STATE v MCCLEAN

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No. 14295 IN THE SUPREME CCUKI' OF THE STATE OF FKNTANA 1978 STATE OF , Plaintiff and Respodent, ANDREW L. MrXLEZW, Defendant and Appellant. or Appeal f c n District C u t of the Eleventh Judicial District, ra: Honorable James M. Salansky, J a g presiding. cde Counsel of Record: For Appellant: -re, Lympus and Doran, Kalispell, mntana Gary G Doran argued, Kalispell, mntana . For Respondent: Mn. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, mntana Leslie Taylor argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, mntana Pat Springer, County Attorney, Kalispell, mntana Stewart A Pearce I1 argued, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell, . P4xkdm .- Filed: ' ' ; Mr. ~ustice Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . ~efendant Andrew L. McClean a p p e a l s from h i s judgment of conviction following a jury t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , F l a t h e a d County. McClean was found g u i l t y o f c r i m i n a l s a l e of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s , i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 5 4 - 1 3 2 ( 1 ) , R.C.M. 1947. Defendant was c h a r g e d w i t h s e l l i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e pound of m a r i j u a n a t o Denny Beach, who i n t u r n s o l d t h e m a r i j u a n a t o an undercover o f f i c e r of t h e F l a t h e a d County S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , Donald Bruce Bounds. Bounds t e s t i f i e d t h a t on September 1 2 , 1977, he and Beach went t o a b a r where t h e y met d e f e n d a n t s h o r t l y a f t e r 9:00 p.m. From t h e r e Beach and d e f e n d a n t proceeded i n t o t h e r e a r p a r k i n g l o t of t h e b a r , w h i l e Bounds remained i n t h e b a r and watched t h r o u g h a back window. H e t e s t i f i e d he saw d e f e n d a n t McClean r e a c h i n h i s p i c k u p , p u l l o u t a brown package and hand i t t o Beach. Bounds t h e n went o u t s i d e , m e t Beach by h i s car and p a i d him $110. Beach and Bounds r e t u r n e d t o t h e i n s i d e of t h e b a r where t h e y m e t d e f e n d a n t o n c e a g a i n . Bounds o b s e r v e d Beach g i v e d e f e n d a n t s e v e r a l b i l l s , p e r h a p s k e e p i n g a s m a l l commiss i o n f o r himself. Then Beach and Bounds l e f t t h e b a r i n Bounds' car. Defendant c h a l l e n g e s h i s c o n v i c t i o n on t h r e e grounds a r i s i n g from t h e c o n d u c t of h i s t r i a l . H i s f i r s t issue c e n t e r s on a s t a t e m e n t made by Bounds d u r i n g cross-examinat i o n t h a t Bounds had t a k e n a p o l y g r a p h t e s t . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by f a i l i n g t o g r a n t a m i s t r i a l f o l l o w i n g t h e mention of p o l y g r a p h t e s t i n g . second, defendant contends h i s c a s e w a s prejudiced because he w a s n o t p e r m i t t e d t o p u t w i t n e s s e s on t h e s t a n d who would t e s t i f y t h a t Bounds on numerous o c c a s i o n s had engaged i n t h e s a l e of a v a r i e t y of r e g u l a t e d d r u g s and had smoked m a r i j u a n a . T h i r d , d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s h e d i d n o t have a f a i r t r i a l b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e was p e r m i t t e d t o amend i t s i n f o r m a t i o n s h o r t l y b e f o r e t r i a l by a d d i n g Denny Beach a s a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s . I s s u e 1. Does t h e mention by a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s t h a t he h a s t a k e n a p o l y g r a p h t e s t n e c e s s a r i l y p r e j u d i c e a criminal defendant's case so a s t o require t h e t r i a l court t o grant a mistrial? Bounds mentioned a p o l y g r a p h t e s t d u r i n g cross-examinat i o n by d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y : "Q. M r . Bounds, you a r e p r o v i d i n g e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t an i n d i v i d u a l on q u i t e a s e r i o u s c r i m e . A. Y e s s i r . "Q. Now, you a r e s t a t i n g t h a t you w e r e n o t under t h e i n f l u e n c e of m a r i j u a n a t h a t e v e n i n g . A. I know t h a t I w a s n ' t s i r . "Q. How do you know t h a t ? A. Because I h a d n ' t smoked any. I do n o t smoke marijuana, sir. "Q. You do n o t smoke m a r i j u a n a ? A. No s i r . A s a m a t t e r of f a c t , I t o o k a p o l y g r a p h . " The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r m i s t r i a l . For a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s , t h e u s e of p o l y g r a p h d a t a and t h e accompanying o p i n i o n of t