STATE v LEISTIKO
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No. 13802 I N THE SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O MONTANA F H F 1978 THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , -vsWILLIAM LEISTIKO, Defendant and Respondent. For A p p e l l a n t : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana A l l e n B. C h r o n i s t e r , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana Ronald W. S m i t h , County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , Havre, Montana For Respondent : M o r r i s o n , E t t i e n and B a r r o n , Havre, Montana R o b e r t M o r r i s o n a r g u e d , Havre, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed: 3 '978 March 1 0 , 1978 - --- - 1978 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court: The S t a t e of Montana b r i n g s t h i s a p p e a l p u r s u a n t t o section 95-2403, K.C.M. 1947, from t h e o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, H i l l County, g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s evidence s e i z e d i n t h e s e a r c h of h i s home under a s e a r c h w a r r a n t . On August 2 7 , 1976, Paula K i r c h g a s l e r ( i n f o r m a n t ) went t o t h e Havre p o l i c e department t o f i l e a complaint concerning an a s s a u l t a g a i n s t h e r t h a t occurred t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t . The a l l e g e d a s s a i l a n t was a t h i r d p a r t y , n o t t h e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t . During t h e c o u r s e of q u e s t i o n i n g concerning t h e a s s a u l t t h e informant r e v e a l e d i n f o r m a t i o n concerning drug use and p o s s e s s i o n by c e r t a i n Havre r e s i d e n t s . This q u e s t i o n i n g was undertaken by O f f i c e r Stremcha of t h e Havre p o l i c e department. As a r e s u l t of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n and t h e i n f o r m a t i o n r e v e a l e d by t h e i n f o r m a n t , an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a s e a r c h warrant was prepared s e e k i n g a u t h o r i z a t i o n t o s e a r c h a r e s i d e n c e occupied by d e f e n d a n t . O f f i c e r Stremcha and t h e informant went b e f o r e J u s t i c e of Peace S t a l l c o p . A t t h i s time J u s t i c e of Peace S t a l l c o p r e q u e s t e d c e r t a i n a d d i t i o n s be made t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e s e a r c h warrant pertaining t o the alleged offense. He placed t h e informant and O f f i c e r Stremcha under o a t h and asked them i f t h e s t a t e m e n t s i n c l u d e d i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n were t r u e and conducted no f u r t h e r examination i n t o t h e s t a t e m e n t s a l l e g e d l y made by t h e informant and made no i n q u i r y a s t o h e r i d e n t i t y o r t h e b a s i s f o r h e r claim. The s e a r c h w a r r a n t was i s s u e d and t h e s e a r c h was conducted by Havre p o l i c e . Drugs were recovered and defendant was a r r e s t e d . An I n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d on August 30, 1976, c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t w i t h c r i m i n a l p o s s e s s i o n of dangerous drugs w i t h i n t e n t t o s e l l i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 54-133.1, R.C.M. 1947. On January 24, 1977, a motion t o s u p p r e s s evidence was f i l e d on b e h a l f of defendant and h e a r i n g was h e l d b e f o r e Hon. B. W. Thomas on February 1 6 , 1977. g r a n t e d t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s . On A p r i l 5 , 1 9 7 7 , t h e c o u r t There was no showing t h a t anv examination was made of t h e informant b e f o r e t h e i s s u i n g j u s t i c e of peace on m a t t e r s which would r e l a t e t o h e r r e l i a b i l i t y o r credibility. The s i n g l e i s s u e on a p p e a l i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s . The i n s t a n t c a s e i n v o l v e s t h e two pronged t e s t a s s e t o u t i n A g u i l a r v. Texas, (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 723 and S p i n e l l i v . United S t a t e s , (1969), 393 U.S. 584, 21 L ed 2d 637. 1509, 12 L ed 2d 410, 89 S.Ct. I n h i s memorandum t o t h e o r d e r s u p p r e s s i n g t h e e v i d e n c e , Judge Thomas h e l d t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n met t h e f i r s t t e s t of A g u i l a r and S p i n e l l i i n t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t c o n t a i n e d "some of t h e u n d e r l y i n g circumstances from which t h e informant concluded t h a t t h e n a r c o t i c s were where [ s l h e claimed t h e y were." However, t h e a f f i d a v i t d i d n o t meet t h e second t e s t i n t h a t i t d i d n o t c o n t a i n s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s from which a judge c o u l d " a s s e s s t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e informant o r t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of h e r i n formation.'' Although t h e informant appeared p e r s o n a l l y b e f o r e J u s t i c e of Peace S t a l l c