AUTO CLUB INS CO v TOYOTA MOTOR
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No. 12666 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1974 - AUTOMOBILE CLUB INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U S . . , INC. , and . A TOYOTA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Honorable W. W. Lessley , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Lyman Bennett, Jr. argued and Lyman Bennett, 111 argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Berg, Angel, Andriolo and Morgan, Bozeman, Montana Charles F. Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: June 13, 1974 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a summary judgment g r a n t e d defendants i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , G a l l a t i n County. T h i s cause a r o s e o u t of an a c c i d e n t i n G a l l a t i n County and i s t h e same a c c i d e n t involved i n Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor S a l e s , U.S.A., Inc., Mont . , 513 P.2d 268, 30 St.Rep. motion f o r summary judgment p l a i n t i f f a s k e d 808. In a t h e t r i a l court t o take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of a l l r e c o r d s , p l e a d i n g s , f a c t s and t h e d e c i s i o n by t h i s Court i n Brandenburger and concluded t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t and i n t h i s Court on a p p e a l , were r e s j u d i c a t a . Here, t h e complaint i s one whereby p l a i n t i f f Automobile Club Insurance Company, i n s u r e r of Tafford O l t z , d r i v e r of t h e Toyota, by way of indemnity s e e k s recovery from Toyota f o r t h e sum of $50,000 which i s t h e amount p l a i n t i f f paid on b e h a l f of O l t z on t h e Brandenburger v e r d i c t and judgment a g a i n s t Oltz and Toyota, and f o r t h e recovery of monies i n c u r r e d by p l a i n t i f f i n defending f o r O l t z t h e c l a i m on which t h e judgment was based. Four s e p a r a t e claims p r e d i c a t i n g l i a b i l i t y a r e made: 1) Strict liability in tort; 2) Alleged breach of e x p r e s s w a r r a n t y ; 3) Alleged breach of implied warranty of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y ; and 4) Alleged breach of implied warranty of f i t n e s s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose. I n Brandenburger. based on idemnity. O l t z f i l e d a c r o s s complaint a g a i n s t Toyota The complaint i n t h e i n s t a n t cause i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same a s t h a t c r o s s complaint except t h a t t h e r e were no a l l e g a t i o n s of n e g l i g e n c e i n manufacture and design of t h e v e h i c l e i n q u e s t i o n h e r e , whereas such a l l e g a t i o n s were contained i n t h e c r o s s complaint f o r indemnity i n Brandenburger. A t t h e c l o s e of a l l testimony i n Brandenburger on b e h a l f o f Toyota, a motion was made t o d i s m i s s t h e indemnity c r o s s complaint on t h e grounds t h e evidence showed a s a m a t t e r of law t h a t O l t z was g u i l t y of a c t i v e n e g l i g e n c e which was t h e proximate cause of t h e a c c i d e n t and rande en burger's death. That same premise was c a r r i e d forward i n t h e answer f i l e d i n t h e i n s t a n t cause i n t h e t h i r d def e n s e wherein i t i s a l l e g e d : hat t h e i n j u r i e s and damages of which p l a i n t i f f complains, i f any, were c o n t r i b u t e d t o and proximately caused by t h e n e g l i g e n c e of T a f f o r d E. O l t z , ugon whose r i g h t of recovery t h e p l a i n t i f f depends. The t r i a l c o u r t i n i t i a l l y g r a n t e d t h e motion and then l a t e r took i t under advisement, b u t d i d n o t i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on indemnity. Subsequently i n t h e s e t t l e m e n t of i n s t r u c t i o n s , counsel f o r Toyota agreed t h a t t h e r e would b e no c l a i m of waiver of t h e indemnity c r o s s c l a i m merely because i t was n o t disposed of i n Brandenburger. Here i t i s contended, however, t h a t t h e v e r d i c t of t h e j u r y and t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h i s Court i n Brandenburger t o certain controlling factors. are res judicata a s Therefore, i n properly applying t h e concept of r e s j u d i c a t a t o t h i s c a s e i t becomes n e c e s s a r y t o c l e a r l y a s c e r t a i n j u s t what t h e Brandenburger d e c i s i o n determined. A s t o t h e j u r y v e r d i c t , i t i s important t o n o t e t h a t t h a t c l a i m was submitted t o t h e j u r y i n s o f a r a s O l t z was concerned on a charge of g r o s s negligence i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e v e h i c l e . As t o t h e Brandenburger c l a i m a g a i n s t Toyota, i t was based on a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e and s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t . The j u r y i n r e t u r n i n g a v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f a g a i n s t O l t z and Toyota i n e f f e c t found O l t z g u i l t y of g r o s s negligence and Toyota e i t h e r g u i l t y of negligence i n manufacture and design o r t h a t t h e v e h i c l e was def e c t i v e and i n an unreasonably u n s a f e c o n d i t i o n . The e f f e c t of t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e Brandenburger j u r y i s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f r e s j u d i c a t a a s t o t h e above m a t t e r s . Toyota argues t h a t t h e j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n Brandenburger i s r e s j u d i c a t a only a s t o t h e following p r o p o s i t i o n s : 1) O l t z was g u i l t y of g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e which was t h e proximate and c o n t r i b u t i n g c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t and rand en burger's d e a t h . I n o t h e r words, b u t f o r h i s g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e , t h e a c c i d e n t would n o t have happened and Brandenburger would n o t have been k i l l e d . 