CLARK v HILDE CONSTRUCTION CO

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No. 13845 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 GEORGE CLARK, Claimant and Appellant, -vsHILDE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Emloyer, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: Workers' compensation Court, Hon. William E Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Charles E. Snyder, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole and Dietrich, Billings, Montana H. Elwood English, Billings, Montana Cause Submitted on briefs; March 3, 1978, 1978 Decided: Filed: MCz % , . .--2 zi - MAR 2 I! 1978 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court : Claimant appeals t h e decision of t h e Workers' Compensation Court, dated A p r i l 27, 1977, denying compensation f o r an a l l e g e d i n j u r y s u f f e r e d i n t h e course of h i s employment on J u l y 11, 1975. O Friday, J u l y 11, 1975, a t approximately 4:00 t o 4:30 n p.m., claimant was changing a t i r e on a t r u c k he was operating f o r Hilde Construction Company, a t a job s i t e 7 o r 8 miles n o r t h of Lame Deer, Montana. Claimant t e s t i f i e d t h a t while changing t h e t i r e , he f e l t something " s l i p " i n h i s back. He received a s s i s - tance from another worker, and proceeded t o complete h i s d a i l y route. Claimant then drove t o h i s home i n Absarokee, Montana. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he a r r i v e d , he experienced s e r i o u s pain i n h i s lower back, and could hardly walk. Claimant's w i f e , t h e s o l e witness t o s e e claimant during t h e period of time immediately following t h e i n j u r y , returned t o t h e family home i n Absarokee on Sunday, J u l y 13, a f t e r a weekend i n Idaho F a l l s , Idaho. She t e s t i f i e d claimant was i n a g r e a t d e a l of pain and could n o t stand e r e c t . On Monday, J u l y 14, claimant attempted t o c o n t a c t h i s foreman concerning t h e i n j u r y , but was unable t o reach him. He then reported t h e i n j u r y t o t h e s e c r e t a r y of h i s union, so t h a t a replacement worker would be located. Hilde Construction Company received n o t i c e of t h e i n j u r y by c l a i m a n t ' s claim f o r compensat i o n , dated August 22, 1975, and received by i t s c a r r i e r , T r a v e l e r s Insurance Company on August 25, 1975. Following t h e i n j u r y , claimant consulted and was .treated by numerous physicians, neurosurgeons, orthopedic s p e c i a l i s t s and chiropractors. The diagnoses of t h e r e s p e c t i v e physicians a r e not c l e a r regarding t h e n a t u r e of c l a i m a n t ' s d i s o r d e r . While some physicians conclude claimant manifests symptoms of m u l t i p l e s c l e r o s i s , o t h e r s diagnosed t h e condition a s s p o n d y l o l i s t h e s i s - a d e f e c t i n o r lack of s o l i d bone i n p o r t i o n s of t h e s p i n e , u s u a l l y i n t h e lower spine. The cause came on f o r hearing before t h e Workers' Compensat i o n Court on November 4 , 1976. I n i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law, t h e Workers' Compensation Court denied compensation t o claimant, finding: "Claimant f a i l e d t o prove by a preponderance of t h e c r e d i b l e evidence t h a t he s u f f e r e d an i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t r e s u l t i n g i n a compensable i n j u r y t h a t s a t i s f i e s t h e requirements of Sections 92-418 I n j u r y o r i n j u r e d an i n j u r y a r i s i n g out of defined; and 92-614(1) ' * and i n t h e course of h i s employment *I." ** ** The determinative i s s u e on t h i s appeal i s whether claimant s u f f e r e d a compensable "injury" within t h e course of h i s employment. W hold t h e Workers' Compensation Court was c o r r e c t i n e concluding he d i d n o t . Section 92-418(1), R.C.M. 1947, s e t s f o r t h t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "injury1' f o r purposes of compensation a s : "(1) a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e from an unexpected cause, o r unusual s t r a i n , r e s u l t i n g i n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l physical harm, and such physical condition as a r e s u l t therefrom and excluding d i s e a s e * *.I' not traceable t o injury * To e s t a b l i s h a compensable i n j u r y , a claimant must prove, by a preponderance of t h e evidence, t h a t t h e condition was proximately caused by a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e from an unexpected cause, o r unusual s t r a i n . McAndrews v. Schwartz, (1974), 164 Mont. 402, 523 P.2d 1379. Where a c l a i m a n t ' s d i s - order o r d i s a b i l i t y i s t h e r e s u l t of a d i s e a s e not t r a c e a b l e t o a work r e l a t e d i n j u r y , i t i s , a s a g e n e r a l r u l e , not