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No. 13440 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, GLORIA RAY EAGAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Patrick J. Kelly argued, Miles City, Montana David J. Patterson, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: iie Hom. P l k Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Allen B. Chronister argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Denzil Young argued, County Attorney, Baker, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: qul;z i9lkjl June 5, 1978 q&G 2 !9]@ - M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s i s an a p p e a l by d e f e n d a n t G l o r i a Ray Eagan from h e r c o n v i c t i o n of t h e o f f e n s e of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homic i d e , e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , F a l l o n County, Montana. The s i n g l e i s s u e t o be d e c i d e d on t h i s a p p e a l i s whether t h e r e was i m p r o p r i e t y i n t h e h a n d l i n g of a problem t h a t a r o s e d u r i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l when o n e of t h e empaneled j u r o r s made s t a t e m e n t s i n a p u b l i c p l a c e , o u t s i d e t h e p l a c e of t r i a l , i n d i c a t i n g h i s p r e j u d i c e , and implying t h a t o t h e r s on t h e j u r y p a n e l m i g h t a l s o be p r e j u d i c e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e f a c t s can be b r i e f l y s t a t e d a s f a r as t h e a l l e g e d crime i s concerned. Defendant was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide a r i s i n g o u t of t h e s h o o t i n g d e a t h of one R u s s e l l Hanson on J u l y 1 3 , 1975. Defendant claimed t h a t R u s s e l l Hanson, w h i l e a g u e s t a t h e r home i n t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s of t h a t d a t e , had a t t a c k e d h e r and a t t e m p t e d t o r a p e h e r , and t h a t s h e was r e q u i r e d t o r e p e l h i s a g g r e s s i o n by t h r e a t e n i n g t o u s e a 30.30 r i f l e a g a i n s t him. Defendant s t a t e d s h e had o r d e r e d t h e d e c e d e n t t o g e t o u t of h e r m o b i l e home and t h a t t h e d e c e d e n t , i n s t e a d of l e a v i n g , had t a k e n a s i t t i n g p o s i t i o n on a couch i n t h e home. A t a t i m e when he was a p p a r e n t l y s t a r t i n g t o g e t up from t h e couch, d e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h e r i f l e a c c i d e n t a l l y d i s c h a r g e d w h i l e s h e was h o l d i n g it a t w a i s t l e v e l , and t h e b u l l e t t h e r e f r o m s t r u c k Hanson and caused h i s death. The c a s e was t r i e d b e g i n n i n g F e b r u a r y 2 , 1976, i n D i s t r i c t Court. The j u r y was empaneled on t h e f i r s t day and opening s t a t e m e n t s w e r e made. T r i a l continued through February 3 , 1976, w i t h t h e c a l l i n g of w i t n e s s e s . On F e b r u a r y 4 , 1976, when t h e d e f e n s e was p r e s e n t i n g i t s c a s e and d e f e n d a n t h e r s e l f had been examined and cross-examined, c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t informed t h e c o u r t t h a t he had j u s t l e a r n e d t h a t one o f t h e j u r o r s , Roland Kruger, had made s t a t e m e n t s i n a b a r i n t h e downtown a r e a t h e evening b e f o r e . The p e r s o n t o whom h e made t h e s t a t e m e n t s w a s e v e n t u a l l y c a l l e d b e f o r e t h e c o u r t t o r e p o r t what was s a i d . Here i s what t h e r e c o r d shows w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e o u t - o f - c o u r t statements: L e t t h e r e c o r d show t h a t t h e Court "THE COURT: i s i n chambers w i t h Counsel and t h e C l e r k and t h a t i t i s 1:00 o ' c l o c k . Immediately p r i o r t o t h e noon b r e a k , Counsel appeared i n chambers and a d v i s e d t h e C o u r t t h a t o n e of t h e j u r o r s on t h e p a n e l s i t t i n g i n t h e Cause now b e i n g t r i e d had been downtown l a s t e v e n i n g i n t h e b a r d i s c u s s i n g t h i s c a s e i n p u b l i c and t h e C o u r t