MAY v FIGGINS

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No. 14958 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 ROBERT MAY,' Deputy Administrator, Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, WILLIE FIGGINS, individually and d/b/a FIGGINS & SONS, Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Respondents. 1 from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, County of Gallatin, Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Berg, Morgan, Coil & Stokes, Bozeman, Montana Michael C. Morgan argued, Bozeman, Montana For -Respondents: Bolinger, Higgins and Andes, Bozeman, Montana Gerry M. Higgins argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: Filed: H ~ IR- I?;;, -1- Decided : February 25, 1980 HA!? 1': @@ Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Plaintiff sued a state District Court in Montana to enforce a Colorado default judgment against defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on Colorado's lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the Colorado action. Summary judgment was denied. After trial, the Court, sitting without a jury, found for plaintiff. Defendant appeals from that judgment. The material facts are undisputed. Defendant Willie Figgins is a Montana road contractor who does most of his work in the Gallatin Valley. Including family members, Figgins has only seven employees at any one time. He does no road contracting in Colorado, does not advertise or solicit business in Colorado, and does not have a Colorado bank account. On December 17, 1971, Willie Figgins signed a "Collective Bargaining Compliance Agreement" which was also signed by representatives of the Montana Joint Council of Teamsters No. 2 3 , which has no connection with the State of Colorado. The compliance agreement was accepted by the Montana A.G.C. Teamsters Trust Fund and by the trustees of the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund at Seattle, Washington. Under this agreement, Figgins agreed to be bound by the articles of trust contained in the pension trust fund. He agreed "to be bound by, become a party thereto, comply with and execute all forms necessary to be bound to the various Articles of Trust contained in the health and welfare plan and pension plan or any other trust established under the terms and conditions of said extent agreement." The Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund is one of the trusts so established. The administrative office of the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund is in Seattle, Washington, the situs of the trust is the State of Washington, and the articles of the trust state that ". . . all questions pertaining to its validity, construction, and administration shall be determined in accordance with the laws of that State." The trust provides that "Employer Con- tributions shall be paid to the depository bank designated by the Administrator of the Trust Fund for the particular Pension Agreement," and that "The County in which the particular Employer Contribution is payable shall be a proper county in which to institute legal proceedings to collect delinquent Employer Contributions." Neither the collective bargaining compliance agreement nor the trust agreement specify where the contributions are to be made. In the compliance agreement, however, defendant also agreed to execute all necessary forms, one of which is the employer's monthly report which designates the United Bank of Denver in Denver, Colorado as the depository bank. Willie Figgins' bookkeeper sent thirty-five (35) checks, approximately one per month, to Colorado following the Trust Administrator's instructions, beginning on March 10, 1972. The checks were defendant's only contact with the State of Colorado. Figgins was later audited by a Seattle, Washington firm for the trust. Plaintiff-respondent, Robert May, Deputy Administrator of the trust, brought an action in Colorado to collect delinquent employer contributions from Figgins. A summons was served on Figgins in Montana, but he did not defend the Colorado lawsuit, and plaintiff took a default judgment i n Colorado. P l a i n t i f f b r o u g h t s u i t i n t h e Montana D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o e n f o r c e t h e Colorado judgment. Figgins moved f o r summary judgment on t h e b a s i s of C o l o r a d o ' s l a c k o f p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r him i n t h e Colorado s u i t , b u t t h e Montana D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d summary judgment and found for plaintiff. Defendant a p p e a l s from t h a t judgment. The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s have been p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r review: 1. Did t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t of s e n d i n g t h i r t y - f i v e c h e c k s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s t r u s t a c c o u n t i n a Colorado bank e s t a b l i s h s u f f i c i e n t "minimum c o n t a c t s " t o g i v e t h e Colorado c o u r t - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e n o n r e s i d e n t Montana in defendant? 