STATE v HANSEN

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No. 80-407 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA O R F F 1981 T E STATE O MONTANA, H F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VS . MICKEY GENE HANSEN, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n . Honorable R o b e r t M. H o l t e r , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : Hood and Sherwood, M i s s o u l a , Montana F o r Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana W i l l i a m Douglas, County A t t o r n e y , Libby, Montana S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 8 1 Decided: S e p t . 1 5 , 1 9 8 1 Filed: - 1 5 1981 Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f the Court. D e f e n d a n t , Mickey Gene Hansen, a p p e a l s from a f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e o f Montana, t h e Nineteenth i n and f o r t h e County of Lincoln. Four i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g t h e S t a t e t o use, for t h e purposes of impeachment, statements made by t h e d e f e n d a n t when e n t e r i n g a g u i l t y p l e a which was l a t e r w i t h d r a w n by t h e c o u r t . 2. evidence, Whether over the District defendant's Court erred objection as i n admitting to relevancy, S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t No. 1, a mug s h o t p h o t o g r a p h o f d e f e n d a n t . 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d when i t r e f u s e d t o review p o l i c e r e p o r t s t o determine i f t a i n e d e x c u l p a t o r y m a t e r i a l and w e r e , therefore, a b l e t o d e f e n d a n t u n d e r s e c t i o n 46-15-302, 4. Whether defendant's the motion f o r District Court a c h a n g e of t h e r e p o r t s condiscover- MCA. erred in denying v e n u e and m o t i o n f o r individually sequestered voir d i r e . T h i s i s t h e second t h i s Court. On a p r e v i o u s a p p e a l , a l b e i t on o t h e r g r o u n d s . , t i m e t h i s c a s e h a s been t h e c a s e was r e v e r s e d , S t a t e v . Hansen ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 608 P.2d 1 0 8 3 , 37 S t . R e p . 657. before Mont. The f a c t s o f t h e c a s e a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t o p i n i o n and w i l l n o t be s e t f o r t h h e r e e x c e p t where i t is n e c e s s a r y t o do s o i n d i s c u s s i n g a n i s s u e t h a t h a s been r a i s e d . To d i s c u s s t h e f i r s t i s s u e i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o consider the background r a i s e d by i t . of the f a c t s leading t o t h e problem D e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d on S e p t e m b e r 6 , 1 9 7 8 , and a n i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d c h a r g i n g him w i t h s e x u a l i n t e r course without consent. D e f e n d a n t was arraigned on that c h a r g e , p l e a d n o t g u i l t y , and t r i a l was s e t f o r J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1979. On J a n u a r y 2 , 1 9 7 9 , d e f e n d a n t , w i t h c o u n s e l , moved t o w i t h d r a w h i s p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y and e n t e r a p l e a o f g u i l t y . During t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s , i n response t o q u e s t i o n s from t h e c o u r t , defendant denied having sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with t h e complaining witness. At t h a t time, defendant's privately- r e t a i n e d c o u n s e l moved t h e c o u r t t o w i t h d r a w a s c o u n s e l , and the motion court, was granted. After further defendant admitted the sexual c o u r t allowed h i s p l e a of guilty. conversations intercourse, and in the The r e c o r d shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s counsel t h e n withdrew h i s motion t o withdraw a s counsel. S e n t e n c i n g was s e t f o r J a n u a r y 1 5 , f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e c o u r t . That presentence r e p o r t contained t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s d e n i a l of sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with t h e complaining witness. on J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1979, because of the report, any The c o u r t , entered a not g u i l t y p l e a f o r d e f e n d a n t and s e t t h e t r i a l f o r F e b r u a r y 6 , 1979. On J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a p p o i n t e d a s u b s t i t u t e counsel for defendant, and t h e t r i a l was r e s e t f o r March 6 , 1 9 7 9 . F o l l o w i n g t r i a l and g u i l t y v e r d i c t on March 8 , 1 9 7 9 , d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o