t h e n o r d e r e d t h a t t h i s meeting b e h e l d a t 1:00 and t h a t t h e p e r s o n who o v e r h e a r d t h e j u r o r b e b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h e C o u r t - Camera and h i s In t e s t i m o n y be t a k e n . "JOHN MEYERS, h a v i n g been f i r s t d u l y sworn by t h e C l e r k , t e s t i f i e d upon h i s o a t h as f o l l o w s : "BY THE COURT: "Q. For t h e r e c o r d , w i l l you s t a t e your name. "A. John Meyers. "Q. Where do you l i v e ? "A. Phebus T r a i l e r C o u r t . y "Q. I t i s m u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t you w e r e downtown l a s t e v e n i n g , i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? "A. Yes. "Q. Where were you a t ? "A. Corner Bar. "Q. A t what t i m e was t h i s ? "A. About 9:30. "Q. What happened i n t h e Corner Bar a t a b o u t 9:30? "A. W e l l , Roland Kruger was t e l l i n g m e t h a t , you know, t h a t h e w a s on j u r y d u t y and as f a r a s he was concerned, t h a t s h e was g u i l t y and h e a l s o t o l d me t h a t h a l f of t h e j u r y i s Hanson's f r i e n d s . "Q. Who e l s e was p r e s e n t when h e was t a l k i n g t o you? "A. H e was j u s t by m e a t t h e end of t h e Bar. "Q. There w a s n ' t anyone e l s e t h a t o v e r h e a r d t h a t conversation? "A. No. "THE COURT: Do Counsel have any o t h e r q u e s t i o n s ? "BY MR. YOUNG: "Q. Have you s e e n him o t h e r n i g h t s down t h e r e ? Has h e been down Monday n i g h t ? "A. W e l l , l e t me s e e . day n i g h t . "MR. KELLY: I d i d n ' t go uptown Mon- I have no q u e s t i o n s . "Q. (By M r . Young) W s h e drunk? a "A. Yes. "Q. Which i s f r e q u e n t t o him? "A. Yes. "THE COURT: Denzil? Do you have any o t h e r q u e s t i o n s , "MR. YOUNG: No, I d o n ' t t h i n k s o . "MR. KELLY: I have one. "Q. He communicated d i r e c t l y w i t h you? "A. Yes. "MR. KELLY: T h a t i s a l l I have. Thank you. "THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. That i s a l l , " (Witness excused. ) "THE COURT: Now, I t h i n k t h a t w e s h o u l d c a l l him i n a n d a s k him, g i v e him a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o e x p l a i n i t o r deny i t o r a d m i t i t . "MR. YOUNG: I s u g g e s t e d t o P a t t h a t i f , you know, i f t h i s were s u p p o r t e d , r a t h e r t h a n c r e a t e a f u r o r on t h e j u r y , w e c o u l d w a i t u n t i l t h e c a s e i s i n and excuse him and u s e t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t e . I f h e were c a l l e d i n h e r e and examined, h e would be excused and t h e r e - - I w a s t h i n k i n g , i t m i g h t c a u s e a l i t t l e d i s t r a c t i o n f o r t h e jury i f he disappeared suddenly. "THE COURT: W e l l , t h i s i s f i n e . I t h i n k t h a t w e o u g h t t o have him i n and have him t e s t i f y . "MR. KELLY: I agree. "THE COURT: Whether w e do i t now o r do i t f o l l o w i n g r e c e s s a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t o d a y ' s t r i a l i s i m m a t e r i a l t o me. "MR. YOUNG: It doesn't matter t o me. "THE COURT: Then i n t h e e v e n t t h a t h e s a y s , 'Yeah, I d i d i t , ' what a r e C o u n s e l ' s s u g g e s t i o n s ? M s u g g e s t i o n - - w e l l , f i r s t of a l l , y "MR. KELLY: a s t o him, I t h i n k t h a t h e s h o u l d be excused a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e c a s e p r i o r t o t h e j u r y going t o t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s . I t h i n k t h e proper I have a a l t e r n a t e should be p u t i n h i s stead. second q u e s t i o n . Does t h i s i n d i c a t e a problem o t h e r t h a n w i t h him on t h i s j u r y ? And I am wondering i f w e have any i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e B a i l i f f regarding conversations. Have t h e y been d i s c u s s i n g t h i s c a s e p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of b e i n g charged? I j u s t d o n ' t know. T h a t i s a q u e s t i o n I d o n ' t have any answer. With him, I have no d o u b t s he s h o u l d be excused. "MR. YOUNG: I w i l l a s k him i f h e h a s