MADISON v YUNKER

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No. 13741 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1978 A. P . MADISON, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, CAREY MATOVICH YUNKER, I n d i v i d u a l l y a n d a s E d i t o r o f t h e Montana Kaimin, t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Montana S t u d e n t Newspaper; The Montana Kaimin; e t a l . , D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, H o n o r a b l e Edward T. D u s s a u l t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: Boone, K a r l b e r g and Haddon, M i s s o u l a , Montana Sam E. Haddon a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana For Respondents: C a l t o n & S t e p h e n s , B i l l i n g s , Montans H e r r o n and Meloy, H e l e n a , Montana P e t e r M. Meloy a r g u d , H e l e n a , Montana Bruce B. B a r r e t t a r g u e d , Missoula, Montana R i c h a r d V o l i n k a t y a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn a n d R o b i n s o n , M i s s o u l a , Montana Gary Graham a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana F o r Amicus C u r i a e : B r i n t o n M a r k l e , H e l e n a , Montana Submitted: Decided: May 5 , 1978 fiul.2 - - r7 3g e Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from t h e o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Missoula County, g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' motion t o d i s m i s s p l a i n t i f f ' s c a u s e of a c t i o n f o r l i b e l and from t h e e n t r y o f judgment f o r d e f e n d a n t s . The p r e s e n t c a u s e of a c t i o n a r o s e o u t of a p u r p o r t e d l i b e l o u s p u b l i c a t i o n w r i t t e n by d e f e n d a n t Carey Matovich Yunker (Yunker) and p u b l i s h e d i n t h e October 8 , 1974 e d i t i o n of t h e Montana Kaimin, t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana s t u d e n t newspaper. In pertinent part the editorial states: " * * * One of t h e memos i s from A 1 Madison. H i s p o s i t i o n , d i r e c t o r of t h e U n i v e r s i t y p r i n t shop, a l o n e makes a n y t h i n g h e would A s w e l l , he i s s a y on t h e m a t t e r s u s p e c t . a c o n g e n i t a l l i a r , a n i n c o m p e t e n t whose own o p e r a t i o n h a s l o s t $103,914.89 i n t h e l a s t four years. * * *" On December 9, 1974, Madison f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l l e g i n g d e f e n d a n t Yunker, a c t i n g i n h e r c a p a c i t y a s e d i t o r of t h e Montana Kaimin, d e l i b e r a t e l y and m a l i c i o u s l y l i b e l e d p l a i n t i f f by p u b l i s h i n g f a l s e defamatory statements. P l a i n t i f f p l e a d e d noncompliance w i t h s e c t i o n 64-207.1, 1947, (Montana's r e t r a c t i o n R.C.M. s t a t u t e ) on t h e grounds t h a t s e c t i o n i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and t h e p u r p o r t e d l i b e l was n o t w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of s e c t i o n 64207.1. Madison prayed f o r judgment i n h i s f a v o r and a n award of s p e c i a l , g e n e r a l , and p u n i t i v e o r exemplary damages i n t h e a g g r e g a t e amount of $102,000. On December 30 and 31, 1974, d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d m o t i o n s t o d i s m i s s Madison's c o m p l a i n t , p u r s u a n t t o Rule 1 2 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., on t h e grounds t h e c o m p l a i n t f a i l e d t o s t a t e a c l a i m upon which r e l i e f c o u l d b e g r a n t e d and t h e D i s t r i c t Court lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n over p a r t i e s i n a l i b e l a c t i o n until ad is on complied w i t h s e c t i o n 64-207.1. The Univer- s i t y of ~ o n t a n a ' smotion t o d i s m i s s w a s based upon t h e a d d i t i o n a l ground t h a t no c l a i m had been f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 82-4312, R.C.M. 1947. On J a n u a r y 31, 1975, Madison f i l e d a motion t o d e f e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of m a t t e r s r a i s e d i n t h e c o n s o l i d a t e d motion of t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana pending f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1. Madison and t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1 was a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t t o t h e maintenance of any a c t i o n f o r l i b e l . On May 2 9 , 1975, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e a r d o r a l argument on d e f e n d a n t s ' s e p a r a t e motions t o d i s m i