f o r t y y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n and d e s i g n a t e d a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r f o r p a r o l e p u r p o s e s . A s previously noted, tion. A new continued until counsel. New trial was June counsel 17, t h i s Court reversed t h a t convicset for 1980, presented May when 1980, which was defendant hired new 6, motions for a change of v e n u e and t o r e q u i r e t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f e v i d e n c e on J u n e 6 , 1980. The c h a n g e of v e n u e m o t i o n was d e n i e d t h a t d a y and a p o r t i o n of t h e motion t o produce g a t i n g o f f i c e r s was d e n i e d l a t e r . verdict was returned on June the reports of investi- Following t r i a l , a g u i l t y 18, 1980, and this appeal resulted. In h i s f i r s t issue defendant contends t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g t h e S t a t e t o i n t r o d u c e , f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s , s t a t e m e n t s d e f e n d a n t made w h i l e e n t e r i n g g u i l t y p l e a which was l a t e r w i t h d r a w n by t h e c o u r t . a This i s s u e d i r e c t l y concerns answers defendant gave t o q u e s t i o n s p o s e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t when h e p l e a d e d g u i l t y on J a n u a r y 2, 1979. use of It raises for t h e f i r s t t i m e t h e problem of t h e t h e s t a t e m e n t s under Rule 410, Mont.R.Evid., which provides: "Offer t o plead g u i l t y ; nolo contendere; w i t h d r a w n p l e a of g u i l t y . Evidence of a p l e a of g u i l t y , l a t e r withdrawn, o r a p l e a of n o l o c o n t e n d e r e , o r of an o f f e r t o p l e a d g u i l t y o r n o l o contendere t o t h e crime charged o r any o t h e r c r i m e , o r o f s t a t e m e n t s made i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h any of t h e f o r e g o i n g p l e a s o r o f f e r s , i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e i n any c i v i l o r criminal a c t i o n , case, or proceeding against t h e p e r s o n who made t h e p l e a o r o f f e r . This r u l e s h a l l n o t apply t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e s t a t e m e n t s made i n c o u r t on t h e r e c o r d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h any o f t h e f o r e g o i n g p l e a s o r o f f e r s where o f f e r e d f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s o r i n a s u b s e q u e n t p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e d e c l a r a n t f o r p e r j u r y o r f a l s e statement." A t t h e second t r i a l , following defendant's testimony t h a t he d i d n o t have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e c o m p l a i n i n g witness without her consent, made on J a n u a r y 2 , showing admitted that on t h e S t a t e used t h e s t a t e m e n t s 1 9 7 9 , f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s , a previous t o such s e x u a l occasion the thereby defendant intercourse without consent. had Our q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r s u c h s t a t e m e n t s a r e a d m i s s i b l e under t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e of R u l e 4 1 0 , M0nt.R.Evi.d. made in connection with a withdrawn The s t a t e m e n t s w e r e guilty plea and were u s e d f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s and s o m e e t t h o s e r e q u i r e m e n t s of the statute. the statements The r e m a i n i n g q u e s t i o n were "voluntary and is whether o r n o t reliable" within the meaning of t h e r u l e . H u t t o v. 28, 1 9 4 , is r e l i e d on by d e f e n d a n t . L.Ed.2d that R o s s ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 429 U . S . the federal statements rules except in of evidence 97 S . C t . do not as M o n t a n a ' s R u l e 4 1 0 , which a l l o w s t h e u s e o f for impeachment p u r p o s e s a s well perjury or f a l s e statements. 