DVORAK v HUNTLEY PROJECT IRRIGATIO

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No. 81-217 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 ROBER W. DVORAK and PATRICIA J. DVORAK, Plaintiffs and Respondents and Cross-Appellants, HUNTLEY PROJECT IRRIGATION DISTRICT, JOHN PROPP and NORMAN MAYNARD, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Harwood, Galles & Gunderson, Billings, Montana Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings, Montana Rockwood Brown argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Keefer, Roybal, Hanson, Stacey and Jarussi, Billings, Montana Calvin J. Stacey argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed: DEc 2s " 8 i2 October 26, 1981 bft '2 3 i ~4 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Court. F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of I n an a c t i o n for damages a g a i n s t a n the irrigation district i t s e m p l o y e e s f o r r e f u s a l to p r o v i d e i r r i g a t i o n water a n d two o f t o plaintif fs' t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a w a r d e d p l a i n t i f f s com- farm, p e n s a t o r y and p u n i t i v e damages i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h a j u r y v e r d i c t . In a post-trial t h e District order, Court vacated t h e award o f p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s a g a i n s t t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t and d e n i e d a new trial. We reverse On A p r i l 2 3 , a damage action in and remand a for trial. new 1 9 7 6 , p l a i n t i f f s Roger and Ann Dvorak f i l e d the District Court of Yellowstone County a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s H u n t l e y P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t and two of i t s employees, Norman ditch Plaintiffs rider. losses its manager, Maynard, sought actual and damages John for Propp, their a crop i n 1 9 7 4 and 1 9 7 5 a n d p u n i t i v e damages o f $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 a g a i n s t each of t h e s e defendants. The d e f e n d a n t s c r o s s - c l a i m e d f o r puni- t i v e damages a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Roger D v o r a k . On November plaintiffs $40,000 in the punitive 7, 1980, amount damages the of $5,000 against The j u r y d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t s ' a verdict for compensatory damages and jury returned each of cross-claim the three defendants. against plaintiff Roger Dvorak f o r p u n i t i v e damages. Thereafter, District Court defendants struck the defendant Huntley P r o j e c t moved award of for a trial. new punitive I r r i g a t i o n District damages and The against denied a new trial. Defendants appeal from d e n i a l of t r i a l and p l a i n t i f f s c r o s s - a p p e a l t h e i r motion from t h a t p a r t o f f o r a new the District C o u r t ' s o r d e r s t r i k i n g t h e $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 p u n i t i v e damages award a g a i n s t defendant Huntley P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t . W e r e s t a t e t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l o r c r o s s - a p p e a l in t h i s manner: 1. for this Did trial t h e manner of violate drawing sections the preselected 25-7-202 and jury list 25-7-204, MCA, thereby denying appellants' right to a trial before jury a s e l e c t e d i n t h e manner p r o v i d e d by l a w ? 2. Were e m p l o y e e s Maynard and P r o p p exempt o r immune from a p u n i t i v e damage j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t them? 3. damage Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n s t r i k i n g t h e p u n i t i v e award against The p a r t i e s ' Huntley sub-issues Project Irrigation District? w i l l be d i s c u s s e d u n d e r t h e p r i n - c i p a l i s s u e s set f o r t h above t o t h e e x t e n t n e c e s s a r y f o r d e t e r mination of t h i s appeal. The I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e manner i n which t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d v i o l a t e d t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana s t a t u t e s . The s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n are as f o l l o w s : " 25-7-202. Judge -- c a p s u l e s c o n t a i n i n g t o draw ballots. When a n i s s u e o f f a c t t o be t r i e d b y a j u r y is b r o u g h t t o t r i a l , t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t must o p e n l y d r a w o u t o f t h e t r i a l j u r o r box as many o f t h e c a p s u l e s c o n t a i n i n g b a l l o t s w i t h t h e names o f j u r o r s t h e r e o n , o n e a f t e r a n o t h e r , as a r e s u f f i c i e n t to form a jury." - -o f d r a w i n g c a p s u l e s . Mode Before the "25-7-204. f i r s t c a p s u l e c o n t a i n i n g a b a l l o t s h a l l have b e e n d r a w n , t h e box m u s t be c l o s e d and w e l l s h a so a s t o t h o r o u g h l y mix t h e c a p s u l e s ken therein. The d i s t r i c t j u d g e m u s t d r a w a c a p s u l e containing a ballot with the juror's name t h e r e o n t h r o u g h a n a p e r t u r e made i n t h e l i d l a r g e e n o u g h o n l y to a d m i t h i s hand c o n v e n i e n t l y a n d w i t h o u t s a i d j u d g e g a z i n g i n t o s a i d box b e f o r e or w h i l e d r a w i n g s a i d c a p s u l e ." The s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s s e t o u t a b o v e were n o t f o l l o w e d i n t h i s case. Instead, a deputy c l e r k of c o u r t removed p a p e r s l i p s , n o t i n c a p s u l e s , from a metal box. The d e p u t y c l e r k d i d not drawn. shake the box before the names were d r a w n by t h e d e p u t y c l e r k were p l a c e d important departure from t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e f r o m t h e metal box o u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e o f not Finally, p l a c e when t h e d e p u t y c l e r k d r e w t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s ' This procedure violated names on a list t h a t w a s d r a w n by l o t p r i o r t o t h e i m p a n e l i n g o f t h e t r i a l j u r y . t h e most The took names t h e d i s t r i c t judge. t h e fundamental purpose of these statutes, viz. t o i n s u r e random s e l e c t i o n o f t r i a l j u r o r s b y l o t from t h e e n t i r e p a n e l encapsulating the o r array. ballots The containing s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t of jurorst the names and t h o r o u g h l y s h a k i n g t h e box b e f o r e d r a w i n g is t h e s t a t u t o r y method f o r a c h i e v i n g random s e l e c t i o n . The s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e d r a w t h e names o f the jurors i n the presence o f t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t is to i n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s are followed. The s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s h e r e d e f e a t e d t h e o b j ec- t i v e o f i n s u r i n g random s e l e c t i o n . I n S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t County o f S i l v e r Mont. 3 5 4 , 348 p.2d following the BOW ( 1 9 ~ 9 1 3~ ) 6 1 4 3 , t h i s C o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of jU ~ Y select i o n statutes and held, "It is not the r i g h t of the individual n e c e s s a r i l y involved, but r a t h e r the e n t i r e jury s y s t e m and t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d , and when a s h o w i n g i s t i m e l y b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t w e would be remiss i n o u r d u t i e s i f we p e r m i t t e d m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n or d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e p r o c e d u r e s s p e l l e d o u t by t h e legislature." 348 P.2d a t 1 4 6 . This Court reaffirmed the requirement that the District C o u r t f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y m a n d a t e o f j u r y s e l e c t i o n i n S t a t e v. F i t z p a t r i c k ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. 1 7 4 , 5 6 9 P.2d 3 8 3 , when w e s t a t e d : . .. " S p e c i f i c a l l y , a l l d u t i e s d e l e g a t e d to t h e j u r y c o m m i s s i o n and d i s t r i c t c o u r t j u d g e were p e r f o r m e d b y t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t w i t h o u t a n y apparent overseeing. W h i l e w e h a v e no c a u s e t o q u e s t i o n t h e good f a i t h of t h e p u b l i c o f f i c e r s i n v o l v e d , it is o b v i o u s t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme f o r s e l e c t i n g and d r a w i n g a j u r y w a s c o m p l e t e l y circumvented. The r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t j u r i e s m u s t be s e l e c t e d and drawn i n s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with the l a w . Where t h e d i s r e g a r d f o r l e g i s l a t i v e m a n d a t e s a m o u n t s t o more t h a n t e c h n i c a l i r r e g u l a r i t y s u b s t a n t i a l compliance h a s n o t been achieved." 