s s . B r i e f s i n sup- p o r t of and i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e motions t o d i s m i s s were f i l e d by t h e p a r t i e s . On December 2 2 , 1976, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s s u e d a n o r d e r g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' motions t o d i s m i s s on t h e grounds s e c t i o n 64-207.1 i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n and Madison f a i l e d t o demand a r e t r a c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 64-207.1, entitled to "* * * defendants being an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p u b l i s h a r e t r a c t i o n t o m i t i g a t e a c t u a l o r compensatory damages, i f any." ~udgment was a c c o r d i n g l y e n t e r e d f o r d e f e n d a n t s . The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w , a s s t a t e d by a p p e l l a n t Madison, are: 1. Does s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r i n g a demand f o r r e t r a c t i o n a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o a n a c t i o n f o r l i b e l , impose u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t s upon p e r s o n a l l i b e r t i e s and r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d by A r t i c l e 11, 1972 Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e due p r o c e s s p r o v i s i o n of t h e Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n ? our tee nth 2. Does s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, have any ap- p l i c a t i o n i n a l i b e l a c t i o n founded upon p u b l i c a t i o n of a n obvious i n t e n t i o n a l falsehood? W e a r e handed f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n a c l a s s i c c o n f r o n t a t i o n between b a s i c and t r e a s u r e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , t h e freedom of s p e e c h and p r e s s g u a r a n t e e d under t h e F i r s t Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , on t h e one hand, and t h e r i g h t s of a n i n d i v i d u a l t o b e s e c u r e from d e f a m a t i o n on the other. The p i v o t a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n we must make i s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y o f s e c t i o n 64-207.1. For on t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a l l e l s e i n t h i s c a s e depends. a s we s a i d i n Granger v . T i m e , I n c . 568 P.2d 535, 541, 34 St.Rep. 983, a (1977) , "* * * It requires, - Mont. , c a r e f u l balanc- i n g of t h e F i r s t Amendment freedoms of s p e e c h and p r e s s , and t h e p e r s o n a l d i g n i t y i n t e r e s t s u n d e r l y i n g t h e law of defamation" . A t t h e o u t s e t , w e s e t o u t i n f u l l t h e s t a t u t e which i s under a t t a c k : "64-207.1. Notice i n w r i t i n g t o publisher of l i b e l o u s o r defamatory m a t t e r - - o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o r r e c t - - d e f e n s e and m i t i g a t i o n of damages. -- - B e f o r e g c i v i l a c t i o n s h a l i b e commenced on a c c o u n t of 3 libelous o r f a m a t o r y publicst i o -i n n newspaper, magazine, p e r i o d i c a l , radio o r television station, or cable television s y s t e m , t h e l i b e l--- s h a l l -e d person f i r s t give those a l l e g e d - be responsible - l i a b l e f o r to or t h e publication a reasonable opport-to c o r r e c t t h e l i b e i o u s o r defamatory m a t t e r Such o p p o r t u n i t y s h a l l b e z v e n by n o t i c e i n w r i t i n g s p e c i f y i n g t h e a r t i c l e and t h e s t a t e m e n t s t h e r e i n which a r e c l a i m e d t o b e f a l s e and d e f a m a t o r y and a s t a t e m e n t of what a r e c l a i m e d t o b e t h e The n o t i c e may a l s o s t a t e t h e true facts. s o u r c e s , i f any, from which t h e t r u e f a c t s may b e a s c e r t a i n e d w i t h d e f i n i t e n e s s and c e r t a i n t y . The f i r s t i s s u e of a newspaper, magazine o r p e r i o d i c a l p u b l i s h e d a f t e r t h e e x p i r a t i o n of o n e week from t h e r e c e i p t o f s u c h n o t i c e s h a l l be w i t h i n a reasonable t i m e f o r c o r r e c t i o n . I n t h e c a s e of r a d i o and t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n s and c a b l e t e l e v i s i o n systems a b r o a d c a s t made a t t h e same t i m e of day as t h e b r o a d c a s t com- plained of and of at least equal duration, which is made within seven (7) days following receipt of such notice shall be within a reasonable time for correction. To the extent that the