50 I t s h o u l d be n o t e d hearings, perjury 202, as for allow use of contrasted to the statements a prosecution for I n Hutto, t h e Court s a i d : " T h e t e s t i s w h e t h e r t h e c o n f e s s i o n was 'extracted by a n y s o r t o f threats or violence, [ o r ] o b t a i n e d by any d i r e c t o r i m p l i e d p r o m i s e s , however s l i g h t , [ o r ] by t h e 429 e x e r t i o n of any improper i n f l u e n c e . ' " U.S. a t 3 0 , 97 S . C t . a t 203, 50 L.Ed.2d a t 197. I n many ways those here. In agreement with criminal charge prosecutor's crime of presence the Hutto the under request, the after prosecuting Arkansas made embezzlement. of f a c t s of a Hutto entering are a plea attorney with law, comparable bargaining regard the defendant, statement to confessing to a a t the to the The confession was made in the defendant's attorney, who advised the d e f e n d a n t o f h i s F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e and i n f ormed him t h a t t h e t e r m s o f t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g were a v a i l a b l e r e g a r d less of the defendant's willingness to comply with the r e q u e s t f o r confession. Subsequently, t h e defendant withdrew the plea bargain, r e t a i n e d new c o u n s e l , and demanded a j u r y trial. that I n t h e c o u r s e of the defendant had that trial confessed h i s statement a t the t r i a l . Subsequent the s t a t e court v o l u n t a r i l y and ruled admitted The d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d . appeals took the defendant in Hutto t h r o u g h t h e s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o u r t s y s t e m s t o t h e Supreme C o u r t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t u n a n i m o u s l y r e v e r s e d t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f A p p e a l s and h e l d (1) t h e that confession was not per se inadmissible in a c r i m i n a l t r i a l m e r e l y b e c a u s e i t was made s u b s e q u e n t t o and a s a r e s u l t of a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g agreement t h a t d i d n o t c a l l for such confession, involuntary defense counsel t e r m s of it since who (2) that and had had been the made informed confession in the the was not presence defendant of that the t h e p l e a b a r g a i n were a v a i l a b l e r e g a r d l e s s of h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o comply w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e q u e s t f o r t h e Such s t a n d a r d s i n H u t t o a r e p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e confession. here. See a l s o , J e n k i n s v. Anderson S.Ct. 100 2124, ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 271 U.S. 65 L.Ed.2d 86; 496, 46 S . C t . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 447 U . S . Raffel v. United 5 6 6 , 70 L.Ed. 231, States 1054. I n t h i s c a s e d e f e n d a n t was a p p e a r i n g f o r t h e p u r p o s e of changing a n o t g u i l t y p l e a t o a g u i l t y p l e a p u r s u a n t t o a plea bargain increased laws. At in which sentence the under the January prosecution the 2, of persistent 1979, r e p r e s e n t e d by p r i v a t e c o u n s e l . the charge against him, would not felony proceeding, seek an offender d e f e n d a n t was The c o u r t a d v i s e d d e f e n d a n t t h e maximum p u n i s h m e n t t h a t he c o u l d r e c e i v e , and h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r , s p e e d y and i m p a r t i a l trial. At t h a t s t a g e of e n t l y became c o n f u s e d o r t h e proceedings, defendant apparreluctant t o proceed, or did not u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n c e p t of a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e r e f e r r e d t o by t h e t r i a l j u d g e . court A r e c e s s was continued to t a k e n and upon r e c o n - vening, the advise defendant rights. The f o l l o w i n g i s a n e x c e r p t f r o m t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f t h e January 2, 1979, proceeding: "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t I am g o i n g t o h a v e t o move t o withdraw a s counsel f o r t h i s i n d i v i d u a l , i n v i e w of t h e f a c t t h a t t o p r o c e e d t o a t r i a l o f t h i s m a t t e r would i n c u r a b r e a c h o f my ethical obligations. The a t t o r n e y / c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e h a s d r o p p e d down t o a p o i n t where I f e e l I c o u l d n ' t r e p r e s e n t him. I believe "THE COURT: I u n d e r s t a n d , c o u n s e l and I am I am g o i n g going t o permit t h e withdrawal. t o a p p o i n t someone. This matter is set f o r trial-"THE DEFENDANT: Ya, I d i d i t . "THE COURT: N O W , Mr. Hansen, i t i s n o t t h e purpose of t h i s proceeding t o t r y t o g e t a c o n f e s s i o n o u t of you. That i s n ' t the B u t t h e p u r p o s e i s t o make purpose of it. s u r e you u n d e r s t a n d your r i g h t s f u l l y and c o m p l e t e l y and t h a t you a r e n ' t p l e a d i n g g u i l t y t o a c r i m e t h a t i n d e e d you f e e l you s h o u l d have a d e f e n s e t o . And i t p u t s counsel i n a very, very strange place. And i f you w i s h o t h e r c o u n s e l I w i l l g e t you other counsel. Because sometimes people d o n ' t s e e e y e t o e y e on t h e s e t h i n g