MARRIAGE OF HERRON

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No. 14743 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF PAUL W. HERRON, Petitioner and Respondent, SHARON M. HERRON, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead. Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Murphy, Robicson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent: Hash, Jellison, O'Brien and Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on briefs: November 11, 1979 Decided: MAR 1c 198C J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. Mr. T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by Sharon M. b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y i n t h i s m a t t e r . Herron on t h e d i s t r i H e r former husband, r e s p o n d e n t D r . P a u l Herron, b r o u g h t a n a c t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n , c u s t o d y , and a d i v i s i o n o f t h e c o u p l e ' s p r o p e r t y i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County o f F l a t h e a d . By agreement of t h e p a r t i e s , and w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e c o u r t , t h e w i f e r e t a i n e d c u s t o d y of t h e f o u r minor c h i l d r e n . Upon t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s i t t i n g without a jury, d i s s o l v e d t h e marriage and, s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n minor e x c e p t i o n s , d i v i d e d t h e p r o p e r t y e q u a l l y between t h e p a r t i e s . The c o u r t r e t a i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e matter f o r t h e s o l e p u r p o s e of e f f e c t u a t i n g t h e "even division." The c o u r t a l s o o r d e r e d c h i l d s u p p o r t i n t h e amount o f $300 p e r month p e r c h i l d and maintenance payments of $400 p e r month f o r 48 months. A t t h e t i m e o f t h e m a r r i a g e on J u l y 2 1 , 1962, D r . Herron w a s a b o a r d - c e r t i f i e d t h o r a c i c and v a s c u l a r s u r g e o n p r a c t i c i n g i n S e a t t l e , Washington. Mrs. Herron w a s a r e g i s t e r e d n u r s e employed a s a s u r g i c a l n u r s e i n S e a t t l e . T h i s w a s D r . H e r r o n ' s second m a r r i a g e and t h e f i r s t m a r r i a g e f o r M r s . Herron. marriage. Dr. Herron had a f a m i l y by h i s p r e v i o u s The t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h r o u g h t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f t h i s m a r r i a g e D r . Herron s u p p o r t e d a n o t h e r f a m i l y , b u t d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e t h e amount of s u p p o r t o r f o r what p e r i o d of time. The p a r t i e s l i v e d i n S e a t t l e where D r . Herron p r a c t i c e d u n t i l 1967 when t h e f a m i l y moved t o C o n n e c t i c u t where he d i d r e s e a r c h f o r t h e S t e r l i n g Drug Company f o r 18 months. he f a m i l y t h e n moved t o N e w York where D r . Herron c o n t i n u e d t o do r e s e a r c h . In 1972 the family moved to Kalispell, Montana, where Dr. Herron joined the surgical practice of a Dr. Lipinski. In recent years, Dr. Herron's net income from his medical practice has been in excess of $45,000 per year. As previously noted, Mrs. Herron was working as a registered nurse in Seattle when she married Dr. Herron. She continued to work as an R.N. until November 1963, when she quit work because of a physical disability. From that time until August 1965, she maintained four foster children in the household. There are four children of this marriage: ~eid, born August 27, 1965; Mark, born March 9, 1966; Shelbey, born September 4, 1967; and, Jamey, born September 25, 1970. Jamey, the youngest, has a learning disability that requires special care and special education. At the time of the dissolution of this marriage, the parties owned the following assets: (1) The Ranch - This consists of some 80 acres and a home with a swimming pool, located in the Flathead Valley between Columbia Falls and Kalispell. (2) The Lake Place - This consists of approximately 31/3 acres with 135 feet of Flathead Lake front near Big Fork, Montana. (3) The Paul Herron Medical Practice and Ownership in the Kalispell Medical Arts Building. (4) The Sharon Herron Home - This is the home occupied by Mrs. Herron and the four children. (5) The George Robbin Estate - Mrs. Herron's father, George Robbin, willed his property to Dr. and Mrs. Herron. Dr. Herron acquired an interest