569 P.2d a t 389. Respondents contend by the D i s t r i c t Therefore, Court respondents t h a t t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n process used i n t h i s case w a s t y p i c a l of contend that counsel for that court. the District s h o u l d h a v e known t h e p r o c e d u r e and o b j e c t e d to t h e j u r y select i o n p r o c e s s i m m e d i a t e l y and h e s h o u l d n o t h a v e w a i t e d week a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t had been e n t e r e d until a t o make h i s o b j e c t i o n known. The basic flaw in this contention that is counsel for t h e I r r i g a t i o n District did not discover the discrepancies i n the jury selection process u n t i l were s t a t u t o r y procedures not being Further, to s u s p e c t t h a t p r i o r to h i s i n q u i r i e s , c o u n s e l had no r e a s o n , the a week a f t e r t h e t r i a l . followed. In other w o r d s , t h e "means o f k n o w l e d g e " were n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r c o u n s e l to o b j e c t b e f o r e or d u r i n g t h e t r i a l . I n L e d g e r v . ~ c ~ e n z i( 1 9 3 8 ) r 1 0 7 Mont. 3 3 5 , 8 5 P.2d e 352, t h i s Court d i s c u s s e d t h e n e c e s s i t y of o b j e c t i n g t o t h e impaneling of a jury in a timely manner. This Court held: . . . " t h a t i f c o u n s e l does n o t have t h e knowledge, o r means o f knowledge, of the i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e drawing of t h e j u r y , o r t h e p a n e l from w h i c h it is s e l e c t e d u n t i l a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t , t h e q u e s t i o n may be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l . " 8 5 P.2d 353. I n t h i s c a s e , c o u n s e l had a r i g h t to r e l y on t h e j u d g e and c l e r k t o follow their statutory duties. The f a c t t h a t no a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e h a s b e e n shown i s i r r e l e v a n t . Whether a d i f f e r e n t ver- dict would followed have purely is determine. departure resulted had the speculative, statutory conjectural procedures and been impossible to The D i s t r i c t C o u r t went w e l l beyond a mere t e c h n i c a l from the jury selection statutes and this type of d e p a r t u r e n e c e s s i t a t e s t h e r e v e r s a l o f t h e v e r d i c t and a r e t r i a l w i t h a j u r y s e l e c t e d i n t h e p r o p e r manner. To a s s i s t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o n r e t r i a l , we w i l l d e t e r m i n e two o t h e r i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h i s a p p e a l . The defendants second Propp issue and presented Maynard are by the exempt District and immune e x e m p l a r y and p u n i t i v e damages awarded a g a i n s t them. gation District 2-9-105, MCA, contends Maynard that because of is w h e t h e r from the The Irri- s e c t i o n s 2-9-104 and and P r o p p are n o t l i a b l e f o r t h e $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 e x e m p l a r y award. S e c t i o n s 2-9-104 and - 1 0 5 , MCA, d o n o t a p p l y to i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s b u t t o t h e s t a t e and g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s . The sec- t i o n o f C h a p t e r 9 t h a t a p p l i e s t o i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s is s e c t i o n 2-9-305 , MCA, which p r o v i d e s : "Governmental e n t i t y to be j o i n e d a s defendant-immunization and i n d e m n z i c a t i o n o f employees. (1) I t is t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s s e c t i o n t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e i m m u n i z a t i o n and i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n o f p u b l i c o f f i c e r s and e m p l o y e e s s u e d f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s o t h e r t h a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t or f e l o n i o u s a c t s , t a k e n w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f t h e i r employment. - - " ( 2 ) I n a n a c t i o n b r o u g h t a g a i n s t any employee o f a s t a t e , c o u n t y , c i t y , town, or o t h e r governm e n