true facts are, with reasonable diligence, ascertainable with definiteness and certainty, only a retraction shall constitute a correction; otherwise the publication of the libeled person's statement of the true facts, of so much thereof as shall not be libelous or another, scurrilous, or otherwise improper for publication, published as his statement, shall constitute a correction within the meaning of this section. If it shall appear upon trial -- publication w a s a m e r that the -honest mistake or misapprehension, - - a then correction, timay published, without comment, in as the - -a position and type as prominent - alleged libel, or in a broadcast made at the same time of day as the broadcast complained of and of at least equal duration, shall constitute a defense against the recovery of any damages except actual damages, - - - - being as well competent and material in mitigation of actual damases - - extent the correction Kblished to the does2so mitigate them. " (Emphasis added. ) -- as The pertinent part of the Fourteen Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: " * * * No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Article 11, 1972 Montana Constitution, has several sections which are pertinent to or have some significance in this case: "Section 3. Inalienable rights. All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities. "Section 4. Individual dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person - the denied the equal protectionof shall laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil - o r p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s on a c c o u n t of r a c e , c o l o r , s e x , c u l t u r e , s o c i a l o r i g i n o r condition, or p o l i t i c a l o r religious ideas. " S e c t i o n 7. Freedom of s p e e c h , e x p r e s s i o n , and p r e s s . No law s h a l l be p a s s e d i m p a i r i n g t h e freedom of s p e e c h o r e x p r e s s i o n . Every person s h a l l - -e-t o speak o r p u b l i s h be f r e whatever - - l-on any s u b j e c t , b e i n g r e s p o n s i he w i l ble for a l l of t h - - - a b u s e - -a t l i b e r t y . I n a l l s u i t s and p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r l i b e l o r s l a n d e r -- h the trut t h e r e o f m a y b e y i v e n i n e v i d e n c e ; and - j u r y , -the under t h e --- n o f t h e c o u r t , s h a l l d e t e r m i n e directio t h e law and t h e f a c -----t s . 7 - " S e c t i o n 1 6 . The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e . C o u r t s of j u s t i c e s h a l l be open t o e v e r y p e r s o n , and speedy remedy a f f o r d e d f o r every i n j u r y of person, property, c h a r a c t e r . No p e r s o n s h a l l be d e p r i v e d of t h i s f u l l l e g a l r e d r e s s f o r i n j u r y i n c u r r e d i n employment f o r which a n o t h e r p e r s o n may b e l i a b l e e x c e p t as t o f e l l o w employees and h i s immediate employer who h i r e d him i f s u c h immediate employer p r o v i d e s c o v e r a g e under t h e Workmen's Compensation Laws of t h i s s t a t e . R i g h t and j u s t i c e s h a l l b e a d m i n i s t e r e d w i t h o u t s a l e , denial, o r delay. or " S e c t i o n 1 7 . Due p r o c e s s of l a w . N person o s h a l l b e d e p r i v e d - -f e , l i b e r t y , o r p r o p e r t of l i ( ~ m ~ h a s usp p l i z d . ) z withouFdue process - of law." I t w i l l be n o t e d t h a t s e v e r a l of t h e f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n r e p e a t o r r e s t a t e l i k e p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . For example, A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 , p r o v i d e s t h a t no p e r s o n s h a l l b e d e n i e d t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e laws. A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 1 7 , p r o v i d e s t h a t no p e r s o n s h a l l be d e p r i v e d of l i f e , l i b e r t y o r p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s of law. Freedom o f s p e e c h , of e x p r e s s i o n and of p r e s s i s g u a r a n t e e d i n Article 11, S e c t i o n 7 . These state constitutional provisions, i d e n t i c a l o r nearly i d e n t i c a l w i t h l i k e language i n t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and c e r t a i n l y i d e n t i c a l i n concept, each c o n s t i t u t e s e p a r a t e and e n f o r c e a b l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i n s o f a r a s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e S t a t e of Montana e x t e n d s . Where s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions a r e i d