GENERAL AG CORP v MOORE

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No. 12843 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A OR F F OTN 1975 GENERAL AGRICULTURE CORPORATION, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , PAUL J. MOORE and LUELLA MAY MOORE, husband and w i f e , e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant : J a r d i n e , Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, Great F a l l s , Montana, K. Dale Schwanke argued, Great F a l l s , Montana W. G. G i l b e r t , J r . , D i l l o n , Montana For Respondents: Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg and Matteucci, Great F a l l s , Montana, Ray F. Koby argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Morrison, E t t i e n and Barron, Havre, Montana J. Chan E t t i e n argued, Havre, Montana Hauge, Hauge, Ober and Spangelo, Havre, Montana Ronald Smith, Havre, Montana Weber, Bosch, Kuhr, Dugdale and Warner, Havre, Montana Burns, Solem and MacKenzie, Chinook, Montana For Amicus Curiae: A l l e n B. C h r o n i s t e r , Helena, Montana Kendrick Smith argued, B u t t e , Montana James T. H a r r i s o n , Jr. argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: February 10, 1975 Decided :APR Filed: 8 dJ 3 (I 19~5 Hon. Arthur Martin, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court: The circumstances l e a d i n g t o t h i s a p p e a l a r e b r i e f . O n November 30, 1972, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d i t s p e t i t i o n seeking t o a p p r o p r i a t e s u r p l u s w a t e r s from an a d j u d i c a t e d stream under p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 89-829, R.C.M. 1947. While t h e a c t i o n was pending t h e l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Chapter 452, Laws of 1973, denominated a s t h e " ~ o n t a n aWater U s e Act. f i e d a s s e c t i o n s 89-865 e t s e q . , R.C.M. If The new Act, codi- 1947, s u b s t i t u t e d a new procedure f o r t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of water r i g h t s , e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1973. The former Act, i n c l u d i n g t h e s e c t i o n under which p l a i n t i f f i n s t i t u t e d i t s a c t i o n , was r e p e a l e d . A f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e new Act, p l a i n t i f f , w i t h o u t changing c h a r a c t e r of r e l i e f sought, f i l e d an amended complaint. O n motion of defendants (a group of a p p r o p r i a t o r s o r c l a i m a n t s who have o r appear t o have, r i g h t s i n t h e source of supply of w a t e r r i g h t s sought by p l a i n t i f f , Cow Creek), t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t dismissed t h e amended complaint on t h e ground p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n was a b a t e d by t h e r e p e a l of s e c t i o n 89-829. The p r o p r i e t y of t h e d i s m i s s a l on t h a t ground i s t h e primary i s s u e on t h i s appeal. A u t h o r i t y f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l i s d e r i v e d from s e c t i o n 43-512, R..C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s : 11 Any s t a t u t e may be r e p e a l e d a t any time, except when i t i s o t h e r w i s e provided t h e r e i n . Persons a c t i n g under any s t a t u t e a r e deemed t o have a c t e d i n contemplation o f t h i s power o f r e p e a l . I 1 S e c t i o n 43-512 i s an e x t e n s i o n of common law s t a t e d i n 73 Am J u r 2d, S t a t u t e s , !j 389: "* * 9; i f a s t a t u t e i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y r e p e a l e d w i t h o u t a s a v i n g c l a u s e i n f a v o r of pending s u i t s , a l l pending Moreover, proceedings thereunder a r e terminated. i n t h e absence of any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s a v i n g c l a u s e , a judgment rendered by v i r t u e of t h e terms of a s t a t u t e which i s r e p e a l e d i s v o i d , although t h e proceedings may have been commenced b e f o r e t h e r e p e a l . 11 ** See a l s o : Anno. 77 A.L.R. 1338, 1345 This rule applies especially to remedial statutes such as section 89-829, R.C.M. 1947. 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, $ 11; Lemon v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry. Co., 38 C.A.2d 659, 102 P.2d 387, 393; Continental Oil Co. v. Mont. C. Co., 63 Mont. 223, 230, 207 P. 116. Initially on appeal, arguments presented in behalf of appellant were directed toward showing that the Water Use Act contained provisions which saved the proceeding from the annihilating effect of section 43-512, W.C.M. 1947. Subsequently, supplemental briefs were submitted which placed emphasis on constitutional considerations rather than legislative intent. We agree that constitutional provisions are controlling in disposition of this appeal. A,rticle 111, Sec. 15, of the 1889 Montana Constitution, provided : h he use of all water now appropriated, or that may hereafter be appropriated for sale, rental, distribution, or other beneficial use, and the right of way over the lands of others, for all ditches, drains, flumes, canals, and aqueducts, necessarily used in connection therewith, as well as the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing the same, shall be held to be a public use.* f: *" In 1972, Montana adopted a new donstitution which became effective on July 1, 1973, Subdivisions (2) and (3) of Section 3, A.rticle IX of the 1972 Constitution are substantially the same as Article 111, Sec. 15, of the 1889 Constitution, but two provi- 1 4, sions of significance to this case, subdivisions ( ) and ( ) were added in Section 3, Article IX of the 1972 Constitution. Subdivision (1) provides : "All existing; rights to the use of any waters for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed." (Emphasis supplied). 