2. Did t h e Montana d e f e n d a n t knowingly c o n s e n t t o Colorado j u r i s d i c t i o n ? On c r o s s - a p p e a l p l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e : Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n by l i m i t i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s t o $1200? "As a r e s u l t o f t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e Supreme C o u r t expanding t h e l i m i t s o f due p r o c e s s t o p e r m i t t h e a s s e r t i o n o f j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r nonr e s i d e n t s where t h e r e h a s been o n l y minimal c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e forum s t a t e , s t a t e s have responded by e n a c t i n g long-arm s t a t u t e s and c o u r t r u l e s e n l a r g i n g t h e scope of p e r m i s s i b l e j u r i s diction i n the s t a t e courts." 2 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 714.41-1 [ 3 ] a t 4-437. "Under t h e s e s t a t e long-arm s t a t u t e s , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether t h e c o u r t h a s i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n i s a two-step p r o c e s s . The c o u r t f i r s t must l o o k t o t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e t o d e t e r mine whether t h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s f o r the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s of t h e c a s e , and second, t h e c o u r t must d e t e r mine whether i t would o f f e n d due p r o c e s s t o assert j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 2 Moore's F e d e r a l Pract i c e 114.41-1111 a t 4-421. The Montana Supreme C o u r t has f o l l o w e d t h e two-step a p p r o a c h i n Haker v. S o u t h w e s t e r n Ry. Co. (1978), - Mont. , 578 P.2d 724, 729, 35 St.Rep. 523, and i t i s t h e p r o p e r frame of a n a l y s i s i n which t o c o n s i d e r t h i s c a s e . A Colorado s t a t u t e g r a n t s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r n o n r e s i - d e n t s i f t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n a r i s e s from ". . a c t i o n of any b u s i n e s s w i t h i n t h i s s t a t e . " § 13-1-124. .the trans- Colo. Rev. S t a t . The Colorado Supreme C o u r t h a s i n t e r p r e t e d t h e s t a t u t e t o mean t h a t Colorado h a s - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n in o v e r any n o n r e s i d e n t who meets t h e "minimum c o n t a c t s " t e s t o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v . S t a t e of Washington ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 1 5 4 , 9 0 L.Ed. 95. "By e n a c t i n g t h e l a t t e r s t a t u t e s , o u r l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o e x t e n d t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of o u r c o u r t s t o t h e f u l l e s t e x t e n t p e r m i t t e d by t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e o f t h e f o u r t e e n t h amendment o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . " S a f a r i O u t f i t t e r s , I n c . v. S u p e r i o r C o u r t ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783, 784. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e o n l y q u e s t i o n t o be d e c i d e d i s whether o r n o t t h e Montana d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s was v i o l a t e d by C o l o r a d o ' s a s s e r t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s c a s e . The l e a d i n g case a d d r e s s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of when a s t a t e may e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p e r s o n o f a nonr e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t i s I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v . S t a t e of Washington, s u p r a . The S t a t e of Washington b r o u g h t s u i t t o r e c o v e r u n p a i d c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e s t a t e unemployment compensation fund from a f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n which had no o f f i c e i n Washington and made no c o n t r a c t s t h e r e , b u t which employed salesmen w i t h i n t h e s t a t e t o s o l i c i t o r d e r s . The d e f e n d a n t c o r p o r a t i o n m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e a c t i v i t i e s of i t s salesmen d i d n o t r e n d e r i t " p r e s e n t " w i t h i n t h e s t a t e f o r p u r p o s e s of p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h due p r o c e s s . I n r e j e c t i n g t h e s e c o n t e n t i o n s , t h e Supreme C o u r t announced: ". . .due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t i n o r d e r t o s u b j e c t a d e f e n d a n t t o a judgment i n p e r sonam, i f he be n o t p r e s e n t w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e forum, h e have c e r t a i n minimum c o n t a c t s w i t h i t s u c h t h a t t h e maintenance o f t h e s u i t d o e s n o t o f f e n d ' t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of f a i r p l a y and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e . ' " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, 326 U.S. a t 316. The Supreme C o u r t e l a b o r a t e d on t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e "minimum c o n t a c t s " t e s t : "Whether due p r o c e s s i s s a t i s f i e d must depend r a t h e r upon t h e q u a l i t y and n a t u r e of t h e act i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f a i r and o r d e r l y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e laws which i t w a s t h e p u r p o s e of t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e t o i n s u r e . That c l a u s e does n o t contemplate t h a t a s t a t e may make b i n d i n g a judgment i n personam a