e n t i c a l , each i s e n f o r c e a b l e i n i t s own r e s p e c t i v e s p h e r e where t h o s e p r i n ciples attach. S e e , Department of Mental Hygiene v . K i r c h n e r ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 C a l . R p t r . v . S t a t e of Montana ( 1 9 7 8 ) , St.Rep. 329, 4 0 0 P.2d 321; Emery - Mont. , 580 P.2d 445, 35 709. The competing freedoms which s e c t i o n 64-207.1 found i n t h e Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . affect are F i r s t and f o r e m o s t o f t h e a f f e c t e d p r o v i s i o n s i s A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 7. Freedom o f t h e p r e s s f l o w e r s i n t h e l a n g u a g e " e v e r y p e r s o n s h a l l be f r e e t o speak o r p u b l i s h whatever h e w i l l on any s u b j e c t " , b u t t h e r e i s a n accompanying t h o r n , " b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l a b u s e of t h a t l i b e r t y . " I t i s noteworthy t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n d o e s n o t d e f i n e t h e c l a u s e " a b u s e of t h a t l i b e r t y " . However, on t h e books a t t h e t i m e of t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n was s e c t i o n 64-203, R.C.M. 1947, a d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e l . That s t a t u t e follows : " L i b e l i s a f a l s e and u n p r i v i l e g e d p u b l i c a t i o n by w r i t i n g , p r i n t i n g * * * which exposes any p e r s o n s t o h a t r e d , contempt, r i d i c u l e , o r obloquy, o r which c a u s e s him t o b e shunned o r a v o i d e d , o r which h a s a tendency t o i n j u r e him i n h i s occupation." W e may assume t h e r e f o r e t h a t a n " a b u s e of t h a t l i b e r t y " would b e any p u b l i c a t i o n t h a t would f i t t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e l . W e a r e f o r t i f i e d i n t h i s c o n c l u s i o n by t h e f a c t t h a t i n A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 7 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e s e c t i o n g o e s on t o s a y , " i n a l l s u i t s and p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r l i b e l o r s l a n d e r , t h e t r u t h t h e r e o f may b e g i v e n i n e v i d e n c e , and t h e j u r y , under t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e c o u r t , s h a l l d e t e r mine t h e l a w and t h e f a c t s . " W d e t e r m i n e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t s u i t s f o r l i b e l a r e recoge n i z e d and p r e s e r v e d i n t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . It is p r o p e r t o t u r n now t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g i n t h e F i r s t Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , re- garding freedom of the press, or the case law applying thereto, that allows the press a greater degree of freedom than the Montana Constitution, or prevents suits for libel such as contemplated by the Montana Constitution. We find from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323 347, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L Ed 2d 789, that states may provide for libel actions, at least where the publication is libelous on its face: "We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. This approach provides a more equitable boundary between the competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. At least this inclusion obtains where, as here, the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes substantial danger to reputation apparent'. This phrase places in perspective the conclusion we announce today. Our inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different from those discussed above if a State purported to condition civil liability on a factual mis-statement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of a defamatory potential * * *." 418 U.S. at 347, 348. We next turn to consider how section 64-207.1 comports with Article 11, Section 7, respecting the freedom of the press which we have already set out in full, and the provisions of Article 11, Section 16, which provides that "courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character It is plaintiff's contention that the provisions of section 64-207.1 absolutely preclude a suit by a defamed individual and that the statutory requirement therein for written notice demanding a retraction is outside the provisions of the 1972 Montana Constitution and an impermissible limitation or restriction on the constitutional right of action for libel. Defendants on the other hand contend that the statute does not bar suits for libel, but