasonable dispute in that they would be "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned," i.e., her birth certificate, marriage certificate, baptismal records, etc. We recognize that there are facts which, "from motives of policy, the law requires a court to judicially notice, or have knowledge of, but of which, in reality, it is ignorant." Mont. 341, 390 P.2d 801. Holtz v. Babcock (1963), 143 When facts are not subject to reasonable dispute, such as in this case, the District Court saves time and money for all parties by taking judicial notice of those facts. See Commission Comment, Rule 201, Mont.R.Evid. Any merit this argument may have is further diminished when considered in the light of June Carranza's eyewitness identification of defendant as the third woman in the store. The fingerprints were taken from the wineglasses Carranza had shown defendant. When these two pieces of evidence are considered together, we can see very little merit to the claim that the judge should not have taken judicial notice of the fact of defendant's aliases, thereby explaining the discrepancies between the name on the fingerprint card and the current name of defendant. F i n a l l y , defendant claims generally t h a t t h e r e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o uphold h e r c o n v i c t i o n . After a r e v i e w o f t h e e v i d e n c e i n f a v o r of t h e v e r d i c t and a r e v i e w of a p p l i c a b l e law, w e f i n d f u l l y s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e f o r t h e j u r y t o d e c i d e t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s on May 2 4 , 1979, were i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a h y p o t h e s i s of innocence. Mere p r e s e n c e a t t h e s c e n e of t h e t h e f t , o r even f a i l u r e t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h a t h e f t which someone i s aware i s t a k i n g p l a c e , i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o h o l d one a c c o u n t a b l e a s a p r i n P e o p l e v. Durham ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 74 C a l . R p t r . c i p a l t o t h e crime. 262, 449 P.2d 198. F u r t h e r , t h e a c t o r need n o t t a k e p a r t i n t h e o v e r t a c t o f t h e t h e f t , o r t h e a c t u a l t a k i n g , t o be found g u i l t y . I11.Dec. P e o p l e v. C o l e ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 50 I l l . A p p . 3 d 848, 365 N.E.2d 133. 133, 7 Although mere p r e s e n c e a t t h e s c e n e of t h e c r i m e and t h e f a i l u r e t o d i s a p p r o v e o r oppose t h e c r i m e do n o t make a p e r s o n l i a b l e , t h e s e f a c t o r s may be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e j u r y , a l o n g w i t h o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s which may i n d i c a t e whether t h e p e r s o n i n some way a i d e d i n t h e commission of t h e c r i m e . I11.2d 482, 236 N.E.2d S.Ct. 257, 21 L.Ed.2d Ill.App.3d See P e o p l e v . Nugara ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 39 693, c e r t . d e n i e d , 393 U.S. 925, 89 261; P e o p l e v. C r u t c h e r ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 72 239, 28 I11.Dec. 404, 390 N.E.2d 571. Where t h e e v i d e n c e d i s c l o s e s , a s i t d o e s i n t h i s c a s e , t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had a n a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h t h e p r i n c i p a l s of t h e crime ( P e o p l e v. C o l e , s u p r a ; P e o p l e v . C r u t c h e r , s u p r a ) , t h a t t h e defendant's conduct a f t e r t h e t h e f t i s compatible w i t h t h e view t h a t s h e was f l e e i n g t h e s c e n e ( P e o p l e v . P e n d l e t o n ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 75 I l l . A p p . 2 d 314, 2 2 1 N.E.2d 1 1 2 ) r that t h e d e f e n d a n t d i v e r t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e c l e r k a t t h e e x a c t t i m e t h e t h e f t t o o k p l a c e (Snyder v. ~ommonwealth (1961), 202 Va. 1009, 1 2 1 S.E.2d 4 5 2 ) , and t h a t t h e fiefen- d a n t made no e f f o r t t o a p p r i s e t h e c l e r k o r t h e a u t h o r i t i e s of t h e f a c t of t h e t h e f t which had o c c u r r e d w i t h i n a few f e e t of h e r ( P e o p l e v. C r u t c h e r , s u p r a ) , we become convinced t h a t t h e j u r y had more t h a n ample e v i d e n c e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s guilt. The c h a i n of e v i d e n c e i s a s e r i e s of c i r c u m s t a n c e s : p r e s e n c e , d i v e r s i o n , s i l e n c e , a s s o c i a t i o n and f l i g h t . These e l e m e n t s of t h e S t a t e ' s proof p r e s e n t a f o r m i d a b l e and The e v i d e n c e w a s unbroken c h a i n o f f a c t s and e v e n t s . s u f f i c i e n t , and t h e c a s e p r o p e r l y s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y . PRESENCE DURING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE H a r t c l a i m s t h a t h e r a b s e n c e d u r i n g t h e f i n a l s t a g e of j u r y s e l e c t i o n v i o l a t e d h e r due p r o c e s s r i g h t s and c o n f r o n t a t i o n r i g h t s under t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , she c o n t e n d s t h a t s h e had a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y g u a r a n t e e d r i g h t t o be p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e peremptory c h a l l e n g e s of t h e j u r y . I n making t h i s argument, H a r t c i t e s Snyder v . Massac h u s e t t s ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a d e f e n d a n t h a s a r i g h t t o be p r e s e n t a t a l l s t a g e s o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s where fundamental f a i r n e s s m i g h t be t h w a r t e d by h e r a b s e n c e . P e t e r s ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642. See S t a t e v . This Court has h e l d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s are n o t v i o l a t e d when t h e m a t t e r s handled d u r i n g h i s o r h e r a b s e n c e were p u r e l y l e g a l . S t a t e v. P e t e r s , supra. H a r t a r g u e s , however, t h a t t h e peremptory c h a l l e n g e s s t a g e of p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s i s n o t a purely legal exercise. She c i t e s a n Idaho d e c i s i o n a s persuasive authority f o r the r u l e t h a t v o i r d i r e jury select i o n p r o c e s s i s a v i t a l s t a g e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a t which defendant's presence i s e s s e n t i a l . 