WEBER v WEBER

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No. 13925 I N T E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O M N A A H F O T N 1978 BEULAH MAY WEBER, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vsJACK L . WEBER, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t Boyd, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . Appeal from: C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: B e n n e t t a n d B e n n e t t , Bozeman, Montana Lyman H. B e n n e t t , I11 a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana F o r Respondent : M a u r i c e M a f f e i a r g u e d , B u t t e , Montana Submitted: Filed: W R * ,. -I.- J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1978 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court: This i s an appeal from a judgment and order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Deer Lodge County, entered June 8 , 1977, f i n d i n g defendant Jack Weber delinquent i n payment of c h i l d support and determining he was n o t e n t i t l e d t o modification of t h e decree of custody entered on November 15, 1972, with r e s p e c t t o t h e two minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n . The period of time r e l e v a n t t o t h i s appeal commenced i n t h e l a t e s p r i n g and e a r l y summer of 1976, when p l a i n t i f f mother contacted defendant f a t h e r f o r t h e purpose of requesting him t o c a r e f o r t h e minor c h i l d r e n f o r t h e summer months of 1976. Following t h e conversation defendant t r a v e l e d t o t h e home of p l a i n t i f f , acquired t h e c h i l d r e n and returned t o h i s home i n Belgrade f o r t h e purpose of caring f o r t h e c h i l d r e n during t h e summer months. I n t h e f a l l 1976, defendant returned t h e c h i l d r e n t o plaintiff. A discussion between t h e p a r t i e s took p l a c e a s t o whether defendant could maintain t h e temporary custody of t h e c h i l d r e n f o r t h e purpose of allowing t h e c h i l d r e n t o a t t e n d school i n Belgrade. Following t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , p l a i n t i f f agreed t o allow defendant t o maintain the custody of t h e minor son, John, t o allow him t o a t t e n d school i n Belgrade. Defendant t h e r e a f t e r returned t o h i s home and e n r o l l e d h i s son i n t h e Belgrade school system. Subsequently defendant was advised by h i s s i s t e r - i n - l a w , Dorothy Weber, t h a t p l a i n t i f f was bringing t h e minor daughter Brenda eo G a l l a t i n Gateway f o r the purpose of r e s i d i n g with defendant' s s i s t e r - i n - l a w and b r o t h e r . Thereupon defendant went t o t h e home of h i s s i s t e r - i n - l a w and b r o t h e r and took h i s daughter with him t o Belgrade and e n r o l l e d h e r i n t h e Belgrade school system, without t h e permission of h i s ex-wife. O September 26, 1976, p l a i n t i f f returned t o G a l l a t i n n Gateway t o v i s i t with h e r minor daughter a t which time she was advised t h e c h i l d was r e s i d i n g with defendant. She then went t o defendant's home i n Belgrade t o g e t h e r daughter. Following an a l t e r c a t i o n which occurred on September 26 a t t h e residence of defendant, a motion f o r temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r , supported by a f f i d a v i t , was f i l e d by p l a i n t i f f and was followed by a temporary o r d e r and o r d e r t o show cause issued by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. A f t e r t h e issuance of t h e o r d e r t o show cause defendant surrendered t h e c h i l d r e n t o p l a i n t i f f . These i s s u e s a r e presented f o r review: 1 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o modify t h e custody degree entered i n November 1972, with r e s p e c t t o t h e two minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s ? 2) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n determining delinquencies i n c h i l d support without allowing c r e d i t t o defendant f o r house r e p a i r s , g r o c e r i e s purchased, and c l o t h i n g purchased f o r t h e c h i l d r e n ? I t i s t h e p o s i t i o n of defendant t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o modify t h e custody with r e s p e c t t o both c h i l d r e n . The b a s i s f o r t h e modification i s d i f f e r e n t f o r each c h i l d . Section 48-339, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p a r t : "(2) The c o u r t s h a l l n o t modify a p r i o r custody decree unless i t f i n d s , upon t h e b a s i s of f a c t s t h a t have a r i s e n s i n c e t h e p r i o r decree o r t h a t were unknown t o t h e c o u r t a t t h e time of e n t r y of t h e p r i o r decree, t h a t a change has occurred i n t h e circumstances of t h e c h i l d o r h i s custodian, and t h a t t h e modification i s necessary t o serve t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d . J I n applying t h e s e standards the c o u r t s h a l l r e t a i n t h e custodian appointed pursuant t o t h e p r i o r decree unless: "(b) The c h i l d has been i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e family of t h e p e t i t i o n e r with consent of t h e custodian * * *." Defendant argues t h a t i n t h e case of h i s minor son, John, i n t e g r a t i o n took p l a c e with t h e consent of p l a i n t i f f . The record i s n o t c l e a r a s t o t h e arrangement concerning how long t h e son was t o s t a y with t h e f a t h e r , b u t t h e f a t h e r d i d e n t e r t h e son i n t h e Belgrade school system f o r t h e year 1976-1977. I t i s apparent from t h e record t h a t when defendant was allowed t o take t h e minor son f o r t h e school year 1976-1977, t h a t John was n o t i n t e g r a t e d i n t o defendant f a t h e r ' s family because a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order was f i l e d on October 