DOUBLE X RANCH v SAVAGE BROS

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No. 12927 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F D U L X RANCH, I N C . , a Delaware O BE AL N Corporation, and STUART M e K P A a s Trustee i n Bankruptcy f o r Great Western Ranches, Inc., P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, S V G BROTHERS, e t a l . , AAE Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Arthur P. Acher argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Hauf, Forsythe and Richard A. Kramer, B i l l i n g s , Montana John A. Forsythe appeared, B i l l i n g s , Montana Richard A. Kramer argued, San Francisco, C a l i f o r n i a Submitted: May 7 , 1975 Decided : JUN Filed: 1 8 3975 1 8 1975 Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d an a c t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County, t o c o l l e c t on f o u r p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s e x e c u t e d by d e f e n d a n t s p u r s u a n t t o a c o r p o r a t e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n p l a n , under of t h e C h a p t e r X / f e d e r a l Bankruptcy Act. Defendants a d m i t t e d e x e c u t i n g t h e n o t e s b u t a l l e g e d f a i l u r e o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n , f r a u d , and d u r e s s a s d e f e n s e s and c o u n t e r c l a i m e d f o r damages based on a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e and wrongful a c t s of t h e t r u s t e e i n b a n k r u p t c y . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d summary judgment t o p l a i n t i f f s on a l l issues. Defendants a p p e a l . P l a i n t i f f s a r e Double X Ranch, I n c . , t h e payee on t h r e e of t h e n o t e s , and S t u a r t M. Kaplan, t h e t r u s t e e i n b a n k r u p t c y and payee on t h e f o u r t h n o t e . Defendants a r e Savage B r o s . , a p a r t n e r s h i p , and t e n p e r s o n s surnamed Savage who w e r e sued i n d i v i d u a l l y and d o i n g b u s i n e s s a s Savage Land and L i v e s t o c k Company, I n c . ; Savage Land and L i v e s t o c k ; and Savage B r o s . , corporation. Inc., a Defendants a r e t h e makers o r g u a r a n t o r s of t h e n o t e s and w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o c o l l e c t i v e l y a s Savage B r a . I n 1969 a Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n , G r e a t Western Ranches, I n c . , was formed. The o b j e c t i v e was t o have v a r i o u s i n v e s t o r s convey t h e i r r a n c h p r o p e r t i e s t o G r e a t Western i n exchange f o r s h a r e s of s t o c k . D e f e n d a n t s , among o t h e r s , t r a n s f e r r e d t h r e e t r a c t s of l a n d , p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , and 150 thoroughbred and q u a r t e r h o r s e s w i t h t h e i r r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s t o G r e a t Western, r e c e i v i n g s h a r e s of s t o c k i n exchange. P l a i n t i f f Double X con- t r i b u t e d $1,000,000 c a s h t o G r e a t Western and r e c e i v e d s h a r e s of s t o c k f o r i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n . G r e a t Western hoped t o a t t r a c t a n a d d i t i o n a l $4,000,000 from European i n v e s t o r s b u t was u n a b l e t o do s o . On J u l y 1, 1970, G r e a t Western f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r c o r p o r a t e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n under C h a p t e r X of t h e f e d e r a l Bankruptcy Act w i t h t h e United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n San F r a n c i s c o . 1 U.S.C.A. 1 55501-676. This r e o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u r t a p p o i n t e d p l a i n t i f f Kaplan a s t r u s t e e , and e v e n t u a l l y approved a c o r p o r a t e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n p l a n f o r Great Western. The o v e r a l l p u r p o s e of t h e c o r p o r a t e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n p l a n was t o p r o v i d e f o r a n o r d e r l y unwinding of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n t h e f o r m a t i o n of G r e a t Western and f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of i t s c r e d i t o r s . Among o t h e r t h i n g s , i n v e s t o r s i n G r e a t Western were p e r m i t t e d t o r e c l a i m t h e i r p r o p e r t y upon t h e s e s p e c i f i c conditions: (1) payment of 1 0 6 p e r s h a r e f o r t h e c o s t s of adminis- tering the reorganization; (2) payment of a n a d d i t i o n a l 3g! o r 49! p e r s h a r e (depend- i n g on t h e t i m e of payment) t o Double X a s reimbursement f o r i t s $1,000,000 c a s h i n v e s t m e n t ; (3) payment t o t h e t r u s t e e o r Double X , r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h e amounts t h e i r p r o p e r t y had been b e n e f i t e d , e i t h e r w h i l e h e l d by G r e a t Western o