CALAWAY v JONES

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 13900 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA TIMOTHY T. CALAWAY, Plaintiff, -vsSID JONES, Defendant. ........................................ SID JONES, Third Party Plaintiff and Appellant, -vsPARKER IRRIGATION Appeal from: & SUPPLY et al., Third Party Defendants and Respondents. District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable doel G, R&h, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great Falls, Montana George N. McCabe argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Marra, Wenz, Iwen and Johnson, Great Falls, Montana Alexander, Kuenning & Miller, Great Falls, Montana Edward C. Alexander argued, Great Falls, Montana Dzivi, Conklin, Johnson & Nybo, Great Falls, Montana William Conklin argued, Great Falls, Montana Cure and Borer, Great Falls, Montana Edward W. Borer argued, Great Falls, Montana Smith, Emmons, Baillie and Walsh, Great Falls, Montana Dennis P. Clarke argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: Decided: May 1, 1978 JUN 2 ? 197.Q M r . J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court: This i s an appeal from an order of d i s m i s s a l e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Cascade County. This a c t i o n was commenced by a complaint f i l e d on December 5 , 1972, by p l a i n t i f f Timothy T . Calaway, a g a i n s t defendant Sid Jones. The complaint a l l e g e d Calaway leased land from Jones i n 1971, t o be seeded i n potatoes. Jones agreed t o provide i r r i g a t i o n f o r the land. The p a r t i e s a d d i t i o n a l l y agreed on a d i v i s i o n of crop shares. Calaway a l l e g e d Jones f a i l e d t o provide t h e i r r i g a t i o n system required and, a s a r e s u l t , t h e e n t i r e crop was l o s t . On January 3, 1973, Jones f i l e d an answer, counterclaim and t h i r d p a r t y complaint, denying r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e crop l o s s , a l l e g i n g sums due and owing him from Calaway and a s s e r t i n g claims seeking both a f f i r m a t i v e r e l i e f and idemnification a g a i n s t Parker I r r i g a t i o n & Supply, a d i v i s i o n of B i t t e r r o o t Cannery & Wholesale Supply Company, a Montana corporation; Simpson Timber Company, a corporation; Gheen I r r i g a t i o n Works, a corporation; and B. F. Goodrich Company, a c o r p o r a t i o n , t h i r d p a r t y defendants and respondents. I n sum, t h e t h i r d party complaint a l l e g e d t h e i r r i g a t i o n system i n s t a l l e d and furnished by respondent Parker I r r i g a t i o n & Supply, and m a t e r i a l s manufactured by t h e o t h e r respondents, were d e f e c t i v e and, t h e r e f o r e , responsible f o r t h e crop f a i l u r e . Respondents f i l e d answers, t h e l a s t was f i l e d by Parker I r r i g a t i o n on November 27, 1973. By reason of crossclaims between t h e respondents f o r indemnity, t h e pleadings between respondents were n o t completed u n t i l A p r i l 1975. I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s were s e n t by Jones t o a l l respondents following t h e i n i t i a t i o n of t h e t h i r d p a r t y a c t i o n . The i n t e r r o - g a t o r i e s were completed upon the June 26, 1974, r e c e i p t of t h e answers of Parker I r r i g a t i o n . B. F. Goodrich Company submitted i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s t o Jones on September 10, 1973. Upon h i s f a i l u r e t o answer, Goodrich, on June 27, 1974, moved t o compel answers t o i t s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . Jones answered t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s on J u l y 2, 1974. Jones was t o be deposed by Goodrich on March 3 , 1975. However, Jones f a i l e d t o appear, and was n o t deposed u n t i l March 24, 1975, upon t h e order t o appear entered by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Jones has taken no f u r t h e r a c t i o n i n prosecution of h i s t h i r d party claims. F i n a l l y , on May 12, 1977, Simpson Timber Company moved t o dismiss t h e t h i r d p a r t y complaint f o r want of prosecution. o t h e r respondents joined i n t h e motion. was held on June 1, 1977. The A hearing on t h e motions On June 7 , 1977, t h e D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e motions t o dismiss, finding: ** t h a t t h e t h i r d p a r t y p l a i n t i f f has not been d i l i g e n t i n t h e prosecution of t h e t h i r d p a r t y comp l a i n t , o r i n procuring determination of t h e p r i n c i p a l a c t i o n and t h a t t h e r e i s no adequate excuse f o r t h e *.It delay It* ** Jones appeals t h e June 7 , 1977, o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court dismissing h i s t h i r d p a r t y complaint. The s o l e i s s u e presented f o r