g a i n s t a n i n d i v i d u a l o r c o r p o r a t e d e f e n d a n t w i t h which t h e s t a t e h a s no c o n t a c t s , t i e s , o r r e l a t i o n s "But t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a c o r p o r a t i o n e x e r c i s e s t h e p r i v i l e g e of c o n d u c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n a s t a t e , it e n j o y s t h e b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e laws o f t h a t s t a t e . The e x e r c i s e of t h a t p r i v i l e g e may g i v e r i s e t o o b l i g a t i o n s ; and, s o f a r a s t h o s e o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s e o u t of o r a r e connected with t h e a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e s t a t e , a p r o c e d u r e which r e q u i r e s t h e c o r p o r a t i o n t o respond t o a s u i t brought t o enforce them c a n , i n most i n s t a n c e s , h a r d l y be s a i d t o be undue." I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, 326 U.S. a t 319. (Citations omitted.) Applying t h e s e s t a n d a r d s t o t h e f a c t s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d : " I t i s evident t h a t these operations establish s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s o r t i e s w i t h t h e s t a t e of t h e forum t o make i t r e a s o n a b l e and j u s t acc o r d i n g t o o u r t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n of f a i r p l a y and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e t o p e r m i t t h e s t a t e t o e n f o r c e t h e o b l i g a t i o n s which a p p e l l a n t has incurred there." 326 U.S. a t 320. McGee v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e I n s . Co. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 355 U.S. 223, r e p r e s e n t s t h e f a r t h e s t e x t e n s i o n t h u s f a r of j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a n o n r e s i d e n t under t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe d o c t r i n e . 114.25[4] a t 4-253 and g 4 . 4 1 - l [ l ] 2 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e a t 4-413. In McGee the b e n e f i c i a r y under a l i f e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y b r o u g h t s u i t i n California against a nonresident insurance corporation. The foreign corporation was served by registered mail pursuant to California statutes. The policy upon which the suit was based had been purchased by the decedent from an Arizona company which was subsequently, absored by defendant, a Texas corporation. Defendant's only connection with Cali- fornia was that it had mailed a reinsurance certificate to the decedent in California offering to insure him under the terms of the original policy and later delivered the insurance contract there. Also, the insured had sent his pre- miums by mail to defendant in Texas. The plaintiff obtained a default judgment in a California state court against the nonresident insurance company and brought an action to enforce the judgment in Texas, where the Texas courts refused to give full faith and credit to the California decree on the grounds that the California court had not secured jurisdiction over defendant consistent with due process. The Supreme Court reversed holding that the California judgment did not violate due process under the rationale of International Shoe. The Court said: "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State . . The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that state when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable. When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum--thus in effect making the company judgment proof. Often the crucial witnesses--as here on the company's defense of suicide--will be found in the insured's locality." McGee. 355 U.S. at 223. . Thus, - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n w a s u p h e l d i n McGee where t h e in o n l y c o n t a c t t h e n o n r e s i d e n t had w i t h t h e forum s t a t e w a s t h e i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t sued upon, and where no e v i d e n c e w a s p r e s e n t e d t h a t any a g e n t o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e d e f e n d a n t was e v e r i n t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a . "However, where d e f e n - d a n t ' s contacts with the state a r e not s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of f a i r p l a y and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e , in personam j u r i s d i c t i o n may n o t be s e c u r e d o v e r him t h r o u g h long-arm s e r v i c e . " 2 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 114.41-1[1] 4-414, S.Ct. c i t i n g Hanson v. Denckla ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d McGee, 1283. at 235, 78 Hanson, d e c i d e d a y e a r a f t e r r e p r e s e n t s a l i m i t a t i o n t o t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s e a r l i e r h o l d i n g s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe and M c G e e . I n Hanson, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d e n i e d a F l o r i d a c o u r t ' s a s s e r t i o n o f j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a Delaware t r u s t and s t a t e d : ". . .it i s e s s e n t i a l i n each case t h a t t h e r e be some a c t by which t h e d e f e n d a n t p u r p o s e f u l l y a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e of c o n d u