MCGEE v BURLINGTON NORTHERN INC

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No. 14233 IN THE SUPRFME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 DONALD R. MCSEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vsBURLETCN NOIITHERN, INC., a corporation, Defendant and Respondent , . Appeal fm: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable N a t Allen, District Judge presiding. Counsel of &cord: For Appellant: John C. Hoyt argued, Great Falls, Wntana For Respondent: Gough, Snanahan, Johnson and Watennan, Helena, Montana Cordell Johnson argued, Helena, Montana Suhitted: Decided: October 1 2 , 1978 -3C' 2 - '978 Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. plaintiff appeals from an order of the District Court, Cascade County, setting aside a satisfaction of judgment. On November 15, 1977, this Court affirmed a jury verdict of $618,000 in favor of plaintiff in his personal injury action against defendant. Mont. McGee v. Burlington Northern (1977), , 571 P.2d 784, 34 St.Rep. 1304. On or about December 7, 1977, negotiations began between counsel for both parties to reach a mutually agreeable satisfaction of the judgment. In the course of these negotiations, defendant offered plaintiff $490,000 to satisfy the judgment. Allegedly this amount plus $171,306.04 obtained by plaintiff through executions on defendant's property, covers the full amount of the judgment with interest, and awards plaintiff his costs. Plaintiff accepted the offer. On December 9, 1977, defendant gave plaintiff's counsel a check for $490,000 in return for a satisfaction of judgment. Defendant thereafter filed the satisfaction of judgment with the District Court. Shortly after plaintiff's counsel had received defendant's check, cashed it and distributed the proceeds, defendant informed him that it was going to stop payment on the check. Defendant told plaintiff's counsel that it was going to stop payment because it had overpaid plaintiff $10,000. Defendant stated that in arriving at the $490,000 figure, it had overlooked $10,000 in advances given plaintiff in 1971 and 1972, which he had agreed to repay. L Plaintiff's counsel told defendant that it could not stop payment on the check, because it had been cashed and the proceeds distributed. Thereafter on December 28, 1977, defendant filed a motion under Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P., to have the satisfaction of judgment s e t a s i d e on t h e grounds o f m i s t a k e and s e e k i n g r e s t i t u t i o n of t h e $10,000 a l l e g e d l y o v e r p a i d t o p l a i n t i f f . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d t h e motion s u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s . B r i e f s were s u b m i t t e d by b o t h s i d e s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment. P l a i n t i f f now a p p e a l s from t h a t o r d e r . I n h i s appeal, p l a i n t i f f has r a i s e d f i v e s e p a r a t e i s s u e s f o r our consideration. broader context. W e w i l l discuss these issues i n t h e i r A c c o r d i n g l y , we r e s t a t e t h e u n d e r l y i n g i s s u e i n t h i s manner: Was i t p r o p e r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o s e t a s i d e t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment t h r o u g h a motion under Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P.? Rule 6 0 ( b ) s u p p l i e s a p r o c e d u r e whereby a p a r t y upon mot i o n c a n b e r e l i e v e d from a " f i n a l judgment, o r d e r o r proceeding" f o r c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c reasons. One of t h e r e a s o n s t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e t o a p a r t y i s "mistake". Defendant a r g u e s t h a t i t was upon t h i s ground t h a t i t made i t s motion. Rule 6 0 ( b ) ( 5 ) p r o v i d e s t h a t a p a r t y may b e r e l i e v e d from a f i n a l judgment upon a showing t h a t i t h a s been s a t i s f i e d . The r u l e d o e s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e t h a t a s a t i s f a c t i o n o f judgment i s a f i n a l judgment, o r d e r o r p r o c e e d i n g from which r e l i e f may b e o b t a i n e d . I f t h i s r u l e were i n t e n d e d t o b e used i n t h e manner d e f e n d a n t used i t , t h e r u l e would n o t p r o v i d e t h a t a ground f o r r e l i e f from a judgment i s t o show t h a t i t h a s been s a t i s f i e d . W hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s e motion under Rule 60 ( b ) . Our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rule 6 0 ( b ) i s bottomed on what we consider t h e i n t e n t of t h e d r a f t e r s . I n construing the ~ u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , we a p p l y t h e r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c - tion. P i e r c e Packing Company v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 8 ) , , Mont. 579 P.2d 760, 35 St.Rep. 656. W give e f f e c t t o e t h e p l a i n language used i n i t s o r d i n a r y meaning and c o n s i d e r t h e r u l e i n i t s e n t i r e t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i n t e n t of t h e drafters. P i e r c e Packing Company v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s u p r a ; G i l d r o y v . Anderson ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. 