in the real and personal property of a gross value of approximately $143,000 and ~ r s . Herron acquired an equal amount, but in addition, life insurance in the amount of $19,841.39 and other joint assets in the amount of $4,234.84, or a gross estate of $167,242.46, which was subject to costs and taxes. (6) Miscellaneous Property - Both parties have miscellaneous personal property which has been divided between them. The division of the miscellaneous property is not contested on appeal. The Herrons acquired many of the above-listed assets as a result of gifts from Mrs. Herron's father. purchased a home while living in Seattle. The Herrons Mrs. Herron sold several life insurance policies held in her name to provide a partial downpayment on the home. Her father gave the couple the money necessary for the remainder of the down payment. When the Herrons moved to Connecticut, they sold the Seattle home and used the proceeds of the sale for a downpayment on a home in Connecticut. The couple repeated the process when they moved to New York. The Herrons used the proceeds from the sale of their New York home to make a downpayment on the Flathead Lake property when they moved to Kalispell. Thus, the acquisistion of the lake property is traceable to a gift from Mr. Robbin. When the couple moved to Kalispell, Mr. Robbin bought a house for the family. He paid $46,000 for the home. The Herrons subsequently sold the house for $46,000 and used the money from the sale as a downpayment on their ranch property. Mr. Robbin also gave the Herrons approximately $59,000 to build an addition onto the house located on the ranch. Therefore, approximately $105,000 of the equity the Herrons have accumulated in the ranch came from gifts from Mr. Robbin. I n addition, Mr. Robbin g a v e D r . H e r r o n $7,500 which was u s e d by D r . H e r r o n t o buy i n t o t h e o f f i c e b u i l d i n g and L i p i n s k i when D r . H e r r o n s e t u p p a r t n e r s h i p owned by D r . practice i n Kalispell. The c o u p l e a l s o r e c e i v e d a s u b s t a n - t i a l s m o f money from M r . R o b b i n ' s e s t a t e . u home owned by M r . The s a l e o f t h e Robbin p r o v i d e d t h e f u n d s f o r t h e down- payment o n t h e home M r s . Herron p r e s e n t l y occupies. The r e m a i n d e r o f t h e e s t a t e r e p r e s e n t s a m a j o r i t y of t h e c o u p l e ' s liquid assets. The i s s u e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t i s w h e t h e r a b a s i c a l l y 50/50 d i v i s i o n o f m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y between D r . and M r s . Herron i s e q u i t a b l e under t h e circumstances r e l a t i n g t o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y by t h e p a r t i e s . W e c l e a r l y and a c c u r a t e l y set o u t t h e s t a n d a r d f o r reviewing property d i v i s i o n s i n d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings i n I n R e t h e M a r r i a g e o f Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , P.2d 361, 35 S t . R e p . 1733. Mont . , 587 I n Brown w e s a i d : "The a p p o r t i o n m e n t made by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i l l n o t b e d i s t u r b e d on r e v i e w u n l e s s t h e r e h a s been a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n a s m a n i f e s t e d by a s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e marit a l assets resulting i n substantial i n j u s t i c e . " Brown, 587 P.2d a t 364, 35 S t . R e p . a t 1736. S e e a l s o I n Re t h e M a r r i a g e o f Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , , 598 P.2d 1 1 2 0 , 1 1 2 3 , 36 St.Rep. M a r r i a g e o f Kaasa ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . 1 5 2 5 , 1528; I n R e t h e - Mont . - 5 9 1 P.2d 1 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 3 , 36 S t - R e p . 