BRYANT DEV ASSO v DAGEL v RECTO
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110. 12825 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A F OTN 19 75 BRYANT DEVbLOPMENT ASSOCIATION, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , - -vs TED DAGEL e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents, -vs - RECTOR ' S GARAGE INC. , Defendant and T h i r d P a r t y P l a i n t i f f , - -vs BRYANT DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION e t a l . , T h i r d P a r t y Defendant-Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l District, Honorable P e t e r G. Meloy, ~ u d g e r e s i d i n g . p Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Smith and H a r p e r , Helena, Montana C h a r l e s Smith, I11 a r g u e d , Helena, Montana F o r Respondents: Towe, Neely and B a l l , B i l l i n g s , Montana W i l l i a m L. Madden, Jr. a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana submitted: J a n u a r y 1 6 , 1975 Decided : FEB 2 1 1975 M. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. r This c a s e i s b e f o r e t h e Court on t h e a p p e a l of Bryant Development A s s o c i a t i o n and t h e c r o s s a p p e a l of ~ e c t o r ' sGarage, I n c . , from an o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lewis and Clark County, which sust a i n e d a d e c i s i o n o f t h e Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjustment g r a n t i n g ~ e c t o r ' sGarage, I n c . , a v a r i a n c e from an emergency r e s i d e n t i a l zoning r e s o l u t i o n . Since 1969 ~ e c t o r ' sGarage, I n c . , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s respondent, has owned and operated an a n t i q u e a u t o s t o r a g e and r e p a i r shop a t 1055 M i l l Road, Lewis and Clark County. Because of t h e inadequate s i z e of t h e company's b u i l d i n g s and a r e l u c t a n c e t o s c a t t e r u n r e s t o r e d automobiles and p a r t s o u t s i d e where they would b e u n s i g h t l y and s u s c e p t i b l e t o t h e elements, o f f i c e r s of respondent had f o r some time been i n t e r e s t e d i n c o n s t r u c t i n g a new b u i l d i n g . I n J u l y 1973, t h e p r o p e r t y a d j o i n i n g t h e e x i s t i n g f a c i l i t i e s , 1035 M i l l Road, was o f f e r e d f o r s a l e . I n r e l i a n c e upon r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of a p p r o p r i a t e county o f f i c i a l s t h a t no zoning o r b u i l d i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s e x i s t e d nor were contemplated f o r t h e neighborhood b e f o r e January 1974, t h e p r o p e r t y was purchased f o r approximately $35,000. O September 10, 1973, n e g o t i a t i o n s were e n t e r e d i n t o w i t h n a b u i l d i n g c o n t r a c t o r f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a p r e f a b r i c a t e d , commercial s t e e l b u i l d i n g t o b e c u t and manufactured i n C a l i f o r n i a and assembled a t t h e job s i t e by t h e c o n t r a c t o r . Although t h e formal c o n t r a c t was n o t signed u n t i l September 1 7 , 1973, t h e manufacturer was n o t i f i e d of the negotiations. O September 14, 1973, a purchase o r d e r i n t h e n amount of $55,500 was confirmed by t h e manufacturer, e a r n e s t money p a i d and work begun. However, on September 1 3 , 1973, unbeknown t o o f f i c e r s of respondent, and w i t h o u t p r i o r n o t i c e whatsoever, t h e Lewis and Clark County Commissioners met i n an evening emergency s e s s i o n and purported t o adopt Temporary I n t e r i m Zoning Resolution No. 1973-33 r e s t r i c t i n g f u r t h e r development of t h e a r e a i n q u e s t i o n t o "CR-Z", s i n g l e family dwelling u n i t s . residential This meeting was convened upon t h e ex p a r t e p e t i t i o n o f some of t h e members of a p p e l l a n t a s s o c i a t i o n who r e s i d e i n t h e neighborhood i n which respondent i s l o c a t e d w i t h t h e very purpose of stopping respondent from completing t h e b u i l d i n g p r o j e c t i t had commenced. O f f i c e r s of respondent were n o t made aware of t h e s e summary proceedings u n t i l t h e following week when an o f f i c e r of t h e c o n t r a c t o r was informed t h e b u i l d i n g p r o j e c t had been p r o h i b i t e d . On October 4 , 1973, c o u n s e l f o r respondent f i l e d an II Applica- t i o n f o r Variance o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , Appeal from t h e Administrat i v e Decision of t h e Lewis & Clark County ~omrnissioners"w i t h t h e Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjustment to permit c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an automobile r e s t o r a t i o n and s t o r a g e f a c i l i t y a t 1035 M i l l Road. A recorded, e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g was h e l d on t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n b e f o r e t h e Board of Adjustment on December 1 0 , 1973. Counsel f o r respondent presented testimony and a memorandum s u p p o r t i n g t h e f i r m ' s content i o n t h a t t h i s zoning r e s o l u t i o n