o p , no i n f o r m a t i o n was c o n t r i b u t e d toward t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of probable c a u s e , o t h e r t h a n t h a t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e a f f i d a v i t of O f f i c e r Stremcha. The r e c o r d c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e only i n f o r m a t i o n b e f o r e t h e j u s t i c e of peace was t h a t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e s t a t e m e n t of f a c t s g i v e n by O f f i c e r Stremcha i n h i s a f f i d a v i t i n s u p p o r t of t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t . Our i n q u i r y must t h e r e f o r e be l i m i t e d t o t h e f o u r c o r n e r s of t h e a f f i d a v i t . P e t i t i o n of Gray, (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532; S t a t e v . B e n t l y , (1970), 156 Mont. 129, 477 P.2d 345. It cannot be d i s p u t e d t h a t h e a r s a y i n f o r m a t i o n may be c o n s i d e r e d t o e s t a b l i s h probable c a u s e . S t a t e v . Paulson, (1975), 167 Mont. 310, 538 P.2d 339; Draper v . United S t a t e s , (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L ed 2d 327. But when k a r s a y informa- t i o n forms t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a f i n d i n g of probable cause and t h e i s s u a n c e of a s e a r c h w a r r a n t , t h e two pronged t e s t s e t o u t i n A g u i l a r must be a p p l i e d and s a t i s f i e d : "* * * t h e m a g i s t r a t e must be informed of [ f i r s t ] some of t h e u n d e r l y i n g circumstances from which t h e informant concluded t h a t t h e n a r c o t i c s were where h e claimed they were, a n d a n d ] some of t h e underl y i n g circumstances from/the o f f i c e r concluded t h a t was ' c r e d i b l e ' o r h i s i n f o r m a t i o n t h e informant 378 U.S. 114. 'reliable' ." *** I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e f i r s t p a r t of t h e t e s t i s n o t a t i s s u e ; however, t h e second p a r t i s a t i s s u e . of t h e A g u i l a r - S p i n e l l i The second p a r t t e s t mandates t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of probable c a u s e be e s t a b l i s h e d only through a c r e d i b l e informant with r e l i a b l e information. The m a g i s t r a t e must be informed of some u n d e r l y i n g circumstances which demonstrate t h a t c r e d i b i l i t y or reliability. The a f f i d a v i t must s e t f o r t h t h e u n d e r l y i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s n e c e s s a r y t o e n a b l e t h e m a g i s t r a t e independently t o judge t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n f o r m a n t ' s c o n c l u s i o n and t h e a f f i a n t must s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m t h a t t h e informant was c r e d i b l e o r h i s information r e l i a b l e . A g u i l a r v. Texas, s u p r a ; S p i n e l l i v. United S t a t e s , s u p r a ; United S t a t e s v . G o l d s t e i n , ( 9 t h C i r . The a f f i d a v i t of O f f i c e r Stremcha, who was n o t p r e s e n t on August 23, 1976, when t h e informant a l l e g e d l y e n t e r e d d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s i d e n c e and saw t h e contraband d r u g s , was based on i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d by informant. I n the i n s t a n t case a f f i a n t s t a t e s t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h e informant i s r e l i a b l e based on t h e candor of h e r s t a t e m e n t s and t h e d e t a i l e d knowledge of defendant and defenda n t ' s r e s i d e n c e , which h e r s t a t e m e n t s c o n t a i n e d . There were no f a c t s s t a t e d t o show informant was known t o t h e o f f i c e r , o r t h a t t h e o f f i c e r had had any p a s t o r s u f f i c i e n t d e a l i n g s w i t h informant upon which t o b a s e a b e l i e f t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n was r e l i a b l e o r truthful. Nor does t h i s Court have any s t a t e m e n t o f c o r r o b o r a t i v e f a c t s known o r d i s c o v e r e d . Here, no f a c t s whatever a r e g i v e n , only a f f i a n t ' s u l t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t he beljwes informant was reliable. The second p a r t of t h e A g u i l a - S p i n e l l i be s a t i s f i e d t e s t cannot w i t h s t a t e m e n t s which a r e a t b e s t c o n c l u s o r y . State ex r e l . Townsend v . D i s t r i c t Court, (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 361, The S t a t e attempted t o b o l s t e r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r s e a r c h w a r r a n t by a p e r s o n a l appearance of t h e informant b e f o r e t h e j u s t i c e of peace. I n S t a t e v . Thomson, (1976), 169 Mont. 158, 162, 545 t h i s Court h e l d t h a t o r a l testimony from an informant could be used t o t e s t h i s r e l i a b i l i t y where t h e a f f i d a v i t was o t h e r wise s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h probable c a u s e . t e s t f o r r e l i a b i l i t y was made. I n t h i s c a s e , no No e f f