compensable under t h e language of s e c t i o n 92-418(1). McAndrews v. Schwartz, supra; LaForest v. Safeway S t o r e s , I n c . , (1966), 147 Mont. 431, 414 P.2d 200. W f i n d claimant f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y h i s e burden of proving "injury" . The bulk of t h e medical evidence tends t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t c l a i m a n t ' s symptoms a r e t h e r e s u l t of m u l t i p l e s c l e r o s i s , a d i s e a s e which, a s p r e s e n t l y understood, i s n o t t r a c e a b l e t o an "injury" such a s t h a t claimant purports t o have s u f f e r e d . Indeed, claimant admitted having been t r e a t e d f o r symptoms commonly a s s o c i a t e d with m u l t i p l e s c l e r o s i s one year p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t . Claimant simply f a i l e d t o prove, by a preponderance of t h e evidence, t h a t h i s physical condition was proximately caused by an industrial injury . A t t h e hearing of November 4, 1976, D r . Howard E. Hultgren, a B i l l i n g s c h i r o p r a c t o r who had t r e a t e d claimant, t e s t i f i e d he was of t h e opinion t h a t claimant was s u f f e r i n g listhesis. from spondylo- D r . Hagen, a B i l l i n g s o r t h o p e d i s t , a l s o t e s t i f i e d by way of d e p o s i t i o n , t h a t claimant was s u f f e r i n g from s p o n d y l o l i s t h e s i s , b u t t h e condition had e x i s t e d p r i o r t o the accident a s revealed by a comparison of X-rays taken both before and a f t e r t h e accident. Thus, the workers' Compensation Court could w e l l have concluded t h e complained of physical c o n d i t i o n , even i f n o t c o n s i d e d a "disease", predated t h e a c c i d e n t . It i s of course t h e r u l e , urged by claimant, t h a t an employee who s u f f e r s from a p r e e x i s t i n g condition i s e n t i t l e d t o compensation i f t h e condition was aggravated o r a c c e l e r a t e d by an i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y . Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, (1975), 166 Mont. 17, 530 P.2d 433; Gaffney v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident B d . , (1955), 129 Mont. 394, 287 P.2d 256; Weakley v. Cook, (1952), 126 Mont. 332, 249 P.2d 926. However, t h e c r i t i c a l shortcoming of c l a i m a n t ' s c a s e , even assuming, arguendo, t h e p r e e x i s t i n g condition and t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e symptoms complained o f , i s h i s f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e occurrence of a work r e l a t e d i n j u r y . Claimant's u l t i m a t e f a i l u r e of proof of a work r e l a t e d i n j u r y i s e v i d e n t , when considering t h e evidence he f a i l e d t o introduce. Claimant c l e a r l y f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e i n j u r y had " a r i s e n out of and i n t h e course of h i s employment" a s required by s e c t i o n 92-614(1), R.C.M. G l a c i e r Park Co., 1947. Williams v. (1962), 140 Mont. 440, 373 P.2d 517. Claimant f a i l e d t o l o c a t e and produce t h e co-worker who a l l e g e d l y a s s i s t e d him i n changing t h e t i r e following t h e claimed accident. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e union s e c r e t a r y t o whom t h e a c c i d e n t was reported on Monday, J u l y 14, 1975, was not l o c a t e d , produced a t t r i a l , nor deposed, although claimant was afforded a 30 day period following t h e hearing t o do so. Therefore, d e s p i t e t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of p r o o f , claimant produced no witnesses t o corroborate h i s obviously s e l f - s e r v i n g testimony concerning t h e occurrence of t h e i n j u r y during t h e course of h i s employment. Where weaker evidence i s o f f e r e d , and i t appears i t was w i t h i n t h e power of t h e o f f e r i n g p a r t y t o produce s t r o n g e r and more s a t i s f a c t o r y evidence, t h e o f f e r e d evidence, i . e . claimant's testimony regarding t h e i n j u r y , i s t o be viewed with d i s t r u s t . Section 93-2001-1, R.C.M. R.C.M. 1947. F u r t h e r , s e c t i o n 93-1301-7, 1947, e s t a b l i s h e s t h e following presumptions: "5. That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse, if produced. "6. That higher evidence would be adverse from in£erior , being producedI'. Given the rules of evidence noted above, we conclude the Workers' Compensation Court could properly infer the testimony not produced would be adverse to claimant's position on the issue of whether the injury arose out of the course of his employment. The decision of the workers ' Compensation Court denying compensation is affirmed. We Concur: Chief Justice n i . I . f- . -.- P C Hon. Bernard Thomas, District Judge, sitting.

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