STATE EX REL CITY MOTOR CO v DIS

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No. 12858 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN THE STATE O MONTANA, e x r e 1 F C I T Y M T R COMPANY, I N C . , a OO corporation, Relators, THE DISTRICT COURT O THE EIGHTH F JUDICIAL DISTRICT O THE STATE O F F MONTANA, I N AND FOR THE C U T O O NY F CASCADE, THE HON. PAUL G. HATFIELD, DISTRICT JUDGE and FRED DOLBERG, Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : For Relators : Marra and Wenz, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Joseph R. Marra a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Church, H a r r i s , Johnson and W i l l i a m s , G r e a t Fa 11s , Montana F o r Respondents: Hoyt and Bottomly, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana John C. Hoyt a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana. Submitted: Decided : December 1 7 , 1974 J N .. 9l57""s A Chief J u s t i c e James T. H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Mr. This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding. R e l a t o r C i t y Motor Company s e e k s a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l o r o t h e r approp r i a t e w r i t d i r e c t i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f Cascade County t o v a c a t e i t s o r d e r d e n y i n g r e l a t o r ' s motion f o r summary judgment under Rule 5 6 , M.R.Civ.P., and t o e n t e r i n i t s s t e a d an o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e motion, a l l i n Cascade County c a u s e No. 73754C. - T h i s C o u r t h e a r d c o u n s e l f o r r e l a t o r e x p a r t e and a n a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t was i s s u e d s e t t i n g a show c a u s e h e a r i n g . Both p a r t i e s t h e r e u p o n s u b m i t t e d b r i e f s and were r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l on o r a l argument. The f a c t s a r e s i m p l e : Ronald P h i l l i p s , c o d e f e n d a n t w i t h r e l a t o r , was employed by r e l a t o r a s a new and used c a r salesman. On t h e n i g h t of F e b r u a r y 27, 1971, p l a i n t i f f i n c a u s e No. 73754C was d r i v i n g h i s c a r i n t h e c i t y of G r e a t F a l l s when he was s t r u c k b r o a d s i d e i n a n i n t e r s e c t i o n by a v e h i c l e d r i v e n by P h i l l i p s . A t t h e t i m e P h i l l i p s was u s i n g a " d e m o n s t r a t o r " owned by r e l a t o r and p r o v i d e d f o r P h i l l i p s ' u s e . The c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t r e l a t o r was p r e d i c a t e d on t h e t h e o r i e s of r e s p o n d e a t s u p e r i o r and n e g l i gent entrustment. However, t h e answer d e n i e d P h i l l i p s was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s employment when h e c o l l i d e d w i t h p l a i n t i f f and t h a t r e l a t o r knew o r s h o u l d have known a b o u t P h i l l i p s t driving record. I n s u p p o r t of i t s motion f o r summary judgment, r e l a t o r r e l i e d on t h e d e p o s i t i o n s of P h i l l i p s and O l e A a f e d t , s a l e s manager f o r r e l a t o r . I t i s contended t h e former document c l e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t P h i l l i p s was i n no way engaged i n r e l a t o r ' s b u s i n e s s when t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d and t h e l a t t e r shows t h a t r e l a t o r d i d e v e r y t h i n g r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d of it i n a s c e r t a i n i n g P h i l l i p s 1 d r i v i n g a b i l i t i e s . Rule 56, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " ( b ) * * * A p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m * * * i s a s s e r t e d * * * may, a t any t i m e , move f o r a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any pa.rt thereof. "(c) * * * The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a . judgment as a matter of law. * * * P summary judgment * * * may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." In Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167, this Court discussed the rationale behind the provision for summary judgment: "The general purpose of Rule 56 is to promptly dispose of actions in which there is no genuine issue of fact, thereby eliminating unnecessary trial, delay, and expense. 