MARRIAGE OF HARRIS

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No. 80-20 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1980 I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F WARREN KIRK H A R R I S , P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l - a n t , DELLA MAE STROTHMAN H A R R I S , R e s p o n d e n t and R e s p o n d e n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t c1f t h e E j - g h t ~ e e n t hJ u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of G a l l a t i n , T h e R o n o r a b l e W. FJ. L e s s l e y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p ; . j e l l a n t : M o r r c l w , S e d i v y , O l s o n s. S c u l l y , B o z e m a n , Montana For Respondent: B o l k o v a . t z , R o m i n e & John F. Bell, Helen&, Montana S u b m i t - t e d on b r i e f s : Decided: Filed: Clerk Auyust 14, 1980 SLP 2 5 198fl Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court . Warren Kirk Harris appeals the decision of the District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, awarding property to his wife, Della Mae Harris, upon a finding that their property settlement agreement was deficient. On January 26, 1978, petitioner filed an action for dissolution of the marriage. The matter came before the Honorable W. W. Lessley, presiding without a jury, and was completed on December 4, 1978. The following day, the parties executed and signed a settlement agreement disposing of the marital property. The agreement was approved by the Dis- trict Court and incorporated into the decree of legal separation entered on December 19, 1978. The decree of legal separation was converted into a decree of dissolution on June 27, 1979. Husband petitioned the District Court for enforcement of the settlement agreement. At the conclusion of a July 3rd hearing, the District Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that the agreement was deficient in two items of personal property, which the court subsequently granted to the wife. After denial of petitioner's motion to amend the findings, or in the alternative to grant a new trial, the husband appealed to this Court. We affirm. The parties were married in Bozeman, Montana, on July 4, 1975. After serious marital problems developed be- tween them, the Harrises executed the December 5th settlement agreement. By the terms of that agreement, the wife was deeded property near Flathead Lake and a residence in Missoula. She was to continue as co-owner with her husband of commercial real estate being leased to her husband's business. F u r t h e r , s h e was d i r e c t e d by t h e agreement t o s i g n a six-year l e a s e of t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y t o t h e b u s i n e s s f o r $40,000 w i t h t h e s t o c k t o be p l a c e d i n escrow. I n h i s p e t i t i o n f o r enforcement o f t h e agreement, t h e husband a l l e g e d t h a t h i s w i f e had f a i l e d t o honor t h e t e r m s of t h e i r agreement by f a i l i n g t o s i g n t h e lease f o r t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y , t h a t s h e had f a i l e d t o d i r e c t t h e bank a s t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e r e n t a l income, and t h a t s h e had f a i l e d t o complete t h e conveyance of h e r s t o c k i n t h e b u s i n e s s o p e r a t e d by h e r husband. A t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e p e t i t i o n t o e n f o r c e t h e s e t t l e m e n t agreement, t h e w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had r e f u s e d t o complete h e r o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e agreement bec a u s e i t was o b v i o u s t o h e r t h a t h e r husband, c o n t r a r y t o p r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g and o r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , was no l o n g e r going t o p r o v i d e h e r w i t h a n automobile and m e d i c a l i n s u r a n c e coverage. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e was c o n f u s i o n a s t o what i n f a c t was a g r e e d t o under t h e agreement. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t concluded t h a t t h e agreement was d e f i c i e n t a s t o t h e a u t o m o b i l e and t h e i n s u r a n c e , and d i r e c t e d t h e husband t o f u r n i s h t h e a d d i t i o n a l items. P e t i t i o n e r o f f e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r o u r review: 1. Was M r s . Harris' request f o r additional property made o r a l l y t o t h e c o u r t , o v e r s i x months a f t e r e n t r y of t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n d e c r e e and a p p r o v a l of t h e w r i t t e n agreement, b a r r e d by R u l e 60 (b), M.R.Civ.P. 2. Was an e a r l i e r f i n d i n g of t h e c o u r t , a s t o t h e c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y of t h e agreement, - j u d i c a t a a s t o t h e res s u b s e q u e n t r e q u e s t s of t h e w i f e . 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n c o n s i d e r i n g a l l e g a - t i o n s of a n o r a l agreement made s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement? 4. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e of t h e o r a l agreement a s t o p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e a u t o m o b i l e and m e d i c a l i n s u r a n c e t o support the D i s t r i c t Court's findings? 