c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e forum S t a t e , t h u s i n v o k i n g t h e b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n of i t s laws." 357 U.S. a t 253. I n Hanson a r e s i d e n t o f Penn- s y l v a n i a c r e a t e d a t r u s t , naming a Delaware t r u s t company a s trustee. The s e t t l o r r e t a i n e d a l i f e e s t a t e and r e s e r v e d a power of a p p o i n t m e n t o v e r t h e remainder. She s u b s e q u e n t l y became a r e s i d e n t o f F l o r i d a , where s h e e x e c u t e d an i n t e r v i v o s power of a p p o i n t m e n t o v e r a p o r t i o n of t h e r e m a i n d e r and made o u t a w i l l a p p o i n t i n g t h e b a l a n c e of t h e t r u s t corpus t o her executrix. When t h e s e t t l o r d i e d i n F l o r i d a , t h e q u e s t i o n a r o s e a s t o whether t h e a s s e t s a p p o i n t e d i n t e r v i v o s s h o u l d have p a s s e d under d e c e d e n t ' s w i l l , s i n c e t h e i n t e r v i v o s a p p o i n t m e n t would have been i n v a l i d under F l o r i d a law a s an a t t e m p t e d t e s t a m e n t a r y d i s p o s i t i o n . A declaratory judgment a c t i o n was b r o u g h t i n F l o r i d a t o r e s o l v e t h i s issue. The Delaware t r u s t company w a s g i v e n n o t i c e a s r e q u i r e d by t h e F l o r i d a s t a t u t e s d e a l i n g w i t h c o n s t r u c t i v e s e r v i c e . The Supreme C o u r t r e v e r s e d t h e F l o r i d a c o u r t ' s a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e m a t t e r , h o l d i n g t h a t under F l o r i d a l a w t h e Delaware t r u s t company was a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t y o v e r which t h e in F l o r i d a c o u r t s had n o t o b t a i n e d - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n . The Supreme C o u r t concluded t h e r e were i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s l i n k i n g t h e t r u s t company t o t h e forum s t a t e . The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i n Hanson s t a t e d : " I n McGee t h e C o u r t n o t e d t h e t r e n d of expanding . . personal -u r i s d i c t i o n over nonresidents j But i t i s a m i s t a k e t o assume t h a t t h i s t r e n d h e r a l d s t h e e v e n t u a l demise of a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of s t a t e c o u r t s . . Those r e s t r i c t i o n s are more t h a n a g u a r a n t e e of immunity from i n c o n v e n i e n t o r d i s t a n t l i t i g a t i o n . They a r e a consequence of t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e power o f t h e r e s p e c t i v e S t a t e s . However minimal t h e burden o f d e f e n d i n g i n a f o r e i g n t r i b u n a l , a d e f e n d a n t may n o t be c a l l e d upon t o do s o u n l e s s he h a s had t h e 'minimal c o n t a c t s ' with t h a t S t a t e t h a t a r e a prerequisite t o i t s e x e r c i s e of power o v e r him. . . . . "We f a i l t o f i n d s u c h c o n t a c t s i n t h e circums t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e . The d e f e n d a n t t r u s t company h a s no o f f i c e i n F l o r i d a , and t r a n s a c t s no busi n e s s there. None o f t h e t r u s t a s s e t s h a s e v e r been h e l d o r a d m i n i s t e r e d i n F l o r i d a , and t h e rec o r d d i s c l o s e s no s o l i c i t a t i o n o f b u s i n e s s i n t h a t S t a t e e i t h e r i n p e r s o n o r by m a i l . . . "The c a u s e of a c t i o n i n t h i s c a s e i s n o t one t h a t a r i s e s o u t o f a n a c t done o r t r a n s a c t i o n consummated i n t h e forum S t a t e . I n t h a t r e s p e c t , i t d i f f e r s from McGee v . I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e I n s . Co., 355 U . S . 2 2 0 , 7 8 S . C t . 1 9 9 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223, and . the cases there c i t e d . . "In contrast, t h i s action involves the v a l i d i t y of a n agreement t h a t was e n t e r e d w i t h o u t any c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e forum S t a t e . The agreement w a s e x e c u t e d i n Delaware by a t r u s t company i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h a t S t a t e and a s e t t l o r d o m i c i l e d i n P e n n s y l v a n i a . The f i r s t r e l a t i o n s h i p F l o r i d a had t o t h e agreement w a s y e a r s l a t e r when t h e s e t t l o r became d o m i c i l e d t h e r e , and t h e t r u s t e e r e m i t t e d t h e t r u s t income t o h e r i n t h a t S t a t e . From F l o r i d a M r s . Donner c a r r i e d on s e v e r a l b i t s of t r u s t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t may be compared t o But t h e r e c o r d t h e m a i l i n g of premiums i n NcGee. d i s c l o s e s no i n s t a n c e i n which t h e t r u s t e e p e r formed any a c t s i n F l o r i d a t h a t b e a r t h e same rel a t i o n s h i p t o t h e agreement a s t h e s o l i c i t a t i o n i n McGee. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h i s s u i t c a n n o t be s a i d t o b e one t o e n f o r c e a n o b l i g a t i o n t h a t a r o s e from a p r i v i l e g e t h e defendant exercised i n Florida. .. "The e x e c u t i o n i n F l o r i d a of t h e powers of a p p o i n t ment under which t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s and a p p o i n t e e s claim does n o t give Florida a s u b s t a n t i a l connection w i t h t h e c o n t r a c t on which t h i s s u i t i s based The u n i l a t e r a l a c t i v i t y of t h o s e who c l a i m some r e l a t i o n s h i p with a nonresident defendant cannot s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of c o n t a c t w i t h t h e forum S t a t e . The a p p l i c a t i o n of t h a t r u l e w i l l v a r y w i t h t h e q u a l i t y and n a t u r e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i v i t y , b u t i t i s e s s e n t i a l i n e a c h case t h a t t h e r e be some a c t by which t h e d e f e n d a n t purp o s e f u l l y a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e o f cond u c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e forum S t a t e , t h u s i n v o k i n g t h e b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n s of i t s laws. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v . S t a t e of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 1 5 4 , 159, 90 L.Ed. 95." 357 U.S. a t 250-253. . .. Defendant a d v o c a t e s t h a t Hanson i s d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s a p p e a l , a p p a r e n t l y on t h e grounds t h a t a l l of h i s i n i t i a l c o n t a c t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e Western Conference of Teamsters P e n s i o n T r u s t Fund w e r e n o t w i t h Colorado, b u t were e i t h e r w i t h Montana o r w i t h t h e S t a t e of Washington, t h e s i t u s of the trust. I t i s t r u e t h a t a l l of t h e i n i t i a l c o n t a c t s con- c e r n i n g t h e t r u s t e s t a b l i s h e d i n Hanson were e i t h e r i n Penns y l v a n i a , where t h e s e t t l o r r e s i d e d a t t h e t i m e t h e t r u s t w a s c r e a t e d , o r i n Delaware, t h e s i t u s of t h e t r u s t , r a t h e r t h a n i n F l o r i d a , where t h e s e t t l o r r e s i d e d a t t h e t i m e s h e e x e r c i s e d h e r power of a p p o i n t m e n t and a t t h e t i m e of h e r death. T h a t f a c t , however, w a s n o t d i s p o s i t i v e i n Hanson, where t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e F l o r i d a c o u r t had no p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e t r u s t e e and no j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e t r u s t based on a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e w e r e no "minimum c o n t a c t s " between t h e Delaware t r u s t e e and t h e forum s t a t e o f F l o r i d a , e i t h e r i n i t i a l l y o r a t any subsequent time. N e v e r t h e l e s s , Hanson h a s a b e a r i n g on t h e outcome of t h i s appeal. I n both cases, the nonresident defendant ( W i l l i e F i g g i n s i n t h i s c a s e , t h e Delaware t r u s t e e i n Hanson) h a s no o f f i c e i n t h e forum s t a t e (Colorado i n t h i s c a s e , F l o r i d a i n Hanson), h a s no a s s e t s t h e r e , t r a n s a c t s no b u s i n e s s t h e r e , and h a s n o t s o l i c i t e d b u s i n e s s i n t h e forum I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e cause of a c t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t state. a p p e a l a r i s e s o u t o f W i l l i e F i g g i n s ' f a i l u r e t o make e m p l o y e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e Colorado bank, w h i l e i n Hanson t h e C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e c a u s e . o f a c t i o n was n o t one t h a t a r o s e o u t o f an a c t done o r a t r a n s a c t i o n consummated i n t h e forum s t a t e , s i n c e t h e Delaware t r u s t w a s n o t e s t a b l i s h e d i n F l o r i d a and had no c o n n e c t i o n w i t h F l o r i d a , d e s p i t e t h e u n i l a t e r a l a c t i v i t y of t h e s e t t l o r i n F l o r i d a and t h e t r u s t e e ' s r e m i t t a n c e o f t r u s t income t o h e r i n t h a t s t a t e . "The c o n t a c t s r e q u i r e d upon which t o b a s e j u r i s d i c t i o n , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h due p r o c e s s , would be g r e a t e r where t h e a c t i o n i s b r o u g h t upon a c l a i m n o t a r i s i n g from t h e s e cont a c t s w i t h t h e s t a t e , t h a n where t h e a c t i o n d o e s a r i s e from t h e s t a t e contacts." a t 4-414. 2 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 114.41-1[1] S e e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, s u p r a , and P e r k i n s v . Benguet C o n s o l i d a t e d Mining Co. S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485. ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 342 U.S. 437, 72 S t i l l , d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t of s e n d i n g c h e c k s t o Colorado c a n be compared w i t h t h e a c t i v i t y of t h e Hanson t r u s t e e i n r e m i t t i n g t r u s t income t o t h e s e t t l o r i n F l o r i d a , and i t must be remembered t h a t i n Hanson t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e r e was no a c t by which t h e d e f e n d a n t t r u s t e e "purposely a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e of conducting a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e forum s t a t e , t h u s i n v o k i n g t h e benef i t s and p r o t e c t i o n s of i t s laws." 357 U.S. a t 253. Applying the rules enunciated in International Shoe, McGee and Hanson to the present case, it does not appear that defendant Willie Figgins had sufficient "minimum contacts" to subject him to