425, 428; I n R e t h e M a r r i a g e o f K r a m e r (1978) r - Mont. 704. , 580 P.2d 439, 442, 35 St.Rep. 700, I n r e v i e w i n g t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n o r d e r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h i s case, w e f i n d t h e l o w e r c o u r t a b u s e d its discretion. The b a s i s f o r t h e e r r o r i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e H e r r o n s ' p r o p e r t y i s t h e f a i l u r e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o f o l l o w t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. S e c t i o n 40- 4-202(1) d i r e c t s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o a p p o r t i o n m a r i t a l assets ". . . b e l o n g i n g t o e i t h e r o r b o t h , however and whenever a c q u i r e d and whether t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o i s i n t h e name o f t h e husband o r w i f e o r b o t h . " That language c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d c o n s i d e r a l l t h e Herron p r o p e r t y , i n c l u d i n g t h a t r e c e i v e d by g i f t o r b e q u e s t from George Robbin, i n d i v i d i n g t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . Brown, 587 P.2d a t 365, 35 St.Rep. r i a g e of Vivian (1978), 35 St.Rep. - Mont. a t 1737; I n re t h e Mar- , 583 P.2d 1072, 1074, 1359, 1362; Morse v . Morse ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 571 P.2d 1147, 1149, 34 St.Rep. See a l s o 1334, 1337. - Mont. , The D i s t r i c t Court here included a l l t h e g i f t property i n t h e m a r i t a l assets, t h u s complying w i t h t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t o f s e c t i o n 404-202 (1) MCA. , The s t a t u t e g o e s on t o s t a t e : ". . . I n d i s p o s i n g of p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e ; p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by g i f t , bequest, devise, o r descent; property a c q u i r e d i n exchange f o r p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d b e f o r e t h e m a r r i a g e o r i n exchange f o r p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by g i f t , b e q u e s t , d e v i s e , o r descent; t h e increased value of property a c q u i r e d p r i o r t o m a r r i a g e ; and p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by a spouse a f t e r a d e c r e e of l e g a l separation, the court s h a l l consider t h o s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e o t h e r s p o u s e t o t h e marriage, including: " ( a ) t h e nonmonetary c o n t r i b u t i o n of a homemaker; " ( b ) t h e e x t e n t t o which such c o n t r i b u t i o n s have f a c i l i t a t e d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h i s p r o p e r t y ; and " ( c ) whether o r n o t t h e p r o p e r t y d i s postion serves a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o maintenance a r r a n g e m e n t s . " S e c t i o n 40, 4-202 (1) MCA. This p a r t of t h e p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s t a t u t e e s t a b l i s h e s t h e c r i t e r i a f o r determining an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of p r o p e r t y b r o u g h t t o t h e m a r r i a g e , a c q u i r e d by g i f t o r beq u e s t d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e and a c q u i r e d a f t e r a d e c r e e o f l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n . The s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h e c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e non-acquiring s p o u s e t o t h e marI n re t h e Mar- r i a g e i n d i v i d i n g t h e s e t y p e s of p r o p e r t y . r i a g e of Herring (1979), 36 S t . R e p . 2052, 2054. Mont. r 602 P.2d 1 0 0 6 , 1 0 0 7 , I n determining t h e exact d i s t r i b u - t i o n o f t h i s t y p e o f m a r i t a l a s s e t , no s e t f o r m u l a c a n be e s t a b l i s h e d a s t o how t h e assets s h o u l d b e e q u i t a b l y d i s tributed. Each c a s e h a s t o b e d e c i d e d o n i t s own m e r i t s . re t h e Marriage of Metcalf 1140, 1143, 36 St.Rep. 35 St.Rep. St.Rep. ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. 1 5 5 9 , 1563; V i v i a n , In -, 598 P.2d 583 P.2d a t 1 0 7 4 , a t 1362; Morse, 571 P.2d a t 1 1 4 7 , 1150, 34 a t 1338. I t i s i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s a s p e c t of t h e d i s - p o s i t i o n s t a t u t e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f a i l e d t o comply w i t h s e c t i o n 40-4-202(1), MCA. I n l i g h t of t h i s section, the property distribution order i s so inequitable a s t o r e p r e s e n t an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . The i n e q u i t y o f t h e 50/50 p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n becomes a p p a r e n t a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s o u r c e o f t h e m a r i t a l assets of t h e p a r t i e s . Almost a l l o f t h e p r o p e r t y a c c u m u l a t e d by t h e H e r r o n s c a n b e t r a c e d t o g i f t s o r b e q u e s t s from George