5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n making t h e g r a n t of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e terms of t h e agreement, w i t h o u t making r e q u i r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t , s u c h a s t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s , a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MA C? R u l e 6 0 ( b ) o f t h e Montana R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e re- c i t e s i n applicable part: "On motion and upon such terms a s a r e j u s t , t h e c o u r t may r e l i e v e a p a r t y o r h i s l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from a f i n a l judgment, o r d e r , o r proceeding f o r t h e following reasons: " ( 6 ) any o t h e r r e a s o n j u s t i f y i n g r e l i e f from t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e judgment. " The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e husband made no o b j e c t i o n a t t h e enforcement h e a r i n g t o t h e t i m e l i n e s s of h i s wife's requests. Although w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e may have been a c r u c i a l i s s u e a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t , t h e h u s b a n d ' s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t makes t i m e l i n e s s a n o n j u d i c i a b l e i s s u e on appeal. The r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s c l e a r . The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t have i t s a t t e n t i o n drawn t o t h e o b j e c t i o n t o which w e a r e now d i r e c t e d . I f t h e w i f e ' s r e q u e s t s were i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y made t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , i t i s t h e o b l i g a t i o n of opposing c o u n s e l t o i l l u m i n a t e t h e i m p r o p r i e t y by making a n e x p r e s s o b j e c t i o n t o i t s o t h a t t h e judge may r e s o l v e t h e i s s u e . E r r o r of t h i s k i n d must be r a i s e d a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t l e v e l and may n o t be urged upon t h i s C o u r t f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal. Mont. Kearnes v . McIntyre C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 173 239, 567 P.2d 433; P i c k e t t v. Kyger ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 87, 439 P.2d 57. See a l s o Bower v . Tebbs ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 132 Mont. 1 4 6 , 314 P.2d 731. W i t h o u t a n o b j e c t i o n t h e r e need b e no r u l i n g , and w i t h o u t a r u l i n g t h i s C o u r t m u s t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e w i f e made h e r r e q u e s t s w i t h i n t h e " r e a s o n a b l e t i m e " r e q u i r e d by R u l e 6 O ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t below acknowledged i n i t s d e c r e e o f l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n , d a t e d December 1 9 , 1978, t h a t t h e s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t e x e c u t e d by t h e p a r t i e s and i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e d e c r e e w a s c o n s c i o n a b l e and s h o u l d b e a p p r o v e d . The husband now a s k s t h i s C o u r t t o f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g as t o c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y of t h e H a r r i s ' s e t t l e ment a g r e e m e n t i s res j u d i c a t a a s t o t h e i s s u e o f t h e i r m a r i t a l a g r e e m e n t , t h u s b a r r i n g any f u r t h e r r e q u e s t s by t h e wife. W e d o n o t come t o t h a t c o n c l u s i o n . I n Brannon v . Lewis and C l a r k County ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 3 Mont. 200, 387 P.2d 706, c i t i n g t h e r u l e of S t a t e e x r e l . S u l l i v a n v . S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No. 1 ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 100 Mont. 468, 50 P.2d 252, w e e s t a b l i s h e d f o u r c r i t e r i a which must b e e s t a b l i s h e d b e f o r e a p l e a o f res j u d i c a t a c a n b e s u s t a i n e d . The p a r t i e s must b e t h e same o r i n p r i v i t y t h e i s s u e s must b e t h e same, t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e a c t i o n must b e t h e same, and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r must b e t h e same. Brannon c o n c l u d e s , a s d o w e , t h a t t h e most i m p o r t a n t of t h e s e c r i t e r i a i s t h a t of t h e i d e n t i t y of i s s u e . In t h i s c a s e t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t d i s s i m i l a r i t y as t o t h e i s s u e s i n v o l v e d t o make t h e d o c t r i n e of res j u d i c a t a i n a p p l i c a b l e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g was t h a t t h e a g r e e m e n t e x e c u t e d by t h e p a r t i e s was n o t u n c o n s c i o n a b l e , n o t t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r i l y c o m p l e t e . The a g r e e m e n t d i s p o s e d o f t h e H a r r i s ' m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y b u t made no p r o v i s i o n f o r a n y f u t u r e support. The p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n h a s no d i r e c t b e a r i n g on any contemporary agreement f o r o b l i g a t i o n s t o be f u l f i l l e d i n the future- T h e r e f o r e , t h i s C o u r t must c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e i s no i d