26, 507 P.2d low. By g i v i n g e f f e c t t o t h e p l a i n language used i n Rule 6 0 ( b ) and considering the r u l e i n i t s e n t i r e t y , w e believe the i n t e n t of t h e d r a f t e r s was t h a t a s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment c o u l d n o t b e s e t a s i d e by a motion under t h i s r u l e . Our d e c i s i o n h e r e d o e s n o t mean t h a t a s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment c a n n o t b e s e t a s i d e . I t may be v a c a t e d by a p p r o p r i a t e proceedings f o r proper cause. Such p r o c e e d i n g s a r e governed by e q u i t a b l e r u l e s . 47 Am J u r 2d Judgments 81032, W e hold t h a t such a p p r o p r i a t e proceedings a r e an inde- pendent a c t i o n i n equity. A s t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t h a s s a i d : ". . . T h i s a c t [ f i l i n g a s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment] became f a i t a c c o m p l i , and c o u l d b e undone o n l y by a c o n v e n t i o n a l a c t i o n i n e q u i t y , claimi n g f r a u d , m i s t a k e , undue i n f l u e n c e , w i t h r e g u l a r s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s , a p p r o p r i a t e s p e c i f i c i t y a s b a s i s f o r i n v o c a t i o n of e q u i t y , and t h e r e s t of t h e trimmings." [Bracketed m a t e r i a l added.] Utah C.V. F e d e r a l C r e d i t Union v . J e n k i n s (Utah 1 9 7 4 ) , 528 P. 2d 1187, 1189. I f d e f e n d a n t d e s i r e s t o have t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment v a c a t e d , i t must p r o c e e d i n t h i s manner. Counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f a l s o c l a i m s t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between him and p l a i n t i f f t e r m i n a t e d upon t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment. He t h e n a r g u e s t h a t s e r v i c e of t h e motion upon him r a t h e r t h a n p l a i n t i f f was improper. Under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , we f i n d no m e r i t t o t h i s argument. Counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f appeared i n t h e a c t i o n i n t h e D i s - t r i c t C o u r t t o a r g u e a g a i n s t t h e motion of d e f e n d a n t . His f i l i n g of a b r i e f i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e motion c o n s t i t u t e d a g e n e r a l appearance. T h i s C o u r t h a s s a i d t h a t when a d u l y l i c e n s e d a t t o r n e y makes a n a p p e a r a n c e i n a p r o c e e d i n g , h i s a p p e a r a n c e i s p r e s u m p t i v e e v i d e n c e of h i s a u t h o r i t y t o r e p r e s e n t t h e p e r s o n f o r whom he a p p e a r s . Coleman v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 1 2 0 Mont. 372, 186 P.2d 91. Counsel f o r p l a i n - t i f f w i l l n o t now be h e a r d t o c l a i m t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p had t e r m i n a t e d . F i n a l l y , counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f has requested t h i s Court t o impose s a n c t i o n s upon d e f e n d a n t under Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P. He a r g u e s t h a t under t h i s r u l e , w e c a n impose s a n c t i o n s upon defendant f o r i n s t i t u t i n g t h i s a c t i o n without reasonable grounds f o r i t . W e disagree. Rule 32 p r o v i d e s t h a t s a n c t i o n s may be imposed upon a party f o r bringing a frivolous appeal. The s a n c t i o n s a r e a u t h o r i z e d a g a i n s t a n a p p e l l a n t , n o t a r e s p o n d e n t i n whose favor t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d . By no s t r e t c h of t h e l a n g u a g e c a n damages b e awarded a g a i n s t a r e s p o n d e n t under t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e of Rule 32. The o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of judgment under Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., i s vacated and t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f judgment i s r e i n s t a t e d . ~~~ B. W&,& Chief J u s t i c e ' ce I ' b22.

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