d i s c u s s e d i t w i t h any of t h e o t h e r j u r o r s . "THE COURT: Well, I t h i n k t h i s i s a p r o p e r i n q u i r y t o a s k him. I f h e h a s been d i s c u s s i n g t h e c a s e w i t h t h e o t h e r j u r o r s , t h a t is--and whether t h e r e s t o f t h e j u r y have i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y have made t h e i r minds up and i f t h e o t h e r members of t h e j u r y have, t h e n I suppose we have a m i s t r i a l . And i f we have a m i s t r i a l , I suppose t h a t w e b e t t e r f i n d o u t a b o u t it today. "MR. YOUNG: W e d o n ' t have any r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t t h e r e s t of t h e jury i s contaminated. No, b u t i f h e s a y s t h i s i s what h a s "THE COURT: happened and t h e whole j u r y i s c o n t a m i n a t e d , t h e n I t h i n k we may a s w e l l d e c l a r e a m i s t r i a l and s t a r t o v e r a g a i n . I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, h e s a y s , no, h e h a s n ' t t a l k e d w i t h t h e r e s t of t h e j u r y , o r h e h a s n ' t h e a r d any of them t a l k , t h e n I t h i n k what we o u g h t t o do i s g e t r i d of him and p u t an a l t e r n a t e i n and go ahead and complete t h e t r i a l . I am n o t g o i n g t o presume t h a t a l l of t h e s e p e o p l e b r e a k t h e i r oath. "ROLAND KRUGER, b e i n g f i r s t d u l y sworn by t h e C l e r k , t e s t i f i e d upon h i s o a t h as f o l l o w s : "BY THE COURT: "Q. Roland, i t h a s been b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e C o u r t t h a t l a s t n i g h t you w e r e downtown i n t h e Corner Bar a t a b o u t 9:30 and w h i l e you were there, you advised a person that you had made up your mind that the defendant was guilty. You further advised this individual that about half of the jury were personal friends of the Hanson family. Is this charge true? "A. Pardon? "Q. Is this charge true? "A. Not to my knowledge, nope. "Q. Were you downtown last night? "A. Yes. "Q. Were you in the Corner Bar? "A. Yes, I was. "Q. Were you there about 9 : 3 0 ? "A. I would assume so. "Q. And while you were there, you were down at the end of the bar talking to John Meyers? "A. John Meyers? I don't even know the guy personally. What does he do? "Q. He is a very dark complected person. Black hair. "A. Oh, did he used to work for Signal? Yes, I was uptown, but any statement I made, I made a joke of it. There was no -"Q. Well, have you discussed this case with any of the other jurors? "A. No, I haven't. "Q. Have any of the jurors discussed it with you? "A. No, they sure haven't. am not that type of guy. "THE COURT: "MR. YOUNG: "MR. KELLY: No, I am positive. Do Counsel have any questions? No. No. "A. No, i f I said anything, it was in the line of bull. There was no business talk. "THE COURT: Okay, you may leave. Tell the Bailiff that I will advise him when we are ready to proceed. " (Witness excused. ) I Okay, what i s t h e s u g g e s t i o n ? "THE COURT: "MR. KELLY: H i s answer was t h a t a n y t h i n g he s a i d So was made i n a -- s a i d i n a humorous f a s h i o n . I t a k e i t a s some of t h e a d m i s s i o n i n c o n n e c t i o n with h i s conversation of t h i s case. I would t h i n k , a t t h e v e r y l e a s t , h e s h o u l d be excused. I think so. "THE COURT: "MR. KELLY: I would a l s o s u g g e s t t h a t h e m i g h t H e a p p e a r s t o b e e i t h e r e x t r e m e l y hung o v e r o r p e r h a p s he i s under t h e i n f l u e n c e r i g h t now. "THE CLERK: -- Hard of h e a r i n g , I t h i n k . "MR. YOUNG: He worked f o r many y e a r s , r i g work, I haven't has probably a f f e c t e d h i s hearing. t a l k e d t o him f o r a c o u p l e of y e a r s and I am n o t aware of t h a t problem. A l l right. Now, d i d you want me t o "THE COURT: e x c u s e him now o r a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t o d a y ' s case? "MR. now. KELLY: I d o n ' t t h i n k he s h o u l d be excused I t h i n k a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t o d a y ' s c a s e . "MR. YOUNG: Fine. "THE COURT: A l l right. L e t ' s go." T h e r e a f t