only sets forth a condition precedent to maintaining a suit; that the effect of section 64-207.1, once followed, is to mitigate damages; and further, that the provision for retraction is in itself a remedy afforded by the statute to a libeled person. This Court has said that: "The underlying purpose of libel laws is to furnish a means of redress for defamation. Every person is entitled to enjoy his reputation unimpaired by false and defamatory remarks. An action for libel or slander is based upon a violation of this right which exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. (Citations omitted.) " Lewis v. Reader's Digest (1973), 162 Mont. 401, 406, 512 P.2d 702. The legislature has defined what constitutes libel. tion 64-203. for libel. Sec- It has also determined who can be held liable Section 64-201, et seq., R.C.M. 1947. These statutes implement the constitutional mandate of Article 11, Section 7, 1972 Montana Constitution and also of Article 11, Section 16, of that Constitution, which provides that a remedy shall be available for injury to character. The District Court in this case dismissed Madison's complaint because Madison failed to give the required notice for retraction. It must be said that the District Court was simply following the statute, which allows no other interpretation. The statute begins with the words: civil action shall be commenced shall first give * * * * * * "Before any the libeled person notice to the libelor * * *." This requirement is in direct derogation of the clear and unambiguous language of Article 11, Section 16, 1972 Montana Constitution, which mandates that the courts of this state are open to every person, and a remedy afforded for every injury to character. " * * * With reference to the subjects upon which the Constitution speaks, its declarations are binding upon the legislature (citing case). Constitutional provisions are conclusive upon the legislature and prevent the enactment of any law which extinguishes or limits the powers conferred by the Constitution (citing cases)." No11 and Kenneady v. Bozeman (1975), 166 Mont. 504, 507, 534 P.2d 880. We do not find that the "right" of a libeled individual to obtain a retraction under section 64-207.1 is in itself a remedy. Remedies for "injury of * * * character" are found in "courts of justice" which "shall be open to every person". In all suits for libel, "the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts". Sections 7 and 16, 1972 Montana Constitution. Article 11, Thus, the state constitution fixes the right to a remedy and where it may be sought. The legislature is without power to provide otherwise. We therefore hold section 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, unconstitutional in that it is in violation of the provisions which we have noted of Article 11, Sections 7 and 16, 1972 Montana Constitution. Having so held, there is no need for us to reach a deci- sion as to the additional objections made by Madison to section 64-207.1 that it violates the due process clauses of the Montana Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It i s enough t o s a y t h a t w e have s u b s t a n t i a l d o u b t s a b o u t t h e v a l i d i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1 under t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s a l s o , and t h a t w e r e s e r v e t o some f u t u r e t i m e as it may become necessary t o discuss those contentions. Nor a r e we r e q u i r e d t o d i s c u s s t h e second i s s u e above s t a t e d , t h a t t h e s t a t u t e cannot apply t o an obvious falsehood. Having d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e which b r o u g h t a b o u t t h e d i s m i s s a l of p l a i n t i f f ' s s u i t i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , w e must send t h i s c a u s e back f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . I n doing s o , however, we a r e o b l i g e d t o s t a t e , f o r g u i d a n c e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s on l i b e l s u i t s and t h e damages o b t a i n a b l e t h e r e i n which now a p p l y . I n doing s o , we c a n p e r h a p s o b v i a t e , o r a t l e a s t e a s e , t h e f e a r s which w i l l r i s e i n t h e b r e a s t s of p u b l i s h e r s , e d i t o r s , and broadc a s t e r s upon p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s o p i n i o n . Although t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a s t a t e may p r o v i d e f o r l i b e l s u i t s ( G e r t z v . R o b e r t Welch I n c . , s u p r a ) , t h e r e h a s been a s u b s t a n t i a l development i n c a s e s from t h a t c o u r t which i s i