JULIAN v BUCKLEY

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 80-93 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 GORDON R. JULIAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, DEARL H. BUCKLEY, and BARBARA M. BUCKLEY, husband and wife, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Gallatin, The Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: William L. Pepper, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Phillip N. Carter, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on Briefs: Decided: Filed: :fi!j 2 1981 November 26, 1980 JAN 2 8 1981 J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Mr. Plaintiff-respondent brought t h i s a c t i o n t o recover damages f o r b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t . Following a n o n j u r y t r i a l , t h e ~ i s t r i c C o u r t of t h e E i g h t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , t all at in County, e n t e r e d judgment i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f . Defendants-appellants f i l e d a motion f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n and l a t e r a motion t o a l t e r and amend t h e judgment. f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p e a l . They t h e n Thereafter t h e D i s t r i c t Court amended i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law on two separate occasions. Respondent f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p e a l , and a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d a n o t i c e of c r o s s - a p p e a l . I n 1975 r e s p o n d e n t , a s b u y e r , and a p p e l l a n t s , a s s e l l e r s , e n t e r e d i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s t o p u r c h a s e and s e l l a t r a c t of These n e g o t i a t i o n s consummated i n t o a c o n t r a c t i n land. which a p p e l l a n t s a g r e e d t o c o n s t r u c t a roadway from t h e e x i s t i n g Bear Canyon Road t o t h e e a s t p r o p e r t y l i n e of t h e t r a c t of l a n d r e s p o n d e n t w a s p u r c h a s i n g . The r o a d was t o be a minimum of twenty f e e t wide and b e composed of a minimum o f n i n e i n c h e s of p i t r u n g r a v e l , p r o p e r l y p l a c e d and comp a c t e d s o t h a t i t c o u l d b e used under a l l w e a t h e r c o n d i tions. The r o a d was t o b e completed by J u l y 1, 1976. During 1976 and 1 9 7 8 a p p e l l a n t s h i r e d Kardash C o n s t r u c t i o n t o b u i l d t h e road. A p p e l l a n t s a l l e g e d t h a t i n 1976 s i x i n c h e s of s h a l e m a t e r i a l w a s p l a c e d on t h e r o a d and a n a d d i t i o n a l f o u r i n c h e s of m a t e r i a l w a s p l a c e d on t h e lower one-half t o t w o - t h i r d s of t h e r o a d . I n 1978, a f t e r b e i n g r e a s s u r e d r e p e a t e d l y by a p p e l l a n t s t h a t t h e r o a d would be completed, r e s p o n d e n t began c o n s t r u c t i o n of h i s home on t h e p r o p e r t y . Respondent s e c u r e d a c o n s t r u c t i o n l o a n of $ 5 4 , 5 0 0 from Bozeman F e d e r a l c r e d i t union. On May 1 7 , 1978, r e s p o n d e n t s e c u r e d a commitment l e t t e r from M e t r o p o l i t a n S e r v i c e Mortgage C o r p o r a t i o n . M e t r o p o l i t a n a g r e e d t o l o a n r e s p o n d e n t t h e sum of $54,500 a t 9-3/4 p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t , r e p a y a b l e on a monthly b a s i s o v e r T h i s commitment w a s c o n d i t i o n e d on t h e r o a d t h i r t y years. b e i n g completed a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t and l e g a l a c c e s s b e i n g o b t a i n e d from t h e S t a t e o f Montana. T h i s commitment e x p i r e d November 1 7 , 1978. On F e b r u a r y 1, 1979, r e s p o n d e n t was r e q u i r e d t o l o a n t o a p p e l l a n t s $232 b e f o r e t h e y would a g r e e t o s e c u r e t h e easements from t h e S t a t e of Montana. On A p r i l 5, 1979, a n o t h e r commitment l e t t e r was o b t a i n e d from M e t r o p o l i t a n , i n which M e t r o p o l i t a n a g a i n a g r e e d t o l o a n r e s p o n d e n t $54,500. T h i s t i m e , however, t h e o n l y c o n d i t i o n was t h a t t h e r o a d be completed a c c o r d i n g t o t h e same s p e c i f i c a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t . The l e g a l a c c e s s problem had been r e s o l v e d when r e s p o n d e n t l o a n e d a p p e l l a n t s t h e money s o t h e y , a p p e l l a n t s , would p u r c h a s e t h e easements from t h e S t a t e of Montana. T h i s commitment l e t t e r a l s o p r o v i d e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t would have t o pay t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r e s t r a t e , 11-1/2 agreed e a r l i e r . p e r c e n t , and n o t 9-3/4 percent a s T h i s commitment l e t t e r e x p i r e d October 5, 1979. A p p e l l a n t s r e f u s e d t o complete c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e r o a d and r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d s u i t . October 9, 1979. A n o n j u r y t r i a l was h e l d on On November 6 , 1979, t h e ~ i s t r i c C o u r t t f i l e d i t s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law i n f a v o r of r e s p o n d e n t . On November 8, 1979, judgment was s i g n e d . A l s o on November 8, 1979, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r motion f o r reconsideration and on November 9, 1979, f i l e d t h e i r motion t o a l t e r o r amend t h e judgment. Both m o t i o n s a l l e g e d t h e judgment and f i n d i n g s d i d n o t conform t o t h e e v i d e n c e . On November 30, 