h e p o l y g r a p h examiner a r e generally inadmissible i n criminal t r i a l s . The p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n p u t f o r w a r d by c o u r t s i n r e j e c t i n g t h e u s e of such evidence i s i t s questionable r e l i a b i l i t y . United S t a t e s v . Alexander ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , 526 F.2d 1 6 1 , 167-68; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M a r s h a l l ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , 526 F.2d 1349, 1360; United S t a t e s v . Tremont ( 6 t h C i r . cert.den. 383 U.S. 944, 86 S.Ct. 1 9 6 5 ) , 351 F.2d 1 4 4 , 1 4 6 , 1198, 16 L Ed 2d 207 ( 1 9 6 6 ) . Some e i g h t e e n y e a r s a g o Montana f o l l o w e d t h e r u l e t h a t .. [ u l n t i l it i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t r e a s o n a b l e c e r t a i n t y f o l l o w s from such t e s t s , it would b e e r r o r t o a d m i t i n evidence t h e r e s u l t t h e r e o f ' . . ." S t a t e v . Hollywood "'. (1960), 138 Mont. 561, 575, 358 P.2d 437, 444 (quoting people v, ~ecker (1942), 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W. 2d 503, 505). Despite numerous improvements in design and technique from the simple systolic blood pressure device at issue in the first polygraph decision, Frye v. United States (1923), 54 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 293 Fed. 1013, courts continue to doubt the "lie detector's" reliability. supra, 526 F.2d at 164. United States v. Alexander, As the court in Alexander concluded, "there are too many uncontrollable or unascertainable factors which may affect the polygraphist's conclusion as to the veracity or falsity of the examinee's responses." at 165. 526 F.2d See also Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 Yale L.J. 694, 727 (1961). In People v. Carter (1957), 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 674, the California Supreme Court held it was error to permit a witness to testify that he had been willing to take a lie detector test, thereby permitting the jury to infer that the defendant was not willing. On the other hand, in Johnson v. State (Fla. App. 1964), 166 So.2d 798, the jury was made aware that a prosecution witness was a polygraph examiner and that the examiner had concluded that the defendant had at first lied to him concerning his whereabouts at the time of the alleged crime. Yet because the examiner revealed neither his actual test results nor his conclusions therefrom, and because the defendant later admitted to the examiner that he was in fact present at the scene of the crime, the court held that the polygraphist's testimony was not prejudicial. 166 So.2d at 805. The Alaska Supreme Court, relying on the ~loridacourt's Johnson decision, applied the rule of whether the mention of p o l y g r a p h was p r e j u d i c i a l t o a c a s e v e r y s i m i l a r i n i t s f a c t s t o t h i s appeal. P.2d 405. G a f f o r d v . S t a t e ( ~ l a s k a 9 6 8 ) , 440 1 I n G a f f o r d t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s , a n undercover o f f i c e r , responded t o d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n by v o l u n t e e r i n g t h a t he had d e s c r i b e d t h e i n c i d e n t a t i s s u e t o a l i e detector. The Alaska c o u r t , q u o t i n g from Johnson held: ". . . [TI h e m e r e f a c t t h a t t h e j u r y i s app r i s e d t h a t a l i e d e t e c t o r t e s t was t a k e n i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y p r e j u d i c i a l i f no i n f e r e n c e a s t o t h e r e s u l t i s r a i s e d o r i f any i n f e r e n c e s t h a t m i g h t b e r a i s e d as the result 4 4 0 P.2d a t 4 1 1 , a r e not prejudicial." q u o t i n g 166 So.2d a t 805. (Emphasis i n o r i ginal. ) = See a l s o P e o p l e v. M a r t i n ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 62 I l l . A p p . 2 d N.E.2d 798, 802, a f f ' d , 203, 210 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 35 I11.2d 289, 220 N.E.2d 170; S t a t e v . Cor ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 4 Mont. 323, 348, 350, 396 P.2d 86, 99-100Thus, d e s p i t e g e n e r a l p o l i c y a g a i n s t t h e u s e of polyg r a p h e v i d e n c e , t h e i s s u e must b e framed i n terms o f i t s p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t on d e f e n d a n t . I n t h i s case the D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a m i s t r i a l . The r e f e r e n c e t o p o l y g r a p h was made under c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n by t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s . H e made no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r e s u l t s of any such t e s t a l t h o u g h