r by t h e c a s h c o n t r i b u t i o n of Double X . Addi- t i o n a l l y , t h e c o r p o r a t e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n plan provided t h a t consenti n g r e c l a i m a n t s i r r e v o c a b l y waived "any r i g h t t o s u e , l i t i g a t e , o r o b t a i n o r e x e c u t e upon a judgment a g a i n s t [ G r e a t Western] o r the trustee * * * i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether s u c h r i g h t s a r e known o r s u s p e c t e d t o e x i s t by t h e c o n s e n t i n g r e c l a i m a n t a t t h e t i m e t h e p l a n becomes e f f e c t i v e . " The p l a n a l s o p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e r e - organization c o u r t r e t a i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n over " a l l questions a r i s i n g i n t h e c o u r s e of consummation of t h e p l a n and n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y provided f o r . " Defendants a c c e p t e d and complied w i t h t h e c o r p o r a t e reo r g a n i z a t i o n p l a n by s a t i s f y i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s p r e c e d e n t t o reclaiming t h e i r property. They p a i d t h e c a s h a s s e s s m e n t s r e q u i r e d and e x e c u t e d t h e f o u r p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s sued upon f o r t h e b a l a n c e . The trustee executed and delivered to defendants transfer documents on their reclaimed property pursuant to the plan. Defendants defaulted on payment of the four promissory notes. Plaintiffs, as payees, filed suit in state district court in Billings, Montana, to collect the balances owing on the notes, with interest and attorney's fees. Defendants re- sponded with a pleading they characterized as an "answer, counterclaim and cross-complaint" in which they admit execution of the and notes but claim failure of consideration, fraud,/duress as affirmative defenses, and counterclaim for damages based on alleged negligence and wrongful acts of the trustee. The facts underlying the three affirmative defenses and the counterclaim are intermingled and overlapping. For clarity of analysis, the basic factual contentions of defendants can be summarized as follows: (1) The trustee represented and warranted that defendants' 150 thoroughbred and quarter horses, with registration certificates, would be returned to them upon payment of the cash assessments and execution of the four promissory notes, which the trustee failed to do. (2) The trustee represented and warranted to defend- ants: (a) that the assessments for restitution to Double X were traceable to the $1,000,000 cash contribution of Double X to Great Western and benefited the property which defendants were reclaiming and (b) that the amounts payable by the reclaiming stockholders were correct; that notwithstanding these representations and warranties by the trustee, defendants were charged with items not properly chargeable against them under the plan. (3) Plaintiffs exerted economic coercion on defendants in that defendants were compelled to execute the promissory notes because otherwise their property would be lost. Defendants had c o n t r a c t e d t o s e l l t h e r e c l a i m e d p r o p e r t y t o t h i r d p a r t i e s and were f a c e d w i t h o t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e p r o p e r t y which c o u l d be f o r e c l o s e d and t h u s c o u l d n o t g e t it back u n l e s s t h e y e x e c u t e d t h e promissory notes. (4) Damages s u s t a i n e d by d e f e n d a n t s by r e a s o n o f t h e f o r e g o i n g f a c t s more t h a n o f f s e t t h e amounts due on t h e promissory notes. P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d an "Answer t o F i r s t A f f i r m a t i v e Defense, C o u n t e r c l a i m and Cross-Complaint" fendants' contentions. p l a c i n g i n i s s u e a l l of de- A d d i t i o n a l l y , waiver by t h e d e f e n d a n t s was alleged. P r e t r i a l d i s c o v e r y c o n s i s t i n g of a d m i s s i o n s , i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and answers was had by b o t h p l a i n t i f f s and d e f e n d a n t s . t h e n moved f o r summary judgment. Plaintiffs T h e r e a f t e r d e f e n d a n t s moved f o r a d d i t i o n a l p r e t r i a l d i s c o v e r y , r e q u i r i n g p l a i n t i f f s t o (1) answer s i x i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s more f u l l y ; ( 2 ) r e q u i r e t h e t r u s t e e and an o f f i c e r o f Double X t o a p p e a r i n B i l l i n g s f o r d e p o s i t i o n s ; and ( 3 ) r e q u i r e p l a i n t i f f s t o produce f o r i n s p e c t i o n u n s p e c i f i e d "relevant records" i n t h e i r possession. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r s u c h f u r t h e r p r e t r i a l d i s c o v e r y and g r a n t e d summary judgment t o p l a i n tiffs. T h e r e a f t e r d e f e n d a n t s moved t o v a c a t e o r amend t h e judg- ment, o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y f o r a new t r i a l . Following d e n i a l o f t h e s e motions, defendants appealed. The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l c a n be summarized i n t h i s manner: (1) A r e t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t s r e s j u d i c a t a ? (2) D i d t h e s t a t e d i s t r i c t c o u r t have j u r i s d i c t i o n ? (3) A r e t h e r e g e n u i n e i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t p r e c l u d i n g summary judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f s ? (4) Should t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t have p e r m i t t e d a d d i t i o n - a l p r e t r i a l discovery? Initially, defendants contend that the issues they have raised in this action, viz. failure of consideration, fraud, duress, and negligent or wrongful acts of the trustee in carrying out the corporate reorganization plan have not been adjudicated by the federal reorganization court, could not have been raised previously, and are not res judicata. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the issues raised by defendants are res judicata under Section 224(1) of the federal Bankruptcy Act. The gist of their contention is that once a corporate reorganization plan is confirmed by the federal reorganization court, all issues resolved by the plan and all questions that could have been raised relating to the plan are res judicata and cannot later be litigated in any court. Section 224(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. S624, provides : "Upon confirmation of a plan-(1) the plan and its provisions shall be binding upon the debtor, upon every other corporation issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan, and upon all creditors and stockholders, whether or not such creditors and stockholders are affected by the plan or have accepted it or have filed proofs of their claims or interests and whether or not their claims or interests have been scheduled or allowed or are allowable * * *". 6A Collier on Bankruptcy, para. 11.13[2], explains this provision in this language: "Thus 5 224(1) 'makes a plan binding upon all parties once it is confirmed', and all questions which could have been raised appertaining thereto become res judicata." See: In re Union League Club of Chicago, 203 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1953); Ely v. Donoho, 45 F.Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). The United States Supreme Court has held the reorganization plan, when confirmed, res judicata even where error in the plan is alleged. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134, 8 3 L.ed. 104. The i s s u e s r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , w i t h one e x c e p t i o n , c o u l d n o t have been r a i s e d i n t h e bankr u p t c y c o u r t a t t h e t i m e of c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n plan. They a r e bottomed on e v e n t s t h a t a r o s e t h e r e a f t e r . The f a c t s g i v i n g rise t o d e f e n d a n t s 1 c l a i m s and d e f e n s e s have n e v e r been l i t i g a t e d i n any c o u r t . R e s J u d i c a t a c a n n o t be used a s a t o o l t o deny d e f e n d a n t s t h e i r day i n c o u r t . The e x c e p t i o n i s t h e c l a i m by d e f e n d a n t s t h a t t h e t r u s t e e charged them w i t h i t e m s n o t p r o p e r l y c h a r g e a b l e a g a i n s t them under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n p l a n . Essentially, d e f e n d a n t s contend t h a t c e r t a i n i t e m s i n c u r r e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e View P o i n t Ranch i n Oregon s h o u l d n o t have been c h a r g e d a g a i n s t them, and t h a t Double X w a s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e i m b u r s e ment b e c a u s e t h e i r c a s h c o n t r i b u t i o n was i n r e a l i t y a l o a n made t o s e c u r e l u c r a t i v e c o n t r a c t s from G r e a t Western. However, t h e f e d e r a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u r t approved t h e assessment schedule. To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e t r u s t e e ' s c h a r g e s r e f l e c t t h e p l a n ' s assessment schedule, defendants' claim i s r e s judicata. The second i s s u e f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s whether t h e s t a t e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m and r e maining d e f e n s e s of d e f e n d a n t s . P l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t consider- a t i o n of t h e s e i s s u e s by s t a t e c o u r t s i s p r e c l u d e d by t h e cont i n u i n g , e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t o v e r 1 t h e d e b t o r ' s p r o p e r t y , c i t i n g S e c t i o n 1 1 of t h e Bankruptcy A c t , 1 U.S.C.A. 1 S 511. T h a t argument i g n o r e s t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s s u i t f o r c o l l e c t i o n on t h e n o t e s was a p l e n a r y p r o c e e d i n g b r o u g h t by t h e t r u s t e e i n s t a t e court, The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e of law h a s been a p t l y s t a t e d i n 6 C o l l i e r on Bankruptcy, p a r a . 