s . But i t i s n ' t t h e p u r p o s e of t h i s t y p e of p r o c e e d i n g t o t r y t o g e t you t o c o n f e s s . I n other I t d o e s n ' t make words, I r e a l l y d o n ' t c a r e . a n y d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e C o u r t , b u t I w a n t t o be s u r e t h a t i f i n d e e d you e n t e r a p l e a , a s you h a v e d o n e , t h a t t h e p l e a i s i n f o r m e d and w i l l i n g on y o u r p a r t and you a r e n o t g o i n g t o s a y f o r e v e r more ' I was r a i l r o a d e d . ' That is t h e p u rp o s e of t h i s t h i n g . And n o t a n y o t h e r purpose. These a r e r i g h t s of y o u r s under t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t we a r e h e r e d a b b l i n g w i t h t h i s m o r n i n g , and y o u r c o u n s e l knows and t h e J u d g e p r e s u m a b l y knows them, a n d w e d o n ' t want t o e x t r a c t f r o m you a p l e a t h a t you d o n ' t f e e l is p r o p e r . If I don't a s k you t h e s e q u e s t i o n s and e s t a b l i s h i n my own mind t h e f a c t t h a t s o m e t h i n g d i d o r d i d n o t o c c u r t h e n I am n o t d o i n g my j o b , you see. And t h a t is why I am a s k i n g you them. So i f you d o n o t a g r e e w i t h y o u r c o u n s e l , s a y so. B e c a u s e he i s n o t e m b a r r a s s e d . He h a s been i n t h i s courtroom a l o t , i n courtrooms b e f o r e , and he u n d e r s t a n d s and h e knows. And p e r h a p s you d o n ' t see e y e t o e y e a t t h i s of his s t a g e of t h e game, and t h a t i s two d i f f e r e n t people i n t h i s world r e a c t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t ways t o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . So I am n o t t r y i n g t o g e t you t o s a y ' Y e s , I d i d i t ' o r 'No, I didn't.' I am j u s t t r y i n g t o a s k you i f i n y o u r own mind you f e l t t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was-i n o t h e r w o r d s t h a t you d i d t h e o f f e n s e , t h a t y e s , i n d e e d , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y i s t h a t you a r e guilty. "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am g u i l t y . "THE COURT: And i f you had a t r i a l by j u r y t h e p r o b a b i l i t y would be v e r y g r e a t t h a t t h e y would f i n d you g u i l t y . T h a t is what I am t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h and t h a t i s why I am a s k i n g you t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . And I d o n ' t w a n t t o e m b a r r a s s y o u , b u t t h e y m u s t be t h e r e , s o w i t h t h a t i n mind do you w i s h t o p r o c e e d , Mr. Hansen? "THE DEFENDAivT: Yes. "THE COURT: Now, I d i d a s k you i n r e g a r d t o t h i s m a t t e r , you d i d have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h i s p e r s o n named? "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: spouse? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes. And t h a t person was n o t your No. "THE COURT: And s h e d i d n o t c o n s e n t t o s u c h intercourse? "THE DEFENDANT: No. "THE COURT: Is t h e r e a n y t h i n g Mr. Hansen t h a t - - I h a v e e x p l a i n e d t o you t h i s m a t t e r o f representation and I want you well represented. Is t h e r e a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h a t a t t h i s t i m e t h a t you b e l i e v e you want t o make a statement t o t h e Court about? "THE DEFENDANT: No. "THE COURT: And s u b j e c t t o t h e v a r i o u s explanations then you are f r e e l y and v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r i n g your p l e a i n t h i s m a t t e r , is t h a t r i g h t ? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes. "THE COURT: I am g o i n g t o a c c e p t i t . I know sometimes it is d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d c o u n s e l i n some o f t h e s e c a s e s and t h e y t r y t o make t h e m s e l v e s known, b u t we d e p e n d somewhat on t h e c o u n s e l - - i n f a c t w e depend a g r e a t d e a l on t h e c o u n s e l i n t h e s e m a t t e r s , Mr. Hansen. And b e c a u s e I know t h e c h a r a c t e r o f y o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n I know t h a t h e would t r y v e r y h a r d t o work i n y o u r i n t e r e s t s , y o u r best interests. B u t t h a t i s why I am a s k i n g you t h a t q u e s t i o n , b e c a u s e e v e n t h e b e s t l a w y e r o c c a s i o n a l l y d o e s n ' t q u i t e see e y e t o e y e w i t h h i s c l i e n t . You u n d e r s t a n d t h a t ? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes. "THE COURT: And you would f e e l you a r e on t h e same wave l e n g t h now? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes." A s previously noted, t h e above d i s c u s s i o n took p l a c e b e f o r e t h e f i r s t t r i a l and was n o t u s e d by t h e S t a t e u n t i l t h e second t r i a l a f t e r defendant, i n h i s d i r e c t testimony, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had n e v e r had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e complaining witness. With t h a t , the S t a t e argues t h a t the f o u n d a t i o n f o r impeachment u n d e r R u l e 4 1 0 , Mont.R.Evid., was properly laid. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h i s Court should adopt any one o f t h e f o l l o w i n g f o u r p e r se r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of the questioned statements: (1) s i n c e t h e s e state- ments were g i v e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a p l e a t h a t t h e c o u r t l a t e r a l l o w e d t o b e w i t h d r a w n , t h e y w e r e made i n v o l u n t a r i l y ; (2) since the s t a t e m e n t s were g i v e n i n connection with a p l e a b a r g a i n a g r e e m e n t , which i s i n e f f e c t a p r o m i s e , s t a t e m e n t s were involuntary; (3) since defendant the was n o t w a r n e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a t t h e time o f t h e c h a n g e o f p l e a o f h i s F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e s t a t e m e n t s were i n v o l u n t a r y ; counsel withdrew prior to the and time (4) since defendant's defendant made the s t a t e m e n t s , t h e s t a t e m e n t s were i n v o l u n t a r y . I n r e p l y , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t we s h o u l d e x a m i n e t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e ques- t i o n e d s t a t e m e n t s w e r e v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e . that, given t h e q u a l i t y of p r o c e d u r e by t h e t r i a l j u d g e , environment, and t h e l a c k of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of r i g h t s and t h e complete l a c k of c o e r c i v e any i n d u c e m e n t t o d e f e n d a n t , t h e s t a t e m e n t was v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e . S t a t e contends, It maintains Therefore, the t h e s t a t e m e n t was a d m i s s i b l e t o impeach t h e t e s t i m o n y g i v e n by d e f e n d a n t a t t r i a l . I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i s s u e w e a g a i n t u r n t o Rule 410, Mont.R.Evid., and t o t h e c o m m i s s i o n comment on t h a t r u l e . The c o m m i s s i o n n o t e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e f e d e r a l r u l e a n d t h e Montana r u l e : "This r u l e is i d e n t i c a l t o a version of F e d e r a l R u l e 410 c o n d i t i o n a l l y a d o p t e d b y Congress. The c o n d i t i o n was t h a t t h e r u l e would be s u p e r s e d e d by a n y amendment t o t h e Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure inconsist e n t with the r u l e . Such a n amendment was made i n R u l e 6 1 1 ( e ) (6), F e d e r a l R u l e s o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , which was l a t e r s u b s t i t u t e d f o r t h i s v e r s i o n of t h e r u l e . The Commission p r e f e r s t h e s u p e r s e d e d v e r s i o n o f t h e r u l e b e c a u s e it a l l o w s u s e o f s t a t e m e n t s w h e t h e r o r n o t made u n d e r o a t h , o n t h e r e c o r d , o r i n t h e p r e s e n c e of c o u n s e l , and most i m p o r t a n t , f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s . The Uniform R u l e 410 ( 1 9 7 4 ) i s s i m i l a r t o t h e f i r s t sentence of t h e r u l e b u t does n o t i n c l u d e a p r o v i s i o n s i m i l a r t o t h e second sentence of t h e r u l e . "This r u l e allows an accused t o o f f e r t o plead g u i l t y or nolo contendere o r t o withdraw such p l e a w i t h o u t e i t h e r a c t i o n being u s e d a g a i n s t him i n any s u b s e q u e n t t r i a l . T h i s is intended t o a i d t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s , under s i m i l a r p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s g i v e n t o o f f e r s o f compromise u n d e r R u l e 4 0 8 , and t o a l l o w h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l e v i d e n c e t o be excluded under c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t t h e reasons f o r o f f e r i n g t o plead or withdrawing p l e a s o f g u i l t y and n o l o c o n t e n d e r e would n o t be u n d e r s t o o d by a j u r y and would a l m o s t p r e clude a f a i r t r i a l . The s e c o