h i s answer c l e a r l y c a r r i e d t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t he had " p a s s e d " a t e s t . There i s no sug- g e s t i o n t h a t t h e w i t n e s s was coached i n advance t o make t h e reference. Cf. G a f f o r d v . S t a t e , 440 P.2d a t 4 1 1 . any a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t a p p e a r s minimal. Finally, The w i t n e s s ' r e s p o n s e was t o q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g h i s own h a b i t s f o r m a r i j u a n a u s e and d e a l t o n l y i n d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t defendant. While s u c h a r e f e r e n c e t o a l i e d e t e c t o r may have b o l s t e r e d t h e w i t n e s s ' c r e d i b i l i t y , i t d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o have done s o e x c e p t p e r h a p s t o r e h a b i l i t a t e him from a p o t e n t i a l l y h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l a t t e m p t a t impeachment. Issue 2 . May a party impeach a witness by putting witnesses on the stand to testify to specific instances of the witness' conduct which might show a motive to testify falsely? Defendant's second issue concerns the order limiting the introduction of impeachment evidence. In his brief defendant argues he should have been permitted to put witnesses on the stand to testify concerning Bounds' personal habits for marijuana use and thereby demonstrate that Bounds had a profit motive in obtaining a conviction. The witnesses available to the defense were willing to testify that Bounds had repeatedly sold and distributed dangerous drugs and had repeatedly indulged in the use and possession of drugs. The witnesses' testimony would have attempted to demonstrate that Bounds used his employment as an undercover narcotics officer to profit himself, to provide for his continuing use of drugs and to successfully secure future employment that he might continue his self-indulgences. The District Court ruled it would permit witnesses to testify only as to Bounds' "reputation for truth in the community". It refused to allow such testimony "to just vaguely uphold this profit motive, just by their testimony that he at different times was in the possession of drugs and offered them drugs." That testimony, the court con- cluded, was not relevant to the charges against defendant. Defendant argues that Rule 404(b), Mont.R.Evid., permits the introduction of evidence of specific acts of the witness, such as he offered, in order to show his motive to testify falsely against defendant. He contends that because Bounds used his employment with the sheriff's office as a cover for obtaining and selling drugs, it would only be l o g i c a l f o r him t o b e b i a s e d and m o t i v a t e d t o t e s t i f y falsely . Rule 4 0 4 ( b ) , Mont.R.Evid., i s i d e n t i c a l t o Rule 4 0 4 ( b ) of t h e F e d e r a l Rules o f Evidence. It states: " ( b ) O t h e r c r i m e s , wrongs, a c t s . Evidence of o t h e r crimes, wrongs, o r a c t s i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e t o p r o v e t h e c h a r a c t e r of a p e r s o n i n o r d e r t o show t h a t h e a c t e d i n c o n f o r m i t y t h e r e w i t h . I t may, however, b e a d m i s s i b l e f o r o t h e r p u r p o s e s , such a s proof o f m o t i v e , o p p o r t u n i t y , i n t e n t , p r e p a r a t i o n , p l a n , knowledge, i d e n t i t y , o r abs e n c e of m i s t a k e o r a c c i d e n t . " Defendant r e l i e s on t h i s r u l e a s a means of p r o v i n g Bounds' motive f o r t e s t i f y i n g f a l s e l y . However, i n t h i s c a s e sub- s e c t i o n ( b ) must b e r e a d t o g e t h e r w i t h Rule 404 ( a ) ( 3 ) r e l a t i n g t o t h e c h a r a c t e r of a w i t n e s s , which p r o v i d e s : to "Character evidence n o t admissible - prove conduct, exceptions; o t h e r crimes; c h a r a c t e r in - issue. " ( a ) C h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e g e n e r a l l y . Evidence of a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r o r a t r a i t of h i s c h a r a c t e r i s n o t admissible f o r t h e purpose of p r o v i n g t h a t h e a c t e d i n c o n f o r m i t y t h e r e w i t h on a p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n , e x c e p t : " ( 3 ) C h a r a c t e r of w i t n e s s . Evidence of t h e c h a r a c t e r o f a w i t n e s s , as p r o v i d e d i n A r t i c l e VI." Thus, w h i l e e v i d e n c e of a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r i s n o t o r d i n a r i l y a d m i s s i b l e t o p r o v e t h e p e r s o n a c t e d i n conf o r m i t y w i t h t h a t c h a r a c t e r , t h e r e i s a n e x c e p t i o n which i s t h e s u b j e c t of