e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court resumed t h e t r i a l , w i t h M. Kruger s t i l l s i t t i n g i n t h e j u r y f o r t h e b a l a n c e of t h e r a f t e r n o o n , d u r i n g which t i m e t h e r e m a i n i n g t e s t i m o n y i n t h e c a s e was completed. T h a t e v e n i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s were s e t t l e d , whereupon c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t moved t h e c o u r t f o r a m i s t r i a l of t h e c a u s e upon t h e ground t h a t t h e r e had been improper c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t of t h e j u r y a s evidenced by t h e h e a r i n g e a r l i e r had t h a t day. The motion was d e n i e d by t h e District Court. On t h e f o l l o w i n g morning, F e b r u a r y 5 , 1976, t r i a l was resumed a t 9:30 a.m. a t which t i m e t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o c e e d i n g s t o o k p l a c e i n chambers: " I N CHAMBERS : " ( M r . Xruger c a l l e d i n . ) "THE COURT: A f t e r t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h i s m a t t e r we d i s c u s s e d y e s t e r d a y , t h e consequences a r e t h a t i f i t w e r e p r o v a b l e , i f you made t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s , we would have a m i s t r i a l and we would have t o go t h r o u g h t h e whole t h i n g one more t i m e a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e expense t o t h e county. "A. Yes. Not o n l y t h a t , b u t i f i t were "THE COURT: p r o v a b l e , you would have v i o l a t e d a t l e a s t two l a w s , t h o s e b e i n g contempt of c o u r t and f a i l u r e t o perform your o f f i c i a l d u t i e s . And I am n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n s e e i n g you c h a r g e d w i t h a crime. I am n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n a n y t h i n g o t h e r than seeing t h a t t h i s t r i a l i s properly, f a i r l y conducted and t h a t t h e county i s n ' t p u t t o t h e expense of r e t r y i n g i t . And s o , f o r t h a t r e a s o n , I t h i n k i t would b e b e s t of a l l i f I remove you a s a j u r o r and p u t one of t h e a l t e r n a t e s i n your s p o t . And t h a t i s what I am g o i n g t o do. "A. Yes. "THE COURT: And I t h i n k t h a t , f i r s t of a l l , a s f a r a s you a r e concerned, I am g o i n g t o i n s t r u c t you n o t t o d i s c u s s t h i s t r i a l o r n o t t o d i s c u s s t h e r e a s o n t h a t you were removed w i t h anybody, and i f you d o , I w i l l c h a r g e you w i t h contempt of c o u r t b e c a u s e I d o n ' t want a b u i l t - i n e r r o r I t i s t o o i m p o r t a n t of a c a s e . i n t h i s case. "A. Yes, I r e a l i z e t h a t . So i t m i g h t be b e t t e r f o r you and "THE COURT: f o r everybody i f you j u s t s a y you g o t s i c k t o d a y and you c o u l d n ' t s i t . "A. Well, I have a q u e s t i o n i f I may a s k i t . Who c a l l e d t h i s i n ? Well, t h e r e p o r t came t o t h e C o u r t "THE COURT: t h r o u g h d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . Somebody a d v i s e d him. I d o n ' t know, I d i d n ' t a s k . "A. Who would it come t o ? "THE COURT: W e l l , defense counsel i s t h e person t h a t t o l d me. Now, I d o n ' t know where h e h e a r d it. "A. Yes, b e c a u s e i f I remember r i g h t , i t was-- W s i t Meyers? a "THE COURT: Yes. I t i s an u n f o r t u n a t e t h i n g and what you c a n do i s s t a y h e r e and I w i l l c a l l t h e j u r y i n and t h e n -- "(Whereupon M r . Kruger was r e p l a c e d by A l t e r n a t e J u r o r NO. 1.) " T h e r e a f t e r , w i t h Kruger excused, and t h e a l t e r n a t e juror s i t t i n g i n h i s place, t h e jury r e t i r e d t o consider i t s v e r d i c t , and r e t u r n e d i t s f i n d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide. On F e b r u a r y 2 6 , 1976, d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o a term of f i v e y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e prison. She moved f o r a new t r i a l on t h e ground s h e had been d e n i e d h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury. The motion f o r new t r i a l was d e n i e d on March 11, 1976, and t h e r e a f t e r t h i s a p p e a l ensued. Defendant s t a t e s two i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w on a p p e a l : 1. Was t h e s t a t e m e n t made by J u r o r Kruger such t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e d s u f f i c i e n t misconduct and p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t of t h e j u r y s o a s t o r e q u i r e a m i s t r i a l ? 