PARRENT v MIDWAY TOYOTA
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No. 80-287 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 MELVIN K. PARRENT, Claimant and Appellant, MIDWAY TOYOTA, Employer and UNIVERSAL WJDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO. , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Honorable William Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Conner, Baiz & Olsen, Great Falls, Montana Tom Baiz argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull and Jones, Billings, Montana Rockwood Brown argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: APP l$fff March 26, 1981 APR 1 6 1981 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Court. This is an appeal from the Opinion of the Workers' Compensation Court's denial of claimant's petition to reopen a final compromise settlement agreement entered into after claimant injured himself in the course of his employment. The Workers' issue raised Compensation on Court this erred appeal in is whether refusing to the allow claimant, who is a minor, to disaffirm the "petition for final settlement" and reopen his workers' compensation case? On August 18, 1975, claimant, who was then fifteen years old, injured his lower back while in the employ of Midway Toyota, Inc., of Great Falls, Montana. At the time he was engaged in lifting heavy objects. Notice was properly and timely given by all parties in the dispute. Defendant accepted liability and paid claimant the appropriate amount of biweekly temporary total disability payments from August 18, 1975, through November 15, 1976, at the weekly rate of $53.36. On October 6, 1975, a on lumbar myelography was performed claimant which demonstrated a herniated disk at the L4-5 level. Claimant underwent surgery in October 1975 performed by Dr. Robert Chambers. The herniated disk was removed and the posterolateral fusion from the fifth lumbar vertebrae to the sacrum was performed. On February 1977 claimant and defendant entered into a final settlement of the claim for 150 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits totaling $6,136.40, less credit in the amount of $640.32 for the permanent partial payments made after November 16, 1976. Claimant has been employed in the oil fields of Montana since his graduation from high school in June 1978. In the per forrnance of his work, he occasionally experienced low back pain when engaged in heavy lifting or straining, but he has been able to perform all work. Tom Mazurek, an adjuster, represented defendant in the settlement negotiations. He negotiated with the claimant's mother (natural guardian) and claimant directly. The petition for final settlement, based on a 23 percent impairment rating, and was signed by claimant only- was witnessed by a friend. Claimant's mother was present at the time he signed the agreement. She did not object to the signing, nor did she or any other person of legal age or of "legal guardian status" cosign the agreement. Later, claimant and his mother requested that the money be paid in a lump sum amount. The Workers' Compensation Division denied the request. Claimant later filed a petition to reopen his claim pursuant to section 39-71-204, MCA. At the hearing, the Workers' Compensation Court found no evidence to indicate that there was any increase in claimant's disability from the time hearing. of the final settlement to the date of this The Workers ' Compensation Court found no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit by defendant in the settlement. The Workers' Compensation Court concluded: "The claimant's guardian participated fully in consideration of the offered final settlement and though did not actually sign the final settlement petition, she nevertheless ratified and approved it on behalf of her ward, the claimant, to the same legal effect as if she had actually signed the petition . . ." Claimant argues this conclusion is contrary to the law. Claimant was a minor at the time the final compromise settlement agreement was entered into between the parties. The petition for final settlement is a contract, and contract principles, therefore, must be applied to determine the petition's validity Peterson (1981), and enforceability. Mont. , 624 P.2d Kienas v. 1, 37 St.Rep. The pertinent statutes are: Section 28-2-201, MCA: "Who may contract. All persons are capable of contracting except minors, persons of unsound mind, and persons deprived of civil rights. Minors and persons of unsound mind have only such capacity as is defined by this part, 28-10-104, and Title 41, chapter 1." Section 28-10-104, MCA: a "Who m a y --E E o i n t a n aqent, who may be an --__--agent. Any person having capacity to contract, except a minor, may appoint an agent, and any person may be an agent." I - Section 41-1-302, MCA: "Contracts of minors--disaffirmance. A minor may make a conveyance or other contract in the same manner as any other person, subject only to his power of disaffirmance under the provisions