3.21, p . 560: " I f t h e t r u s t e e , r e c e i v e r o r debtor i n possession i n s t i t u t e s a plenary a c t i o n i n a s t a t e c o u r t , t h a t c o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n of a l l t h e i n c i d e n t s of t h e l i t i g a t i o n w i t h i n i t s s c o p e . " Were i t o t h e r w i s e , a monstrous i n j u s t i c e would r e s u l t . The t r u s t e e , h a v i n g chosen t h e s t a t e c o u r t a s h i s forum, c o u l d e l i m i n a t e any d e f e n s e s o r c o u n t e r c l a i m s t o h i s a c t i o n w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e i r m e r i t s by t h e s i m p l e e x p e d i e n t of c l a i m i n g exclusive jurisdiction i n the reorganization court. W e hold t h a t , w h i l e t h e s t a t e c o u r t must c l e a r l y e n f o r c e t h e t e r m s of t h e reo r g a n i z a t i o n p l a n , it c a n n o t r e f u s e t o e n t e r t a i n d e f e n s e s o r r e l a t e d c o u n t e r c l a i m s which a l l e g e e v e n t s o c c u r r i n g a f t e r conf i r m a t i o n o f t h e p l a n m e r e l y on t h e ground of e x c l u s i v e j u r i s diction i n the reorganization court. see: Brown v . Gerdes, 321 U.S. For f u r t h e r a u t h o r i t y , 1 7 8 , 6 4 S.Ct. 487, 88 L ed 659; Ohio O i l Co. v. Thompson, 1 2 0 F.2d 831 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 4 1 ) ; Dawson v . N a t i o n a l L i f e I n s . Co., 156 Tenn. 306, 300 S.W. 567. W e n e x t d e t e r m i n e whether o r n o t t h e r e e x i s t g e n u i n e i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t p r e c l u d i n g summary judgment on t h e r e maining i s s u e s . The f a c t u a l c o n t e n t i o n s of t h e d e f e n d a n t s have a l r e a d y been summarized, and a l l r e l a t e t o t h e a f f i r m a t i v e def e n s e s and c o u n t e r c l a i m . To s u s t a i n t h e summary judgment, p l a i n t i f f s must have e s t a b l i s h e d t h e a b s e n c e of any i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t a s t o e a c h of t h e d e f e n s e s and t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m . Roope v. The Anaconda Co., 159 Mont. 28, 4 9 4 P.2d 922; S t a t e ex r e l . C i t y of Helena v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Mont .- I The d e f e n s e of economic d u r e s s i s c l e a r l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o summary judgment i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f s . There i s s i m p l y no a l l e g a t i o n h e r e of a n u n l a w f u l d e t e n t i o n of p r o p e r t y , a s r e q u i r e d by t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f d u r e s s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 1 3 - 3 0 5 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. D e f e n d a n t s 1 a l l e g a t i o n s amount t o n o t h i n g more t h a n a s t a t e m e n t of t h e i r economic d i s t r e s s a t t h e t i m e t h e y e x e c u t e d t h e notes. T h a t i s c l e a r l y n o t enough t o v a l i d a t e t h e d e f e n s e . Pederson v . Thoeny, 8 8 Mont, 569, 2 9 5 P. 250; McNussen v . Grayb e a l , 146 Mont. 1 7 3 , 405 P.2d 447. The a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of f a i l u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n was a l s o a p r o p e r s u b j e c t f o r summary judgment i n f a v o r of p l a i n tiffs. The c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r d e f e n d a n t s 1 p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s was b i l l s of s a l e from t h e t r u s t e e c o v e r i n g t h e i r r e c l a i m e d r a n c h and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y s i t u a t e d t h e r e o n . I n accord with t h e t e r m s of t h e p l a n , t h e t r u s t e e conveyed o n l y h i s i n t e r e s t i n .the properties. The i m p o r t of t h a t form of conveyance i s e v i d e n t i n a l e t t e r w r i t t e n t o t h e t r u s t e e by d e f e n d a n t s 1 a t t o r n e y . In t h a t l e t t e r , he w r o t e : " * * * S a i d B i l l s of S a l e w i l l n o t be c o n s t r u e d by t h e s a i d s h a r e h o l d e r s [ d e f e n d a n t s h e r e ] t o i n c l u d e any w a r r a n t y by t h e T r u s t e e t h a t t h o s e i t e m s of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y l i s t e d on t h e E x h i b i t s t o t h e B i l l s of S a l e a r e a c t u a l l y p h y s i c a l l y l o c a t e d on t h e s a i d farms which a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e Order of R e s c i s s i o n made a p a r t of t h e B i l l s of S a l e , o r t h a t any o r a l l of s u c h i t e m s