4 Subdivision ( ) provides : h he legislature shall provide for the administration, control and regulation of water rights and shall establish a system of centralized records, in addition to the present system of local records.11 Section 6 of the Transition Schedule of the 1972 Constitution contains this provision: f1 General transition "2 ( ) The validity of all public and private bonds, debts, and contracts, and of all suits, actions and rights of action, shall continue as if no change had taken place. 1 1 This paragraph will hereafter be referred to herein as the "transition clause". 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law $48, states: "Jt Jc * it is within the power of those who adopt a constitution to make some of its provisions selfexecuting. * * * II A provision is self-executing when it can be given effect without the aid of legislation and there is nothing to indicate that legislation is contemplated in order to render it operative * *. "The fact that a right granted by a constitutional provision may be better or further protected by supplementary legislation does not of itself prevent the provision in question from being self-executing; nor does the self-executing character of a constitutional provision necessarily preclude legislation for the better protection of the right secured, or legislation in furtherance of the purposes, or of the enforcement, of the provision. See also: State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp. , 114 Mont. This Court in State v. Aitchison, 96 Mont. 335, 341, 30 P.2d 805, in discussing the constitutional provision relative to public use of water, said: 11 The effect of this constitutional provision in declaring certain uses to be public, and the declaration of this court that the provision is self-executing, have the effect of foreclosing a11 inquiry into the question whether or not the enumerated uses are public, both by the legislature and the judiciary.I t We construe Article IX, Section 3 (1) of the 1972 Constitution as not only reaffirming the public policy of the 1889 Constitution but also as recognizing and confirming all rights acquired under that Constitution and the implementing statutes enacted thereunder. Construed in this context, Article IX, Section 3, with the exception 4, of subdivision ( ) is self-executing. As urged by respondents, legislation may be enacted in contemplation of constitutional provisions to become effective at a later date. State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 164 Mont. 141, 520 P.2d 776, 31 St.Rep. 138. Proceeding from this premise respondents argue the repeal of section 89-829, R.C.M. 1947, took effect before the effective date of the 1972 Constitution with the result that appellant had no existing right that could be recognized and confirmed. The routing of the repealing provision of the Act through section 43-512, R.C.M. 1947, has the effect of giving these statu- tory provisions priority over the 1972 Constitution. The statu- tory repealing provision and section 43-512, operating together, say that appellant has lost its right to proceed under section 89-829, R.C.M. 1947. On the other hand, Article IX and the transition clause of the 1972 Constitution express an intent to the contrary. The supremacy of constitutional mandates is too well established to require citation. This principle is summarized in 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, 5 56: It A written constitution is not only the direct and basic expression of the sovereign will, it is also the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and offices of government with respect to all matters covered by it, and must control as it is written until it is changed by the authority which established it. No function of government can be discharged in disregard of or in opposition to the fundamental law. The state constitution is the mandate of a sovenzign people to its servants and representatives. No one of them has a right to ignore or disregard its mandates, and the legislature, the executive officers, and the judiciary cannot lawfully act beyond its limitations. 11 Montana is in accord. 0'~annonv. Gustafson, 130 Mont. 402, 303 P.2d 938; State ex rel. Nagle v Stafford, 97 Mont. 275, 34 . P.2d 372; State ex rel. DuFresne v. Leslie, 100 Mont. 449, 50 Against this background we turn to the question of whether appellant has an existing right within the meaning of the key words of Article IX, Section 3 1 , () 1972 Constitution rights to the use of any waters * * *. " -- "All existing We construe these words in the light of the established principles of construction as stated in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, 5 19: II The words of a c o n s t i t u t i o n may n o t be ignored a s meaningless 5;. I f t h e language used i s c l e a r and unambiguous i t s meaning and i n t e n t a r e t o be a s c e r t a i n e d from t h e i n s t r u m e n t i t s e l f by c o n s t r u i n g t h e language a s i t i s w r i t t e n . Unless t h e c o n t e n t s u g g e s t s o t h e r w i s e , words a r e t o be given t h e i r n a t u r a l obvious o r o r d i n a r y meaning. There i s no o c c a s i o n f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n where t h e language i s p l a i n and d e f i n i t e . 