was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ; t h a t i t had e s t a b l i s h e d and was e n t i t l e d t o a nonconforming use e x c e p t i o n t o t h e zoning; and, t h a t i n t h e event t h e zoning was found t o apply t o i t , a v a r i a n c e should be g r a n t e d . The Bryant Development A s s o c i a t i o n , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s a p p e l l a n t , a l s o appeared, p r e s e n t e d testimony i n o p p o s i t i o n t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e q u e s t s and l a t e r f i l e d i t s l e g a l memorandum. O February 2, 1974, t h e Board of Adjustment n g r a n t i n g respondent t h e r e q u e s t e d v a r i a n c e . i s s u e d an o r d e r By p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i , a p p e l l a n t asked t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o review t h a t d e c i s i o n , contending i t was unwarranted by t h e f a c t s . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n and i s s u e d a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i t o t h e Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjustment. On March 25, 1974, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ordered t h a t t h e ~ o a r d ' so r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e v a r i a n c e be stayed. Respondent thereupon moved, and was permitted t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e review proceedings. Counsel f o r respondent f u r t h e r moved on A p r i l 8 , 1974, t h a t t h e s t a y o r d e r be d i s s o l v e d o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h a t a p p e l l a n t be r e q u i r e d t o p o s t a $15,000 bond t o cover damages which might a c c r u e t o R e c t o r ' s Garage because of t h e s t a y o r d e r . By an order, dated July 1, 1974, the district court denied this latter moti on. In answer to appellant's petition for a writ of certiorari, respondent denied that the decision of the Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjustment was not based upon substantial evidence. It further alleged as a first counterclaim and crossclaim that the that the ~oard'sorder was defective in its failure to grant Rector's Garage, Inc. a nonconforming use exception to the zoning resolution, ins~eaciof a variance. k second counterclaim and crossclaim was also interposed claiming, alternatively, that the ~oard'sorder should be reversed because of its failure to quash the zoning resolution as unconstitutional. A third counterclaim requested damages stemming from appellant's unlawful and improper actions in instigating the emergency zoning resolution. By a final order, dated July 17, 1974, the district court afkirmed the decision of the Lewis and Clark County Board of Adjustment granting respondent the requested variance. Although the court further denied appellant's motion to strike or dismiss respondent's first counterclzim requesting a nonconforming use exception to the zoning, its order did not determine whether or not Rector's Garage, Inc. was entitled to such relief. Appellant's motions to strike or dismiss the second and third counterclaims were granted. The case now comes to this Court upon timely notices of appeal by Bryand Development Association and crossappeal by ~ector'sGarage, Inc. Although appellant argues the only issue is the variance granted and urges that the writ of certiorari does not permit inquiry beyond that, the controlling issue on this appeal is the validity of L'emporary Interim Zoning Resolution No. 1973-33. We recognize that ordinarily the scope of review on a writ of certiorari is limited to whether an inferior tribunal, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction. R.C.M. Section 93-9002, 1947; State ex rel. Mercer v. Woods, 116 Mont. 533, 538, L35 P. 2d 197. We also recognize: "The a u t h o r i t i e s a r e g e n e r a l l y t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t , upon review of a d e c i s i o n of a zoning b o a r d , t h e p e t i t i o n e r w i l l n o t b e heard upon t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e zoning o r d i n a n c e , o r of t h e a c t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e under which t h e o r d i n a n c e was e n a c t e d . " 58 Am J u r , Z o n i n g 5 232. See e . g . , Austin v. O l d e r , 278 Mich. 518, 270 N.W. 771. However, Montana's s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 16-4706, R.C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s f o r t h e powers and procedures of t h e board of a d j u s t m e n t , s t a t e s i n s u b s e c t i o n (8) : 11 *** Any person a g g r i e v e d by any d e c i s i o n of may p r e s e n t t o a t h e board of adjustment 9: 9: c o u r t of r e c o r d a p e t i t i o n , d u l y v e r i f i e d , s e t t i n g f o r t h t h a t such d e c i s i o n i s i l l e g a l , i n whole o r i n p a r t , s p e c i f y i n g t h e grounds of t h e i l l e g a l i t y . k 9~ 9:" (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) * F u r t h e r , s u b s e c t i o n (11) of s e c t i o n 16-4706, s t a t e s : " k ; 9~ The c o u r t may r e v e r s e o r a f f i r m , wholly o r p a r t