n i t s e l f a p r o t e c t i o n t o p u b l i s h e r s b e c a u s e i t l i m i t s t h e r i g h t t o damages. These r e s t r i c t i o n s on damages a r e i n t h e m s e l v e s a d e t e r r e n t t o t h e b a r r a g e of l i b e l s u i t s t h a t p u b l i s h e r s m i g h t o t h e r w i s e f e a r . The development b e g i n s w i t h N e w York Times Co. v. S u l l i v a n ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 376 U.S. 95 A R 1912. L 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 1 L Ed 2d 686, 1 T h e r e , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t found t h a t t h e d i s s e m i n a t i o n of news was s o i m p o r t a n t t h a t news media s h o u l d b e p r o t e c t e d from l i b e l judgments, and s h o u l d a l s o be s h i e l d e d from t h e i r own " s e l f - c e n s o r s h i p " b r o u g h t a b o u t by f e a r of l i b e l s u i t s . The Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l c o u l d n o t r e c o v e r on a c l a i m f o r d e f a m a t i o n u n l e s s " a c t u a l m a l i c e " had been p r e s e n t . I m p l i e d o r presumed malice was out. "Malice" meant publication of the defaming material with a "knowledge that it was false, or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not". The burden of proof was on the plaintiff to prove that kind of malice with convincing clarity. The court found that the First Amendment permitted, on public issues, vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on public officials. In Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L Ed 2d 125, the New York Times rule was extended to a public official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation. In Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, and Associated Press v. Walker (1967), reported together in 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L Ed 2d 1094, reh.den. 389 U.S. 889 (1967), the court extended the New York Times rule to public figures. "Public figures" are defined in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra: " * * * For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of a special prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment." 418 U.S. at 345. Finally, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, the Supreme Court, while allowing states to provide for libel suits, erected a fence around the amount of damages recoverable: "We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no f a r t h e r than i s necessary t o p r o t e c t t h e l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t involved. It i s necessary t o r e s t r i c t d e f a m a t i o n p l a i n t i f f s who do n o t p r o v e knowledge of f a l s i t y o r r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e t r u t h t o compensation f o r a c t u a l i n j u r y . W e need n o t d e f i n e ' a c t u a l i n j u r y , ' a s t r i a l c o u r t s have wide e x p e r i e n c e i n framing appropriate jury i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t o r t actions. S u f f i c e it t o s a y t h a t a c t u a l i n j u r y i s n o t l i m i t e d t o out-of-pocket l o s s . Indeed, t h e more customary t y p e s of a c t u a l harm i n f l i c t e d by defamatory f a l s e h o o d i n c l u d e impairment of r e p u t a t i o n and s t a n d i n g i n t h e community, p e r s o n a l h u m i l i a t i o n , and m e n t a l a n g u i s h and s u f f e r i n g . Of c o u r s e , j u r i e s must b e l i m i t e d by a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s , and a l l awards must b e s u p p o r t e d by competent e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n j u r y , a l t h o u g h t h e r e need be no e v i d e n c e which a s s i g n s a n a c t u a l d o l l a r v a l u e t o t h e injury. "We a l s o f i n d no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a l l o w i n g awards of p u n i t i v e damages a g a i n s t p u b l i s h e r s and b r o a d c a s t e r s h e l d l i a b l e under s t a t e d e f i n e d s t a n d a r d s of l i a b i l i t y f o r d e f a m a t i o n . I n most j u r i s d i c t i o n s j u r y d i s c r e t i o n o v e r t h e amounts awarded i s l i m i t e d o n l y by t h e g e n t l e r u l e t h a t they n o t be excessive. Consequently, j u r i e s a s s e s s p u n i t i v e damages i n wholly unpred i c t a b l e amounts b e a r i n g no n e c e s s a r y r e l a t i o n t o t h e a c t u a l harm c a u s e d . And t h e y remain f r e e t o use t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n s e l e c t i v e l y t o Like p u n i s h e x p r e s s i o n s o f unpopular views. t h e d o c