n d s e n t e n c e o f t h i s r u l e i s added t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e a c c u s e d d o e s n o t a b u s e t h i s r u l e and c o n t r a d i c t earlier statements. See H a r r i s v. N e w York, The t r i a l c o u r t i s 4 0 1 U.S. 2 2 2 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . r e q u i r e d t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s were ' v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e ' and i f c o n t r a d i c t e d , t h e s t a t e m e n t s may b e i n t r o d u c e d f o r p u r p o s e s o f impeachment o r p r o s e c u t i o n per jury. the for " E x i s t i n g Montana l a w h a s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l t w i t h t h e p r o b l e m of o f f e r s t o p l e a d o r withdraw p l e a s , a l t h o u g h a p l e a of g u i l t y t h a t is n o t withdrawn is a d m i s s i b l e i n subsequent proceedings. S i k o r a v. S i k o r a , 1 6 0 Mont. 2 7 , 3 3 , 499 P . 2 d 8 0 8 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . T h e r e f o r e t h i s r u l e i s new t o Montana law. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t Montana law d o e s n o t a l l o w p l e a s of n o l o c o n t e n d e r e ; however, s u c h a p l e a is i n c l u d e d i n t h e r u l e because it h a s b e e n r e c o g n i z e d by Montana c o u r t s i n a c a s e where s u c h a p l e a was e n t e r e d i n f e d e r a l c o u r t and was r e l e v a n t t o a s t a t e c a s e . S t a t e ex r e l . M c E l l i o t v . F o u s e k , 9 1 Mont. 4 5 7 , 461, 8 P.2d 795 ( 1 9 3 2 ) . " I t is o b v i o u s from t h e a b o v e comment t h a t t h e commis- s i o n chose t o allow c e r t a i n statements given i n connection with guilty impeachment pleas and purposes. plea negotiations Rule 410 is an to be used exception g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t a d m i s s i o n s by a p a r t y - d e f e n d a n t to for the a r e admis- s i b l e . T h i s e x c e p t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e comment, was g r a n t e d t o encourage t h e use of p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t s . But, t h e r u l e was n o t d e s i g n e d t o a l l o w a d e f e n d a n t t o a b u s e t h e p l e a b a r g a i n p r o c e s s w i t h no p e n a l t y . Here defendant is no stranger in court, although r e a d i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y a t t h e h e a r i n g on J a n u a r y 2 o n e would t h i n k i t had been h i s f i r s t time i n c o u r t . The t r i a l c o u r t c a r e f u l l y and e x t e n s i v e l y q u e s t i o n e d d e f e n d a n t on t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of t h e p l e a , h i s understanding of the charge, the c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e p l e a and t h e f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r h i s p l e a . When d e f e n d a n t w e n t back on t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s against h i s counsel's wishes, counsel requested the court t o withdraw as counsel because of e t h i c s t h a t h e f e l t was v i o l a t e d . a breach of professional The c o u r t s t a t e d it would g e t d e f e n d a n t a new a t t o r n e y , and d e f e n d a n t t h e n v o l u n t a r i l y a d m i t t e d t h a t h e had committed t h e act. C l e a r l y d e f e n d a n t abused t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s here, and sustain we t h e d e c i s i o n of the trial judge in a l l o w i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t t o be i n t r o d u c e d . I n r e p l y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s f o u r p e r se r u l e s a g a i n s t t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r g u e d by t h e S t a t e , t h e S t a t e notes that it was defendant here who moved the District C o u r t t o a l l o w him t o w i t h d r a w h i s n o t g u i l t y p l e a and t o p l e a d g u i l t y , and t o move t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o a c c e p t t h e plea of guilty, d e f e n d a n t must establish that the p l e a was b e i n g k n o w i n g l y and v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d . guilty The c o u r t m u s t t h o r o u g h l y e x p l o r e t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s on t h e p a r t o f a defendant prior 46-12-204, to accepting a g u i l t y plea. MCA. I n S t a t e v. 179, See s e c t i o n this Court Azure noted ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. that the 189, 573 P.2d to establish b e s t method v o l u n t a r i n e s s i s on a f a c t u a l b a s i s and t h a t t h i s s h o u l d b e d o n e a t t h e time