STATE v COLEMAN

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No. 13296 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF YONTANA 1978 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vsDEWEY EUGENE COLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Moses, Tolliver and Wright, Billings, Montana Charles F. Moses argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Forsythe argued, County Attorney, Forsyth, Montana Lee Overfelt, Billings, Montana Submitted: March 1, 1978 Decided :APR Filed: \Pi? 2 c 1978 2 6 1978 C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e Court. Mr. D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s from t h e f i n a l judgment o f t h e ~ i s t r i c t o u r t , Rosebud County, f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l . C D e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d o f d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e , a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , and s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , i n f l i c t ing bodily injury. On J u l y 4 , 1974, Peggy Lee H a r s t a d , 21 y e a r s o f a g e , d i s a p p e a r e d w h i l e d r i v i n g a l o n e from Harlowton t o Rosebud, Montana. She was l a s t s e e n a l i v e a r o u n d 9:00 p.m. that n i g h t a t M e l s t o n e , Montana. On J u l y 5 , 1 9 7 4 , h e r c a r was found w i t h i n a few m i l e s o f h e r home, n e a r Rosebud. On J u l y 7 , 1974, a r a n c h hand d i s c o v e r e d a p u r s e and o t h e r a r t i c l e s b e l o n g i n g t o Peggy Lee H a r s t a d i n s i d e a c u l v e r t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t e n m i l e s w e s t o f h e r abandoned c a r . I n t h e developing i n v e s t i g a t i o n , an e l d e r l y couple informed t h e s h e r i f f o f Rosebud County t h a t t h e y had s e e n a b l a c k man a n d a w h i t e man h i t c h h i k i n g on J u l y 4 between Roundup and F o r s y t h , Montana a t a b o u t t h e t i m e o f day Peggy L e e H a r s t a d was d r i v i n g between t h o s e towns. Subsequently, t h e s e two men were i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e d e f e n d a n t , Dewey Eugene Coleman, a b l a c k man, and R o b e r t Dennis Nank, a w h i t e man. On J u l y 9 , 1974, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Rosebud County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e went t o t h e V e t e r a n ' s ~ d m i n i s t r a t i o n H o s p i t a l i n S h e r i d a n , Wyoming, where t h e s e men w e r e , to q u e s t i o n them. D e f e n d a n t and Nank a d m i t t e d b e i n g i n t h e a r e a o f Peggy L e e H a r s t a d ' s d i s a p p e a r a n c e and h i t c h h i k i n g t h r o u g h Forsyth on t h e n i g h t of J u l y 4th. On August 6 , 1974, t h e F.B.I. l a b o r a t o r y provided a p o s i t i v e comparison between a f i n g e r p r i n t l i f t t a k e n from t h e e x t e r i o r o f t h e H a r s t a d v e h i c l e and a sample f i n g e r p r i n t o f ~ a n k . The F.B.I. a l s o r e p o r t e d a p o s i t i v e comparison between a f i n g e r p r i n t of d e f e n d a n t and a l i f t t a k e n from a paper found i n H a r s t a d ' s purse. I n a n i n t e r v i e w w i t h F.B.I. a g e n t s o n August 1, 1974, d e f e n d a n t and Nank a d m i t t e d s e e i n g t h e H a r s t a d v e h i c l e abandoned on t h e r o a d . When h e was asked about h i s f i n g e r p r i n t i n t h e purse, defendant s t a t e d t h a t he found a p u r s e along t h e road they w e r e h i t c h h i k i n g . Vacuumings w e r e t a k e n i n t h e H a r s t a d v e h i c l e . w e r e s e n t t o t h e F.B.I. laboratory f o r analysis. These They r e p o r t e d , on September 1 3 , 1974, t h a t Negroid head h a i r s w e r e f o u n d i n t h e l o o s e h a i r s t a k e n from t h e f r o n t s e a t . In a d d i t i o n , two Negroid p u b i c h a i r s w e r e f o u n d i n t h e vacuumings. On August 29, 1 9 7 4 , t h e decomposed body o f Peggy L e e H a r s t a d w a s found o n t h e n o r t h bank o f t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e R i v e r , j u s t w e s t o f F o r s y t h , Montana. A f o r e n s i c patholo- g i s t , D r . J o h n P f a f f , i d e n t i f i e d t h e r e m a i n s a s Peggy Lee H a r s t a d by t h e u s e of d e n t a l c h a r t s . Because o f t h e s t a t e of decomposition of h e r remains, D r . Pfaff could n o t d e t e r - mine a c a u s e of d e a t h . S i n c e t h e i r o r i g i n a l q u e s t i o n i n g i n S h e r i d a n , Wyoming, t h e d e f e n d a n t and Nank had moved t o B o i s e , I d a h o , sometime i n August. A t t h e r e q u e s t o f Rosebud County a u t h o r i t i e s , t h e B o i s e p o l i c e had k e p t t h e s e men u n d e r s u r v e i l l a n c e . On O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1974, t h e t h e n Rosebud County a t t o r n e y , W i l l i a m M e i s b u r g e r , and U n d e r s h e r i f f Graham u akin went t o B o i s e , I d a h o t o f u r t h e r i n t e r r o g a t e d e f e n d a n t and Nank. he n e x t d a y , O c t o b e r 1 7 , 1974, M e i s b u r g e r and m akin went t o see t h e Boise police. They t a l k e d t o D e t e c t i v e m rake of t h e B o i s e p o l i c e a b o u t b r i n g i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t and ~ a n k o t h e t police s t a t i o n f o r questioning. They i n f o r m e d him o f a l l t h e e v i d e n c e t h e y had c o n n e c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t and ~ a n k i t h w t h e d e a t h of Peggy L e e K a r s t a d . D e t e c t i v e Brake, s i n c e he had been d o i n g some o f t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e o f t h e two men, knew a b o u t most o f t h e e v i d e n c e e x c e p t a b o u t h e r body b e i n g found. A f t e r d i s c u s s i n g t h e c a s e w i t h M e i s b u r g e r and Makin, D e t e c t i v e Brake and a D e t e c t i v e C r o w e l l went t o t h e a p a r t ment where t h e s e two men w e r e l i v i n g . There t h e defendant and Nank w e r e p l a c e d u n d e r a r r e s t w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t f o r d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e i n t h e d e a t h o f Peggy L e e H a r s t a d . A f t e r t h e i r a r r e s t and being placed i n custody, a r r e s t w a r r a n t s and c o m p l a i n t s were i s s u e d by a j u s t i c e o f t h e p e a c e f o r Rosebud County. The w a r r a n t s and c o m p l a i n t c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t and Nank w i t h d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e . Upon t h e i r a r r e s t , d e f e n d a n t and Nank w e r e a d v i s e d o f their rights. The d e f e n d a n t r e f u s e d t o w a i v e h i s r i g h t s . Nank d i d w a i v e h i s r i g h t s a n d , a f t e r b e i n g i n c u s t o d y f o r a few h o u r s , g a v e a f u l l c o n f e s s i o n . I n h i s confession, he i m p l i c a t e d h i m s e l f and t h e d e f e n d a n t . H e confessed t h a t t h e y k i d n a p p e d , r a p e d , and murdered Peggy L e e H a r s t a d . Nank c o n s e n t e d t o a s e a r c h o f t h e i r a p a r t m e n t and c a r f o r t h e murder weapons h e s a i d w e r e u s e d i n t h e crime--namely, m o t o r c y c l e h e l m e t s and a r o p e . their A s e a r c h w a r r a n t was o b t a i n e d and t h e h e l m e t s and r o p e r e c o v e r e d . On O c t o b e r 2 4 , 1974, a m o t i o n f o r l e a v e t o f i l e a n I n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Rosebud County, was r e q u e s t e d and g r a n t e d . The I n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g e d t h e d e f e n d a n t with t h r e e counts: Count I , d e l i b e r a t e homicide; Count 11, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ; and Count 111, s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y . ~ e f e n d a n tp l e a d not g u i l t y t o a l l counts. On J a n u a r y 3 0 , 1975, d e f e n d a n t moved t o s u p p r e s s a l l c o n f e s s i o n s , s t a t e m e n t s and e v i d e n c e , i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d . A s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g was h e l d . Following t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a - t i o n o f t h e t r i a l j u d g e by t h e S t a t e and t h e a s s i g n m e n t o f t h e c a s e t o a n o t h e r j u d g e , a second s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g was h e l d and d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n d e n i e d . On May 7 , 1 9 7 5 , t h e S t a t e e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h R o b e r t Nank. Under t h e t e r m s o f t h e a g r e e m e n t , Nank a g r e e d t o p l e a d g u i l t y t o d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e and s o l i c i t a t i o n t o commit s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , and f u r t h e r a g r e e d t o t e s t i f y a t d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l i n r e t u r n f o r t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e aggravated kidnapping charge. On May 1 9 , 1 9 7 5 , d e f e n d a n t ' s t h e n c o u r t a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l made a n o r a l o f f e r o f a c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a o f g u i l t y i n r e t u r n f o r d i s m i s s a l of t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e . On May 2 3 , 1975, a w r i t t e n o f f e r o f a c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a o f g u i l t y was p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t . In t h i s o f f e r , defendant i n s i s t e d on maintaining h i s innocence. The S t a t e r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t a g u i l t y p l e a w i t h defendant maintaining h i s innocence. Following a change o f d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u r t appointed c o u n s e l , a c h a n g e o f v e n u e from Rosebud County t o C u s t e r County and f i n a l l y t o Y e l l o w s t o n e County, and o t h e r p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s and m o t i o n s , d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l commenced on O c t o b e r 2 3 , 1 9 7 5 , i n Y e l l o w s t o n e County. A t t r i a l , Coleman and Nank r e l a t e d o p p o s i t e s t a t e m e n t s of f a c t a s t o t h e i r involvement w i t h M i s s Harstad. Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e and Coleman w e r e t r a v e l i n g between Roundup and F o r s y t h on U. when t h e y r a n o u t o f g a s . S. 12 on h i s motorcycle They t h e n t r i e d t o h i t c h h i k e . He s a i d t h a t one c a r stopped, b u t t h e e l d e r l y couple refused t o g i v e them a r i d e . Nank s t a t e d t h a t M i s s H a r s t a d s t o p p e d and g a v e them a ride. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t w h i l e d r i v i n g down t h e r o a d , h e r e a c h e d o v e r and t u r n e d t h e key on h e r c a r o f f and s t e e r e d the car t o a stop. H e s t a t e d t h a t he p u t t h e g i r l i n t h e back s e a t , t o o k h e r c l o t h e s o f f , and a t t e m p t e d t o r a p e h e r , b u t f a i l e d , w h i l e Coleman d r o v e t h e c a r . Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t Coleman t h e n r a p e d h e r w h i l e h e h e l d h e r f o o t , t e s t i f y i n g t h a t h e had a f o o t f e t i s h . Nank s a i d t h a t t h e y t h e n went down by t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e R i v e r . He c a r r i e d t h e g i r l , now f u l l y c l o t h e d , o v e r h i s s h o u l d e r , w h i l e Coleman came from b e h i n d s w i n g i n g h i s s i l v e r motorc y c l e h e l m e t by t h e c h i n s t r a p and c r a s h e d i t a g a i n s t h e r skull. Nank s a i d t h a t Coleman t h e n t o o k a y e l l o w n y l o n r o p e and a t t e m p t e d t o s t r a n g l e h e r and a s k e d Nank t o h e l p , b u t h e did not strangle her. Then t h e y t o o k h e r down t o t h e r i v e r and dumped h e r i n t o i t . A s s h e was n o t d e a d , Nank h e l d h e r head u n d e r w a t e r w h i l e Coleman h e l d h e r l e g s . Nank t h e n t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y d r o v e h e r c a r back toward F o r s y t h u n t i l i t r a n o u t o f g a s . They removed some t h i n g s from t h e c a r and walked i n t o F o r s y t h . Nank l e f t Coleman i n F o r s y t h , h i t c h h i k e d w i t h g a s t o t h e m o t o r c y c l e , and r e t u r n e d t o p i c k up Coleman. They t h e n went t o t h e V. A. H o s p i t a l i n S h e r i d a n where t h e y s t a y e d u n t i l g o i n g t o B o i s e . D e f e n d a n t Coleman, on t h e o t h e r hand, t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e m o t o r c y c l e r a n o u t o f g a s and t h e y were r e f u s e d a r i d e , Nank s u g g e s t e d t h a t b e c a u s e Coleman was b l a c k and t h e r e w e r e few b l a c k s i n t h a t a r e a , h e s h o u l d go g e t t h e g a s alone. Coleman t e s t i f i e d t h a t w h i l e h e was s i t t i n g o f f t h e highway smoking, Nank g o t a r i d e . A f t e r s e v e r a l h o u r s , Nank r e t u r n e d i n a c a r a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o Coleman, Nank was w e t , u p s e t and a c t i n g s t r a n g e . Coleman s a i d he was t o l d t o g e t t h e i r t h i n g s o f f t h e motor- c y c l e and g e t i n t h e c a r . When t h e y b o t h were i n t h e c a r , Nank a d v i s e d Coleman t h a t he had k i l l e d a g i r l . o u t o f g a s , and t h e y s t a r t e d t o walk. The c a r r a n Nank gave Coleman a p u r s e t o c a r r y and l a t e r t o l d him t o g e t r i d of i t . threw t h e p u r s e i n t o a c u l v e r t . Coleman They t h e n had b r e a k f a s t i n F o r s y t h , and Nank l e f t Coleman w h i l e he went t o g e t t h e motorcycle. Coleman a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t Nank t h r e a t e n e d him i f he e v e r d i s c l o s e d any of t h e s e f a c t s . The t r i a l ended on November 1 4 , 1975. g u i l t y v e r d i c t s on a l l t h r e e c o u n t s . The j u r y r e t u r n e d On November 21, 1975, t h e c o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t Coleman t o 1 0 0 y e a r s on Count I ( d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e ) ; t o d e a t h by hanging on Count I1 ( a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ) ; and t o 4 0 y e a r s on Count I11 ( s e x u a l intercourse without consent i n f l i c t i n g bodily i n j u r y ) . D e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l was d e n i e d . A s t a y of e x e c u t i o n h a s been g r a n t e d pending t h i s a p p e a l . Defendant r a i s e s 4 1 s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r on a p p e a l . W e w i l l d i s c u s s t h e s e a l l e g e d e r r o r s w i t h i n t h e broader c o n t e x t of t h e i s s u e t o which t h e y r e l a t e . W e w i l l r e s t a t e t h e i s s u e s i n t h i s manner: 1. Whether t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , imposed a s d e f e n d a n t ' s s e n t e n c e f o r c o n v i c t i o n on Count I1 i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ? 