Robbin. The c o u p l e p u r c h a s e d t h e r a n c h p r o p e r t y f o r $65,000, added a p p r o x i m a t e l y $59,000 w o r t h o f improvements t o t h e r a n c h h o u s e , and i n s t a l l e d a p o o l on t h e p r o p e r t y a t a c o s t o f $15,000. T o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r t h e r a n c h and improve- m e n t s t h u s e q u a l a p p r o x i m a t e l y $140,000. Mr. ~ o b b i n ave g t h e Herrons o v e r $100,000 o f t h e $140,000 t h e y s p e n t on t h e Property. The F l a t h e a d Lake p r o p e r t y was p u r c h a s e d w i t h money from t h e s a l e o f homes f o r which M r . gave t h e H e r r o n s a p a r t of t h e downpayment. Dr. Robbin o r i g i n a l l y Mr. Robbin gave Herron t h e money he needed t o buy i n t o h i s m e d i c a l practice i n Kalispell. Herron bought t h e home s h e and Mrs. t h e c h i l d r e n now r e s i d e i n w i t h t h e p r o c e e d s from t h e s a l e o f t h e R o b b i n ' s f a m i l y home, which t h e c o u p l e i n h e r i t e d from George Robbin. The o t h e r main m a r i t a l a s s e t , t h e George Robbin E s t a t e , o r i g i n a t e d from a d e v i s e from M r s . Herron's father. George Robbin t h u s g i f t e d o r bequeathed o v e r a q u a r t e r o f a m i l l i o n d o l l a r s t o t h e Herrons d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e i r marriage. The p r o p e r t y was g i v e n t o t h e Herrons jointly, but Mr. Robbin c e r t a i n l y d i d s o t o p r o v i d e f o r h i s o n l y d a u g h t e r . The p r o p e r t y s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d a s p r i n cipally g i f t s to M r s . Herron. Given t h e f a c t t h a t most of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s w e r e accumulated v i a g i f t s from M r s . Herron's f a t h e r , D r . Herron's c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e m a r r i a g e from o t h e r s o u r c e s would have t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweigh M r s . H e r r o n ' s t o r e n d e r e q u i t a b l e a 50/50 d i v i s i o n of t h e c o u p l e ' s a s s e t s . T h a t s i m p l y i s n o t t h e case here. p a r t i e s worked. For t h e f i r s t y e a r o f t h e m a r r i a g e , b o t h t h e Mrs. Herron t h e n assumed t h e d u t i e s of c a r i n g f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s home. She a l s o c a r e d f o r f o s t e r c h i l d r e n b r o u g h t i n t o t h e home and l a t e r f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s four natural children. Dr. Herron s u p p o r t e d t h e f a m i l y f i n a n c i a l l y w i t h income from h i s m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e . The m a r r i a g e had a l l t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a c o u p l e working t o g e t h e r and c o n t r i b u t i n g e q u a l l y toward t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n and maintenance o f t h e m a r i t a l assets. M r s . Herron main- t a i n e d t h e f a m i l y home and c a r e d f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s c h i l d r e n , e n a b l i n g D r . Herron t o p r a c t i c e h i s p r o f e s s i o n . Dr. Herron p r a c t i c e d m e d i c i n e , p r o v i d i n g t h e income t o s u p p o r t M r s . There i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t D r . Herron and t h e c h i l d r e n . Herron c o n t r i b u t e d more t o t h e m a r r i a g e t h a n M r s . Herron. I n f a c t , t h e e v i d e n c e i s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , a s D r . Herron t e s t i f i e d t h a t p a r t o f h i s income went t o pay alimony and c h i l d s u p p o r t f o r h i s f o r m e r w i f e and t h e c h i l d r e n o f h i s f i r s t marriage. W e have c o n s i d e r e d s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s i n s e v e r a l r e c e n t cases. I n I n re t h e M a r r i a g e of Balsam ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont , - 589 P.2d 652, 36 St.Rep. 79, M r . . Balsam's p a r e n t s gave him some s h a r e s i n t h e f a m i l y b u s i n e s s v a l u e d i n e x c e s s o f $50,000. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e s t o c k a p a r t o f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , b u t awarded M r s . Balsam no i n t e r e s t i n t h e s t o c k s on d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e marriage. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t s i n c e t h e s t o c k s had n o t a p p r e c i a t e d d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e , none o f t h e i r v a l u e c o u l d be a p r o d u c t o f c o n t r i b u t i o n from t h e m a r i t a l e f f o r t . a t 654, 36 St.Rep. a t 83. Balsam, 589 P.2d W e a f f i r m e d t h e d e c i s i o n and r a t i o n a l e of t h e lower c o u r t . I n Brown, s u p r a , M r . father. 14 y e a r s . H e and M r s . Brown i n h e r i t e d a r a n c h from h i s Brown worked t h e r a n c h t o g e t h e r f o r The r a n c h was v a l u e d between $350,000 and $450,000 a t t h e t i m e o f d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e Browns' m a r r i a g e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded M r s . Brown $25,000, o r between 5 and 7 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l v a l u e of t h e r a n c h , a s h e r e q u i t a b l e s h a r e of t h e property. T h i s C o u r t found t h a t M r s . Brown acquired a vested i n t e r e s t i n the ranch property regardless o f i t s s o u r c e by v i r t u e o f h e r 1 4 y e a r s a s a m o t h e r , housew i f e and p a r t t i m e r a n c h hand. Brown, 587 P.2d a t 365, 35 St.Rep. at 1737. We held that awarding her such a small amount of the total valuation of the ranch represented an inequitable division of the marital asset. Brown, 587 P.2d at 365, 35 St-Rep. at 1737-1738. In Metcalf, supra, Mr. Metcalf had received an inheritance five years prior to dissolution of the marriage. The Metcalfs' earnings at the time they received the inheritance were such that they spent the money for the normal expenses of the marriage. We found it impossible for the District Court to trace the inheritance under these circumstances. Metcalf, 598 P.2d at 1143, 36 St.Rep. at 1563. We held that a District Court faced with this predicament could not be . .become an appraiser, an accountant, a computer, and an all-around genius .. required to "I. . ' " and enter spe- cific findings regarding an inheritance expended in this fashion. Metcalf, 598 P.2d at 1143, 36 St.Rep. at 1563 (citing Downs v. Downs (1979), - Mont. , 592 P.2d 938, 939, 36 St.Rep. 577, 579). These cases set out some broad guidelines for an equitable division on dissolution of property acquired via gift or bequest to one party to the marriage. The gift must be traceable before the District Court will be required to make specific findings regarding the property. Metcalf, supra. If none of the value of the property is a product of contribution from the marital effort, the District Court can justifiably find that the non-acquiring spouse has no interest in the property. Balsam, supra. If, on the other hand, both parties to the marriage contribute to the maintenance and thus the appreciated value of the gift property, it is inequitable to award the non-acquiring spouse only a fraction of the value of the asset on dissolution. Brown, supra. The f a c t s h e r e do n o t f a l l s q u a r e l y under any of t h e previously decided cases. is definitely traceable. Unlike Metcalf, t h e g i f t property W e a r e not presented with t h e Balsam s i t u a t i o n o f no c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e maintenance of t h e a s s e t and no a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y d u r i n g t h e marriage. W e do have a s e t of f a c t s i n v o l v i n g e q u a l c o n t r i - b u t i o n t o t h e maintenance o f t h e g i f t a s s e t s and a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e a s s e t s a s i n Brown. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e r e , however, h a s n o t awarded s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l l t h e g i f t p r o p e r t y t o t h e a c q u i r i n g spouse. The s i t u a t i o n l i e s somewhere between t h e r e s u l t s r e a c h e d i n Balsam and Brown. The f a c t s do n o t w a r r a n t t h e t o t a l d e n i a l of any i n t e r e s t i n t h e g i f t e d m a r i t a l a s s e t s by t h e non-acquiring s p o u s e j u s t i f i e d i n Balsam. Both p a r t i e s h e r e c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e maintenance o f t h e a s s e t s , and t h e a s s e t s have a p p r e c i a t e d . By t h e same t o k e n , j u s t a s i n Brown, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t would n o t be j u s t i f i e d i n awarding t h e n o n - a c q u i r i n g s p o u s e o n l y a s m a l l f r a c t i o n of t h e t o t a