l y , o r may modify t h e d e c i s i o n brought up f o r review. I I W h o l d t h a t t h e s e words i n s e c t i o n 16-4706, R.C.M. e 1947, g i v e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s a much b r o a d e r scope of review t h a n t h e A similar g e n e r a l Montana s t a t u t e s p e r t a i n i n g t o c e r t i o r a r i . p o s i t i o n h a s been e n u n c i a t e d i n Arizona. See e.g., Board of A d j u s t m e n ~ o fC i t y of Phoenix, 6 Ariz.App. 811. Lewis v. 494, 433 P.2d To hold o t h e r w i s e , a s a p p e l l a n t would have u s do, and deny respondent t h e u s e of t h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , would be a triumph o i form over s u b s t a n c e . Appellant f u r t h e r contends t h a t respondent i s precluded from r a i s i n g t h e i s s u e because of r e s p o n d e n t ' s s t a t u s a s an i n t h e main a c t i o n . 11 intervenor" I t a r g u e s t h a t an ' i n t e r v e n o r cannot r a i s e i s s u e s which t h e o r i g i n a l p a r t i e s , i n t h i s c a s e t h e a p p e l l a n t and The Board of Adjustment, d i d n o t o r could n o t , r a i s e . However, i t was a p p e l l a n t ' s own e r r o r which i n i t i a l l y c a s t respondent i n t h e r o l e of " i n t e r v e n o r " when i t named t h e Board of Adjustment a s t h e defendant i n i t s p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i . s e c t i o n 93-9004, R.C.M. While under 1947, t h e w r i t was p r o p e r l y d i r e c t e d t o t h e Board of Adjustment, s e c t i o n 93-8801, R.C.M. t h e a d v e r s e p a r t y may be known a s t h e d e f e n d a n t . 1947, s t a t e s t h a t In t h i s case, c e r t a i n c o n c e p t u a l and p r o c e d u r a l d i f f i c u l i t i e s would have been avoided i f respondent ~ e c t o r ' sGarage Znc., t h e I1 a d v e r s e p a r t y " had been p r o p e r l y d e s i g n a t e d a s "defendant1'. I n Freeman v. Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534, t h i s Court reviewed a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e t o t h e v a l i d i t y of a zoning s t a t u t e and ordinance brought t o i t by way of an a p p e a l from c e r t i o r a r i proceedings conducted by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n reviewing a v a r i a n c e g r a n t e d by t h e board of adjustment of Great F a l l s . This Court passed upon t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e w i t h o u t even h e s i t a t i n g t o q u e s t i o n whether t h e a p p e l l a n t was precluded from r a i s i n g such a c h a l l e n g e o r whether t h e i s s u e could be determined by i t i n a c e r t i o r a r i proceeding. Proceeding t o t h e m e r i t s , respondent argues t h a t s e c t i o n 16-4711, R.C.M. 1947, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on i t s f a c e because i t provides t h a t an emergency zoning r e s o l u t i o n may be enacted w i t h o u t g i v i n g owners whose p r o p e r t y may be a f f e c t e d p r i o r n o t i c e of t h e proceedings. W do n o t h e r e c o n s i d e r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 5ssue e s i n c e , i n any e v e n t , t h e s t a t u t e s were n o t followed. I n viewing Chapter 47, T i t l e 1 6 , R.C.M. 1947, a s a whole, i t i s c l e a r t h a t s e c t i o n 16-4711, providing f o r t h e enactment of emergency zoning r e g u l a t i o n s , i s governed by t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 16-4705, providing f o r n o t i c e and h e a r i n g "in t h e adoption o r amendment of zoning r e g u l a t i o n s " . Nothing i n Chapter 47, n o r i n s e c t i o n 16-4711 i n p a r t i c u l a r , d e t r a c t s from t h i s view. I n f a c t , when s e c t i o n 16-4711 was enacted t h e immediately preceding s e c t i o n of t h a t b i l l was an amendment of s e c t i o n 16-4705. The c l o s e proximity of t h o s e two s e c t i o n s i n Chapter 273, Laws of 1971, would i n d i c a t e a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t h a t t h e two s e c t i o n s should be construed t o g e t h e r . It i s apparent t h e L e w i s and Clark County Commissioners d i d n o t follow t h e procedure provided by s e c t i o n 16-4705. It thus follows t h a t Temporary I n t e r i m Zoning Resolution No. 1973-33 i s void f o r f a i l u r e t o follow t h e n o t i c e and h e a r i n g p r o v i s i o n s s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 16-4705, R.C.M. 1947. Thus, respondent R e c t o r ' s Garage, I n c . , judgment. is entitled to a Since t h e r e c o r d b e f o r e u s does n o t i n d i c a t e whether t h e a r e a h a s been p r o p e r l y zoned s i n c e t h i s a c t i o n , we a r e unable t o s a y t h a t a judgment of nonconforming u s e i s proper. Accordingly, we r e t u r n t h e m a t t e r t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r e n t r y o f an o r d e r o r judgment n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what has been s a i d i n t h i s Opinion. Costs a r e awarded respondent R e c t o r ' s Garage, Inc. W Concur: e Chief J u s t i c e
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