Rule 608, Mont.R.Evid. Rule 608 d e a l i n g w i t h impeachment and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of w i t n e s s e s c o n t a i n s two p a r t s . P a r t ( a ) l i m i t s a n a t t a c k on a w i t n e s s ' c r e d i b i l i t y t o o p i n i o n o r r e p u t a t i o n e v i d e n c e on t h e witness' character f o r truthfulness o r untruthfulness: " ( a ) Opinion and r e p u t a t i o n e v i d e n c e of c h a r a c t e r . The c r e d i b i l i t y o f a w i t n e s s may b e a t t a c k e d o r s u p p o r t e d by e v i d e n c e i n t h e form of opinion o r reputation, but subject t o these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." Witness A, therefore, may give his opinion as to Witness B's character, but he is limited to stating only his opinion of Witness B's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Part (b) of Rule 608 deals with those instances in which opinion or reputation evidence concerning a witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is admissible and proscribes, except in limited circumstances, the use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of conduct. These limited circumstances are described in the second sentence of part (b), dealing with cross-examination of a witness who has testified concerning his own or another witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness: Thus, on direct examination Witness A may not bolster his opinion concerning the truthfulness or untruthfulness of Witness B by making reference to specific instances of B's conduct. On cross-examination, however, Witness A may be questioned on his opinion by reference to such specific instances. This cross-examination, however, is further limited by the trial court's discretion in determining whether it is in fact relevant to the issue of B's credi- bility. The p o i n t of Rule 608 f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of t h i s a p p e a l i s t h a t r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of a w i t n e s s ' c o n d u c t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of p r o v i n g h i s c h a r a c t e r f o r t r u t h f u l n e s s o r u n t r u t h f u l n e s s i s never p e r m i t t e d on d i r e c t examination. I n t h i s r e s p e c t Rule 608, which i s n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l t o i t s f e d e r a l counterpart, a c t s i n conformity w i t h Rule 4 0 5 ( a ) , which i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e f e d e r a l r u l e . Rule 4 0 5 ( a ) , g o v e r n i n g t h e methods of p r o v i n g c h a r a c t e r , makes i n q u i r y i n t o s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of c o n d u c t p e r m i s s i b l e o n l y on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n : " ( a ) R e p u t a t i o n o r o p i n i o n . I n a l l cases i n which e v i d e n c e of c h a r a c t e r o r a t r a i t o f c h a r a c t e r of a p e r s o n i s a d m i s s i b l e , proof may b e made by t e s t i m o n y a s t o r e p u t a t i o n o r On by t e s t i m o n y i n t h e form of a n o p i n i o n . cross-examination, i n q u i r y i s allowable i n t o r e l e v a n t s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of c o n d u c t . " See Advisory Committee's Notes t o Fed.R.Evid. F.R.D. 183, 268-69 6 0 8 ( b ) , 56 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; C l a r k e , Montana Rules of Evi- dence: A G e n e r a l Survey, 39 Mont. L. Rev. 79, 120-21 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t he w a s i m p r o p e r l y d e n i e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p u t v a r i o u s w i t n e s s e s on t h e s t a n d t o t e s t i f y a s t o w i t n e s s Bounds' u s e of m a r i j u a n a o r s a l e of d r u g s i s c o n t r a r y t o Rules 4 0 5 ( a ) and 608. This i s particu- l a r l y t r u e i n l i g h t of Rule 6 0 8 ( b ) ' s r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . T h i s r u l e , a l o n g w i t h Rule 403, g i v e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t wide d i s c r e t i o n t o e x c l u d e e v i d e n c e which i n i t s view would c r e a t e a d a n g e r of u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e o r confus i o n of t h e i s s u e s : "Although r e l e v a n t , e v i d e n c e may be e x c l u d e d i f i t s probative value i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweighed by t h e d a n g e r o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e , c o n f u s i o n of t h e i s s u e s , o r m i s l e a d i n g t h e j u r y , o r by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of undue d e l a y , w a s t e of t i m e , o r n e e d l e s s p r e s e n t a t i o n of cumulative evidence." Rule 