1979, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r motion f o r a s t a y of e x e c u t i o n . On December 3, 1979, a h e a r i n g was h e l d i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t on a p p e l l a n t s ' motion t o a l t e r o r amend. On December 4 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d a p p e l l a n t s n o t t o s e l l o r i n any way encumber t h e i r r e a l p r o p e r t y . On December 5 , 1979, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r f i r s t n o t i c e of appeal. Thereafter, t h e following events occurred: (1) December 6 , 1979, r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o have t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a p p o i n t a p p r a i s e r s . (2) December 1 0 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t amended i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e . (3) December 1 3 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d a s t a y of e x e c u t i o n and awarded a t t o r n e y f e e s t o r e s p o n d e n t . (4) December 1 8 , 1979, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r s u p p l e - m e n t a l motion t o a l t e r o r amend t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w t o r e q u i r e r e s p o n d e n t t o u s e t h e damages awarded him t o complete t h e r o a d . (5) J a n u a r y 1 4 , 1980, t h e above motion was h e a r d and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d a n o t h e r h e a r i n g t o be h e l d on F e b r u a r y 5, 1980. (6) F e b r u a r y 5, 1980, a h e a r i n g w a s h e l d on above motions and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t gave b o t h p a r t i e s twenty d a y s t o submit b r i e f s . (7) F e b r u a r y 26, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t amended i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w f o r t h e second t i m e and o r d e r e d r e s p o n d e n t t o p r e p a r e a judgment. (8) March 21, 1980, r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of a p p e a l and t h e r e a f t e r a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r n o t i c e of cross-appeal. The first issue is whether the District Court had jurisdiction to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law, make and enter orders affecting the rights of the parties, and amend its original judgment after December 5, 1979, the date on which appellants' first notice of appeal was filed. Since 1954 it has been an established rule in Montana that when a notice of appeal has been filed, jurisdiction over the parties to the controversy and subject matter passes from the District Court and vests in the Supreme Court. It becomes the Supreme Court's duty to maintain the status quo of the parties until the controversy can be determined. Benolken v. Miracle (1954), 128 Mont. 262, 273 P.2d 667. On November 8, 1979, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that the court amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law because the same did not conform to the evidence. This motion was noticed for hear- ing on December 3, 1979. On November 9, 1979, appellants filed their motion to alter or amend the judgment because the same did not conform to the weight of the evidence presented at trial. This motion was also noticed for hearing on December 3, 1979. Appellants' memorandum brief in support of their motion to alter or amend the judgment was not signed by appellants' attorney until November 30, 1979, and could not have been filed any earlier than that date. A hearing on these motions was held on Monday, December 3, 1979. On Wednesday, December 5, 1979, and before the court could rule on appellants' motions, appellants filed their notice of appeal. Having done this, appellants stripped t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of j u r i s d i c t i o n . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t w a s w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y and j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make o r e n t e r any f u r t h e r o r d e r e x c e p t i n m a t t e r s embraced i n t h e a c t i o n and n o t a f f e c t e d by t h e o r d e r a p p e a l e d from. Benolken v. Miracle, supra. I n B r y a n t Development A s s o c i a t i o n v . Dagel ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 166 Mont. 8, 531 P.2d 1319, t h i s C o u r t , i n a p e r curiam o r d e r , stated: ". . . Under s e c t i o n 93-8011, R.C.M. 1947, w e , have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n p a s s e s from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o t h i s C o u r t upon serv i c e and f i l i n g of t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l . See Benolken v. M i r a c l e , 128 Mont. 262, 273 P.2d 667; P o l s o n v. Thomas, 138 Mont. 533, 357 P.2d 349. While t h i s s t a t u t e h a s been s u p e r s e d e d by R u l e s 6 and 7 of t h e Montana Rules of App e l l a t e C i v i l P r o c e d u r e t h e former r u l i n g s t i l l a p p l i e s and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make and e n t e r i t s o r d e r 513 P.2d a t 1320. . . ." A t no t i m e a f t e r a p p e l l a n t s ' n o t i c e of a p p e a l was f i l e d w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was t h e r e a motion t o d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l o r t o withdraw t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l . When t h e D i s - t r i c t C o u r t amended i t s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law on December 1 0 , 1979, and a g a i n on F e b r u a r y 26, 1980, i t d i d s o without t h e necessary j u r i s d i c t i o n . Therefore, these amendments a r e n u l l and v o i d , and t h e o r i g i n a l judgment