l v a l u e o f t h e g i f t p r o p e r t y b e c a u s e of t h e j o i n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p r o p e r t y and t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e property. Both p a r t i e s h e r e s h o u l d s h a r e e q u a l l y i n t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e v a l u e of t h e g i f t p r o p e r t y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t i o n from t h e m a r r i a g e and a p p r e c i a t i o n d u r i n g t h e marriage. The Herrons s h o u l d n o t , however, s h a r e e q u a l l y i n t h e t o t a l v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y s i n c e t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s came t o t h e m a r r i a g e p r i n c i p a l l y a s g i f t s f o r M r s . err on's benefit. W e t h e r e f o r e remand t h e c a s e t o D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r retrial. On remand, we d i r e c t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o c o r r e c t two a d d i t i o n a l e r r o r s i n i t s h a n d l i n g of t h i s c a s e . W have e r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e t h e n e t w o r t h o f t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v o r c e t o have a proper d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . P.2d a t 1 0 0 7 , 36 St.Rep. St.Rep. H e r r i n g , 602 a t 2054; Brown, 587 P.2d a t 365, 35 a t 1738; V i v i a n , 583 P.2d a t 1074, 35 St.Rep. 1361; Kramer, 580 P.2d a t 443, 35 St.Rep. a t 704. at The n a t u r e o f some o f t h e p r o p e r t y i n v o l v e d h e r e i l l u s t r a t e s t h e r e a s o n a n e t w o r t h d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e an e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y c a n b e made. For ex- ample, D r . H e r r o n i n t r o d u c e d a n e x h i b i t and g a v e t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l v a l u i n g h i s m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e a t $7,500. To v a l u e a t $7,500 a n i n t e r e s t i n a m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e t h a t i n c l u d e s p a r t ownership i n a c l i n i c b u i l d i n g , goodwill, accounts r e c e i v a b l e t o t a l i n g o v e r $50,000, and a c a p a c i t y f o r g e n e r a t i n g o v e r $45,000 p e r y e a r i n income i s , o f c o u r s e , r i d i c u lous. L i k e w i s e , t o award M r s . H e r r o n 50 p e r c e n t o f $7,500 a s h e r e q u i t a b l e s h a r e of t h e medical p r a c t i c e , even a b s e n t t h e f a c t t h a t h e r f a t h e r gave D r . Herron t h e money t o buy i n t o the practice, i s patently inequitable. T h e r e must b e a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e t r u e worth of a s s e t s l i k e D r . Herron's medical p r a c t i c e b e f o r e an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s c a n b e made. D e s p i t e o u r r e p e a t e d s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e n e c e s s i t y o f determining n e t worth b e f o r e d i v i d i n g m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , t h e District C o u r t f a i l e d t o do s o here. d o s o on remand. W e advise the court t o I n considering t h e family a s s e t s under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h e c o u r t on remand s h o u l d t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n how t h e j o i n t e s t a t e o f t h e c o u p l e w a s a c q u i r e d and make a n e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e same. The 50/50 r u l e i s n o t a b s o l u t e when i t b r i n g s a b o u t a n i n e q u i table distribution. The second error by the District Court involves the maintenance award made in this case. Maintenance can only be awarded to parties lacking sufficient property to provide for their needs and unable to support themselves through appropriate employment. Section 40-4-203(1), MCA. The court cannot determine if the parties possess sufficient property to support themselves until the marital assets have been valued and divided. Therefore, the District Court should not award final maintenance payments until the marital assets have been valued and equitably apportioned. Vivian, 583 P.2d at 1075, 35 St.Rep. at 1362; In re the Marriage of Johnsrud (1977), - Mont. 907, 34 St.Rep. 1417, 1423-1424. , 572 P.2d 902, Here the marital assets have been neither valued nor equitably apportioned. The maintenance award should therefore be