t a l e n t i t y f o r a n e g l i g e n t a c t , e r r o r , or omission or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e conduct of t h e employee committed w h i l e a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s o f f i c e or e m p l o y m e n t , t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y e m p l o y e r s h a l l be made a p a r t y defendant t o the action. " ( 3 ) Recovery a g a i n s t a governmental e n t i t y under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of p a r t s 1 through 3 o f t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a c o m p l e t e b a r to a n y a c t i o n o r r e c o v e r y o f damages b y t h e c l a i m a n t , b y r e a s o n o f t h e same s u b j e c t m a t t e r , a g a i n s t t h e e m p l o y e e whose n e g l i g e n c e o r wrongf u l a c t , e r r o r , o r o m i s s i o n or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e I n any such c o n d u c t g a v e r i s e t o t h e claim. a governmental entity, the action against e m p l o y e e whose c o n d u c t g a v e r i s e t o t h e s u i t s h a l l be immune from s u i t by r e a s o n s o f t h e same s u b j e c t matter if the governmental entity a c k n o w l e d g e s or i s bound b y a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e c o n d u c t upon which t h e claim i s b r o u g h t a r i s e s o u t o f t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f s u c h e m p l o y e e s 1 e m p l o y m e n t , u n l e s s t h e c l a i m is b a s e d upon a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t or f e l o n i o u s a c t o f t h e employee. "(4) I n a n y a c t i o n i n which a governmental the e n t i t y e m p l o y e e is a p a r t y d e f e n d a n t , e m p l o y e e s h a l l be i n d e m n i f i e d b y t h e government a l e n t i t y e m p l o y e r f o r a n y money j u d g m e n t s or l e g a l e x p e n s e s t o w h i c h he may be s u b j e c t as a r e s u l t o f t h e s u i t u n l e s s t h e c o n d u c t upon which t h e claim is b r o u g h t d i d n o t a r i s e o u t o f t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s employment or i s a n tort o r f e l o n i o u s act of tG intentional employee ( ~ p ha m i s a d d e d . ) s ." Under t h i s s e c t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s a r e immune from b e i n g s u e d f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s u n l e s s t h e i r a c t is i n t e n t i o n a l o r felonious. S e c t i o n 2-9-305(1), MCA. The I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h i s C o u r t c a n n o t s p e c u l a t e as t o w h e t h e r t h e j u r y , in their verdict, had f o u n d P r o p p and Maynard t o h a v e c o m m i t t e d an intentional tort. The o r i g i n a l a c t i o n was b a s e d tion 85-7-1911(1), sec- t h e v i o l a t i o n of states which MCA, upon in pertinent part: "The b o a r d o f c o m m i s s i o n e r s s h a l l a p p o r t i o n t h e water f o r i r r i g a t i o n among t h e l a n d s i n t h e d i s t r i c t i n a j u s t and e q u i t a b l e manner . . ." The j u r y found that t h e D i s t r i c t had v i o l a t e d t h i s s e c t i o n and t h a t P r o p p and Maynard b y t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l a c t s had a l s o v i o l a t e d T h e r e was a c l e a r v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s section. a s t a t u t o r y duty when t h e D i s t r i c t , t h r o u g h t h e a c t s o f P r o p p and Maynard, t o p r o v i d e water t o t h e D v o r a k s . failed The " a c t " o f f a i l i n g - p r o v i d e to water - - i- case w a s a r g u a b l y - i n t e n t i o n a l a c t a n d a s s u c h in th s an it an of - would j u s t i f y - award - p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s . S e c t i o n 27-8-221, I MCA. The I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t c o n t e n d s t h a t no showing o f a c t u a l malice was made and t h e r e f o r e t h e p u n i t i v e damage award a g a i n s t P r o p p and Maynard c a n n o t s t a n d . Goddard (1979) St.Rep. . ---- Mont ---- 8 5 4 , 864-865, I n F i r s t S e c . Bank o f Bozeman v . I 5 9 3 P.2d 1040, 1048-10491 36 t h i s Court held: " I t is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o show a c t u a l m a l i c e t o r e c o v e r p u n i t i v e damages. Kwmk+w+ v. H o l i d a y ' N a r r ; n q i ? - 0 ~ Y R a m b l e r C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , ----Mon t ---- I 5 7 5 P.2d 5 7 8 , 3 5 S t . R e p . 