stands. On a complete r e v i e w of t h e r e c o r d , w e f i n d t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l judgment awarding r e s p o n d e n t damages of $34,068 i s not justified. T h e r e i s no b a s i s o r e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d f o r such a n amount. Respondent concedes t h i s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a t t e m p t e d t o c o r r e c t t h e s e f i n d i n g s by t h e s u b s e q u e n t amended f i n d i n g s and judgment. Upon remand of t h e c a s e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may p r o p e r l y e v a l u a t e t h e damages and amend i t s p r i o r f i n d i n g s and judgment. A p p e l l a n t s n e x t a r g u e t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t damage award e n t e r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h e o r i g i n a l judgment i s s p e c u l a t i v e and i n c a p a b l e of a c c u r a t e and r e a s o n a b l e d e t e r m i n a t i o n a s a m a t t e r of law. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded i n t e r e s t damages f o r t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i n t e r e s t p a i d o v e r a t h i r t y - y e a r p e r i o d on a 9-3/4 p e r c e n t l o a n and i n t e r e s t p a i d o v e r a t h i r t y - y e a r p e r i o d on a 11-1/2 percent rate. Appellants c o n t e n d t h a t s h o u l d i n t e r e s t r a t e s d r o p below 11-1/2 p e r c e n t , r e s p o n d e n t c o u l d r e f i n a n c e h i s home a t t h e lower r a t e and n e v e r i n c u r t h i s damage. Appellants claim t h i s aspect o f damages i s s p e c u l a t i v e , remote and p r o s p e c t i v e i n n a t u r e and r e s p o n d e n t h a s n o t i n c u r r e d a p r e s e n t i n j u r y . W dise agree. I n Walton v . C i t y of Bozeman ( 1 9 7 8 ) , - Mont. 588 P.2d 518, t h i s C o u r t upheld t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s award of f u t u r e o r p r o s p e c t i v e damages: " ' P r o s p e c t i v e damages' a r e t h o s e which a r e r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n t o f o l l o w t h e s t a t e of f a c t s on which p l a i n t i f f ' s s u i t i s b a s e d ; s u c h dama g e s have n o t y e t a c c r u e d a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l , b u t i n t h e n a t u r e [ o f ] t h i n g s must c e r t a i n l y o r most p r o b a b l y r e s u l t from t h e s t a t e of f a c t s found t o be e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l . See S t a t e Highway Board v. Coleman ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 77 Ga.App. 756, 50 S.E.2d 262. "Although s p e c u l a t i v e damages may n o t be r e covered, reasonable c e r t a i n t y t h a t f u t u r e damages w i l l o c c u r w i l l s u s t a i n a n award f o r f u t u r e damages. This test m e e t s t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t such must be r e a s o n a b l e . S e c t i o n 17-607, R.C.M. 1947. See C r u s e v. Clawson (1960) , 137 Mont. 439, 352 P.2d 989." Walton, 588 P.2d a t 522. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e amount of damages i s n o t specul a t i v e b u t r a t h e r c a n be d e t e r m i n e d . Respondent c a n n o t b e expected t o sue a p p e l l a n t s every t i m e t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e changes. There i s s u f f i c i e n t c e r t a i n t y i n t h e r e c o r d t o make a damage award, a f t e r d i s c o u n t i n g t h e amount p r o p e r l y . W w i l l n o t h e r e d i s c u s s t h e amount and t h e a c c u r a c y of e t h e amount awarded. On remand t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i l l be a l l o w e d t o amend i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w and judgment i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i n t e r e s t damage amount, d i s c o u n t i n g p r o p e r l y and awarding s u c h amount. F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e award of r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e o r i g i n a l judgment was e r r o r b e c a u s e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f a i l e d t o a l l o w a h e a r i n g on t h e m a t t e r . Only i n a s u b s e q u e n t h e a r i n g , a f t e r t h e o r i g i n a l judgment w a s entered, w a s t h e r e an opportunity t o address t h a t i s s u e and t o d e t e r m i n e a n e x a c t amount. Upon remand t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h a l l a l s o e n t e r a p r o p e r amended f i n d i n g of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n of law and judgment r e g a r d i n g t h e amount of a t t o r n e y f e e s based on f i n d i n g s i t made on s u b s e q u e n t h e a r i n g s . Attorney f e e s should be awarded t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n up t o t h e t i m e of t h e o r i g i n a l judgment and n o t i c e o f a p p e a l . However, a l l c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s i n c u r r e d s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e t i m e o f f i l i n g of t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l s h a l l b e p a i d by e a c h party. Any s u b s e q u e n t c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s from t h e i s s u a n c e of t h i s o p i n i o n s h a l l b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e law. The c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r f u r t h e r proceedings c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion. n W concur: e &'- dt ? &Chief J u s t i c e A T h i s c a u s e was s u b m i t t e d p r i o r t o J a n u a r y 5 , 1981.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.