1, 1976 and t h e custody of t h e son returned t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . The son was only i n t h e custody of t h e defendant from e a r l y summer 1976 t o October 1, 1976. There i s no evidence from which t h e c o u r t could determine, a s required by s e c t i o n 48-339(2), R.C.M. 1947, t h a t a change has occurred i n t h e circumstances of t h e c h i l d John, o r h i s custodian, which r e q u i r e s a modification t o s e r v e h i s b e s t interests. This Court has long r e l i e d upon t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n custody matters. Mont . , I n Brooks v. Brooks, 556 P.2d 901, 33 S t . Rep. 1114, 1116, t h e Court stated: "This Court has long followed t h e r u l e t h a t unless t h e r e i s a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t , a d e c i s i o n on custody w i l l n o t be overruled on appeal. Love v. Love, 106 Mont. 303, 533 P.2d 280; Gilmore v. Gilmore, 166 Mont.47, 530 P.2d 480; Anderson v. Anderson, 145 Mont. 244, 400 P.2d 632. I n t h e s e cases t h i s Court has committed i t s e l f t o t h e view t h a t t h e welfare of t h e c h i l d i s t h e paramount c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n awarding custody and t h a t i t must of n e c e s s i t y , be l e f t l a r g e l y t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge. He hears t h e testimony, s e e s t h e witnesses' demeanor and has a s u p e r i o r advantage i n determining those d i f f i c u l t problems .'' W can f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e e D i s t r i c t Court regarding t h e custody of John, t h e minor son. I n regard t o t h e minor daughter Brenda, defendant asks t h i s Court t o look t o s e c t i o n 48-339(2)(c), R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s t h a t i n applying i t s standards t h e c o u r t s h a l l r e t a i n t h e custodian appointed pursuant t o t h e p r i o r decree u n l e s s : " ( c ) t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t environment endangers s e r i o u s l y h i s p h y s i c a l , mental,moral, o r emotional h e a l t h , and t h e harm l i k e l y t o be caused by a change of environment i s outweighed by i t s advant a g e s t o him." I t i s t h e p o s i t i o n of defendant t h a t t h e record preponderates i n favor of modification of custody based upon s e c t i o n 48-339(2)(c). From t h e record it i s c l e a r Brenda was .placed i n t h e custody of defendant f o r t h e summer 1976. A f t e r p l a i n t i f f returned from r e c e i v i n g medical treatment i n C a l i f o r n i a , she took Brenda with h e r t o h e r home i n Anaconda. T h e r e a f t e r , she, a s t h e custodian of t h e c h i l d , placed h e r temporarily i n t h e home of h e r former brother-in-law, Sam Weber. Defendant without t h e consent of p l a i n t i f f took Brenda t o h i s own home and would not r e t u r n h e r custody t o p l a i n t i f f , u n t i l t h e c o u r t o r d e r required him t o do so. W e f i n d no change i n t h e circumstances of p l a i n t i f f mother which would j u s t i f y a modification of t h e decree a s it p e r t a i n s t o t h e custody of t h e minor daughter Brenda. The welfare and b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d a r e t h e primary concern of t h e c o u r t and even though t h e r e have been s u b s t a n t i a l changes i n t h e mother's h e a l t h , t h i s Court w i l l n o t modify t h e o r d e r u n l e s s t h e welfare of t h e c h i l d w i l l be promoted. Plaintiff t e s t i f i e d she has no present h e a l t h problems which would i n t e r f e r e with h e r d u t i e s i n c a r i n g f o r t h e c h i l d r e n . Defendant has f a i l e d t o produce any evidence upon which a modification of custody could be based. The D i s t r i c t Court a s t r i e r of t h e f a c t s , had t h e opportunity t o observe t h e p a r t i e s , had t h e b e n e f i t of t h e r e p o r t s of t h e welfare departments and found i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r modific a t i o n of t h e decree a s i t p e r t a i n s t o t h e custody of t h e two minor c h i l d r e n . This Court w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h a t r u l i n g . Also, i t i s defendant's p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court f a i l e d t o recognize o t h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s made by him toward t h e support of h i s c h i l d r e n i n determining t h a t defendant was delinquent i n payment of c h i l d support. Haaby v. Haaby, (1974), 165 Mont. 475, 478, 529 P.2d 1387. Here, defendant f a t h e r has contributed t o t h e support of h i s minor c h i l d r e n i n ways o t h e r than t h e payment of c h i l d support. It i s uncontradicted t h a t he (1) bought g r o c e r i e s f o r t h e c h i l d r e n ; (2) bought c l o t h e s f o r t h e c h i l d r e n ; ( 3 ) r e p a i r e d t h e motor i n t h e furnace a t t h e mother's home; and (4) s k i r t e d t h e t r a i l e r home of t h e mother. A l l of these c o n t r i b u t i o n s enhance t h e welfare of t h e c h i l d r e n , b u t a r e t h i n g s customarily performed by a f a t h e r i n a d d i t i o n t o support payments. F u r t h e r , t h e problem of g i v i n g t h e defendant f a t h e r c r e d i t f o r doing t h e s e things i s t h a t nowhere i n t h e record does defendant o f f e r testimony a s t o t h e amount he spent f o r g r o c e r i e s , c l o t h i n g and r e p a i r s . The D i s t r i c t Court had no way of knowing whether he c o n t r i b u t e d , i n kind, an amount equal t o t h e delinquency i n t h e support payments. Therefore, t h e D i s t r i c t Court was n o t i n e r r o r i n holding t h a t defendant was delinquent i n h i s c h i l d ' s u p p o r t payments. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. f F Justice W Concur: e - - Chief stic ice

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