2. Did t h e a l t e r n a t i v e remedy chosen by t h e c o u r t , t h a t i s , replacing t h e jury with an a l t e r n a t e , cure t h e t r i a l defect? W e w i l l consider t h e i s s u e s together. The r i g h t of a d e f e n d a n t t o speedy p u b l i c t r i a l by a n i m p a r t i a l j u r y i s s o s a c r e d t o o u r system of j u r i s p r u d e n c e t h a t i t i s p r e s e r v e d b o t h i n o u r s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s . A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 2 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ; S i x t h Amendment, United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . The v e r b a t i m e x c e r p t from t h e t r a n s c r i p t i n d i c a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a s w e l l a s c o u n s e l , were f u l l y aware of t h e s a n c t i t y of d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o a n i m p a r t i a l j u r y . We are c a l l e d upon h e r e t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e c o u r s e of a c t i o n t a k e n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t upon t h e d i s c o v e r y of a d i s q u a l i f i e d j u r o r d i d i n f a c t remove any p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t occas i o n e d t h e r e b y s o t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a c c o r d e d h e r r i g h t of fair trial. For t h e most p a r t , i t seems t h a t w e would r e g a r d a s p e r s u a s i v e t h e f i n d i n g o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t any p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t o f misconduct by a j u r o r had i n f a c t been removed. C e r t a i n l y i n such m a t t e r s a s w h e t h e r , f o r example, t h e r e s p o n s e s of a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r on v o i r d i r e i n d i c a t e h i s s t a t e of mind, o r whether a j u r o r had i n f a c t d i s q u a l i f i e d h i m s e l f by p r e j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t would be g i v e n c o n s i d e r a b l e w e i g h t by t h i s Court. I n t h e s i t u a t i o n p r e s e n t e d h e r e , however, i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h i s C o u r t i s i n a s good a p o s i t i o n a s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o make t h i s judgment where t h e r e a r e no f a c t u a l c o n f l i c t s a p p a r e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e conduct i t s e l f . A s was s t a t e d i n P e o p l e v . Brown, (1976), "Some c a s e s have t r e a t e d t h e i s s u e of t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of j u r y misconduct a s b e i n g a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t and have h e l d t h a t a f i n d i n g of no p r e j u d i c e i m p l i e d i n t h e d e n i a l of a new t r i a l s h o u l d n o t be s e t a s i d e u n l e s s t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t o s u s t a i n i t . * * * W a r e of t h e view however e t h a t t h e more e n l i g h t e n e d and a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e i s t h a t s i n c e j u r y misconduct c h a l l e n g e s t h e fundamental r i g h t t o a n u n p r e j u d i c e d j u r y and t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e t r i a l proceedings, t h i s i s s u e i s a n i n d e p e n d e n t a p p e l l a t e i s s u e t o be a d j u d i c a t e d by t h i s c o u r t based upon t h e whole r e c o r d . * * *" From t h e r e c o r d i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r d i d i n f a c t make t h e s t a t e m e n t s a t t r i b u t e d t o him i n a