o r t was made by t h e j u s t i c e of peace t o i n q u i r e i n t o f a c t s beyond t h e s t a t e m e n t s a p p e a r i n g i n the application. The f o l l o w i n g testimony d u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g on t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s evidence r e v e a l s J u s t i c e of Peace s t a l l c o p ' s statements: "A. [ I ] asked them, [Stremcha and i n f o r m a n t ] , q u e s t i o n s concerning t h e s t a t e m e n t s t h a t were made i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t t o determine whether o r n o t t h e y knew what was i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and t h a t they were w i l l i n g t o swear t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n were the truth. "Q. I n q u e s t i o n i n g t h e informant and M r . Stremcha, d i d you s e e k any i n f o r m a t i o n o u t s i d e of t h e f a c e of t h e document t o f i n d probable c a u s e ? A . No. I merely i n q u i r e d t o t h e m a t t e r s s e t f o r t h i n t h e application. "Q. D you r e c a l l any s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s t h a t you o asked h e r r e l a t i v e t o t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and t h e f a c t s t h a t were s e t f o r t h ? A . N o . I don't r e c a l l s p e c i f i c questions.'' N e i t h e r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n nor t h e q u e s t i o n s asked by J u s t i c e of Peace S t a l l c o p s a t i s f y t h e requirements f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g j u s t i f i a b l e r e l i a n c e on t h e s t a t e m e n t s of informant. N evidence o was o f f e r e d t h a t i n t h e p a s t s h e had g i v e n a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n of c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . N evidence was p r e s e n t e d by t h e p o l i c e o which would i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d was a c c u r a t e . No a t t e m p t was made t o e s t a b l i s h t h e informant a s an u p s t a n d i n g o r believable citizen. I n t h i s c a s e , we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h t h e r u l e s p e r t a i n i n g t o a mere "informant", not a "citizen-informant" . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s c l e a r l y s e t f o r t h by t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t i n People v . Smith, (1976), 132 Cal.Rptr. 397, 553 P.2d 557, 560: " ' A " c i t i z e n - i n f o r m a n t " i s a c i t i z e n who p u r p o r t s t o be t h e v i c t i m of o r t o have been t h e w i t n e s s of a crime who i s motivated by good c i t i z e n s h i p and a c t s openly i n a i d of law enforcement. It i s reasonable f o r p o l i c e o f f i c e r s t o a c t upon t h e r e p o r t s of such an A "citizen-informant" o b s e r v e r of c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a mere informer who g i v e s a t i p t o law enforcement o f f i c e r s t h a t a person i s engaged i n Thus, experienced t h e c o u r s e of c r i m i n a l conduct. s t o o l pigeons o r persons c r i m i n a l l y involved o r d i s p o s e d a r e n o t regarded a s " c i t i z e n - i n f o r m a n t s " because they a r e g e n e r a l l y motivated by something o t h e r t h a n good citizenship. The d e s i g n a t i o n ' c i t i z e n informant' i s j u s t a s c o n c l u s i o n a r y a s t h e d e s i g n a t i o n ' r e l i a b l e - i n f o r m a n t . ' I n e i t h e r c a s e t h e c o n c l u s i o n must be supported by f a c t s s t a t e d i n t h e a f f i d a v i t . " 553 P.2d 560. *** *** *** * * *' * * * See A g u i l a r v. Texas s u p r a . The r e c o r d h e r e r e v e a l s t h e informant c l e a r l y d i d n o t q u a l i f y a s a "citizen-informant" . F i r s t , the affiant police officer had had p r i o r c o n t a c t w i t h informant, b u t d i d n o t a d v i s e J u s t i c e of Peace S t a l l c o p of t h i s f a c t . Second, t h e informant had c o n t a c t w i t h t h e Havre p o l i c e department and t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e on more than t e n occasions p r i o r t o August 27, 1976. Third, informant was a convicted f e l o n a t t h e time t h e a p p l i c a t i o n was made and b e l i e v e d t h e p o l i c e were aware of t h a t f a c t . Fourth, t h r e e felony charges had been made a g a i n s t informant p r i o r t o August 27, 1976. The record b e f o r e J u s t i c e of Peace S t a l l c o p contained nothing by which he could independently judge t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e information. The D i s t r i c t Court h e l d t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t s were n o t p r e s e n t b e f o r e J u s t i c e of Peace S t a l l c o p and t h e a p p l i c a t i o n was t h e r e f o r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e issuance of a s e a r c h warrant. W agree. e The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. ,' W Concur: e Chief J u s t i c e u J w & d M*U Hon. Alf e B. Coate, D i s t r i c t Judge, s k d n g with t h e Court. Justice
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