of this chapter and to the provisions of Title 40, chapter 1." Section 41-1-304, MCA: "When minors-may disaffirm. In all cases other than those specified by 41-1-303, 41-1-305, and 41-1-306, the contract of a minor may, upon restoring the consideration to the party from whom it was received, be disaffirmed by the minor himself, either before his majority or within a reasonable time afterwards, or in case of his death within that period, by his heirs or personal representatives." Section 41-1-304, MCA, allows a minor to disaffirm his contract. Because the sixteen-year-old claimant signed the petition for final settlement in his own behalf, he a l o n e was t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t y . Tom Mazurek c h o s e t o c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e c l a i m a n t ; h e must, therefore, be prepared c l a i m a n t ' s d i s a f f i r m a n c e of t o a c c e p t t h e consequences of the petition. The p e r s o n who d e a l s w i t h a n i n f a n t d o e s s o a t h i s own p e r i l . D e v e r i c h ( 1 9 5 0 ) 98 Cal.App.2d Defendant c l a i m s t h a t Niemann v . 787, 221 P.2d 1 7 8 . Hermoine P a r r e n t , t h e mother, was p r e s e n t a t a l l t i m e s d u r i n g t h e s i g n i n g o f t h e c o n t r a c t ; t h a t t h e mother approved of t h e c o n t r a c t ; t h a t t h e r e was no objection t o the contract; t h a t the adjuster negotiated with t h e mother and t h e c l a i m a n t d u r i n g t h e weeks p r i o r signing the of contract and that after the t o the contract was s i g n e d , t h e m o t h e r was s t i l l a w a r e o f t h e c o n t r a c t r i g h t s o f c l a i m a n t and d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e same. Because of c l o s e r e l a t i o n and c o n t i n u o u s a w a r e n e s s o f t h e mother, c o n t r a c t is e n f o r c e a b l e . is It immaterial this the W disagree. e that Hermoine Parrent may have a d v i s e d and c o u n s e l e d c l a i m a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s w o r k e r s ' compensation claim. The m o t h e r is t h e n a t u r a l g u a r d i a n of t h e minor c l a i m a n t , b u t t h i s r e l a t i o n o n l y a f f e c t s h e r r i g h t t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e m i n o r and d o e s n o t e n l a r g e h e r r i g h t s to the property of contracting party. legally to the the minor. Claimant was the sole H e i s t h e o n l y p a r t y t h a t bound h i m s e l f contract. As a minor, he is e n t i t l e d to d i s a f f i r m and r e s c i n d t h e f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t . C o n t r a r y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s a r g u m e n t i n t h i s a r e a i s Gage v. Moore year-old defendant (Okla. 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 9 8 P.2d 395. I n Gage a f o u r t e e n - boy b r o u g h t a n a c t i o n t o r e s c i n d a c o n t r a c t . refused, and suit was brought. The The defendant c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s f a t h e r had a c q u i e s c e d i n and ratified the purchase and, for that reason, the contract s h o u l d n o t be r e s c i n d e d and a v o i d e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f . rejecting this contention fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Bombardier A.L.R. Goodrich v. and finding the (1920), court, 94 V t . 208, In for the quoting from 110 A . 11, 9 1028, s t a t e d : " ' T h e r i g h t o f an i n f a n t t o r e s c i n d h i s c o n t r a c t is u n a f f e c t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t h i s f a t h e r was p r e s e n t a d v i s i n g and a p p r o v i n g t h e transaction. The a s s e n t o f t h e f a t h e r a d d s n o t h i n g t o t h e b i n d i n g f o r c e o f an i n f a n t ' s promise. 1 9 8 P.2d a t 396. . ." I t is t h e p o l i c y of t h e law t o d i s c o u r a g e a d u l t s from contracting with claimant was petition a for discouraged a minor. minor final at Tom Mazurek the time settlement; testified claimant yet, from o b t a i n i n g c l a i m a n t ' s he knew signed the Mazurek was not s i g n a t u r e on the petition. The insurer, Compensation adjuster Division Mazurek h a v e much knowledge i n t h e a r e a o f w o r k e r s ' claimant and his knowledgeable Defendant e r r e d mother. parties W e and greater the Workers' expertise and compensation law t h a n have are overlooked dismayed simple that these contract law. in not requiring claimant's legal guardian t o s i g n t h e p e t i t i o n f o r f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t on b e h a l f of and i n p l a c e of claimant himself. The f i n a l compromise s e t t l e m e n t i s s e t a s i d e , and w e remand this case to the Workers' Compensation proceedings c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s Opinion. Court for We concur:
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