403, Mont.R.Evid. Thus, t h e t r i a l c o u r t a c t e d w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n ref u s i n g t o permit defendant's witnesses t o t e s t i f y concerning s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s o f m a r i j u a n a u s e by Bounds. I s s u e 3. Should t h e t r i a l c o u r t have g r a n t e d a d e f e n s e motion f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e a f t e r p e r m i t t i n g t h e S t a t e t o amend i t s w i t n e s s l i s t o n t h e morning of t r i a l ? On F r i d a y , F e b r u a r y 3 , 1978, d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l r e c e i v e d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t Denny Beach had n e g o t i a t e d a p l e a w i t h t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y , t h a t he would t e s t i f y f o r t h e S t a t e a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t McClean, and f u r t h e r t h a t t h e S t a t e would s u b s t i t u t e o n e d e t e c t i v e f o r a n o t h e r a s a w i t n e s s . Due t o a p r i o r commitment d e f e n s e c o u n s e l l e f t t h a t weekend f o r a b a r a s s o c i a t i o n c o n f e r e n c e i n a n o t h e r p a r t of t h e state. On Monday morning, t h e 6 t h , t h e c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o amend i t s i n f o r m a t i o n t o change t h e name of t h e d e t e c t i v e w i t n e s s and t o add Denny Beach as a w i t n e s s and g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t t h e noon hour t o i n t e r v i e w Beach, r a t h e r than granting a continuance a s defendant requested. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e S t a t e l a c k e d good c a u s e t o amend i t s l i s t of w i t n e s s e s a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-1803(a) ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947. "Good c a u s e " was d e f i n e d i n S t a t e v. K l e i n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 350, 547 P.2d 75, a s a " s u b s t a n t i a l r e a son". The p o l i c y i s t o a v o i d s u r p r i s e t o a d e f e n d a n t which would p r e j u d i c e h i s case: "'Good c a u s e ' h a s been d e f i n e d a s ' s u b s t a n t i a l r e a s o n ' , one t h a t a f f o r d s a l e g a l e x c u s e . "The c o u r t s h o u l d f i r s t d e t e r m i n e whether t h e need f o r t h e a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s and t h e r e a son f o r t h e i r n o t being d i s c l o s e d earlier i s a 'substantial reason'. It should then determine whether t h e r e i s p r e j u d i c e based on s u r p r i s e and whether t h i s s u r p r i s e c a n be overcome by t h e g r a n t i n g o f a c o n t i n u a n c e . I f t h e surp r i s e e l e m e n t c a n be overcome by a c o n t i n u a n c e , t h e n t h e w i t n e s s e s s h o u l d b e e n d o r s e d and t h e c o n t i n u a n c e g r a n t e d . The s p i r i t and i n t e n t of t h e l a w i s t h a t names and a d d r e s s e s of potent i a l w i t n e s s e s s h o u l d be d i s c l o s e d a s soon a s t h e y a r e known." 169 Mont. a t 354, 547 P.2d a t 77. H e r e , t h e S t a t e informed d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l of t h e change i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h i n h o u r s a f t e r B e a c h ' s negot i a t e d plea. Defendant concedes t h e need f o r changing t h e name of t h e d e t e c t i v e who would t e s t i f y a s t o c h a i n o f evidence. Defense c o u n s e l c h o s e t o keep h i s commitment t o t r a v e l t h e weekend b e f o r e t r i a l , and, a s t h e S t a t e p o i n t s o u t , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d o e s n o t p r a c t i c e law a l o n e . h i s p a r t n e r s c o u l d have i n t e r v i e w e d Beach. One of F u r t h e r , on t h e day o f t r i a l , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c h o s e t o keep a s p e a k i n g engagement a t a b a r luncheon r a t h e r t h a n i n t e r v i e w Beach. From a p r a c t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c o u l d have a d e q u a t e l y p r e p a r e d f o r t r i a l w i t h o u t i n t e r v i e w i n g Beach i n any c a s e . Under t h e s e circum- s t a n c e s i t i s h a r d l y a c a s e of s u r p r i s e t o d e f e n d a n t . He knew of B e a c h ' s i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e t r a n s a c t i o n f o r which h e was t o be t r i e d . The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t err by r e f u s i n g t o g r a n t a continuance. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . W e Concur: "/ J u s t i c e s (2'

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