reviewed on remand. In reviewing the maintenance award, we recommend that the District Court carefully consider the advisability of placing any time restrictions on the duration of the maintenance to Mrs. Herron. Section 40-4-203(2), MCA, sets out the considerations relevant to the amount and duration of a maintenance award. That sub'section states: "The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant facts including: "(a) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian; " (b) 'the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; "(c) the standard of living established during the marriage; "(dl the duration of the marriage; " (e) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and " (f) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance. " Considering these factors, Mrs. Herron is now 45 years old. She left the job market over 15 years ago in part because a physical disability made it difficult for her to work as a nurse. Her recent efforts to obtain and hold a job have met with minimum success at best. Mrs. Herron main- tains a home for four children, the youngest of whom has a learning disability and may require Mrs. Herron's care for quite some time. Dr. Herron, on the other hand, is a prac- ticing surgeon in the prime of his professional career. His employment allows him to earn in excess of $45,000 annually. This level of income would allow him to pay the support and maintenance ordered by the District Court and still retain approximately $25,000 annually for his own expenses. Addi- tionally, the couple established a relatively high standard of living during their 16 years of marriage. The court should also consider whether the property awarded to the parties is income consuming or income producing in determining the amount and duration of maintenance payments. Johnsrud, 572 P.2d at 905, 34 St.Rep. at 1421; Brawman v. Brawrnan (1962), 199 Cal.App.2d 876, 19 Cal.Rptr. 106, 110. Brawman illustrates the rationale for considering the nature as well as the amount of distributed property in determining adequate maintenance. The California court points out that the practical effect of a property division awarding income consuming property to one spouse and income producing property to the other leaves one spouse in possession of property the spouse is unable to maintain while placing the other party in control of assets that generate a comfortable living. Brawman, 19 Cal.Rptr. at 110. The Brawman court found this situation inequitable and held that maintenance should be employed as a remedy. 19 Cal.Rptr. at 111. Here we find the property awarded to Mrs. Herron, although possibly substantial in quantity, is income consuming in nature. The primary income producing marital asset, the medical practice and attendant goodwill, will be awarded to Dr. Herron. The danger exists of creating a situation in which Mrs. Herron would be "property poor", i.e. in possession of a large quantity of property but unable to generate the income to maintain the property. In contrast, the marital assets received by Dr. Herron should allow him to continue making a handsome salary. We agree with the Brawman court that maintenance payments to Mrs. Herron should be employed to compensate for the inequities inherent in this situation. The considerations set forth in section 40-4-203(2), MCA, and the nature of the Herron marital assets to be distributed militate against limiting the duration of maintenance payments to Mrs. Herron. On remand we advise the District Court to reconsider its decision to do so. For the above reasons, we remand the case for retrial on the issues of property disposition and maintenance. We concur: Justices Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring in part and dissenting in part: I must respectfully dissent from the majority in concluding that the gifts from the wife's father to the couple must be counted as the wife's contribution in dividing the marital estate. The record shows that the gifts were made irrevocably to the couple. That being so, ownership of one-half of the gifts was vested in the husband at the time of the gifts. It may be in the light of after-events that the father would not have made those gifts to the husband had the father known what was in the future, but we cannot cure that with our hindsight. This Court is in no better position to reverse the ownership of the gifts than the father's executor would be. We might wish it otherwise, but that is the law. Justice

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