94 Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676. I d a h o v . Carver ( 1 9 7 2 ) , F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t a l s o con- tends that her failure to object or protest her absence did not result in a waiver of the right. (See State v. Reed (1922), 65 Mont. 51, 210 P. 756, wherein we held that the right to be present at all crucial stages of the proceedings is a nonwaivable right.) We are of the opinion, however, that the act of peremptorily challenging the jury is a wholly legal exercise and defendant's absence from that stage of the proceedings is in no way violative of defendant's rights. Idaho v. Carver, supra, is not properly relied on by defendant. In that case, defendant was not present at any time during the selection of the jury that ultimately tried him. In this case, however, the record reflects that Hart was absent only during the peremptory challenges. Although defendant's presence may be crucial during the voir dire questioning of the jury, the act of the peremptory challenge of jurors is a pro forma execution of the decisions formulated during questioning. The absence of defendant was not injurious to either her right of due process or her right of confrontation. JURY INSTRUCTION Defendant's final assignment of error is directed at the District Court's refusal of her proposed Instruction No. 9, regarding the credibility of witness identification testimony. That proposed instruction is set forth below: "Identification testimony is an expression of belief of impression by the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense and to make reliable identification later. "In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following: "(1) Are you convinced that the witness had a capacity and adequate opportunity to observe the offender? "Whether t h e w i t n e s s had a n a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e t h e o f f e n d e r a t t h e t i m e of t h e o f f e n s e w i l l be a f f e c t e d by s u c h m a t t e r s a s how l o n g o r s h o r t a t i m e was a v a i l a b l e , how f a r o r c l o s e t h e w i t n e s s was, how good w e r e l i g h t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , whether t h e w i t n e s s had o c c a s i o n t o see o r know t h e p e r s o n i n t h e p a s t . " ( 2 ) A r e you s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n made by t h e w i t n e s s s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e o f f e n s e was a p r o d u c t o f h i s own r e c o l l e c t i o n ? You may t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t b o t h t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was made. " I f t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by t h e w i t n e s s may have been i n f l u e n c e d by c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e d e f e n d a n t was p r e s e n t e d t o him f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n you s h o u l d s c r u t i n i z e t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h g r e a t c a r e . You may a l s o c o n s i d e r t h e l e n g t h of t i m e t h a t e l a p s e d between t h e o c c u r r e n c e of t h e c r i m e and t h e n e x t o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e w i t n e s s t o see t h e d e f e n d a n t , a s a f a c t o r b e a r i n g on t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . " The S t a t e o b j e c t e d t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n b e c a u s e i t had been o f f e r e d w i t h o u t any a u t h o r i t y . On a p p e a l d e f e n d a n t does n o t argue t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s a c o r r e c t statement of t h e law b u t o n l y t h a t s h e was e n t i t l e d t o an i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e of fender. Two p o i n t s s u s t a i n o u r f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e was no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n t h e r e f u s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o g i v e H a r t ' s j u r y I n s t r u c t i o n No. 9. F i r s t of a l l , t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e j u r y was t o l d by t h e judge i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. "You a r e t h e s o l e judges of t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a l l t h e w i t n e s s e s who have t e s t i f i e d i n t h i s c a s e , and of t h e w e i g h t t o be g i v e n t h e i r t e s t i mony. A w i t n e s s i s presumed t o speak t h e t r u t h ; b u t this presumption may be r e p e l l e d by t h e manner i n which h e t e s t i f i e s , by t h e n a t u r e of h i s t e s t i m o n y , o r by e v i d e n c e a f f e c t i n g h i s c h a r a c t e r f o r t r u t h , honesty o r i n t e g r i t y , o r h i s m o t i v e s , o r by c o n t r a d i c t o r y e v i d e n c e ; and i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e w e i g h t t o be g i v e n t o t h e t e s t i mony of any w i t n e s s , you have a r i g h t t o c o n s i d e r t h e a p p e a r a n c e of e a c h w i t n e s s on t h e s t a n d , h i s manner of t e s t i f y i n g , h i s a p p a r e n t candor o r l a c k of c a n d o r , h i s a p p a r e n t f a i r n e s s o r l a c k of f a i r - ness, his apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence, his knowledge and-means of knowledge on the subject upon which he testifies, together with all the other circumstances appearing in evidence on the trial." (Emphasis added.) We are persuaded that the jury was properly and adequately instructed on the credibility of all witnesses, including that of the eyewitness, June Carranza. We also feel that the circumstances do not dictate the giving of Hart's proposed instruction. Such an instruction may be proper, if not mandatory, in certain cases. The necessity of this type of instruction is especially clear when there is only a single eyewitness's unsubstantiated testimony which identifies the offender. Masterson (9th Cir. 1976), 529 F.2d 30. United States v. But in the case before us, June Carranza's testimony was corroborated by the presence of defendant's fingerprints on the wineglasses. Although the fingerprints are not without dispute, we find that even given that dispute as valid, they are sufficiently supportive of Carranza's testimony to amply justify the refusal of defendant's proposed Instruction No. 9. We conclude, therefore, that the conviction of Shirley Hart should be affirmed. $his cause was submitted prior to January 5, 1981. V Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea will file a separate opinion later. -20-
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