2. Whether d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d have been s e n t e n c e d f o r 4 0 y e a r s on h i s c o n v i c t i o n under Count I I I ? 3. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s t h e e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d a f t e r h i s a r r e s t s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d ? 4. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n a l o f f e r t o p l e a d g u i l t y s h o u l d have been a c c e p t e d ? 5. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s t h e t h r e e c o u n t s of t h e I n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d and whether t h e I n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d have been amended a f t e r d e f e n d a n t ' s e n t r y of a p l e a ? Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s second j u r y c h a l l e n g e s h o u l d 6. h a v e been s u s t a i n e d ? 7. Whether t h e s c o p e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s was i m p r o p e r l y l i m i t e d ? Whether N a n k ' s competency a s a w i t n e s s s h o u l d h a v e 8. been d e t e r m i n e d p r i o r t o h i s t e s t i m o n y ? 9. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , a t t h e c l o s e of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e , f o r l a c k of c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank's t e s t i m o n y s h o u l d h a v e been g r a n t e d ? 10. Whether some o f t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s w e r e a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y improperly t o t h e p r e j u d i c e of defendant? 11. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e 12. Whether c e r t a i n S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t s w e r e a d m i s s i b l e jury? and w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t ' s e x h i b i t s w e r e p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d ? 13. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d ? I s s u e 1. Defendant argues t h a t h i s d e a t h s e n t e n c e cannot s t a n d because it i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . claims. H e r a i s e s two The f i r s t i s t h a t two j u r o r s were e x c u s e d f o r c a u s e by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t b a s e d on t h e i r v i e w s o f c a p i t a l p u n i s h ment. D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s i s i n v i o l a t i o n of Witherspoon v. I l l i n o i s , 776. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 391 U.S. 510, 88 S . C t . 1 7 7 0 , 2 0 L Ed 2d H i s second c l a i m i s t h a t M o n t a n a ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e , u n d e r which h e was s e n t e n c e d , i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on i t s f a c e . The Witherspoon r u l e i s t h a t a s e n t e n c e of d e a t h c a n n o t b e c a r r i e d o u t i f t h e j u r y t h a t imposed o r recommended i t was c h o s e n by e x c l u d i n g p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s f o r c a u s e s i m p l y because they voiced g e n e r a l o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e death penalty. There i s an exception t o t h e r u l e . It provides t h a t i f a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r i s i r r e v o c a b l y committed t o v o t i n g a g a i n s t c o n v i c t i o n b e c a u s e o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a d e a t h p e n a l t y , h e may be p r o p e r l y excluded f o r c a u s e and a s e n t e n c e of d e a t h carried out. I n t h i s c a s e , d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t Witherspoon makes h i s d e a t h s e n t e n c e i n v a l i d a s two j u r o r s were i m p r o p e r l y excluded. W e disagree. W h o l d t h a t t h e two p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s i n t h i s c a s e e were p r o p e r l y excluded under t h e e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e o f Witherspoon. One j u r o r s t a t e d t h a t no matter how s t r o n g t h e e v i d e n c e of g u i l t was, h e c o u l d n o t v o t e t o c o n v i c t i f a d e a t h p e n a l t y c o u l d b e imposed. The o t h e r j u r o r s t a t e d t h a t she f e l t she could not l i v e with h e r s e l f i f she was o n a j u r y t h a t c o n v i c t e d a p e r s o n and t h a t p e r s o n r e c e i v e d a death sentence a s a r e s u l t . Thus, b o t h of t h e s e j u r o r s were i r r e v o c a b l y committed t o v o t i n g a g a i n s t a c o n v i c t i o n because defendant could r e c e i v e t h e d e a t h penalty. Their b e i n g excused f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e of t h e i r i r r e v o c a b l e commitment a g a i n s t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y d o e s n o t i n v a l i d a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s death sentence. A t t h e t i m e of d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l , t h e death penalty s t a t u t e i n Montana f o r a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g was s e c t i o n 945-304, R.C.M. 1947. I t read: "A c o u r t s h a l l impose t h e s e n t e n c e of d e a t h f o l l o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g i f i t f i n d s t h a t t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t . " Defendant was s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h under t h i s s t a t u t e . T h i s s t a t u t e was r e p e a l e d by t h e 1977 s e s s i o n of t h e state legislature. 1977. S e c t i o n 1 6 , Chapter 338, Laws of Montana The new d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s a r e c o d i f i e d a s s e c - t i o n s 95-2206.6 t o 95-2206.15, R.C.M. 1947. The c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l i t y of Montana's p r e s e n t d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s a r e n o t involved i n t h i s case. S e c t i o n 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947, a s i t e x i s t e d i n 1975, i s a mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e . I n t h e l i g h t of r e c e n t U. S. Supreme C o u r t d e c i s i o n s , t h i s s t a t u t e i s u n c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l on i t s f a c e , and d e f e n d a n t ' s d e a t h s e n t e n c e t h e r e u n d e r cannot stand. I n 1976, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , r u l e d o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s . Woodson v . North C a r o l i n a , U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L ed 2d 944. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 The s t a t u t e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t was North C a r o l i n a ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e . It p r o v i d e d t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e f o r a l l p e r s o n s c o n v i c t e d of f i r s t - d e g r e e murder. I n holding t h i s s t a t u t e unconstitu- t i o n a l , t h e Supreme C o u r t s a i d : " * * * North C a r o l i n a ' s mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e f o r f i r s t - d e g r e e murder d e p a r t s markedly from contemporary s t a n d a r d s r e s p e c t i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e punishment of d e a t h and t h u s c a n n o t be a p p l i e d cons i s t e n t l y w i t h t h e E i g h t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments' r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s power t o p u n i s h ' b e e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n t h e 1 l i m i t s of c i v i l i z e d s t a n d a r d s . ' " Woodson v . North C a r o l i n a , 428 U.S. a t 301, quothng from Trop v . D u l l e s , ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L ed 2d 630. I n two l a t e r c a s e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t a l s o I h e l d mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s u n c o n s t ~ t u t i o n a l . I Coker v . G e o r g i a , (1977), , U.S. 97 b . C t . 2861, 53 I L e d 2d 982; Harry R o b e r t s v . L o u i s i a n a , , 97 S.Ct. 1993, 52 L ed 2d 637. (197l7), U.S. I n Cokex t h e C o u r t h e l d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a Georgia s t a t u t e r e q u i ~ i n gt h e imposit i o n of t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e f o r r a p e , when one^ o r more s p e c i - f i e d a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s were found t o b e p r e s e n t . Harry R o b e r t s t h e C o u r t h e l d unconstitutional^ In a Louisiana s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a d e a t h s l e n t e n c e f o r k i l l i n g a peace o f f i c e r . t h e Court s a i d : Concerning t h e L o u i, s i a n a s t a t u t e , " * * * it i s essential t h a t the c a p i t a l sentencing decision allow f o r consideration o f w h a t e v e r m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s may b e relevant t o e i t h e r the particular offender o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . Because t h e Louisiana s t a t u t e does n o t allow consideration of p a r t i c u l a r i z e d m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s , it i s unconstitutional." Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 U.S. a t 1996. The same p r o b l e m s t h a t e x i s t e d i n t h e s t a t u t e s d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n Woodson, Coker, and H a r r y R o b e r t s a r e p r e s e n t i n t h e s t a t u t e u n d e r which d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d i n 1975. I t i s a mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e . Under t h i s s t a t u t e , i f t h e court finds, a s it did i n t h i s case, t h a t t h e v i c t i m of a n aggravated kidnapping d i e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e c r i m e , t h e c o n v i c t e d d e f e n d a n t must b e s e n t e n c e d t o die. T h e r e i s no p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r any m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . It only allows the court t o determine t h e aggravating circumstance of death. This i s n o t constitutionally permissible. To have a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a l i d d e a t h p e n a l t y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s e s t a b l i s h e d c e r t a i n n e c e s s a r y p r o c e d u r e s . See: 1 5 3 , 96 S . C t . 929. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. 2909, 4 9 L ed 2d 859; P r o f f i t t ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. v . Texas, Gregg v . G e o r g i a , 242, 96 S.Ct. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. v. F l o r i d a , 2960, 49 L e d 2d 913; J u r e k 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L e d 2d None o f t h o s e r e q u i r e d p r o c e d u r e s a r e p r e s e n t i n Montana's d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e a s it e x i s t e d i n 1974, nor w e r e t h e y p r o v i d e d o t h e r w i s e i n t h i s c a s e . Thus, d e f e n d a n t ' s death sentence cannot stand. I s s u e 2. D e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o 40 y e a r s f o r Count 111, s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , injury. i n f l i c t i n g bodily T h i s s e n t e n c e was imposed p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 94-5- 503 ( 3 ) , R.C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s : " I f t h e v i c t i m i s l e s s t h a n 16 y e a r s o l d and t h e o f f e n d e r i s 3 o r more y e a r s o l d e r t h a n t h e v i c t i m o r i f t h e of f e n d e r i n £ l i c t s b o d i l y i n j u r y upon anyone i n t h e c o u r s e of committing sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent, he s h a l l be imprisoned i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any term of n o t l e s s t h a n 2 y e a r s o r more t h a n 4 0 y e a r s , e x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n 95-2206.18." Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o support t h e v e r d i c t t h a t t h e defendant i n f l i c t e d bodily i n j u r y upon Peggy Lee H a r s t a d i n t h e c o u r s e of committing Since t h a t i s so, sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. defendant argues t h a t h i s 4 0 year sentence i s erroneous. We agree. The s t a n d a r d used t o measure j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n s i s w e l l settled i n this state. , Mont. S t a t e v . Pascgo, 566 P.2d 802, 34 St.Rep. 657. (1977), The r u l e i s t h a t q u e s t i o n s of f a c t must be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e j u r y and g i v e n t h e r e q u i r e d l e g a l minimum of e v i d e n c e , t h i s C o u r t on r e v i e w w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e jury. S t a t e v. M e r s e a l , 1364. The e v i d e n c e i s examined t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e r e i s ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 167 Mont. 409, 538 P.2d s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e c o n v i c t i o n when viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e s t a t e . S t a t e v . Pascgo, supra; S t a t e v. Merseal, supra; S t a t e v. Farnes, Mont. , 558 P.2d 472, 33 St.Rep. 1270. (1976), Applying t h e s e s t a n d a r d s h e r e , we f i n d i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o support t h e v e r d i c t t h a t t h e defendant i n f l i c t e d bodily i n j u r y i n t h e c o u r s e of committing s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e . The e v i d e n c e shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d commit s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. a n t did so. Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defend- Negroid p u b i c h a i r s w e r e found i n t h e c a r . However, Nank d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t d e f e n d a n t i n f l i c t e d b o d i l y i n j u r y upon Peggy L e e H a r s t a d w h i l e engaged i n s e x u a l intercourse. The p a t h o l o g i s t , D r . Pfaff, specifically t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e found no e v i d e n c e o f p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t o Peggy L e e H a r s t a d d u r i n g h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e body. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s show t h a t Peggy L e e H a r s t a d was k i l l e d f o l l o w i n g h e r r a p e . his, t h e y s a y , f i t s t h e requirements of s e c t i o n 93-5-503(3), R.C.M. 1947, t h a t b o d i l y i n j u r y was i n f l i c t e d i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e r a p e . W e a r e unconvinced. To s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n f o r s e x u a l intercourse without consent, i n f l i c t i n g bodily i n j u r y , t h e r e must b e a showing o f b o d i l y i n j u r y a s t h a t t e r m i s d e f i n e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l c o d e , s e c t i o n 94-2-101 ( 5 ) , R.C.M. 1947. That s e c t i o n reads: " ' B o d i l y i n j u r y ' means p h y s i c a l p a i n , i l l n e s s , o r any impairment of p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n and i n c l u d e s m e n t a l i l l n e s s o r impairment. " T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e showing t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n f l i c t e d any s u c h i n j u r i e s on Peggy L e e H a r s t a d . Thus, t h e v e r d i c t of t h e jury t h a t defendant i n f l i c t e d bodily i n j u r y i n t h e c o u r s e of committing s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by a n y e v i d e n c e and c a n n o t s t a n d . Defendant s h o u l d p r o p e r l y h a v e b e e n s e n t e n c e d u n d e r s e c t i o n 94-55 0 3 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, f o r c o m m i t t i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. I s s u e 3. P r i o r t o t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t moved t o h a v e suppressed t h e evidence s e i z e d i n Idaho--the motorcycle h e l m e t s and t h e r o p e . H e a r g u e s t h a t h i s a r r e s t w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t was u n l a w f u l b e c a u s e o f a l a c k o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o arrest. H e contends t h a t t h e S t a t e d i d n o t have probable c a u s e t o a r r e s t him u n t i l a f t e r Nank's c o n f e s s i o n s e v e r a l hours a f t e r h i s a r r e s t . H e f u r t h e r c l a i m s t h a t Nank's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s w e r e v i o l a t e d b e c a u s e Nank's c o n f e s s i o n and c o n s e n t t o t h e s e a r c h w e r e i n v o l u n t a r y . t r i c t Court refused t o suppress t h e evidence. The D i s - Defendant m a i n t a i n s t h i s was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r and r a i s e s t h e same arguments on a p p e a l t h a t he d i d i n t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g . W f i n d t h e r e was p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o a r r e s t d e f e n d a n t e w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t . The l e g a l i t y of an a r r e s t i s determined by t h e law of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n where t h e a r r e s t was e f f e c t e d . M i l l e r v . United S t a t e s , 1190, 2 L ed 2d 1332. ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U . S . 301, 78 S.Ct. I n t h i s c a s e , s i n c e t h e a r r e s t took p l a c e i n I d a h o , I d a h o law must b e a p p l i e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e a r r e s t . D e t e c t i v e Brake a r r e s t e d d e f e n d a n t and Nank i n B o i s e w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t f o r a d e l i b e r a t e homicide i n Montana. 603(3), I.C., I d a h o ' s g e n e r a l a r r e s t s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 19provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "A p e a c e o f f i c e r may make a n a r r e s t i n o b e d i e n c e t o a w a r r a n t d e l i v e r e d t o him, o r may, w i t h o u t a warrant, a r r e s t a person: " 3 . When a f e l o n y h a s i n f a c t been committed and h e h a s r e a s o n a b l e c a u s e f o r b e l i e v i n g t h e p e r s o n a r r e s t e d t o have committed i t . " A e x a m i n a t i o n of Idaho law d i s c l o s e s no c a s e d e t e r m i n i n g n whether a p e a c e o f f i c e r may a r r e s t a p e r s o n i n Idaho f o r a c r i m e committed e l s e w h e r e , w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t , by t h e a u t h o r i t y g i v e n him i n t h i s s t a t u t e . I d a h o , l i k e Montana, h a s a d o p t e d t h e Uniform C r i m i n a l E x t r a d i t i o n Act. There i s a p r o v i s i o n i n t h a t a c t f o r a r r e s t s w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t of f u g i t i v e s from a n o t h e r s t a t e , which d e f e n d a n t and Nank a r e . 4514, I . C . , T h i s p r o v i s i o n i s s e c t i o n 19- which r e a d s a s f o l l o w s : " A r r e s t w i t h o u t a warrant.--The a r r e s t of a p e r s o n may be l a w f u l l y made a l s o by a n o f f i c e r o r a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t upon r e a s o n a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e a c c u s e d s t a n d s charged w i t h a c r i m e punisha b l e by d e a t h o r imprisonment f o r a term e x c e e d i n g o n e (1) y e a r i n t h e c o u r t s of a n o t h e r s t a t e ; b u t when s o a r r e s t e d t h e accused must b e t a k e n b e f o r e a judge o r m a g i s t r a t e w i t h a l l p r a c t i c a b l e speed and c o m p l a i n t must be made a g a i n s t him under o a t h s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e ground f o r t h e a r r e s t a s i n t h e l a s t s e c t i o n ; and t h e r e a f t e r h i s answer s h a l l b e h e a r d a s i f h e had been a r r e s t e d on a w a r r a n t . " The c o u r t s i n I d a h o have n o t had o c c a s i o n t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s statute. Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have h e l d t h a t t h i s p r o v i s i o n of t h e Uniform C r i m i n a l E x t r a d i t i o n Act i m p l i e s t h e n e c e s s i t y of some p r i o r c o u r t a c t i o n i n t h e s t a t e where t h e c r i m e w a s committed, b u t t h e a c t i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o r e p u d i a t e t h e common law r u l e t h a t a n a r r e s t may b e made on p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o b e l i e v e t h e a r r e s t e d p e r s o n had committed a c r i m e i n a n o t h e r s t a t e i r r e s p e c t i v e of l a c k of c o m p l a i n t o r w a r r a n t in that state. D e s j a r l a i s v. S t a t e , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 73 Wis.2d 480, " I n some j u r i s d i c t i o n s a n o f f i c e r h a s no a u t h o r i t y t o a r r e s t w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t a f u g i t i v e from j u s t i c e from a n o t h e r s t a t e , even on t e l e g r a p h i c o r p e r s o n a l r e q u e s t of t h e o f f i c e r s of t h e demanding s t a t e . I n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s a n a r r e s t may b e made by a n o f f i c e r w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t , a t l e a s t under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s where t h e f u g i t i v e h a s 35 C.J.S. E x t r a d i t i o n , committed a f e l o n y * * * 512 ( b ) ." . These a r e m a t t e r s l e f t wholly t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s . Burton v . New York Cent. R.R. S.Ct. 108, 62 L.Ed. 314. Co., ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 245 U.S. 315, 38 Thus, t h e i n q u i r y must b e whether o r n o t I d a h o r e c o g n i z e s t h e common law r u l e . I n o u r view Idaho law r e c o g n i z e s t h e common law r u l e t h a t a n a r r e s t may b e made w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t where t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r has probable cause t o b e l i e v e t h e person a r r e s t e d had committed a c r i m e i n a n o t h e r s t a t e . Defendant's a r r e s t was l e g a l i n t h i s c a s e a s D e t e c t i v e Brake had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o b e l i e v e d e f e n d a n t had committed a f e l o n y i n Montana. Under Idaho law, p r o b a b l e c a u s e e x i s t s where t h e r e i s s u c h a s t a t e of f a c t s a s would l e a d a man of o r d i n a r y c a r e and prudence t o b e l i e v e o r e n t e r t a i n a n h o n e s t and s t r o n g s u s p i c i o n t h a t such p e r s o n h a s committed a c r i m e . Polson, State v. ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 8 1 I d a . 147, 339 P.2d 510; S t a t e v . Loyd, ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 92 I d a . 20, 435 P.2d 797. Here, D e t e c t i v e Brake knew Peggy Lee H a r s t a d had d i s a p p e a r e d on t h e n i g h t of J u l y 4 , 1974. H e knew d e f e n d a n t and Nank had been s e e n t o g e t h e r i n t h e a r e a of h e r d i s a p p e a r a n c e on t h a t n i g h t . He knew t h e i r f i n g e r p r i n t s had been i d e n t i f i e d on h e r c a r and p u r s e . H e knew Negroid head h a i r s and p u b i c h a i r s were found i n h e r c a r and t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a Negro. This c o n s t i t u t e d probable c a u s e t o a r r e s t them. Next w e must l o o k t o see i f t h e s e a r c h of t h e a p a r t m e n t and c a r , where t h e h e l m e t s and r o p e w e r e r e c o v e r e d , was lawful. W e n o t e t h a t t h i s s e a r c h was n o t t h e p r o d u c t of d e f e n d a n t ' s and Nank's a r r e s t . consent t o t h e search. I t was based on Nank's Defendant q u e s t i o n s whether Nank's c o n s e n t was f r e e l y g i v e n . However, d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t a s s e r t any v i o l a t i o n s of Nank's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . The r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t a d e f e n d a n t d o e s n o t have s t a n d i n g t o c h a l l e n g e v i o l a t i o n s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of a c o - d e f e n d a n t o r t h i r d p a r t y by law enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s . S t a t e v . Braden, ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. 