p u b l i c p l a c e t o a t h i r d p e r s o n , w h i l e t h e t r i a l was i n progress. When t h e j u r o r was b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h e c o u r t i n chambers, h e f i r s t d e n i e d t h a t h e knew t h e t h i r d p e r s o n . Then t h e j u r o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he was merely j o k i n g a s t o any s t a t e m e n t s h e had made. Following t h a t h e s t a t e d he had n o t d i s c u s s e d t h e c a s e w i t h any of t h e o t h e r j u r o r s . When t h e j u r o r was excused a f t e r h i s e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e r e was a d i s c u s s i o n by c o u r t and c o u n s e l a s t o whether h e was "under t h e i n f l u e n c e " o r hung o v e r , o r whether he was i n f a c t h a r d of h e a r i n g . A t any r a t e , t h e j u r o r was p e r m i t t e d t o s i t w i t h t h e remainder of t h e j u r y f o r t h e b a l a n c e of t h e t i m e t h a t t e s t i m o n y was t a k e n t h a t day. F u r t h e r , t h e r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a t i n t h e p e r i o d when t h e c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r was s i t t i n g w i t h t h e j u r y , f o l l o w i n g h i s e x a m i n a t i o n i n chambers, f o u r r e c e s s e s w e r e t a k e n by t h e c o u r t d u r i n g t h e remainder of t h e a f t e r n o o n . There w a s a r e c e s s t a k e n w h i l e c o u r t and c o u n s e l r e t i r e d t o chambers t o d i s c u s s a l e g a l p o i n t , and a f u r t h e r r e c e s s f o r t h e same purpose. A rest-period r e c e s s was t a k e n m i d a f t e r n o o n , and a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e t e s t i m o n y , a n e v e n i n g r e c e s s was d e c l a r e d u n t i l 9:30 a.m. t h e f o l l o w i n g morning. On e a c h of t h e s e occasions i t appears t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y w i t h t h e u s u a l admonition t h a t t h e y s h o u l d n o t d i s c u s s t h i s c a s e w i t h e a c h o t h e r o r among t h e m s e l v e s o r w i t h o t h e r s ; b u t , it i s a l s o t o b e n o t e d t h a t t h e same admonition had been g i v e n p r i o r t o t h e d i s c o v e r y of t h e p r e j u d i c i a l s t a t e ments, which admonition t h e c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r a p p a r e n t l y ignored. Allowing t h i s j u r o r t o s i t w i t h t h e remainder of t h e jury, including t h e a l t e r n a t e , a f t e r t h e discovery t h a t h e was a d i s q u a l i f i e d j u r o r i s t h e f i r s t d i f f i c u l t y we f i n d i n t h e p r o c e d u r e f o l l o w e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . The second d i f f i c u l t y r e l a t e s t o t h e b a l a n c e of t h e s t a t e m e n t s a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e same j u r o r - - t h a t i s , "he a l s o t o l d me t h a t h a l f of t h e j u r y i s Hanson's f r i e n d s " . The q u e s t i o n s by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h i s p o i n t t o Kruger d i d n o t q u i t e r e a c h t h e s o u r c e of t h i s j u r o r ' s i n f o r m a t i o n as t o t h i s s t a t e m e n t , n o r t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h e r e i n t h a t h a l f of t h e j u r y was a l s o p r e j u d i c e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t . The third difficulty relates to whether the disqualified juror may have made known his prejudice to the other members of the jury. The District Court relied completely upon the responses of the challenged juror that he had not discussed the case with the other jurors. At no stage of the trial were the other jurors interrogated by the District Court as to what contact or expression of opinion the challenged juror may have made to them while he was sitting with them on the jury panel. This is important because as pointed out in People v. Brown, supra: "In approaching the issue of prejudice, it first must be noted that a unanimous verdict is required in a criminal case. Thus, the disqualification of a single juror could have resulted in a different verdict on any of the counts." 