the jurisdiction of the Colorado court. It would be unfair to this defendant and unreason- able to require him to defend in Colorado where his only contact with that forum was to mail thirty-five checks to a Denver Bank. Willie Figgins has no offices in Colorado, does no contracting work in Colorado, solicits no business there, and does not have a Colorado bank account. By his act of merely sending checks to plaintiff's bank in Colorado, he has not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business within that forum, and he has not thereby invoked the benefits and protections of its laws. Conse- quently, there is no rationale to justify subjecting him to Colorado ' s jurisdiction. In support of this conclusion are holdings from the courts of other states which state that merely making payments in a state does not establish the requisite minimum contacts to satisfy due process. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt (Tex. 1977), 553 S.W.2d 760, 763, cert. denied 434 U.S. 1063; Freedom Finance Co. v. Berry (N.J.Super. 1972), 62 N.J. 256, 290 A.2d 298, affVd/300 A.2d 341; "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. v. Seneca Foods Corp. (1972), 361 Mass. 441, 280 N.E.2d 423. Colo. Compare Tucker v. Vista Financial Corp. (1977), , 560 P.2d 453, holding that California could properly exercise jurisdiction over a resident of Colorado whose sole contact with California was that in Colorado she co-signed a promissory note payable in California to a California bank and authorized funds to be disbursed in California. The Montana contractor did not knowingly consent to in Colorado - personam jurisdiction. In the collective bar- gaining compliance agreement which he signed with the Western Conference of Teamsters, located in Seattle, Washington, defendant agreed to be bound by the articles of trust contained in the pension trust fund. One provision of the articles of trust stated that the county in which the employer contribution is payable as designated by the Administrator of the trust fund "shall be a proper county in which to institute legal proceedings to collect delinquent Employer Contributions." Neither the collective bargaining compliance agreement nor the articles of trust specified where the employer contributions were to be paid. They were paid to the Colorado bank by defendant upon receipt of subsequent instructions from the Trust Administrator. In the collec- tive bargaining compliance agreement, however, defendant also agreed to execute all necessary forms, one of which is the employer's monthly report which designates the depository bank. The general rule is that "parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court . . ." National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent (1964), 375 U.S. 311, 316, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354. In this case, however, the courts of Colorado could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendant consistent with due process, so that any purported consent to Colorado's jurisdiction would amount to a waiver of the constitutional right to due process and would have to be evaluated in that light and by the tests applicable to a waiver of constitutional rights. The defendant contractor in this case could not have known that the agreement which he signed would subject him to the jurisdiction of Colorado courts because there was nothing in the collective bargaining compliance agreement or in the articles of trust that specified the jurisdiction as to which he waived his constitutional due process rights. Hence, there was no clear waiver of his due process rights as required by Fuentes v. Shevin (1972), 407 U.S. 67, 95, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556. District Court (1976), Compare Clinic Masters v. Colo. I 556 P.2d 473. As stated in Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum (1975), 88 N.M. 532, 543 P.2d 825, 830: "An agreement to waive this constitu- tional right must be deliberately and understandingly made, and language relied upon to constitute such a waiver must clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver of this right." To accept the respondent's argument that the defendant here contractually consented to be sued in Colorado would be to give the respondent carte blanche to use contracts of adhesion to establish a right to sue defendants wherever would be most convenient to respondents, and least convenient to defendants. The contractual provisions purport- ing to waive - personam jurisdiction are unreasonable and in unenforceable. Furthermore, defendant did not waive his rights as to Colorado jurisdiction. The Compliance Agreement, which Willie Figgins signed, and Trust Agreement, to which he was bound, do not state specifically the county and state where legal proceedings are to be instituted. By subsequently re- ceiving a notice to send payments to Colorado and by accommodating the Trust Administrator by mailing payments to Colorado, defendant did not deliberately, understandingly, clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously consent to the jurisdiction of the State of Colorado. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is dismissed. The matter is remanded to the District Court so that proceedings may be had to determine costs and reasonable attorney fees for the services of defendant's attorneys and assessment of the same against plaintiff. I I Justice We concur: wa4. a&-8 Chief Justice %A: Justices I

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