1 2 4 , 515 P.2d 692. r u l e i s based on Alderman v . United S t a t e s , 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L e d 2d 176. his ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 394 U.S. T h e r e f o r e , we h o l d d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t c l a i m any v i o l a t i o n of Nank's F o u r t h mendment r i g h t s and h i s c o n s e n t t o t h e s e a r c h made i t a l a w f u l search. There was no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s . I s s u e 4. Defendant c l a i m s t h e S t a t e r e f u s e d t o p l e a b a r g a i n w i t h him o r t o a c c e p t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a of g u i l t y b e c a u s e he i s a b l a c k man. H e c l a i m s i t was b e c a u s e of h i s r a c e t h a t t h e S t a t e i n s i s t e d upon having a f u l l t r i a l i n t h i s c a s e , where, upon c o n v i c t i o n , a d e a t h s e n t e n c e c o u l d be imposed. He a r g u e s i t i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r t h e S t a t e n o t t o p l e a bargain o r t o accept h i s o f f e r t o plead g u i l t y . How t h i s would be s o , d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t made c l e a r t o u s . W r e c o g n i z e t h a t a d e f e n d a n t may p l e a d g u i l t y w h i l e e maintaining h i s innocence, e s p e c i a l l y t o avoid a d e a t h sentence. S.Ct. Brady v . United S t a t e s , ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 U.S. 742, 90 1463, 25 L e d 2d 747; North C a r o l i n a v . A l f o r d , 400 U.S. 25, 9 1 S.Ct. 1 6 0 , 27 L ed 2d 162. (1970), However, t h e s e c a s e s d e a l w i t h a t t e m p t s t o withdraw a g u i l t y p l e a a f t e r i t h a s been e n t e r e d and d e a l w i t h t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a of g u i l t y . These c a s e s do n o t r e q u i r e t h e t r i a l court o r t h e prosecution t o accept a g u i l t y plea. The acceptance of a g u i l t y p l e a t o a charged o f f e n s e i s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . A c c o r d i n g l y , w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e S t a t e ' s r e f u s a l t o plea bargain with defendant o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r e f u s a l t o a c c e p t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a of g u i l t y w h i l e maintaining h i s innocence. I s s u e 5. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying h i s motion t o d i s m i s s t h e I n f o r m a t i o n f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e an offense. argument i s t h a t s e c t i o n 95-1503, R.C.M. His 1947, r e l a t i n g t o t h e form of a c h a r g e , r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e c h a r g e t o be i n o r d i n a r y and c o n c i s e l a n g u a g e , and i n such a manner t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t would know what was i n t e n d e d . H e alleges that the I n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e d i d n o t meet t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t . Defendant p r e m i s e s h i s argument on t h e S t a t e ' s a t t e m p t t o amend t h e I n f o r m a t i o n a f t e r e n t r y of d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a . He a l l e g e s t h a t t h e S t a t e , i n a t t e m p t i n g t o amend t h e ~ n f o r m a t i o n . a d m i t t e d t h e I n f o r m a t i o n was d e f e c t i v e . The t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d t o a l l o w t h e I n f o r m a t i o n t o b e amended. However, t h e c o u r t i t s e l f amended Count 11, t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e , t o add t h e words: " r e s u l t i n g i n t h e d e a t h of Peggy Lee H a r s t a d . " W e f a i l t o s e e how t h e S t a t e ' s a t t e m p t t o amend t h e Information a i d s t h e defendant i n claiming t h e Information i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t . The S t a t e by amending t h e I n f o r m a t i o n was They w e r e n o t t r y i n g t o make i t a b e t t e r I n f o r m a t i o n . c l a i m i n g i t was i n s u f f i c i e n t a s i t e x i s t e d . An I n f o r m a t i o n need o n l y b e s u f f i c i e n t t o a p p r i s e t h e a c c u s e d of t h e n a t u r e of t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . I t need n o t be p e r f e c t . "It i s frequently stated, a s a general rule, e i t h e r w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o s t a t u t o r y misdemeanors, o r t o s t a t u t o r y offenses generally, t h a t a charge i s s u f f i c i e n t which f o l l o w s t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e c r e a t i n g t h e o f f e n s e ; and i t h a s been h e l d t h a t , i f a c c u s e d i n s i s t s on g r e a t e r p a r t i c u l a r i t y , i t i s incumbent on him t o show t h a t from t h e o b v i o u s i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o r known p r i n c i p l e s of law t h e p a r t i c u l a r c a s e forms a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e . " 4 2 C.J.S. I n d i c t m e n t s and I n f o r m a t i o n s , § 1 3 9 ( c ) . Montana f o l l o w s t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e . An I n f o r m a t i o n t h a t p r o p e r l y c h a r g e s a n o f f e n s e i n t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e describing the offense i s sufficient. S t a t e v. R a n d a l l , ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054; S t a t e v. Shannon, ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 95 Mont. 280, 26 P.2d 380; S t a t e v . Haley, 132 Mont. 366, 318 P.2d 1084; S t a t e v . Duncan, (1957), ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 130 Mont. 562, 305 P.2d 761; S t a t e e x r e l . G l a n t z v. D i s t r i c t Court, ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 154 Mont. 1 3 2 , 461 P.2d 193. W e h o l d t h a t t h e I n f o r m a t i o n f i l e d i n t h i s c a s e was sufficient. Each c o u n t f o l l o w e d t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e s f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 94-5-102, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , s e c t i o n 94-5-303, R.C.M. R.C.M. 1947, 1947, and s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , s e c t i o n 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947. A s f o r t h e amendment by t h e c o u r t t o Count 11, c o n t r a r y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s contention, w e f i n d t h a t it w a s a proper amendment. S e c t i o n 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947, a s i t e x i s t e d i n 1975, a l l o w e d a n I n f o r m a t i o n t o b e amended a s t o form a f t e r e n t r y of p l e a b u t n o t a s t o substance. Defendant argues t h a t t h e amendment t o Count I1 was o n e o f s u b s t a n c e . He c l a i m s t h a t p r i o r t o t h i s amendment, h e was n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e death penalty. W e disagree. W e r e c o g n i z e t h a t any amendment t o a n I n f o r m a t i o n which charges a crime d i f f e r e n t i n penalty i s a m a t t e r of substance and i m p e r m i s s i b l e . 254 P . 22. S t a t e v. Fisher, 872; S t a t e v . K n i g h t , Here, ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 79 Mont. 46, ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 3 Mont. 27, 387 P.2d however, t h e amendment was o n e of form. Defendant knew from t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was g o i n g t o be sought. P r i o r t o t h e amendment t o Count 11, t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , upon a c o n v i c t i o n , c o u l d have b e e n s o u g h t u n d e r e i t h e r Count I o r Count 11. t o Count 11. The amendment s i m p l y l i m i t e d i t Furthermore, t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t defendant was n o t s u r p r i s e d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was b e i n g s o u g h t . He o b j e c t e d t o t h e amendment i n t h e l o w e r c o u r t , b u t h e d i d n o t a s k f o r any continuance a s a r e s u l t of it. H e c l e a r l y knew p r i o r t o t h e amendment t h a t t h e S t a t e was s e e k i n g t h e d e a t h penalty. I n a n y e v e n t , no l e g a l p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t e d from t h e amendment o f Count I1 i n t h e l i g h t o f o u r h o l d i n g t h a t M o n t a n a ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e a s i t e x i s t e d i n 1975 i s unconstitutional. I s s u e 6. On O c t o b e r 20, 1975, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a c h a l - l e n g e t o t h e j u r y p a n e l c l a i m i n g t h a t i t was n o t drawn and summoned i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n s t a t u t e s . The c h a l l e n g e was made i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h s e c t i o n 95-1908, R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s how a j u r y c h a l l e n g e i s t o b e made. A f t e r a f u l l h e a r i n g on t h e c h a l l e n g e , t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court dismissed t h e jury panel. The c o u r t t h e n o r d e r e d a new p a n e l of 60 j u r o r s be drawn and summoned t o a p p e a r f o r t r i a l on October 23, 1975. Defendant r a i s e d a second j u r y c h a l l e n g e t o t h i s p a n e l . He a g a i n a r g u e d t h a t t h e p a n e l was n o t drawn and summoned i n accordance with t h e s t a t u t e s . lenge. The c o u r t d e n i e d t h e c h a l - Defendant, on a p p e a l , c l a i m s h i s second j u r y c h a l - l e n g e s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d . W e disagree. B a s i c a l l y , d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s t h r e e arguments c o n c e r n i n g why t h e j u r y p a n e l t h a t t r i e d him was i m p r o p e r l y drawn and summoned. F i r s t , h e s a y s t h a t t h e r e w e r e more numbers i n t h e j u r y box t h a n names on t h e j u r y l i s t . numbers i n t h e box and 44,765 on t h e l i s t . There w e r e 55,763 When a number was drawn h i g h e r t h a n 44,765, i t w a s r e t u r n e d t o t h e box. Defendant c l a i m s t h a t h a v i n g more numbers i n t h e j u r y box t h a n names o n t h e j u r y l i s t f a i l s t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y comply w i t h t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n s t a t u t e s and c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e error. S e c t i o n 93-1402, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t e a c h name on t h e j u r y l i s t be a s s i g n e d a number. R.C.M. S e c t i o n 93-1404, 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e numbers b e p l a c e d i n t h e j u r y box i n s u c h a manner t h a t t h e y c a n n o t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from each o t h e r . N e i t h e r of t h e s e s t a t u t e s r e q u i r e t h a t t h e r e be o n l y a s many numbers i n t h e j u r y box a s names on t h e j u r y l i s t e x c e p t t h e r e c a n o n l y b e one number f o r e a c h j u r o r . Defendant makes no a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e r e was more t h a n o n e number f o r e a c h j u r o r . T h e r e f o r e , w e h o l d t h a t h a v i n g more numbers i n t h e j u r y box t h a n names on t h e j u r y l i s t d o e s n o t d e s t r o y t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e p a n e l drawn. The p u r p o s e of t h e s e s t a t u t e s i s t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e r e b e no u n f a i r n e s s i n t h e s e l e c t i o n of t h e j u r y . D i s t r i c t Court, S t a t e e x r e l . ~ e n n i n g s e nv . ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 136 Mont. 354, 348 ~ . 2 d 143; I n r e J u r y Box C a p s u l e s , ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 1 5 0 Mont. 583, 447 P.2d 687. We f i n d no u n f a i r n e s s h e r e i n t h e d r a w i n g o f t h e j u r y p a n e l . Second, d e f e n d a n t c o m p l a i n s t h a t t h e 200 j u r o r s drawn were n o t i f i e d by t e l e p h o n e by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c l e r k t o see i f t h e y would b e a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e t r i a l on O c t o b e r 23, 1975. S i x t y - o n e o f t h o s e c a l l e d r e p l i e d t h e y would b e available. Defendant c l a i m s t h a t , i n e f f e c t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c l e r k e x c u s e d 139 j u r o r s , and t h a t , u n d e r t h e law, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c l e r k may n o t e x c u s e j u r o r s from j u r y d u t y . F u r t h e r , d e f e n d a n t c l a i m s t h a t t h e j u r o r s were a l l o w e d t o excuse themselves f o r s l i g h t o r t r i v i a l cause i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e o n b e i n g e x c u s e d from j u r y d u t y . S e c t i o n 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, a u t h o r i z e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e t o draw and summon a d d i t i o n a l j u r o r s f o r a t r i a l when i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o d o s o . This s e c t i o n f u r t h e r provides t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l j u r o r s may b e n o t i f i e d by t e l e p h o n e by t h e c l e r k of court. I n t h i s case, a f t e r dismissing t h e f i r s t j u r y p a n e l , a d d i t i o n a l j u r o r s w e r e needed. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e drew 200 numbers o u t o f t h e j u r y box t o g e t a 60 member j u r y p a n e l . the jurors. H e authorized the c l e r k t o o r a l l y notify The c l e r k , a s s e c t i o n 93-1512, R.C.M. a u t h o r i z e s , n o t i f i e d t h e j u r o r s by t e l e p h o n e . 1947, Thus, d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m t h a t n o t i f y i n g t h e j u r o r s by t e l e p h o n e was i m p r o p e r i s without m e r i t . S e c t i o n 93-1305, R.C.M. 1947, d o e s d e a l w i t h t h e g r o u n d s f o r b e i n g e x c u s e d from j u r y d u t y . It provides t h a t a juror may n o t b e e x c u s e d f o r s l i g h t o r t r i v i a l c a u s e . On t h e r e c o r d t h a t i s b e f o r e u s , t h e r e i s no showing t h a t t h e c l e r k excused any of t h e j u r o r s c a l l e d . W e note t h a t the d i s t r i c t j u d g e had o r d e r e d t h e c l e r k t o h a v e a p a n e l o f 60 j u r o r s f o r t h e t r i a l o n O c t o b e r 23, 1975, which h e d i d . Further, the r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e o f a j u r o r t o a p p e a r , i f properly n o t i f i e d , w i l l n o t i n v a l i d a t e a subsequent t r i a l , a s a defendant has no r i g h t t o select a p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r , b u t has only a r i g h t t o r e j e c t a juror. (196311 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777. S t a t e v . Moran, Applying t h a t r u l e t o t h i s case, w e hold t h a t defendant's t r i a l should n o t be i n v a l i d a t e d b e c a u s e 60 o u t o f 200 j u r o r s a p p e a r e d which was t h e s i z e o f t h e p a n e l o r d e r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . F i n a l l y , defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e speed used i n s e l e c t i n g t h e j u r y d e n i e d him h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury panel. H e argues t h a t t h e jury panel d i d n o t r e p r e s e n t a c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f t h e community a s most o f t h e j u r o r s came from t h e w e s t s i d e o f B i l l i n g s , Montana. The r u l e i s t h a t a d e f e n d a n t h a s a r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y s e l e c t e d from t h e p r o p e r p l a c e and drawn and summoned a c c o r d i n g t o law. The s y s t e m a t i c and i n t e n t i o n a l e x c l u s i o n o f a c l a s s o f p e r s o n s o r a p u r p o s e f u l and d e l i b e r a t e d e s i g n t o s e c u r e t h e j u r y from a l i m i t e d a r e a i n s t e a d o f t h e e n t i r e county d e p r i v e s a defendant of fundamental c o n s t i t u tional rights. P.2d 232. S t a t e v . Hay, ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 120 Mont. 573, 194 I n - t h i s C o u r t found t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d Hay t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t h e had b e e n d e p r i v e d o f h i s r i g h t t o have a j u r y t a k e n from a c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f t h e c o u n t y by showing t h a t a l l members o f t h e j u r y p a n e l w e r e r e s i d e n t s o f t h e c o u n t y s e a t , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a showing t h a t i t was t h e r e s u l t of d e l i b e r a t e design. I n t h i s case, t h e r e was no showing o f d e l i b e r a t e d e s i g n t o g e t a j u r y p a n e l from o n l y t h e w e s t s i d e of B i l l i n g s . W e h o l d t h a t t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d i n s u b s t a n t i a l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e law and t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m t h a t h e was d e n i e d a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y must f a i l . Issue 7. Defendant claims error in improperly restrict- ing his cross-examination of some of the State's witnesses. At the time of trial section 93-1901-7, R.C.M. 1947, governed the scope of permissible cross-examination. In substance it permits cross-examination as to any testimony elicited on direct examination or facts connected therewith and all other facts connected with the witness's testimony which tends to enlighten the jury on the question in controversy. State Highway Commission v. Bennett, (1973), 162 Mont. 386, 513 P.2d 5. We have examined the District Court's rulings concerning cross-examination of State's witnesses Ash, Schiffer and Nank, and find no error. The questions asked were either argumentative, immaterial or otherwise answered. Defendant also claims error in connection with his attempted cross-examination of State's expert witness Hippard from the F.B.I. laboratory concerning identification of the hairs taken from the Harstad vehicle and comparison of these hairs with defendant Coleman's hair. The District Court properly disallowed cross-examination of Hippard concerning his ability to identify hair from pictures as the witness testified that he could not look at a picture of a hair and identify it. Hippard testified on direct examination that the only way of identifying and comparing hair was by a comparison microscope which was the method he used. Although defendant offered to submit hair samples to Hippard, he did not specifically state how this would be done or offer to furnish a comparison microscope. The District Court did tell defendant to proceed with his cross-examination and that they were then through with the witness unless defendant himself c a l l e d him on d i r e c t , which d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t do. The m a t t e r of p e r m i t t i n g e x p e r i m e n t s , t e s t s , and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s i s o n e a d d r e s s e d t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . S t a t e v . London, ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 4 1 0 , 310 P.2d 571; S t a t e v . ~ e l l e r , ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 126 Mont. 142, 246 P.2d 817; S t a t e v . ~ h o m p s o n , ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 415, 524 P.2d 1115. W e f i n d no a b u s e of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n h e r e under t h e o f f e r of t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g s . I s s u e 8. Defendant a s s i g n s e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s c h a l l e n g e t o Nank's m e n t a l competency a s a w i t n e s s . A Montana s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s t h a t t h o s e of unsound mind c a n n o t be w i t n e s s e s . S e c t i o n 93-701-3(1), R.C.M. 1947. It i s t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge t o d e t e r m i n e t h e competency of a w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y . 180, 213 P . 805. S t a t e v . Newman, There i s no presumption ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66 Mont. A t h a t a witness i s i n c o m p e t e n t and t h e burden i s on t h e p a r t y a s s e r t i n g t h e incompetency t o p r o v e i t . S t a t e v . Newman, s u p r a . This d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t do. F u r t h e r m o r e , i f a w i t n e s s i s s u f f i c i e n t l y competent t o u n d e r s t a n d and a p p r e c i a t e t h e n a t u r e and o b l i g a t i o n of a n o a t h and c a n c o r r e c t l y n a r r a t e t h e f a c t s i n v o l v e d i n t h e c a s e , h e may t e s t i f y and t h e s t a t e of h i s m e n t a l i t y g o e s o n l y t o t h e w e i g h t o f h i s t e s t i m o n y and n o t t o i t s admissibility. M a r t i n v . Hover, ( 1 9 2 1 ) , 60 Mont. 302, 199 P. 694. W f i n d no e r r o r by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h i s i s s u e . e I s s u e 9. A t t h e c l o s e of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e , d e f e n d a n t moved t o d i s m i s s t h e I n f o r m a t i o n , o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r a judgment o f a c q u i t t a l f o r l a c k of c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank's t e s t i m o n y . C o r r o b o r a t i o n of t h e t e s t i m o n y of one r e s p o n s i b l e o r l e g a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r t h e same o f f e n s e i s necessary t o s u s t a i n a conviction. 1947. S e c t i o n 95-3012, R.C.M. his s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s c o r r o b o r a t i o n by e v i d e n c e which t e n d s t o c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e , w i t h o u t t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e p e r s o n l e g a l l y accountable o r responsible. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e w a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank's t e s t i m o n y t o s u s t a i n defendant's conviction. W e disagree. The r u l e on c o r r o b o r a t i o n i s s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Cobb, ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76 Mont. 89, 245 P. 265. In t h a t case, w e held t h a t t h e c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e may b e s u p p l i e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t o r h i s w i t n e s s e s ; i t may be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ; i t need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a conviction o r e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e of g u i l t ; and i t need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e c r i m e b u t must t e n d t o c o n n e c t him w i t h t h e c r i m e . I n S t a t e v . Keckonen, ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 107 Mont. 253, 84 P.2d 341, w e h e l d t h a t where t h e a l l e g e d c o r r o b a t i v e evidence i s e q u a l l y consonant with a reasonable explanation p o i n t i n g toward i n n o c e n t c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t of d e f e n d a n t , t h e n s u c h e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t t e n d t o c o n n e c t him w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e and i s i n t h e r e a l m of s p e c u l a t i o n , not corroboration. Where t h e claimed c o r r o b o r a t i o n shows no more t h a n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o commit a c r i m e and s i m p l y proves suspicion, it i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t corroboration t o j u s t i f y a c o n v i c t i o n upon t h e t e s t i m o n y of an accomplice. S t a t e v. Jones, ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 95 Mont. 317, 26 ~ . 2 d 341. Applying t h o s e r u l e s t o t h i s c a s e , w e h o l d t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank's t e s t i m o n y t o s u s t a i n defendant's conviction. The c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e i s : he c r a c k i n d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t o r c y c l e h e l m e t ; a h a i r of Peggy ~ e e H a r s t a d b e i n g on t h e r o p e b e l o n g i n g t o t h e s e men; t h e f i n g e r - p r i n t s on h e r c a r and i n h e r p u r s e ; t h e Negroid p u b i c h a i r s s i m i l a r t o d e f e n d a n t ' s and t h e Negroid head h a i r found i n h e r c a r ; and, t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t d e f e n d a n t and Nank were s e e n t o g e t h e r on t h e same r o a d and a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same t i m e t h a t ' Peggy L e e H a r s t a d d i s a p p e a r e d . This evidence tends t o c o n n e c t d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e s charged. I t i s e v i d e n c e of more t h a n mere o p p o r t u n i t y o r s u s p i c i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t committed t h e s e o f f e n s e s . This e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t e s t a b l i s h any r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n p o i n t i n g toward i n n o c e n t c o n d u c t . W f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f d e f e n d a n t ' s motion. Issue 10. On a p p e a l , a s a t t h e t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s o b j e c t i o n s t o c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n s and answers e l i c i t e d from t h e S t a t e ' s witnesses. H e argues t h a t t h e s e a r e cumulative errors requiring reversal. W e do n o t a g r e e . H i s f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s t o Nank's b e i n g a l l o w e d , on d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n , t o t e s t i f y t h a t he had t o l d t h e same s t o r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e c r i m e t o t h e p o l i c e and t h e F.B.I. prior t o the t r i a l . Defendant c l a i m s t h a t t h i s t e s t i m o n y was used t o b u t t r e s s and f o r t i f y Nank's t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e h i s testimony w a s challenged. B a s i c a l l y , t h e q u e s t i o n s t o Nank w e r e t o f i n d o u t i f Nank was t e s t i f y i n g t o t h e t r u t h . This Court has held i n t h e p a s t t h a t t h e S t a t e may a s k s u c h q u e s t i o n s on d i r e c t examination. P.2d 584. S t a t e v. C o l l e t t , ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 118 Mont. 473, 167 I n C o l l e t t , t h i s Court s a i d t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t commit p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r i n a l l o w i n g t h e w i t n e s s t o answer a q u e s t i o n a s t o whether h e was t e s t i f y i n g t o t h e truth. The r a t i o n a l e i s t h a t w h i l e t h e answer i s i n t h e n a t u r e of a s e l f - s e r v i n g d e c l a r a t i o n , i t i s o n l y a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of what t h e w i t n e s s promises t o d o when h e t a k e s t h e oath. W b e l i e v e t h i s approach i s sound and w i l l f o l l o w it e here. W h o l d t h e q u e s t i o n s and answers a s t o Nank's p r i o r e statements do n o t c o n s t i t u t e p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . Defendant t h e n o b j e c t s t o a n F.B.I. agent being allowed t o t e s t i f y about defendant's a t t i t u d e i n h i s interview with d e f e n d a n t a t S h e r i d a n , Wyoming. Specifically, the agent t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was e v a s i v e d u r i n g q u e s t i o n i n g . W e a g r e e t h a t t h i s was improper o p i n i o n e v i d e n c e . However, t e c h n i c a l e r r o r s o r d e f e c t s w i l l n o t p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r reversal i n a criminal prosecution. Gallagher, S t a t e v. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 501, 4 4 5 P.2d 4 5 . W hold t h a t e t h e a d m i s s i o n of t h i s t e s t i m o n y was o n l y a t e c h n i c a l e r r o r and i s n o t a b a s i s f o r r e v e r s a l . Next, d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t a F . B . I . fingerprint e x p e r t was a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y on r e - d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n beyond t h e s c o p e of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . The q u e s t i o n s t o which t h e d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t e d concerned t h e d a t e on which t h e F.B.I. laboratory received c e r t a i n f i n g e r p r i n t cards. The r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h e r e was some c o n f u s i o n a s t o t h e d a t e s v a r i o u s f i n g e r p r i n t c a r d s were r e c e i v e d . Under t h o s e circum- s t a n c e s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n a l l o w i n g t h e S t a t e t o c l a r i f y t h e i s s u e on r e - d i r e c t . F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o w i t n e s s Makin t e s t i f y i n g a s t o where h e was t o l d c e r t a i n h a i r s came from. c l a i m s t h i s was h e a r s a y . Defendant An e a r l i e r w i t n e s s , Ash, who was t h e d e c l a r a n t , t e s t i f i e d as t o where h e found t h e h a i r s . Here, u n d e r s h e r i f f Makin was t e s t i f y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e chain of evidence. He had r e c e i v e d t h e h a i r s from O f f i c e r Ash, who t o l d Makin he o b t a i n e d t h e h a i r s from t h e abandoned H a r s t a d v e h i c l e . Thus, t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of ~ s was h a p a r t of t h e c h a i n of e v i d e n c e . W f i n d no c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r i n t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e e S t a t e ' s witnesses s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant reversal. I s s u e 11. Defendant o b j e c t s t o c e r t a i n i n s t r u c t i o n s which were g i v e n t o t h e j u r y and o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t were r e f u s e d . W e f i n d t h e j u r y was p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d . D e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s t o I n s t r u c t i o n 22. This i n s t r u c t i o n was t h a t i f t h e j u r y found d e f e n d a n t committed a homicide and no c i r c u m s t a n c e s of m i t i g a t i o n , e x c u s e o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n a p p e a r s , t h e y may i n f e r t h a t t h e homicide was committed knowingly and p u r p o s e l y . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n was b a s e d on s e c t i o n 9 5 - 3 0 0 4 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. follows the s t a t u t e . The i n s t r u c t i o n Defendant a r g u e s t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n a s a s t a t u t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , c i t i n g Leary v . United S t a t e s , 57. ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L e d 2d T h i s c a s e p r o v i d e s t h a t t o have a v a l i d c r i m i n a l s t a t u - t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n , t h e presumed f a c t must more l i k e l y t h a n n o t f l o w from t h e proved f a c t on which i t depends. W e f i n d t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n and s t a t u t e a r e c o n s t i t u - tionally valid. The j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e y "may" f i n d knowledge o r p u r p o s e when t h e r e a r e no c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f m i t i g a t i o n , excuse, o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . t o find this. They a r e n o t r e q u i r e d Thus, i t i s n o t a c o n c l u s i v e p r e s u m p t i o n . The i n s t r u c t i o n and s t a t u t e d o n o t v i o l a t e t h e Leary r e q u i r e ment b e c a u s e a f i n d i n g o f knowledge o r p u r p o s e would more l i k e l y t h a n n o t f l o w from t h e proved f a c t t h a t a homicide was committed by d e f e n d a n t and where t h e r e w e r e no circums t a n c e s of m i t i g a t i o n , j u s t i f i c a t i o n , o r excuse. D e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o I n s t r u c t i o n 26, which g a v e t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of "knowingly", and f u r t h e r o b j e c t s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 1 6 , which d e a l t w i t h c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and p r e m e d i t a t i o n , was n o t g i v e n . I n s t r u c t i o n 26 was t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f "knowingly" a s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 94-2-101(28), R.C.M. 1947. The p o r t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e and i n s t r u c t i o n d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o i s : "When knowledge of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i s a n e l e m e n t of a n o f f e n s e , s u c h knowledge i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a p e r s o n i s aware of a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s e x i s t e n c e . " Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n d o e s n o t comply w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l T h a t i s why, a c c o r d i n g t o r e q u i r e m e n t s of c r i m i n a l i n t e n t . d e f e n d a n t , h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 16 s h o u l d have been g i v e n a s i t e x p l a i n e d t h e c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and p r e m e d i t a t i o n necess a r y f o r a c o n v i c t i o n of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. W b e l i e v e t h e r e was no e r r o r i n t h e c o u r t ' s g i v i n g of e I n s t r u c t i o n 26 and r e f u s i n g t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n 16. W have c o n s i d e r e d t h e n e c e s s i t y of i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y e on c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and p r e m e d i t a t i o n b e f o r e . Sharbono, 196. (1977), Mont. , S t a t e v. 563 P.2d 61, 34 St.Rep. I n t h a t c a s e , we found no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s refusal t o give an instruction identical t o defendant's o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 16. There, w e held t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had changed t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f mens r e a . T h i s C o u r t s a i d , i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of c r i m i n a l i n t e n t : "Upon t h e whole i t i s t h e p e r s o n who means t o do t h e t h i n g t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a c r i m e , knows h e i s d o i n g i t , and knows t h a t t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l and u n j u s t i f i a b l e r i s k i n d o i n g i t , whose c o n d u c t w a r r a n t s condemnation of t h e k i n d from which c o n v i c t i o n r e s u l t s . " Sharbono, 563 P.2d a t 72. Therefore, w e f i n d t h e c o u r t properly i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury a s t o t h e "knowledge" r e q u i r e d f o r a c o n v i c t i o n i n I n s t r u c t i o n 26 and p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d d e f e n d a n t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n 16. Defendant o b j e c t s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 10 w a s n o t given. T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n d e a l s w i t h t h e burden of p r o o f . I t comes from S t a t e v . Halk, ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 49 Mont. 173, 1 4 1 P. The C o u r t a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e burden of proof i n I n s t r u c t i o n 4 . Thus, t h e r e i s no e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 10. Next d e f e n d a n t complains t h a t h i s proposed I n s t r u c t i o n 1 4 on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t was n o t g i v e n . W believe the court e r i g h t f u l l y refused t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s i n c e t h e jury w a s a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t i n t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n s 5, 6 , 7 , and 10. D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n would have o n l y been r e d u n d a n t , and, t h e r e f o r e , was u n n e c e s s a r y . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 34 s h o u l d have been g i v e n . This i n s t r u c t i o n d e a l t with t h e n o t having t o d e c i d e i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e g r e a t e r number of w i t n e s s e s i f t h e i r t e s t i m o n y d o e s n o t produce conviction i n t h e i r minds. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t w i t h t h e number of w i t n e s s e s t h e S t a t e produced, h e was e n t i t l e d t o t h i s instruction. W e disagree. W e must p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n d e f e n d a n t proposed was a d e q u a t e l y c o v e r e d i n t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n 2 . This i n s t r u c t i o n read i n part: "You a r e n o t bound t o d e c i d e i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e d e c l a r a t i o n s of any number of w i t n e s s e s , n o t p r o d u c i n g c o n v i c t i o n i n your minds, a g a i n s t a l e s s number o r a g a i n s t a presumption o r o t h e r e v i d e n c e s a t i s f y i n g your minds. The d i r e c t e v i d e n c e of o n e w i t n e s s who i s e n t i t l e d t o f u l l c r e d i t i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e proof of any f a c t i n t h i s case." T h i s i s a s t a n d a r d Montana J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n Guide i n s t r u c t i o n which c o r r e c t l y s t a t e s t h e law. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was c o r r e c t i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 34 c o v e r i n g t h e same s u b j e c t . Next, d e f e n d a n t a l l e g e s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 35A s h o u l d have been g i v e n . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n was on t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Where t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e o f m i t i g a t i o n t h a t would f i t w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e , s e c t i o n 94-5-103, 1947, t h e t r i a l c o u r t R.C.M. s h o u l d p r o p e r l y r e f u s e t o i n s t r u c t on s u c h c r i m e . (1977), v . Baugh, 1315. Mont. , State 571 P.2d 779, 34 St.Rep. I n v i e w i n g t h e r e c o r d h e r e , w e f i n d no e v i d e n c e o f mitigation. This i n s t r u c t i o n was p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d . D e f e n d a n t a l s o o b j e c t s t o I n s t r u c t i o n 40. This instruc- t i o n t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t s e n t e n c i n g was v e s t e d i n t h e c o u r t and t h e j u r y was n o t t o c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b l e p u n i s h m e n t defendant could r e c e i v e i n reaching a v e r d i c t . Defendant's o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t i n t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , and i n v o i r d i r e o f t h e jury, t h e j u r y was l e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e j u d g e had d i s c r e t i o n i n imposing t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s i m p l y t o l d t h e j u r y s e n t e n c i n g was up t o t h e judge. The i n s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t s t a t e t h a t t h e judge c a n m i t i g a t e punishment. I t o n l y s a y s t h a t h e h a s t h e power t o impose p u n i s h m e n t , which i s c o r r e c t . I t i s where t h e jury i s i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e various p o s s i b i l i t i e s of sentence t h a t prejudice t o t h e defendant e x i s t s . S t a t e v . Zuidema, ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont. 367, 485 P.2d 952. T h i s i s n o t t h e case here. The i n s t r u c t i o n was p r o p e r . F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t form u s e d o n Count 11. The j u r y was s p e c i f i c a l l y a s k e d t o f i n d i f Peggy Lee H a r s t a d d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f t h e a g g r a v a t e d kidnapping. The j u r y f o u n d t h a t s h e d i d . Defendant argues t h a t Montana law d o e s n o t p r o v i d e f o r s p e c i f i c f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s by t h e j u r y . The j u r y was g i v e n g e n e r a l v e r d i c t s a s k i n g f o r a f i n d i n g o f g u i l t y o r n o t g u i l t y on e a c h c o u n t . The j u r y was t o make t h e a d d i t i o n a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e element necessary f o r t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was p r e s e n t . Under t h o s e circumstances, t h i s a d d i t i o n a l f a c t u a l f i n d i n g does n o t f a l l i n t o t h e v i c e of a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t . I t does n o t r e q u i r e a f a c t d e t e r m i n a t i o n which c o u l d b e u s e d t o undermine t h e Thus, t h e v e r d i c t f o r m s w e r e p e r m i s s i b l e . general verdict. I n any e v e n t , o u r h o l d i n g on M o n t a n a ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e r e n d e r s t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r n o n p r e j u d i c i a l . I s s u e 12. D e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o some e x h i b i t s which w e r e a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e and some o f h i s own which w e r e refused admission. H i s f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s t o S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 20. T h i s was a p i c t u r e o f t h e a r e a i n which Peggy L e e H a r s t a d ' s body was found. I n t h e p i c t u r e , h e r decomposed body c a n be s e e n . D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s p i c t u r e was p r e j u d i c i a l b e c a u s e i t i s a gruesome p h o t o g r a p h . H e c l a i m s t h a t any r e l e v a n c y of t h i s p h o t o g r a p h i s outweighed by i t s p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t . T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t p h o t o g r a p h s which h e l p t h e jury understand t h e c a s e a r e admissible, b u t photographs t h a t a r e c a l c u l a t e d t o arouse t h e sympathies o r p r e j u d i c e s of t h e jury a r e properly excluded. S t a t e v. Bischert, ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 1 5 2 , 308 P.2d 9 6 9 . T h i s C o u r t went o n t o s a y , i n t h a t c a s e , t h a t p h o t o g r a p h s may n o t b e u s e d i f i n t e n d e d t o i n f l a m e t h e minds of t h e j u r y r a t h e r t h a n e n l i g h t e n them a s t o t h e f a c t s . W e a f f i r m t h e r u l e of t h e B i s c h e r t case, but r e j e c t its application t o t h i s case. I n B i s c h e r t , t h e p h o t o g r a p h was e x t r e m e l y d i s t a s t e f u l and d i d n o t make a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e d e v e l o p ment o f t h e f a c t s i n t h a t c a s e . This i s n o t the case here. W e have examined t h e p h o t o g r a p h and f i n d t h a t it i s h a z y , i n d i s t i n c t , and o f p o o r q u a l i t y . Any gruesome c h a r a c t e r t h a t t h e photograph might o t h e r w i s e p o s s e s s i s l o s t i n i t s development and r e p r o d u c t i o n . The p h o t o g r a p h i s r e l e v a n t i n t h a t i t shows t h e j u r y t h e a r e a i n which t h e body was found; and i t c o r r o b o r a t e s Nank's t e s t i m o n y a s t o h e r b e i n g f u l l y c l o t h e d and a s t o where t h e body was. Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e r e , t h e p h o t o g r a p h ' s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e outweighs i t s p r e j u d i c i a l effect. Defendant o b j e c t s t o t h e a d m i s s i o n of two o t h e r photoThese w e r e g r a p h s , namely, S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t s 4 1 and 43. p i c t u r e s of t h e a p a r t m e n t b u i l d i n g and t h e p a r k i n g l o t i n B o i s e , where d e f e n d a n t and Nank were a r r e s t e d . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e p h o t o g r a p h s w e r e i r r e l e v a n t and c u m u l a t i v e evidence. A s a g e n e r a l r u l e , p h o t o g r a p h s , when r e l e v a n t t o d e s c r i b e a p e r s o n , p l a c e o r t h i n g , a r e a d m i s s i b l e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e x p l a i n i n g and a p p l y i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c a s e . County F a r m e r s ' Co., F u l t o n v. Chouteau ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 9 8 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025. The p h o t o g r a p h s of t h e a p a r t m e n t b u i l d i n g and p a r k i n g l o t h e l p e d t o d e s c r i b e t h e p l a c e where t h e d e f e n d a n t and Nank w e r e arrested. These p h o t o g r a p h s showed where t h e h e l m e t s and r o p e were r e c o v e r e d . These photographs a s s i s t e d t h e j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e a r r e s t and s e a r c h i n B o i s e . They were properly admitted. Defendant a l s o o b j e c t s t o t h e a d m i s s i o n of Nank's m o t o r c y c l e helmet i n t o e v i d e n c e . H i s complaint i s t h a t t h e chain of evidence w a s n o t e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r t o t h e admission o f t h e h e l m e t and f u r t h e r complains t h a t h e was n o t a l l o w e d t o v o i r d i r e Nank p r i o r t o i t s a d m i s s i o n . Defendant s t a t e s t h e r e was a problem w i t h t h e c h a i n of e v i d e n c e i n t h a t t h i s h e l m e t was l a b e l e d a s b e l o n g i n g t o d e f e n d a n t and n o t ~ a n k . S i n c e Nank, p r i o r t o t h e a d m i s s i o n of t h e h e l m e t , p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d i t a s h i s , we f i n d t h e c h a i n of evidence e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r t o i t s admission. The mismarked l a b e l i s of no consequence a s t h e l a b e l was n o t a d m i t t e d i n t o evidence. W r e c o g n i z e t h a t d e f e n d a n t might have been e allowed t o v o i r d i r e Nank p r i o r t o t h e a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e of t h e h e l m e t b u t such was n o t r e q u i r e d . T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t such a v o i r d i r e would have produced a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t . A t most, o n l y a p r o c e d u r a l e r r o r n o t a f f e c t i n g t h e m e r i t s was i n v o l v e d , and n o t a p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r r e q u i r i n g r e v e r s a l . S t a t e v. Heiser, ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 413, 407 P.2d 370. Defendant f u r t h e r c l a i m s e r r o r i n a d m i t t i n g i n e v i d e n c e t h e w a i v e r of r i g h t s form g i v e n t o d e f e n d a n t i n B o i s e , which he r e f u s e d t o s i g n . Defendant c l a i m s t h i s e x h i b i t was i r r e l e v a n t and s h o u l d have been excluded a s c u m u l a t i v e evidence. W c a n f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e a d m i s s i o n of t h i s e x h i b i t . e This e x h i b i t aided i n t h e jury i n understanding t h e events o f t h i s c a s e t h a t o c c u r r e d i n B o i s e , Idaho. It supported t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e B o i s e d e t e c t i v e s a s t o t h e d a t e of t h e a r r e s t , t h e t i m e of t h e a r r e s t , and t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s informed of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . The e x h i b i t was properly admitted. Defendant o b j e c t s t h a t h i s E x h i b i t s V , W, X and Y were r e f u s e d . These e x h i b i t s were p i c t u r e s of t h e S t a t e ' s f i n g e r p r i n t p h o t o s . They were e n l a r g e m e n t s and a n o v e r l a y of them was made. By u s e of t h e o v e r l a y , d e f e n d a n t wanted t o show any d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s . Our r e v i e w of t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t l a y a f o u n d a t i o n , p r i o r t o moving f o r t h e a d m i s s i o n of h i s e x h i b i t s , showing t h a t f i n g e r p r i n t s c o u l d be compared i n t h e manner d e f e n d a n t was a t t e m p t i n g t o compare them. What d e f e n d a n t wanted t o do was t o show t h e j u r y by a c t u a l measurement t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e d i s t a n c e between t h e r i d g e s between a known p r i n t of d e f e n d a n t and t h e p r i n t found i n Peggy Lee Harstad's purse. manner. A f i n g e r p r i n t c a n n o t be compared i n t h i s The same f i n g e r p r i n t w i l l produce d i f f e r i n g r e s u l t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o a measurement between t h e r i d g e s depending upon t h e p r e s s u r e a p p l i e d i n making t h e p r i n t and t h e manner i n which t h e p r i n t was l e f t upon t h e s u r f a c e . Fingerprints a r e compared by d e t e r m i n i n g i f t h e same r i d g e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e p r e s e n t i n a known p r i n t and unknown p r i n t . These r i d g e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l n o t v a r y between t h e d i f f e r e n t ways i n which a n i m p r e s s i o n i s made on a s u r f a c e . The r u l e i s t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether a p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n h a s been l a i d i n o r d e r t o i n t r o d u c e e x h i b i t s i n t o e v i d e n c e r e s t s w i t h t h e lower c o u r t and i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l n o t b e o v e r t u r n e d u n l e s s t h e r e i s a c l e a r a b u s e of discretion. S t a t e v . Olsen, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 1, 445 P.2d 926. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y e x c l u d e d t h e e x h i b i t s b e c a u s e no p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n w a s l a i d f o r t h e i r a d m i s s i o n . Finally, defendant claims t h a t t h e c o u r t erred i n r e f u s i n g h i s E x h i b i t T showing some c a l c u l a t i o n s 1 a s t o t h e h e i g h t of t h e w a t e r l e v e l i n t h e Yellowstone River on J u l y 4 , 1974. T h i s e x h i b i t was t o a i d d e f e n d a n t ' s argument t h a t Peggy Lee H a r s t a d was n o t drowned i n t h e r i v e r a s Nank t e s t i f i e d s h e was. Defendant was t r y i n g t o p r o v e t h a t t h e r i v e r , on ~ u l y , 1974, was t o o d e e p , i n t h e a r e a where t h e body was 4 found, f o r Nank and d e f e n d a n t t o b e h o l d i n g h e r under t h e water. This e x h i b i t w a s n o t a d m i s s b l e b e c a u s e of a l a c k of a p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n . Our r e v i e w of t h e t r a n s c r i p t r e v e a l s t h a t t h e w i t n e s s e s who p r e p a r e d t h i s e x h i b i t were n e v e r shown t o have t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o p r e p a r e such a n e x h i b i t ; i t was n o t made c l e a r how t h e y a r r i v e d a t t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s t h e y made of t h e h e i g h t , f l o w , and volume of t h e r i v e r ; a n d , i t was n o t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e i r c a l c u l a t i o n s of t h e h e i g h t of t h e r i v e r on J u l y 4 , 1974, were competent. Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e r e was no e r r o r i n d e n y i n g t h i s e x h i b i t admission i n evidence. I s s u e 13. f o r a new t r i a l . Following h i s c o n v i c t i o n , d e f e n d a n t moved One of t h e grounds d e f e n d a n t r a i s e d was t h a t a f t e r b o t h s i d e s had r e s t e d t h e i r c a s e , d e f e n d a n t was c o n t a c t e d by a w i t n e s s who knew of d e f e n d a n t ' s good c o n d u c t and c h a r a c t e r . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h i s newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e i s grounds f o r a new t r i a l under s e c t i o n 95-2101, R.C.M. 1947. " I t i s w e l l - s e t t l e d t h a t a new t r i a l w i l l n o t be g r a n t e d upon t h e ground of newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i dence where i t a p p e a r s t h a t such new e v i d e n c e c a n have no o t h e r e f f e c t t h a n t o d i s c r e d i t t h e t e s t i m o n y of a w i t n e s s a t t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l . I t i s o n l y when i t i s shown by competent and s a t i s f a c t o r y e v i d e n c e t h a t a p p e l l a n t would n o t have been conv i c t e d , b u t f o r t h i s e v i d e n c e , t h a t a new t r i a l w i l l b e g r a n t e d f o r newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) " S t a t e v. Schleining, (1965), 146 Mont. 1, 1 7 , 403 P.2d 625. I n t h i s c a s e , d e f e n d a n t ' s newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e would o n l y go t o d i s c r e d i t Nank's t e s t i m o n y and d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t shown t h a t t h i s e v i d e n c e would make t h e d i f f e r e n c e between h i s b e i n g o r n o t b e i n g c o n v i c t e d i n a new t r i a l . Under t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , w e w i l l f o l l o w t h e g e n e r a l r u l e i n f i n d i n g no e r r o r i n t h e d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l . W have examined t h e s u b s i d i a r y c o n t e n t i o n s of d e f e n d a n t e and f i n d t h a t none would change o u r h o l d i n g s i n t h i s c a s e o r merit s p e c i a l discussion i n t h i s opinion. The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n on a l l t h r e e c o u n t s i s a f f i r m e d . The s e n t e n c e s imposed f o r Counts I1 and I11 a r e The c a s e i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r vacated. r e s e n t e n c i n g on Counts I1 and 111. zL&g%& Chief J u s t i c e W Concur: e A ,' 92-d -I dd>i<p f/d J u s t i c e dr" / t t i n g i n the vacant s e a t Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the opinion but dissent as to the majority's disposition of Issue 2. The majority finds no substantial evidence to support the jury's determination that defendant inflicted bodily injury in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent. Section 94-5-503(3), R.C.M. 1947, provides: " * * * if the offender inflicts bodily injury upon anyone in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any term of not less than 2 years or more than 40 years, except as provided in 95-2206.18." The majority freely admits "the evidence shows that defendant did commit sexual intercourse without consent" and the jury so found. Nor is there any quarrel that there is substantial evidence showing that defendant participated in the killing of Peggy Lee Harstad. These facts were proven to the jury despite the fact, as the majority notes, the pathologist could find no evidence of physical injury to her badly decomposed body. While the majority is unclear in what respect the State's proof was lacking, the State must have f5iled to prove either that (1) defendant inflicted "bodily injury" on the victim, or (2) the bodily ingury was inflicted in the course of the commission of the rape. Undoubtedly, there is substantial evidence that defendant inflicted bodily injury on the victim. As noted above, the evidence indicates defendant participated in causing her death. Certainly death is "bodily injury" within the meaning of the statute. That death is "impairment of physical condition" is so obvious that it deserves little comment. Section section 94-2-101(5), R.C.M. 1947. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results. For example, a person who breaks the arm of the victim in the course of committing a rape can receive a 40 year sentence for the rape, but a rapist who kills the victim can receive no more than a 20 year sentence for the rape. I cannot believe the legislature intended that a rapist receive a lighter sentence because he did more harm to the victim than is required by the definition of "bodily injury". If death is, indeed, bodily injury, the only remaining requirement is that the death be inflicted "in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent". This phrase is explained in section 94-5-503(4), R.C.M. 1947: "An act 'in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent' shall include an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or cormnission." (Emphasis added.) Clearly there is substantial evidence to show the victim was killed in the "flight after" the commission of the rape. According to Nank's testimony, she was raped in her car, and then beaten and drowned nearby. Had she lived, she would have been able to identify defendant and Nank as the perpetrators. The jury cer- tainly would have been reasonable to infer that she was killed in an attempt to cover up the commission of the rape. The majority completely ignores the "flight after" language of the statute. In summary, I find substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict that defendant inflicted "bodily injury" upon the victim "in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent". Her death supplied all the "bodily injury" required. Her death was inflicted in the course of committing the rape because it was an integral part of the flight after the commission of the offense. This is precisely the type of conduct the statute was intended to punish to the most severe extent. I would affirm the imposition of the 40 year sentence. ( k Justice Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I agree with the majority opinion holding section 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947, to be unconstitutional. Clearly, the United States Supreme Court has prohibited mandatory death penalties because there is no allowance for consideration of mitigation. However, I would go yet another step and reverse the conviction because the second jury panel was not chosen in substantial compliance with the applicable statutes of calling in a new jury array. In fact, there was a complete failure to follow sections 93-1501 and 93-1509, R.C.M. The majority proceeds with this issue as though the District Court was only calling in additional jurors to complement the jury panel already legally in existence. The law involved is contained in Title 93, Chapter 15, entitled "Jurors--Drawing and Summoning for Courts of Record." Section 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, upon which the majority relies, is but one of the statutes covering the selection of juries. That section provides: "Obtaining additional jurors when necessary. Whenever it appears to a district judge that additional jurors will be needed for any term or trial - the judge shall draw as many numbers from jury box No. 1 as are necessary to secure the required number of additional jurors. Before drawing the numbers the judge shall by appropriate order designate the number of jurors needed, and, when the judge believes that securing the additional jurors from all of the county would cause unnecessary delay or expense then he may order the jurors selected from only a designated portion of the county, which portion shall never be less than the corporate limits of the county seat. If, in the selection of the additional jurors, a number is drawn and the jury list shows the person represented by the number to be a resident of an area outside the area designated by the court order then that number shall be returned to the jury box and a new number drawn. When the required number of names have been selected the judge may order the prospective jurors notified by telephone by the clerk of the court or he may order them summoned by the sheriff either by certified mail or by personal service." (Emphasis added. ) This statute allows additional jurors to be summoned by telephone (as one of the means of summoning a juror) where the jury array, then legally in existence, is not sufficient in number to complete the work of the court during the term of court. It does not apply where the legal existence of a jury array has been successfully challenged and it therefore becomes necessary to summon an entirely new jury panel--precisely what occurred in this case. The entire jury panel was excused because it was not summoned in compliance with the applicable statutes. The majority recognizes that this happened by stating: " * * * On October 20, 1975, defendant filed a challenge to the jury panel claiming that it was not drawn and summoned in accordance with the jury selection statutes. The challenge was made in conformity with section 95-1908, R.C.11. 1947, which states how a jury challenge is to be made. - After a full hearing on the challenge, the District Court dismissed the jury panel." (Emphasis added. ) Clearly, upon this dismissal, the jury panel was no longer legally in existence. If any more cases were to be tried during that jury term, an entire new jury panel had to be summoned. In such case sections 93-1501 and 93-1509, R.C.M. 1947, come into play. Section 93-1501, "Summoning of trial jury", provides: "At least once each year in each county when a civil or criminal case has been at issue and ready for trial for more than six (6) months and the plaintiff or defendant in such case has requested a jury trial or whenever the business of a district court requires the attendance of a trial jury for the trial of civil or criminal cases, and no jury is in attendance, the court must make an order directing a trial jury to be drawn and summoned to attend before said court. Such order must specify the number of jurors to be drawn, and the time at which the jurors are required to attend, which time may be at the same term in which the jurors are drawn, or at the next succeeding term, in the discretion of the court. And the court may direct that such causes, either criminal or civil, in which a jury may be required, or in which a jury may have been demanded, be continued and fixed for trial when a jury shall be in attendance." (Emphasis added. ) Thereafter, the statutes providing for the mechanics of selecting a jury panel (sections 93-1503 et. seq.) are followed until the requisite number of jurors is chosen from the jury list and jury boxes. After this is done, the jurors are then summoned in the manner as provided in section 93-1509, which provides: "The sheriff, as soon as he receives a list or lists of jurors drawn, shall summon the persons named therein to attend the court at the time mentioned in the order, by a written notice by certified mail to that effect addressed to them to the post-office address named in the jury list an2 deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid, except in cases where the district judge expressly directs that such service shall be made by giving personal notice, and shall return the list to the court at the opening of the regular session thereof, or at such session or time as the jurors may be ordered to attend, specifying the names of those who are summoned, and the manner in which each person was notified." (Emphasis added.) There can be no question that sections 93-1501 and 93-1509 must be followed in circumstances where a jury panel is not already legally in existence. Section 93-1512 applies only where for some reason there are not sufficient numbers on the original panel to complete the business of the court for the particular term involved. Here, the District Court entirely ignored sections 93-1501 and 931509 and the majority has approved this bypass. The procedure actually used by the District Court is fraught with dangers and is hardly the procedure to be approved for summoning an entire jury panel when a man is on trial for his life. Here, a District Court, after dismissing an entire jury panel for procedural irregularities in the summoning process, commits an error equally as grave in allowing the clerk of court to obtain sixty willing jurors by calling them on the telephone. We have no idea of the actual number of jurors called before sixty of them agreed to sit. We do not know the exact procedure used by the clerk in calling the jurors. Did he go down the list alphabetically and continue calling until he obtained the required number of jurors? Did he call jurors in areas of Yellowstone County where, from previous experience, he determined it would be most likely to get an affirmative response? Did he in fact call most of the jurors first who lived on the west side of Billings, commonly known to be the area where "successful" people live? did the clerk of court tell each person when he called? What What ex- cuses did the potential jurors give if they stated they could not sit on the jury panel? pearing? missible? Did they have a legal excuse for not ap- Did the clerk tell the jurors what excuses would be perWe will never know the answers to these questions. one thing, however, I am certain. Of If it so happened that the sixty jurors ultimately serving were a true cross-section of the residents of Yellowstone County, it was an accident. It did not occur because the District Court scrupulously followed the law. Under these cir- cm~stances,it is a travesty to allow the conviction to stand. In State v. Fitzpatrick, (1977), Mont . , 569 P.2d 383, 358, 34 St.Rep. 736, 740, this Court stated: "This Court has long held the accused in a criminal prosecution is constitutionally guaranteed a trial by an impartial jury selected and drawn in accordance with the law. State ex rel. Henningsen v. District Court, supra; State v. Hay, 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232; Dupont v. McAdow, 6 Mont. 226, 9 P. 925. Any material deviation or departure in procuring a jury has been held to constitute a denial of fundamental constitutional rights. State v. Porter, supra; State v. Groom, 49 Mont. 354, 141 P. 858; State v. Tighe, 27 Plont. 327, 71 P. 3; reversed on other grounds 35 Mont. 512, 90 P. 981." (Emphasis added.) In the present case there was not only a material departure in procuring a jury, there was a total failure to follow the applicable law. Clearly, the defendant has been denied a fundamental constitutional right. For the foregoing reason I would reverse defendant's conviction and order a new trial.

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