132 Cal.Rptr. at 221. The duty to preserve a fair trial for the defendant rests in the first instance upon the trial judge. Shaw, (Mich. 1969), 164 N.W.2d 7, 12, 13. People v. When a juror is found to have been guilty of improper conduct, such improper conduct is charged to the entire panel, Kinkaid v. Wade, (Kan. 1966), 410 P.2d 333, 337, since the jurors operate as a unit, and since public policy demands that misconduct be discouraged and insofar as possible prohibited. 337. Kinkaid, at We cannot assume therefore that the remainder of the jury panel had been safeguarded from contamination in the absence of some interrogation addressed to those jurors to dispel the possibility that prejudice existed, either from friendship, or from prejudicial comments by Kruger. It is this factor that distinguishes this case from State v. Baugh, (1977), Mont . , 571 P. 2d 779, 34 St.Rep. 1315. Baugh was a case where the District Court learned during the course of the trial that one of the jurors had, before the trial, viewed a videotape of the exhumation of t h e d e c e a s e d . The c o u r t l e a r n e d of t h i s f a c t f i v e d a y s a f t e r t h e t r i a l had commenced. The c o u r t c a l l e d t h e j u r o r i n t o chambers and determined t h e r e t h a t t h e j u r o r had i n f a c t previewed t h e v i d e o t a p e . The j u r o r , upon t h e c o u r t ' s q u e s t i o n , i n d i c a t e d t h a t no o t h e r j u r o r knew t h a t s h e had viewed t h e v i d e o t a p e . The c o u r t immediately excused t h e j u r o r from f u r t h e r s e r v i c e and a l l o w e d t h e t r i a l t o proceed by s e a t i n g one of t h e a l t e r n a t e j u r o r s . However, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n Baugh took one more i m p o r t a n t s t e p . A f t e r t h e j u r y had r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t , b u t b e f o r e t h e v e r d i c t was announced, t h e c o u r t q u e s t i o n e d t h e j u r y and asked them i f a t any t i m e d u r i n g t h e t r i a l t h e d i s q u a l i f i e d j u r o r had d i s c u s s e d w i t h any of them any of t h e e v i d e n c e on the trial. A l l of t h e j u r y responded "No". have no s u c h r e a s s u r i n g i n t e r r o g a t i o n . In t h i s case we There i s l e f t hanging i n t h e a i r h e r e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t one h a l f of t h e j u r y i n t h i s c a s e were f r i e n d s of t h e d e c e d e n t o v e r whose d e a t h d e f e n d a n t was b e i n g t r i e d ; moreover, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e d i s q u a l i f i e d j u r o r may have communicated h i s p r e j u d i c e t o o t h e r members of t h e j u r y was n o t f u l l y s e a r c h e d o u t . In t h a t s i t u a t i o n i t c a n n o t be s t a t e d u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t no p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t had o c c u r r e d . I t i s t h e r u l e i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t i f j u r y misconduct i s shown t e n d i n g t o i n j u r e t h e d e f e n d a n t , p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t i s presumed; however, t h e presumption i s n o t a b s o l u t e and may be r e b u t t e d by t h e u s e of t e s t i m o n y of t h e j u r o r s t o show f a c t s which p r o v e t h a t p r e j u d i c e o r i n j u r y d i d n o t o r could n o t occur. S t a t e v. Jackson, Mont. 508, 522, 24 P . ~ l e c t r i c ,I n c . , 722. 213, 216. (1890), 9 P u t r o v . ~ a l c e rand Mannix ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 7 Mont. 1 3 9 , 1 4 7 , 410 ~ . 2 d 717, The p r o c e d u r e f o l l o w e d by t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court i n Baugh had t h e e f f e c t of overcoming t h e presumption of p r e j u d i c e c a u s e d by j u r y misconduct. The r e s p o n s e of t h e j u r o r s , b e f o r e t h e i r v e r d i c t was announced, overcame t h e presumption. I n t h i s c a s e , t h e members of t h e j u r y were n o t s o i n t e r r o g a t e d , and t h e r e f o r e t h e presumption of p r e j u d i c e remains. What t h i s C o u r t s a i d i n P u t r o , s u p r a , b e a r s r e p e a t i n g : "The g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e of o u r l e g a l system i s f a i r n e s s . W e must t e n a c i o u s l y a d h e r e t o t h e i d e a l t h a t b o t h s i d e s of a l a w s u i t be g u a r a n t e e d Sec. 27, A r t . 