review i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n dismissing t h e t h i r d p a r t y comp l a i n t f o r want of prosecution. The r u l e of c i v i l procedure which governs t h e d i s m i s s a l of an a c t i o n f o r f a i l u r e t o prosecute i s Rule 41(b), M.R.Civ.P. I t provides i n p a r t : -- "INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL EFFECT THEREOF. For f a i l u r e of t h e p l a i n t i f f t o prosecute o r t o comply with t h e s e r u l e s o r any order of c o u r t , a defendant may move f o r d i s m i s s a l of an a c t i o n o r of any claim a g a i n s t him. ** *It It i s g e n e r a l l y h e l d , i n t h e absence of a s t a t u t e pres c r i b i n g time l i m i t a t i o n s f o r bringing an a c t i o n t o t r i a l , t h a t t h e matter of d i s m i s s a l f o r want of prosecution i s a matter addressed t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . This Court s t a t e d i n Cremer v. Braaten, (1968), 151 Mont. 18, 19, 20, 438 P.2d 553: "It i s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o dismiss an a c t i o n i f i t has n o t been prosecuted with reasonable d i l i g e n c e . It i s presumed t h e t r i a l c o u r t a c t e d c o r r e c t l y and i t s decision w i l l n o t be overturned without a showing of an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . M.R.Civ.P., Rule 41(b); S t a t e Savings Bank v. Albertson, 39 Mont. 414, 415, 102 P. 692; S i l v e r v. Eakins, 55 Mont. 210, 175 P. 876." I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , Jones argues t h e District Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n dismissing t h e cross-complaint a s respondents have shown no a c t u a l prejudice occasioned by t h e d e l a y , a s a l l witnesses a r e p r e s e n t l y a v a i l a b l e f o r t r i a l . Likewise, Jones con- tends t h e delay a t t r i b u t a b l e t o him was n o t exceedingly lengthy, thus f a i l i n g t o give r i s e t o a presumption of prejudice. W e cannot agree with t h i s contention i n view of t h e conduct of Jones during t h e discovery phase of the t h e proceedings. It i s well e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana law t h a t an a c t i o n may be dismissed f o r f a i l u r e of t h e p l a i n t i f f t o prosecute i t with due d i l i g e n c e , absent a s u f f i c i e n t showing of excuse. S t a t e ex r e l . Johnstone v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1957), 132 Mont. 377, 319 P.2d 957; Cremer v. Braaten, supra. The unanimous weight of a u t h o r i t y demonstrates t h a t t h e r u l e i s equally a p p l i c a b l e t o a defendant's f a i l u r e t o d i l i g e n t l y prosecute a cross-claim o r counterclaim. Seaman v. Superior Court of Marin County, (1920), 183 Ca1.47, 190 P. 441; H a r r i s v. H a r r i s , (1948), 65 Nev. 342, 196 P.2d 402; P e t t i n e v. Rogers, (1958), 63 N.M. 457, 321 P.2d 638; Hanson v. Lee, (1970), 3 Wash.App. 461, 476 P.2d 550; 27 CJS.Dismissa1 & Nonsuit 565. I t was i n i t i a l l y held i n Montana t h a t mere l a p s e of time i s insufficient i n i t s e l f t o j u s t i f y a dismissal. S t a t e Savings Bank v. Albertson, (1909), 39 Mont. 414, 102 P. 692. However, i n commenting upon t h e r u l e i n Cremer v. Braaten, supra, t h i s Court s t a t e d : " P l a i n t i f f argues t h a t t h e a c t i o n could n o t be dismissed a s defendant has shown no i n j u r y by t h e delay. When a p l a i n t i f f has s l e p t on h i s cause f o r over twelve years t h e law presumes i n j u r y and places t h e burden on t h e p l a i n t i f f t o show good cause f o r t h e delay. S t a t e ex r e l . Johnstone v. D i s t r i c t Court, 132 Mont. 151 Mont. 20. 377, 319 P.2d 957." A unreasonable delay t h e r e f o r e operates t o place upon t h e p a r t y n seeking r e l i e f t h e burden of demonstrating a reasonable excuse f o r h i s inaction. Here, however, we f i n d t h e delay occasioned by Jones' i n a c t i o n t o be unreasonable. Jones f a i l e d t o take any s i g n i f i c a n t a c t i o n towards a f i n a l determination of t h e case f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e years p r i o r t o t h e d i s m i s s a l , and has o f f e r e d no excuse f o r t h e delay. Jones' f a i l u r e t o timely respond t o c e r t a i n i n t e r r o g a - t o r i e s , and f a i l u r e t o appear a t a scheduled deposition c h a r a c t e r i z e h i s i n a c t i o n regarding furtherance of an u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n of h i s claim. A s no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n dismissing t h e cross-claim has been demonstrated, t h e order dismissing such claim i n favor of respondents and each of them i s a f %! + , W Concur: e zd $.%YCPQ Chief Justice Justices .

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.