of t h e e n t e r i n g of trial i n h i s power judge did all basis for the plea. the plea. to establish Here t h e a factual D e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t he had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e with t h e complaining w i t n e s s , t h a t s h e was n o t h i s s p o u s e and t h a t t h e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e had t a k e n p l a c e without her consent. A r e c e n t c a s e of August L e e White ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - S t .Rep. noted (No. t h a t S t a t e v. , Mont. 80-351, Azure, t h i s Court, S t a t e v. decided supra, - P.2d 1 August 31, I 1981), requires the record to d i s c l o s e t h e defendant has f u l l understanding of t h e crime t o w h i c h he p l e a d s . will n o t presume standing of requires a the Absent such understanding, that t h e p l e a was made charge." defendant have The full State "with agrees knowledge of t h i s Court an underthat Azure the charge a d m i t t e d by p l e a d i n g g u i l t y . W e are satisfied r e q u i r e m e n t s of Azure that and the that present case meets the t h e d i s p a r a t e outcomes of t h i s c a s e and A z u r e a r e mandated by t h e d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s of e a c h c a s e . discussed, the F i n a l l y we n o t e t h a t , a s p r e v i o u s l y record in this case demonstrates that d e f e n d a n t was s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f o r m e d t o e n t e r a p l e a t h a t was " v o l u n t a r y w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c h a r g e , " s e c t i o n 46-12204, MCA. I n A z u r e t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t s o i n f o r m e d . W e f i n d no m e r i t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n h e r e t h a t h e was n o t p r o p e r l y i n f o r m e d and s u s t a i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a d m i s s i o n o f t h e dispute evidence. The n e x t i s s u e r a i s e d i s w h e t h e r S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t No. 1, a p h o t o g r a p h o f d e f e n d a n t , was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t over d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n . Defendant c i t e s S t a t e v. B i s c h e r t ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 1 5 2 , 308 P.2d 9 6 9 , f o r s u p p o r t o f h i s p o s i t i o n . It states: ". . . p h o t o g r a p h s s t a n d on t h e same f o o t i n g a s d i a g r a m s , maps, p l a n s and t h e l i k e , and a s a g e n e r a l r u l e , whenever r e l e v a n t t o d e s c r i b e a person, place, or thing, they are a d m i s s i b l e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e x p l a i n i n g and a p p l y i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c a s e . "Photographs t h a t a r e c a l c u l a t e d t o arouse t h e s y m p a t h i e s o r p r e j u d i c e s of t h e j u r y a r e properly excluded, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f they a r e not s u b s t a n t i a l l y necessary or i n s t r u c t i v e t o show m a t e r i a l f a c t s o r c o n d i t i o n s . " 131 Mont. a t 1 5 9 , 308 P.2d a t 973. H e r e , t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d a p h o t o g r a p h t a k e n a t t h e t i m e of defendant's a r r e s t . i n an unkept, messy The e x h i b i t was a mug s h o t o f d e f e n d a n t state. Defendant contends that the p h o t o was i r r e l e v a n t and d i d n o t go t o showing any m a t e r i a l fact. B i s c h e r t was a h o m i c i d e c a s e i n v o l v i n g a s m a l l c h i l d . The fact situation there is not applicable to the fact situation here. In this case the photo was taken at the time of defendant's arrest. It was admitted as part of the identi- fication testimony of the victim and was corroborative of the victim's ability to identify defendant both at trial and at the time of the incident. A view of the photograph cer- tainly does not arouse anyone's passion or prejudice, nor is it inflammatory. Therefore, we find no merit to this issue. The next issue for review is whether the trial court erred in refusing to review police reports to determine if they contained exclupatory material and were, therefore, discoverable to the defendant under section 46-15-302, MCA. Prior to trial defendant filed a motion to produce, pursuant to section 46-15-302, MCA, asking to inspect and copy "all papers, documents, oral or written statements hands of the prosecutor. . . ." in the At a hearing on the motion the State took the position that all police reports were work product and not discoverable. Defendant relies on section 