111, Montana Cona fair trial. s t i t u t i o n . The f u n c t i o n of t h e j u r y i s t o dec i d e t h e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e o n l y on e v i d e n c e introduced a t t r i a l . I t h a s been n o t e d t h a t ' T h e r e i s no p r a c t i c a b l e method t o s o a n a l y z e t h e m e n t a l o p e r a t i o n of t h e j u r o r s a s t o d e t e r mine w h e t h e r , i n p o i n t of f a c t , t h e v e r d i c t would have been t h e same i f t h e t r i a l had been c o n d u c t e d , a s b o t h p a r t i e s had a r i g h t t o e x p e c t , a c c o r d i n g t o law and upon t h e e v i d e n c e i n c o u r t . ' McDaniels v . McDaniels, 40 V t . 3 6 3 . The t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have d e c l a r e d a m i s t r i a l i n j u s t i c e t o i t s e l f a s w e l l a s t o p a r t i e s , s o t h a t a f a i r t r i a l may res u l t and t h e v e r d i c t when r e n d e r e d may b e e n t i t l e d t o t h e r e s p e c t of b o t h p a r t i e s and t h e c o n f i d e n c e of t h e c o u r t . W c a n n o t be t o o s t r i c t i n g u a r d i n g e t r i a l s by j u r i e s from improper i n f l u e n c e s . T h i s s t r i c t n e s s i s n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e due c o n f i d e n c e t o p a r t i e s i n t h e r e s u l t s of t h e i r c a u s e s , and t o e n l i g h t e n t h e p u b l i c who have r e c o u r s e t o o u r c o u r t s t h a t any improper i n f l u e n c e which h a s t h e n a t u r a l tendency t o p r e j u d i c e t h e v e r d i c t i s grounds f o r a m i s t r i a l . * * * " 147 Mont. 147, 148, 4 1 0 P.2d 722. W e r e v e r s e t h e judgment of c o n v i c t i o n a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t and remand f o r a new t r i a l . We concur: Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: I dissent. By sheer speculation the majority finds, without a scintilla of proof, that the jury might have been influenced by something Juror Kruger said or did before being removed at the conclusion of the case. Our recent case of State v. Baugh, (1977), Mont. , 571 P.2d 779, 34 St.Rep. 1315, is in my view controlling. In that case we held: "Defendant was not prejudiced by the occurrence involving juror Kolar. While serious prejudice may have arisen if juror Kolar had participated in the verdict, those problems were thus arrested by replacing her with an alternate juror and the further safeguards taken by the trial judge." 571 P.2d 784. The same can be said here. The trial court questioned the offending juror to insure he had not discussed the case with the other jurors. The defense counsel agreed that the court should wait until the conclusion of the evidence to dismiss the juror so as not to disrupt the jury. The court went further by instructing the juror not to discuss his removal with anyone and to say he was sick, if asked. In addition, there is nothing in the record to show prejudice to the appellant. The fact the juror said the victim's family "enjoyed the friendship of most people in the area" falls far short of the prejudice that would prevent a fair trial. examination. This fact came out during voir dire The juror himself contradicted any factual basis for the statement when he denied talking to any of the jurors or that any had talked to him. Here, t h e t r i a l c o u r t had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o t a k e what c u r a t i v e measures w e r e necessary b e f o r e t h e j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s began and I c a n f i n d no b a s i s f o r f i n d i n g any p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t w a r r a n t i n g a new t r i a l . ra Mr. f 1 w C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. Has e l 1 c o n c u r s w i t h t h e d i s s e n t . Chief J u s t i c e

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