2) That Toyota was e i t h e r g u i l t y of n e g l i g e n c e , o r t h a t t h e v e h i c l e i n q u e s t i o n was i n a d e f e c t i v e o r unreasonably u n s a f e condit i o n , and t h a t such n e g l i g e n c e o r c o n d i t i o n a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d a s a proximate cause of rande en burger's d e a t h . This C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n Brandenburger made no d e t e r m i n a t i o n Toyota was s t r i c t l y l i a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f i n s u r a n c e company by way of indemnity f o r t h a t i s s u e was n o t b e f o r e t h e Court. The d e c i s i o n o f t h i s Court was t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t was a p p l i c a b l e i n Montana; t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h a t i s s u e were c o r r e c t ; t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o show t h a t t h e v e h i c l e i n q u e s t i o n was i n a d e f e c t i v e and unreasonably dangerous c o n d i t i o n ; and, t h a t such dangerous c o n d i t i o n c o n t r i b u t e d a s a proximate cause of rande en burger's d e a t h . W w i l l n o t s e t f o r t h i n d e t a i l t h e f a c t s of Brandenburger v. e Toyota Motor S a l e s , e t . a l . , St.Rep. 808. Mon t . , 513 p . 2 d S 6 8 , 30 Reference i s made t o t h a t c a s e f o r t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n . Here, t h r e e i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r in: 1) Determining t h a t no r i g h t of indemnity by p l a i n t i f f a g a i n s t defendants e x i s t e d ? 2) Denying p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r summary judgment? 3) Granting d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r summary judgment? A s t o i s s u e No. 1, t h e v e r d i c t i n Brandenburger a g a i n s t O l t z and Toyota c l e a r l y determed t h e y were j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s . Such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s r e s j u d i c a t a a s t o t h e p a r t i e s h e r e involved i n t h e p r e s e n t indemnity l i t i g a t i o n . The g e n e r a l r u l e i s a j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o e i t h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n o r indemnity. v. Seaton, 277 F.Supp. A s noted by Judge Jameson i n Panasuk 979, 980: "The r u l e i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n Montana t h a t , ' i f t h e concurrent negligence of two o r more persons causes an i n j u r y t o a t h i r d person, they a r e j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y l i a b l e , and t h e i n j u r e d person may sue them j o i n t l y o r s e v e r a l l y , and r e c o v e r a g a i n s t one o r a l l ' . [Citing cases] t h e Montana c o u r t a l s o recognized t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t 1 one of t h e s e v e r a l wrongdoers cannot r e c o v e r a g a i n s t a n o t h e r wrongdoer a l t h o u g h he may have been compelled t o pay a l l t h e damages f o r t h e wrong done. 1 11 *** The " c o n f l i c t i n g views" r e g a r d i n g t h e r i g h t of c o n t r i b u t i o n a s between j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s i s w e l l summarized i n t h e Annotation, 60 ALR2d 1366. See a l s o : J u r 2d,Indemnity 520. 18 Am J u r 2d, C o n t r i b u t i o n 5 33; 4 1 Am There a r e e x c e p t i o n s b u t , where each t o r t - f e a s o r i s chargeable w i t h a f f i r m a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e , n e i t h e r i s e n t i t l e d t o indemnity o r c o n t r i b u t i o n . 41 Am JUT2d, Indemnity 521. Two r e c e n t opinions of t h i s Court involved t h e q u e s t i o n of indemnity between j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s b u t a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . St. Paul F i r e and Marine I n s . Co. v. Thompson, 152 Mont. 396, 451 P.2d 98; Crosby v. B i l l i n g s Deaconess H o s p i t a l , 149 Mont. 314, 426 P.2d 217. While indemnity was allowed i n Thompson i t was on t h e b a s i s of imputed negligence o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under t h e d o c t r i n e of respondeat s u p e r i o r n o t on any independent a c t of n e g l i g e n c e of t h e employer. I n Crosby t h i s Court r e v e r s e d a summary judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t b u t noted t h a t t h e h o s p i t a l ' s c l a i m f o r indemnity would be d e f e a t e d i f t h e evidence showed t h a t i t s ( h o s p i t a l ' s ) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p l a i n t i f f was t h a t of an a c t i v e t o r t f e a s o r . See a l s o : Northern Railway Company v. United S t a t e s , 187 F.Supp. Great 690. A s t o any claim t h a t t h e indemnity sued f o r i n t h i s cause i s based upon warranty, we f i n d t h a t 0 l t z ' s a c t i v e negligence which c o n t r i b u t e d a s a proximate cause t o t h e a c c i d e n t b a r s any r e c w e r y . I n a c a s e s i m i l a r t o Brandenburger on t h e f a c t s , t h e Washington Court denied indemnity, Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Stromme, 4 Wash.App. 85, 479 P.2d 554, 556, and s a i d : I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h i s assignment of e r r o r , p l a i n t i f f contends t h e d o c t r i n e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y imposes a s u f f i c i e n t degree of l i a b i l i t y on defendants f o r i n j u r y t o t h e u s e r of i t s product t o e s t a b l i s h t h e primary-secondary r e l a t i o n s h i p between t o r t f e a s o r s required t o invoke t h e e x c e p t i o n t o t h e indemnity proh i b i t i o n r u l e . Assuming arguendo t h a t t h e r e might be s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y imposed upon defendants f o r i n j u r i e s s u f f e r e d by t h e u s e r of a d e f e c t i v e product i n such a s i t u a t i o n , t h i s does n o t diminish t h e quantum, o r change t h e c h a r a c t e r , o f l i a b i l i t y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f ' s insured. II " ~ a s h i n g t o n ' s r e c e n t adoption of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y a s a b a s i s f o r t o r t a c t i o n a g a i n s t a manufacturer does not, of i t s e l f , r a i s e t h e t o r t f e a s o r ' s l i a b i l i t y thereunder t o a h i g h e r p l a t e a u o r degree than t h e u s e r ' s l i a b i l i t y which stems from t h e u s e of t h e product c a u s i n g t h e i n j u r y ; n o r does i t change o u r indemnity law p e r t a i n i n g t o j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s . The f a c t s surrounding t h e i n c i d e n t g i v i n g r i s e t o t h e i n i t i a l cause of a c t i o n and t h e d u t i e s breached by t h e t o r t f e a s o r s determine whether indemnity w i l l be p e r m i t t e d , n o t t h e theory upon which t h e i r l i a b i l i t y may be based. W b e l i e v e Rufener v. S c o t t , s u p r a , c o n t a i n s e one of t h e c l e a r e r s t a t e m e n t s of t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s i s s u e wherein i t s t a t e s 46 Wash.2d a t 243, 280 P.2d a t 255, q u o t i n g from 27 Am.Jur.Indemnity $18: * f o r a t o r t i s genI"* dr one c o n s t r u c t i v e l y l i a b l e e r a l l y h e l d e n t i t l e d t o indemnity from t h e a c t u a l wrongdoer, r e g a r d l e s s of whether l i a b i l i t y i s imposed on t h e person seeking indemnity by s t a t u t e o r by r u l e of law, *.I *** ** ( I t a l i c s ours.) I n o t h e r words, i f t h e t o r t i o u s conduct of t h e wrongdoer, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e underlying t h e o r y of l i a b i l i t y , does n o t h i n g more than f u r n i s h a c o n d i t i o n t o which a subsequent independent ' a c t ' of a co-wrongdoer o c c u r s , t h e t o r t f e a s o r s a r e n o t i n p a r i d e l i c t o and i n demnity may b e allowed. Conversely, i f each of t h e t o r t f e a s o r ' s a c t s a l t h o u g h independent concur i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the basis for the actual liability,they are i n pari delicto and indemnity w i l l n o t be allowed. I n t h e i n s t a n t a p p e a l p l a i n t i f f ' s cause was dismissed a t t h e c l o s e of i t s case. The t r i a l c o u r t found a s a m a t t e r of law t h a t Mrs. Blacklaw was l i a b l e t o C u r t i s f o r (1) o p e r a t i n g an automobile w i t h a d e f e c t i v e brake system, (2) f a i l i n g t o sound h e r horn t o warn C u r t i s of h e r approach, and I f only (1) had (3) f a i l i n g t o apply h e r emergency brake. been t h e b a s i s f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n we would be compelled t o r e v e r s e and remand t h e c a s e f o r a f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n t a t i o n of o t h e r p o s s i b l e s o u r c e s of Mrs. lackl law's l i a b i l i t y . The a c t u a l wrongdoer i n such a s i t u a t i o n could be t h e r e t a i l e r o r t h e manufacturer who placed t h e d e f e c t i v e automobile i n h e r possession. [ C i t i n g c a s e . ] However, t h e presence of (2) and (3) e s t a b l i s h a c t u a l l i a b i l i t y i n a d d i t i o n t o h e r c o n s t r u c t i v e f a u l t . Thus, h e r t o r t i o u s conduct concurred w i t h d e f e n d a n t s ' i n producing t h e i n j u r y and t h i s concurrence precludes indemnity. 11 II W hold t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g i n Brandenburger t h a t O l t z was e g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t i s c o n t r o l l i n g and t h i s precludes a p p e l l a n t i n surance company from r e c e i v i n g indemnity. Having s o found t h e r e can be no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o g r a n t summary judgment f o r a p p e l l a n t . judgment f o r respondent was proper. The judgment i s affirmed. Granting of summary W e Concur: s . - ----c------------c-L--------------I^I^- chief Justice P ' / ..................................... Justices. M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell, s p e c i a l l y concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t . However, i n m v i e y t h e r u l e y of c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l r a t h e r than r e s j u d i c a t a i s involved here. See G e s s e l l v. J o n e s , 149 Mont. 418, 427 P.2d 295, f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n . Justice
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