46. F r a u d or malice may be S e c t i o n 17-208, R.C.M. a c t u a l or presumed. 1 9 4 7 , now s e c t i o n 27-1-221, MCA. I m p l i e d malice may be shown b y p r o o f t h a t d e f e n d a n t e n g a g e d i n a c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t knowing i t to be h a r m f u l and unlawful. Ferguson v. Town Pump, I n c . v. Wallace D i t e m a n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mon t I 580 P.2d 9 1 5 , 9 2 1 , 35 S t . R e p . 8 2 4 , 8 3 1 ; Miller v . Fox (1977)1 Mon t , 5 7 1 P.2d 8 0 4 , 34 S t . R e p . 1 3 6 7 ; C a s h i n v. N o r t h e r n p a c i f i c R a i l w a y Company ( 1 9 3 4 ) 96 Mont. 9 2 , 28 P.2d 8 6 2 . . . . "'Malice-in-law' is imp1 i e d where d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d u c t is u n j u s t i f i a b l e ." Here , the P r o p p and Maynard s cond u c t was a r g u a b l y un j u s t i- f i a b l e i n t h a t t h e y i n t e n t i o n a l l y f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e water to t h e Dvoraks' farm. T h e i r a c t i o n s , i f b e l i e v e d by t h e j u r y , a r e suf- f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n s u b j e c t i n g them to l i a b i l i t y f o r p u n i t i v e damages. The Dvoraks have cross-appealed, alleging that the D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o m m i t t e d error by s t r i k i n g t h e p u n i t i v e damage award a g a i n s t t h e D i s t r i c t . They p r e s e n t s e v e r a l c o n t e n t i o n s b u t w e need o n l y t o d i s c u s s w h e t h e r Montana l a w p r o v i d e d f o r g o v e r n mental immunity at the time this a c tion arose. T h i s a c t i o n arose i n and is l i m i t e d to t h e summer o f 1 9 7 4 , a f a c t t h a t was s t i p u l a t e d to by b o t h p a r t i e s . The 1 9 7 2 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s i n S e c t i o n 1 8 , A r t i c l e 11: " S e c t i o n 1 8 . S t a t e s u b j e c t t o s u i t . The s t a t e , c o u n t i e s , c i t i e s , t o w n s , and a l l o t h e r l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s s h a l l h a v e no immunity f r o m s u i t f o r i n j u r y t o a p e r s o n or p r o p e r t y , e x c e p t as may be s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e d b y l a w b y a 2/3 v o t e o f e a c h h o u s e of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ." The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t p r o v i d e governmental 2-9-105, MCA, entities in 1977. until it These immunity f o r c e r t a i n s t a t e and enacted sections 2-9-104 and a p p l y to this S e c t i o n 1-2-109, MCA s t a t u t e s do not a c t i o n and c a n n o t be a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y . provides : "When laws r e t r o a c t i v e . No l a w c o n t a i n e d i n a n y -o f t h e s t a t u t e s o f Montana is r e t r o a c t i v e u n l e s s e x p r e s s l y so d e c l a r e d . " The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by s t r i k i n g t h e award o f p u n i t i v e damages against the Huntley Project Irrigation R e v e r s e d and remanded f o r a new t r i a l . Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: District. Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d i s s e n t i n g : I respectfully dissent. The m a j o r i t y h o l d s t h a t t h e manner i n which t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n s 25-7-202 and 25-7-204, MCA, and t h e r e b y a b r i d g e d t h e D i s t r i c t ' s f u n d a m e n t a l . r i g h t s t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y . The m a j o r i t y r e l i e s upon S t a t e v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , C o u n t y o f S i l v e r Bow ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 6 Mont. 348 P.2d P.2d 569 1 4 3 ; Ledger v . MacKenzie ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 0 7 Mont. 352; and S t a t e v. 383. P.2d Fitzpatrick each While discuss the necessity for of 354, 3 3 5 , 85 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. these cases does a D i s t r i c t Court s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s when s e l e c t i n g a j u r y , to 174, in fact follow the t h e r e a r e some i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e f a c t s i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e and t h o s e i n t h