46-15-302(2), MCA, which provides in part: . . . This subsection does not apply to "(2) the work product of the prosecution, which is documents drawn up by law enforcement officials for internal communications and law enforcement officers' field notes, except that any exculpatory information contained in such documents or notes must be produced." Defendant argues that because the offense was alleged to have occurred some twenty-one months prior to defendant's request at the second trial, because several officers, including Woods and Spain, were no longer employed by the law enforcement officials of Lincoln County, there was no independent record of their and because investigation, defendant was unable to determine whether their statements c o n t a i n e d any e x c u l p a t o r y m a t e r i a l . H e , t h e c o u r t t o review t h e s e p o l i c e t h e r e was d i s c o v e r a b l e m a t e r i a l therefore, requested reports and d e t e r m i n e i n them. if that He a l l e g e s t h e c o u r t d e n i e d t h e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s m e r e l y o n t n e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e y c o n t a i n e d no e x c u l patory matters. the At omnibus hearing on June 6, 1980, defendant requested t h e c o u r t t o review t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s t o d e t e r mine if t h e r e were inconsistencies in s t a t e m e n t s and h e r t r i a l t e s t i m o n y . s o and d i d . focused The on the w r i t t e n motion For that Court. error record for reason, the the of indicate Spain court to that early defendant and Woods o r so is issue victim's The c o u r t a g r e e d t o d o does not testimony the review not made those properly any reports. before this The m a t t e r c a n n o t be u s e d t o p u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n if was it not brought specifically to the court's attention. The f i n a l i s s u e b e f o r e u s i s w h e t h e r i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r motion filed for a for a a f f i d a v i t on May 3 0 , June 6, 1980. J u n e 1 6 , 1980. of a c h a n g e o f v e n u e and a individually sequestered motion pretrial change 1980, of the court erred voir venue dire. with which was h e a r d The m o t i o n was renewed, Defendant a supporting and d e n i e d on h e a r d and d e n i e d on Both o f t h e s e m o t i o n s r a i s e d t h e same i s s u e s publicity and the publication of information w h i c h c l e a r l y would n o t h a v e been a d m i s s i b l e a t t r i a l . This issues Court which d i s c r e t i o n of Mont. -, are set recently addressed forth here as the change going the court. See, S t a t e v. 614 P.2d 470, 37 S t . R e p . Bashor 1098. venue the to of sound (1980), In - S t a t e v. Board ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 5 Mont. 1 3 9 , 143-144, 337 P.2d 9 2 4 , 927, we s e t f o r t h the t e s t a s follows: It "Our c o u r t l o o k s f o r a c h a i n r e a c t i o n . s t a r t s with the basic premise t h a t the a c c u s e d i s e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r t r i a l . Next i t checks t h e p u b l i c i t y complained o f , a s t o its c o n t e n t s and more i m p o r t a n t , a s t o i t s t o t a l e f f e c t upon t h e ' f a i r t r i a l r i g h t . ' F i n a l l y , i t o b j e c t i v e l y c o n s i d e r s t h e end resulk-was a f a i r t r i a l denied a s a r e s u l t of t h e p u b l i c i t y and i t s e f f e c t s ? . . . . . ." W h a v e examined c a r e f u l l y t h e a l l e g a t i o n s g i v e n f o r e t h e r e q u e s t e d c h a n g e o f v e n u e and f i n d t h e y f a i l t o e s t a b lish any possibility of jury noted by the publicity. As jurors, Cook and Mrs. Mr. prejudice State, Seekins, due only two to pretrial prospective r e s p o n d e d t h a t t h e y had r e a d o r h e a r d a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e c a s e i n t h e newspaper o r on the radio. T h e r e were two M i s t e r s Cook on t h e p r o s p e c t i v e jury and panel eliminated by both Misters peremptory s e r v e on t h e t r i a l j u r y . Cook and Mrs. challenge and therefore did were not I n a d d i t i o n , Mr. S t e b a n s , who was s e l e c t e d a s an a l t e r n a t e j u r o r , newspapers Seekins s a i d t h a t h e had r e a d some a r t i c l e s b u t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d . a l t e r n a t e juror did not sit a s a juror However, the in the deliberations. T h e r e f o r e , no p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n shown. The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . We c o n c u r :

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