e n t i t y of i s s u e s and t h a t - j u d i c a t a does n o t b a r res f u r t h e r a c t i o n on any a l l e g e d agreements between t h e p a r t i e s a s t o m a t t e r s n o t i n v o l v i n g t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of m a r i t a l property. P e t i t i o n e r f u r t h e r a s s e r t s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g e v i d e n c e of a n o r a l agreement made s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e w r i t t e n s e t t l e m e n t agreement. However, t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e husband made no o b j e c t i o n during t r i a l c o u r t proceedings t o h i s w i f e ' s testimony a b o u t t h e a u t o m o b i l e and t h e i n s u r a n c e . Once a g a i n , we must c o n c l u d e t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e r e may have been a c r i t i c a l i s s u e a s t o t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of such e v i d e n c e below, t h e h u s b a n d ' s f a i l u r e t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e of p a r 0 1 e v i d e n c e a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r f e i t e d any r i g h t t o a remedy on a p p e a l . McIntyre C o n s t r u c t i o n Co., supra. Kearnes v . See a l s o Massey-Ferguson C r e d i t Corp. v . Brown ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 396, 401, 547 P.2d 846. I t i s the petitioner's position t h a t there i s insuf- f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g t h a t a n o r a l agreement e x i s t e d between t h e p a r t i e s . I n t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e , w e a r e g u i d e d by a number of w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s a d h e r e d t o by t h i s Court. The c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t - n e s s e s and t h e w e i g h t t o be g i v e n t h e i r t e s t i m o n y a r e m a t t e r s which a r e e x c l u s i v e l y t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n a nonjury case. P.2d 1234. Corscadden v. Kenney ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 98, 572 I n examining t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e w e r e v i e w t h e same i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , and w e f u r t h e r presume t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conc l u s i o n s o f law of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o be c o r r e c t , S p r i n g s Corp. v. P i e r r e ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. 1 ~ock P - . 2d I 37 S t . ~ e p . 1378, 1384. Only i f o u r r e v i e w d i s c l o s e s a d e c i d e d preponderance of e v i d e n c e c o n t r a r y t o t h e f i n d i n g s and conc l u s i o n s of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , w i l l we d i s t u r b t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Morgan and Oswood C o n s t . Co. v . Big Sky of Montana ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 268, 275, 557 P.2d 1017, 1021. I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e i s no p r e ponderance of e v i d e n c e c o n t r a r y t o t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e t r i a l court. The o n l y e v i d e n c e t h a t a n o r a l agreement d i d n o t e x i s t was t h e h u s b a n d ' s d e n i a l t h a t such a n agreement was made. However, t h e husband d i d p l a c e a c a r a t h i s w i f e ' s d i s - p o s a l f o r s e v e r a l months a f t e r t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n which c o u l d p r o p e r l y be i n t e r p r e t e d a s a n a c t i o n i n f u r t h e r a n c e of h i s o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e o r a l c o n t r a c t . W w i l l not decide e whether o r n o t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was c o r r e c t i n i t s a s s e s s ment of t h e e v i d e n c e b e f o r e i t , b u t we d o f i n d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t d i f f e r i n g c o n c l u s i o n s , and we a r e c o n s t r a i n e d t o honor t h e judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court . A c c o r d i n g l y , w e c a n a l s o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t were based on s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e s o a s t o p r o p e r l y s u p p o r t t h e c o u r t ' s judgment. P e t i t i o n e r f i n a l l y contends t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n making a n " e q u i t a b l e " g r a n t of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t making c e r t a i n f i n d i n g s , such a s t h e n e t worth of t h e e s t a t e , a s r e q u i r e d under s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. W e disagree. T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t a D i s t r i c t C o u r t need n o t s e t f o r t h with p a r t i c u l a r i t y i t s findings i f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e c o u r t was aware o f and c o n s i d e r e d t h e d i r e c t i v e i t e m s of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. The husband s p e c i f i c a l l y mentions t h e n e t worth of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . found i n Maberry v . Maberry ( 1 9 7 9 ) , A s t h i s Court Mont. - 598 P.2d , "There i s no e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h t h e n e t worth of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e p r i o r