e c a s e s r e l i e d upon by t h e m a j o r i t y . In supra, State the v. trial District judge Court, failed to County o f follow Silver the BOW, statutory p r o c e d u r e s f o r s e l e c t i n g a j u r y v e n i r e when h e drew s l i p s o f paper, which jurors, were from t h e numbered jury box. and represented The slips enclosed i n separate black capsules. of prospective paper were not The f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w t h i s s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e was c h a l l e n g e d by c o u n s e l on t h e v e r y n e x t d a y , b e f o r e a n y j u r y was a c t u a l l y i m p a n e l e d . This Court held: " I t is not t h e r i g h t of t h e individual necessarily involved, but r a t h e r t h e e n t i r e j u r y system and t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s which m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d , and when a showinq i s t i m e l y b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t we would be r e m i s s i n o u r d u t i e s i f we p e r m i t t e d m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n o r d e p a r t u r e from t h e p r o c e d u r e s s p e l l e d o u t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . " (Emphasis added.) 348 P.2d a t 1 4 6 . The g e n e r a l r u l e a s s e t o u t i n 50 C . J . S . at 903, emphasizes the timeliness of an J u r i e s , S175 objection by stating, "Objections because of irregularities in drawing or is summonin the u r s h o u l d be m a d e b e f o r e --------q-----j -- y........................... t h e B u r yimpaneled and sworn, and if not so made ordinarily are not available after verdict on a motion in arrest or for a new See, State v. Steen, (1916), 29 Id. 337, 158 P. trial." 499. In this case no objection was made by counsel until one week after the verdict had been entered. This delayed objection it begs cannot be considered timely, and the question as to whether counsel would have objected had the verdict gone the other way. The District contends, and the majority agrees, that counsel did not discover the improper method of impaneling the jury until a week after the trial. MacKenzie, supra, to support They cite Ledger v. their argument that irregularities in selection of a jury panel can be objected to after a verdict has been entered. This is a misinterpre- tation of the holding Ledger. Ledger states the general rule that a party who fails to challenge or object waives impaneling of a jury. an irregularity 85 P.2d at 352. in the This Court, when discussing the "knowledge" necessary for a timely objection held: "Counsel had the means of knowledge, and while it may be true that the fact and manner of the drawing were not brought home to them personally, nevertheless such means of knowledge were at their command, and therefore, these cases do not come within the rule of the Missouri court." 85 P.2d at 353. Here, counsel also had the "means of knowledge," for he merely had to ask, at anytime, how the jury was impaneled. It is hard to imagine that, if counsel felt that the jury was not impartial at the time of trial, he would wait until a week a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t b e f o r e o b j e c t i n g t o t h e i m p a n e l i n g . S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick, s u p r a , was n o t a r e v e r s a l t h a t was b a s e d upon t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e n a t u r e o f t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n procedure. District It that was it selection statutes. a reminder shall to use the Thirteenth Judicial and comply with the This Court s a i d , "[wle s t a t e d i n i t i a l l y t h a t t h i s m a t t e r was n o t p r o p e r l y r a i s e d o n a p p e a l , is of sufficient f u t u r e guidance." jury import to warrant a full but it discusion for 569 P.2d a t 3 8 9 . H e r e , a s i n F i t z p a t r i c k , t h e s e l e c t i o n o f j u r o r s was n o t i n t o t a l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h s e c t i o n s 25-7-202 and 25-7-204, MCA. However, t h e o b j e c t i o n t o t h e p r o c e d u r e was n o t t i m e l y and, therefore, Further, should not be the basis of a reversal. t h e r e h a s b e e n no i n d i c a t i o n t h e j u r y h e a r i n g t h e c a s e was a n y t h i n g b u t f a i r and i m p a r t i a l . . 0:- i /a(- , . , + Justice r;" C

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