of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y e v e r e x i s t e d , and s a i d s h a r e h o l d e r s hereby waive any c l a i m t h e y may have o r t h a t may a r i s e a g a i n s t G r e a t Western Ranches, I n c . , a g a i n s t S t u a r t M. Kaplan, a s T r u s t e e of G r e a t Western Ranches, I n c . , and e a c h of them, r e l a t i n g t o t i t l e t o said personal property, o r any of i t . " [Bracketed m a t e r i a l added.] (Emphasis added. ) Defendants r e c e i v e d what t h e y b a r g a i n e d f o r - - t h e conveyance of t h e t r u s t e e ' s i n t e r e s t i n c e r t a i n personal property, including t h e thoroughbred and q u a r t e r h o r s e s , d e v o i d of any a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d o r t h a t t h e t r u s t e e had any t i t l e t o convey. That was t h e e f f e c t of t h e B i l l of S a l e , and was e x p r e s s l y r e c o g n i z e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t s . They c a n n o t now be h e a r d t o c l a i m f a i l u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Defendants1 l a s t a f f i r m a t i v e defense i s t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t e x e c u t i o n of t h e n o t e s was induced by f r a u d . The e l e m e n t s of t h a t f r a u d a r e a l l e g e d t o be f a l s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t t h e amounts a s s e s s e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s ' s t o c k were c o r r e c t ; t h a t assessments in favor of Double X were traceable to its cash contribution; and that 150 thoroughbred and quarter horses, with their registration papers, would be among the reclaimed property conveyed to the defendants. As already discussed, the confirmation of the reorganization plan by the reorganization court made issues relating to the assessments res judicata, and therefore they cannot be relitigated in Montana courts. The only element of this defense which remains to be considered here is that which alleges false representations by the trustee concerning the horses and their registration papers. We note that these allegations have been denied by plaintiffs. The letter from defendants' attorney, alluded to heretofore, belies this allegation. It evidences the defendants' understanding that the existence of and title to the horses was not being warranted by the trustee in his conveyance. Under the rules governing summary judgments, the letter established a sufficient absence of genuine factual issue on this point to shift the burden of demonstrating such issue to defendants. The record here is devoid of such evidence, the only allusion thereto was the bareallegation in the pleadings. Accordingly, the dis- trict court was correct ia awarding summary judgment to plaintiffs on this issue. On the basis of the "wrongful acts" or negligence alleged in the affirmative defenses, defendants have also counterclaimed for damages. Since the defenses have proved faulty, as a matter of law, the counterclaim necessarily suffers the same deficiency. There are no genuine issues of material fact. The facts con- tained in the record demonstrate that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on all issues, as a matter of law. The final issue raised by defendants concerns the district court's denial of their motion for further discovery to "seek evidence to support the allegations of the affirmative defense and Cross-Complaint." The district court, without objection, had ordered that all discovery be completed by June 15, 1974. Defendants1 motion for further discovery was made on June 19, 1974, offering no excuse for delay. The district court's refusal to grant that motion was not an abuse of discretion, for two reasons: (1) all parties had ample opportunity to conduct discovery, with knowledge of the date by which it must be completed, and (2) the affirmative defenses and counterclaim are de- fective, as a matter of law, and could not be salvaged by additional facts, even if it were assumed that further discovery would produce additional, material facts. Responsibility for failure to discover facts supporting defendants' defenses and counterclaim must be assessed against the defendants, who failed to complete their discovery within the alloted time. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. We concur: J C/ Justices M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s s p e c i a l l y concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t reached, b u t would not e n t e r i n t o t h e discussion on so-called i s s u e s which a r e not r a i s e d a s i s s u e s a t all. The only i s s u e r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t s i s whether t h e r e a r e genuine i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t s t o support a summary judgment. With t h a t p a r t of t h e opinion, I agree. r' " ---.,---#...4"2d"C Justice. ' . *-, j----*--16-r:-s--A-I L

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