t o g r a n t i n g maintenance t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r " . The c o u r t below h e l d a h e a r i n g on a l l e l e m e n t s i n m a r i t a l e s t a t e , and t h e r e i s no s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h e c o u r t d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e whole of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e s e p a r a t i o n agreement was d e f i c i e n t . Mcreover, a s w e found i n . I n Re t h e M a r r i a g e of M i l l e r ( C h . u = ~ N o80-71, Decided August 27, 1 9 8 0 ) , t h e e x i s t e n c e of a v a l i d agreement presumes t h a t t h e n e t w o r t h of t h e p a r t i e s h a s been c o n s i d e r e d by t h e p a r t i e s a s t o t h e p r o p e r t y d i s p o s e d of by t h e agreement. I n t h e case before us t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t h a t t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s was e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and by t h e s e t t l e m e n t agreement e x e c u t e d by t h e p a r t i e s . T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e lower c o u r t a b s e n t a c l e a r a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n by which t h e t r i a l judge a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h o u t t h e employment of c o n s c i o u s judgment o r exceeded t h e bounds of r e a s o n . of F r e d e r i c k s e n ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 191, 1 9 2 . - Mont. , I n R e t h e Marriage - P.2d , 37 St.Rep. Although we r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e by which t h e w i f e ' s r e q u e s t was g r a n t e d w a s i r r e g u l a r and p r o c e d u r a l l y i n f i r m , we c a n n o t go s o f a r a s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a c t e d w i t h o u t " t h e employment of c o n s c i o u s r e a s o n " o r "exceeded t h e bounds of r e a s o n . " Accordingly, w e a f f i r \ hV& & Justices Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l d i s s e n t i n g : I dissent. T h e m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n i n t h i s c a s e p a v e s t h e way f o r d i s g r u n t l e d s p o u s e s t o come i n t o c o u r t a t a n y t i m e f o r a r e v i e w o f t h e i r w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreements. t h i s v i o l a t e s e t t l e d c o n t r a c t law, Not o n l y does b u t i t circumvents t h e pur- p o s e s o f t h e U n i f o r m M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t as a d o p t e d i n t h i s state. S e c t i o n 40-4-201(1), MCA p r o v i d e s t h e p r o c e d u r e b y w h i c h p a r t i e s t o a marriage can e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n agreement s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s u p o n t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e i r marriage: ( 1 ) To p r o m o t e a m i " S e p a r a t i o n agreement. c a b l e s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s ~ u t e sb e t w e e n ~ a r t i e s t o a m a r r i a g e a t t e n d a n t ' upon t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n o r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e i r marriage, t h e part i e s may e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n s e p a r a t i o n agreement c o n t a i n i n g p r o v i s i o n s f o r d i sposit i o n o f a n y p r o p e r t y owned b y e i t h e r o f t h e m , m a i n t e n a n c e o f e i t h e r o f t h e m , and s u p p o r t , c u s t o d y , and v i s i t a t i o n o f t h e i r c h i l d r e n . " T h i s agreement i s b i n d i n g upon t h e c o u r t , unless the c o u r t f i n d s i t t o be u n c o n s c i o n a b l e : " ( 2 ) I n a proceeding f o r d i s s o l u t i o n o f marriage o r f o r legal separation, the terms o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n agreement, e x c e p t t h o s e prov i d i n g f o r t h e s u p p o r t , c u s t o d y , and v i s i t a t i o n o f c h i l d r e n , a r e b i n d i n g upon t h e c o u r t u n l e s s i t f i n d s , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e economi c c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e p a r t i e s and a n y o t h e r r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e produced b y t h e p a r t i e s , on t h e i r own m o t i o n o r on r e q u e s t o f t h e c o u r t , t h a t t h e s e p a r a t i o n agreement i s unconscionable." S e c t i o n 4 0 - 4 - 2 0 1 ( 2 ) , MCA. The d i s t r i c t j u d g e , i n e n t e r i n g t h e decree o f l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n o f D e c e m b e r 1 9 , 1 9 7 8 , made s e v e r a l f i n d i n g s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p a r t i e s ' w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement: "2. That t h e P r o p e r t y S e t t l e m e n t Agreement o f t h e p a r t i e s , d a t e d D e c e m b e r 5 , 1 9 7 8 , i s made a p a r t o f t h i s Decree." "6. That s a i d P r o p e r t y S e t t l e m e n t Agreement i s not unconscionable." Once s u c h f i n d i n g s a r e e n t e r e d b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , t h e UMDA f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ t l e r m s are enforceable MCA. . . . as ... o f t h e agreement c o n t r a c t terms." S e c t i o n 40-4-201(5), I n e n f o r c i n g p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t s as c o n t r a c