t r i n e of presumed damages, j u r y d i s c r e t i o n t o award p u n i t i v e damages u n n e c e s s a r i l y e x a c e r b a t e s t h e d a n g e r of media s e l f - c e n s o r s h i p , b u t , u n l i k e t h e former r u l e , p u n i t i v e damages a r e wholly i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e s t a t e i n t e r e s t t h a t j u s t i f i e s a negligence standard f o r p r i v a t e d e f a m a t i o n a c t i o n s . They a r e n o t compensation for injury. Instead, they a r e p r i v a t e f i n e s l e v i e d by c i v i l j u r i e s t o p u n i s h r e p r e h e n s i b l e c o n d u c t and t o d e t e r i t s f u t u r e occurrence. I n s h o r t , t h e p r i v a t e defamation p l a i n t i f f who e s t a b l i s h e s l i a b i l i t y under a l e s s demanding s t a n d a r d t h a n t h a t s t a t e d by N e w York T i m e s may r e c o v e r o n l y s u c h damages a s a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o compensate him f o r a c t u a l injury." 418 U.S. a t 349, 350. I n t h i s c a s e , d e f e n d a n t s have c o n s t a n t l y r e f e r r e d t o Madison a s a " p u b l i c o f f i c i a l " , a p p a r e n t l y t o b r i n g t h i s c a s e under t h e u m b r e l l a of N e w York T i m e s Co. v . S u l l i v a n , supra. W e a r e s k e p t i c a l t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e p r i n t shop a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana, M i s s o u l a , Montana, i s indeed a "public o f f i c i a l " . I n G e r t z v . R o b e r t Welch, I n c . , s u p r a , i t was h e l d t h a t a lawyer was n o t a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l , a l t h o u g h h e had t a k e n on a prominent c a s e and was by v i r t u e of h i s p r o f e s s i o n a n o f f i c e r o f t h e c o u r t . L i k e w i s e , i t may b e contended i n t h e r e t r i a l t h a t Madison i s a " p u b l i c f i g u r e " . Whatever h i s s t a t u s , i t i s a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e j u r y t o d e t e r mine, b e c a u s e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n t h a t t h e j u r y under t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e c o u r t i s t h e judge of b o t h law and f a c t . A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 7 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . With a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e j u r y c a n d e t e r m i n e t h e s e m a t t e r s and t h e i r s t a t u s i n any t r i a l , u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e stipulated. I n t h i s c a s e , t h e r e f o r e , a p p l y i n g t h e r a t i o n a l e of t h e c a s e s of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t on damages f o r l i b e l , i f Madison i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be a p r i v a t e p e r s o n , h e must p r o v e : (1) t h a t t h e p u b l i s h e d m a t e r i a l was f a l s e ; (2) t h a t defendants a r e c h a r g e a b l e w i t h f a u l t i n t h e p u b l i c a t i o n ; and ( 3 ) t h a t a c t u a l i n j u r y t o him e n s u e d , f o r which h e may r e c o v e r h i s a c t u a l damages. Moreover, ( 4 ) i f he proves t h a t t h e publica- t i o n was made by d e f e n d a n t s w i t h knowledge of i t s f a l s i t y o r i n r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e t r u t h o r f a l s i t i e s t h e r e o f , he may r e c o v e r p u n i t i v e damages f o r s u c h m a l i c e , b u t s u c h m a l i c e does n o t include h a t r e d , personal s p i t e , i l l - w i l l , sire t o injure. N e w York Times Co. v . o r a de- ~ u l l i v a n ,s u p r a ; L e t t e r Carriers v . A u s t i n ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 418 U.S. 264, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 4 1 L Ed 2d 745. I f Madison i s a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l o r p u b l i c f i g u r e , he may recover only i f he proves t h e threshhold f a c t t h a t t h e publicat i o n was made w i t h knowledge of i t s f a l s i t y o r r e c k l e s s d i s regard f o r i t s t r u t h o r f a l s i t y . a c t u a l and p u n i t i v e damages. He c o u l d t h e n r e c o v e r h i s We now, therefore, reverse the judgment and order of dismissal of plaintiff's complaint by the District Court and remand the cause to the District Court for further proceedings, consonant with this opinion. Costs to the plaintiff. We Concur: Chief Justice , \ Justice \ . ' - Hon. Leonard H Langen, District . Judge, sitting for Mr. Justice Harrison

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