11 * Corp., + See a l s o : ** S t a t e ex r e l . S t a f f o r d v. Fox-Great F a l l s T h e a t r e 114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d 689; R i d e r v. Cooney, 94 Mont. 295, The word " r i g h t s " i s l i m i t e d o n l y by t h e word " e x i s t i n g " . Outside t h i s l i m i t a t i o n i t extends t o "All", definition. a word t h a t needs no W a g r e e w i t h amicus c u r i a e t h a t p r i o r i t y i n approe p r i a t i o n of w a t e r i s a v a l u a b l e r i g h t and q u o t e w i t h a p p r o v a l from t h e c i t e d Utah c a s e , Whitmore v. Murray C i t y , 107 Utah 445, "* * Although i t i s t r u e t h a t p l a i n t i f f does n o t and cannot have a r i g h t t o t h e u s e of t h e w a t e r u n t i l he h a s completed h i s works and p u t i t t o a b e n e f i c i a l u s e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r i g h t t o proceed and a c q u i r e t h i s r i g h t by complying w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y requirements i s a v a l u a b l e r i g h t and i t s v a l u e o f t e n depends upon i t s priority. *** II Property r i g h t s i n water c o n s i s t not alone i n t h e amount of t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n , b u t , a l s o , i n t h e p r i o r i t y of t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n . It o f t e n happens t h a t t h e c h i e f v a l u e of an a p p r o p r i a t i o n c o n s i s t s i n i t s p r i o r i t y over o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t i o n s i n t h e same n a t u r a l stream. Hence, t o d e p r i v e a person of h i s p r i o r i t y i s t o d e p r i v e him of a most v a l u a b l e p r o p e r t y r i g h t . * * *" The word " e x i s t i n g " i s t o be examined i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e law under which a p p e l l a n t commenced i t s a c t i o n . Rider v. Cooney, supra. 1972. A p p e l l a n t ' s p r i o r i t y came i n t o e x i s t e n c e on November 30, Respondents1 e f f o r t s h e r e i n t o remove whatever p r i o r i t y a p p e l l a n t might have gained by commencing i t s a p p r o p r i a t i o n i s a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h a t r i g h t . The words "to" and "use" a r e t o be examined i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e c l a r e d p o l i c y of "public use" and a l s o i n t h e c o n t e x t of s e c t i o n 89-829, R.C.M. 1947. The f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n under s e c t i o n 89-829 i s t h e f i r s t s t e p l e a d i n g t o 11 use", i t b e i n g an i n t e g r a l p a r t of p u t t i n g w a t e r t o p u b l i c and b e n e f i c i a l use. Limiting 11 use" t o p e r f e c t e d o r a c t u a l I1 use" would n u l l i f y t h e e x i s t i n g r i g h t of p r i o r i t y c r e a t e d by t h e f i l i n g . When t h e i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e s e words i s c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e body of t h e law t o which t h e y r e l a t e , they r e t a i n t h e i r n a t u r a l meaning. When s o r e a d , a p p e l l a n t had " e x i s t i n g r i g h t s " when t h e 1972 C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e Montana Water Use Act went i n t o e f f e c t . Other r u l e s governing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r t i f y t h e meaning we have given t o A r t i c l e I X , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . 16 C.J.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law $ 5 14 t o 1 6 , s t a t e : 11 In construing a constitution, i t s e s s e n t i a l character J" It i s t o be regarded must always be k e p t i n mind. a s fundamental law t o which a l l o t h e r laws must y i e l d , and should be i n t e r p r e t e d i n such a manner a s t o c a r r y o u t t h e broad g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of government s t a t e d therein ** * * *. 11 A c o n s t i t u t i o n , o r p r o v i s i o n t h e r e o f , should r e c e i v e a r e a s o n a b l e and p r a c t i c a l i n t e r n r e t a t i o n i n accord w i t h common sense. Confusion, ambiguity o r c o n t r a d i c t i o n should b e avoided i f p o s s i b l e . Of two a l t e r n a t i v e cons t r u c t i o n s , t h a t which g i v e s r i s e t o fewer o r l e s s comp l i c a t e d q u e s t i o n s should be favored, *** * I1 The prime e f f o r t o r fundamental purpose i n c o n s t r u i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n , , i s t o a s c e r t a i n and g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t of t h e framers and of t h e people who adopted i t . The c o u r t , t h e r e f o r e should c o n s t a n t l y keep i n mind t h e o b j e c t sought t o be accomplished and proper r e g a r d should b e given t o t h e evil:, i f any, sought t o be prevented o r remedied,J<;k J". *** The c o n s t r u c t i o n w e have given t o A r t i c l e I X , S e c t i o n 3 ( 1 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , would e n t i t l e a p p e l l a n t t o proceed i n t h e absence of t h e t r a n s i t i o n c l a u s e . n i s h e s t h e f i n a l touch. The t r a n s i t i o n c l a u s e f u r - It affirms the r i g h t s I1 recognized and confirmed" by A r t i c l e I X . I n view of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n h e r e i n made i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s i d e r t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t so e x t e n s i v e l y d i s c u s s e d by counsel. W e n o t e , however, t h a t t h e Water Use Act d i s c l o s e s a l e g i s l a t i v e construction consistent with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision. Legis- l a t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , though n o t conc l u s i v e , i s e n t i t l e d t o g r e a t weight. Johnson v. C i t y of Great F a l l s , 38 Mont. 369, 99 P. 1059; S t a t e v. Toomey, 135 Mont. 35, Judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s r e v e r s e d . D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. W Concur: e Justices. Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison and J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly took no p a r t i n t h i s o p i n i o n , deeming themselves d i s q u a l i f i e d .

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