t u a l t h i s C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y r e 1 ied o n M o n t a n a agreements, c o n t r a c t law t o f i n d t h a t a w r i t t e n instrument supersedes a l l o r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s which occurred p r i o r t o o r simultaneously w i t h t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e w r i t t e n agreement. M e r r i t t v. M e r r i t t (1974), 165 Mont. Sect i o n 28-2-904, 1 7 2 , 1 7 8 , 5 2 6 P.2d MCA; 1375, 1379. B o t h p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n a d m i t t o e x t e n s i v e negot i a t i o n s and d i s c u s s i o n s p r i o r t o s i g n i n g t h i s agreement. d i s c u s s e d i n many ways [ s i c ] . . . for " H a r r i s acknowledged i n c o u r t t h a t o f settlement. Mrs. a w h o l e y e a r we E v e r y t i m e he d e c i d e d t o d i v o r c e me a g a i n , we w o u l d come u p w i t h a n o t h e r t y p e o f settlement." Finally, o n D e c e m b e r 5, w r i t t e n s e t t l e m e n t agreement, sonal property. 1978, the parties did sign a d i s p o s i n g o f t h e i r r e a l and p e r - At t h a t point i n time they fixed t h e i r r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r p r o p e r t y , (1980) , Mont. -9 P.2d , 37 St.Rep. M i l l e r v. Miller 1523, 1526, and t h e i r p r i o r d i s c u s s i o n s about d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e i r p r o p e r t y were 2 . no l o n g e r d e t e r m i n a t i v e . S e c t i o n 2 8 - X - 9 0 4 , MCA. T h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e made no f a c t u a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e par- t i e s had e n t e r e d i n t o a s e p a r a t e e n f o r c e a b l e o r a l Rather, agreement. he c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t f i n a l i z e d t h e p a r t i e s ' p r o p e r t y d i s p u t e s and was a c o m p l e t e a n d f i n a l property a g r e e m e n t e x c e p t t h a t i t was d e f i c i e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o i n s u r a n c e and t h e c a r . T h e r e w e r e no a l l e g a t i o n s o f , mistake o r overreaching, o r findings of, fraud, n o r was any r e a s o n g i v e n t o e x p l a i n why t h e s e i t e m s were n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e agreement. Yet t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and t h i s C o u r t a r e p r e p a r e d t o r e w r i t e t h i s w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y agreement, signed v o l u n t a r i l y by both p a r t i e s , s e n c e o f t h e i r own a t t o r n e y s . - 10- and i n t h e p r e - The m a j o r i t y c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e c a r and t h e i n s u r a n c e as m a t t e r s w h i c h w o u l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be c o v e r e d b y t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement, b u t r a t h e r as i t e m s o f " f u t u r e s u p p o r t " t h a t c o u l d be t h e s u b j e c t o f a s e p a r a t e agreement. Y e t t h e r e was no f a c t u a l f i n d i n g o f a s e p a r a t e s u p p o r t agreement, and i n f a c t , t h e d i s t r i c t judge i m p l i c i t l y noted i n h i s f i n d i n g s t h a t these t w o i t e m s were m e r e l y o m i s s i o n s from t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t , i n a w a r d i n g t h e s e t o Mrs. Harris, and t h e d i s t r i c t judge found t h a t t h e same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u p p o r t e d t h e a w a r d o f t h e s e i t e m s a s s u p p o r t e d t h e o t h e r property d i s t r i b u t e d t o her. I do n o t d i s p u t e t h e power o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e s in M o n t a n a t o m o d i f y a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t . Sect i o n 40-4-208 ( 3 ) provides : "(3) T h e p r o v i s i o n s as t o p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n may n o t be r e v o k e d o r m o d i f i e d b y a c o u r t , except: "(a) upon w r i t t e n c o n s e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s ; or "(b) i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f cond i t i o n s t h a t j u s t i f y the reopening o f a judgment under t h e laws o f t h i s s t a t e . B u t t h e r e was no f i n d i n g made b y t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e w h i c h j u s t i f i e s t h e reopening o f t h i s judgment. T h e r e was no f i n d i n g o f f r a u d , m i s t a k e , m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , o r any o t h e r c o n d i t i o n w h i c h allows the rescission or modification of a contract. This c o n t r a c t was m o d i f i e d o n l y b e c a u s e t h e c o u r t f o u n d i t t o be "inequitable," despite the 'er finding that the a g r e e m e n t was n o t I t i s u n f o r t u n a t e i f one p a r t y t o an agreement n e g l e c t s t o i n c l u d e t e r m s which i n r e t r o s p e c t t h a t spouse f e e l s s h o u l d have been i n c l u d e d . B u t t h i s i s no r e a s o n t o o v e r t u r n t h e a g e - o l d law o f contracts, w r i t t e n agreement, which seeks t o p r e s e r v e t h e s a n c t i t y o f a a n d a l l o w s p a r t i e s t o i t t o be a p p r i s e d o f t h e i r r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r t h a t a g r e e m e n t . Chief Justice \

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