6 Moore Fed.Prac.2dI S 56.11, page 2057 further states: "'A summary judgment is a judgment in bar that results from an application of substantive law to facts that are established beyond a reasonable controversy. The purpose of the hearing on the motion for such a judgment is not to resolve factual issues. It is to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact in dispute; and if not, to render judgment in accordance with the law as applied to the established facts.' "At page 2131, Sec. 56.15 of 6 Moore Fed.Prac.2d that authority states the burden placed upon the party opposing summary judgment in these words: " ' * * * the party opposing motion must present facts in proper form--conclusions of law will not suffice; and the opposing party's facts must be material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy, nor merely suspicious.'" In Hager v. Tandy, 146 Mont. 531, 537, 410 P.2d 447, this Court said: " * * * on a motion for summary judgment the formal issues presented by the pleadings are not controlling and the court must consider the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, oral testimony and exhibits presented." See: Barron & Daniels v. Paddock, 145 Mont. 207, 399 P.2d 740; 3 Holtzoff, S 1236. Thus the determinative question here is whether respondent has raised factual issues that are material and of a substantial nature. A f t e r s t u d y i n g t h e whole r e c o r d , e s p e c i a l l y t h e d e p o s i - t i o n s of P h i l l i p s and A a f e d t , we must c o n c l u d e t h a t r e s p o n d e n t h a s f a l l e n s h o r t of m e e t i n g t h i s burden. Was P h i l l i p s a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e of h i s employment a t t h e t i m e of t h e F e b r u a r y 27, 1971 a c c i d e n t ? Re- s p o n d e n t p u r p o r t s t o f i n d agency r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l a t o r and P h i l l i p s on t h e b a s i s of c e r t a i n s e l e c t e d p a s s a g e s from Aafedt's deposition. F o r example: "Q. And what i s t h e p u r p o s e of g i v i n g your salesmen a d e m o n s t r a t o r ? A. W e l l , w e hope t o u s e i t a s a t o o l t o sell Chevrolets. I would l i k e t o t h i n k t h a t i s what t h e y u s e them f o r . And it i s your b e l i e f , a t any r a t e , t h a t any t i m e a salesman i s i n a d e m o n s t r a t o r t h a t it i s a s a l e s a s s e t t o C i t y Motors? A. Y e s ; it c e r t a i n l y is. "Q. "Q. Now, t h e n , do you t h i n k t h a t t h e more e x p o s u r e you g i v e your new v e h i c l e s by u s e on t h e c i t y s t r e e t s of G r e a t F a l l s t h e b e t t e r o f f C i t y Motors i s ? A. I a m s u r e t h a t i s bound t o be t r u e . "Q. And was M r . P h i l l i p s g i v e n a d e m o n s t r a t o r i n p a r t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of d r i v i n g it on t h e s t r e e t s s o t h a t p e o p l e c a n see your new v e h i c l e s ? A . Along t h a t l i n e , yes. "Q. So t h a t i s what he was d o i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , w a s n ' t i t ? A. D r i v i n g one of o u r demonstrators? Right. "Q. Yes. "Q. With your p e r m i s s i o n ? A. A. Right. "Q. And you f e l t t h i s was i n f u r t h e r a n c e of t h e Right." b e n e f i t of C i t y Motor Company. A . Respondent a l s o q u o t e s s e c t i o n 53-118, R.C.M. 1947, c o n c e r n i n g d e a l e r ' s motor v e h i c l e l i c e n s e p l a t e s , and c i t e s c a s e s i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have c o n s t r u e d l i k e s t a t u t e s t o g i v e r i s e t o a presumption t h a t a salesman d r i v i n g a c a r d i s p l a . y i n g d e a l e r ' s plates is operating it in the dealer's business, and this presumption continues in the absence of unequivocable evidence to the contrary. The chief difficulty with this line of argument is that it ignores the balance of Aafedtls testimony and Phillips' testimony altogether. Aafedt further testified: "Q. NOW, what do you expect your salesmen to do with the demonstrators you furnish them? A. Well, as I mentioned, want them to demonstrate them. They are, however, available for their own personal use * * * they can even leave the city, they can leave the state with permission, prior permission. For personal use, but they are to be used as a demonstrator." On cross-examination: "Q. You didn't mean to imply by your testimony, did you, that at the time of the accident Ronald Phillips was in the course and scope of his employment? A. No; he was alone. He wasn't demonstrating the car. He was going home, so he wasn't heading toward a prospect, if that is what you mean. "Q. There was a question, somewhat ambiguous, that Mr. Hoyt asked you, and that is whether or not at the time of the accident, and I'm quoting the question to the best of my memory, whether or not at the time of the accident he was employed by City Motors, and my question to you is that you did not mean to imply by that answer, did you, that he was in fact acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident? A. No." The pertinent part of Phillips' testimony is this: "Q. A. Where had you been just prior to the accident? The Wrangler restaurant. "Q. Where were you going from there? home. A. Going "Q. Did you stop anywhere after you left the Wrangler before you had the accident? A. Yes, I did, I don't recall where. I picked up some hot dog buns and some milk or something of this sort, I can't recall. I know I picked it up, but I don't know if it was at a store, it might have been at Super America, next door. "Q. "Q. the you for say On i n s t r u c t i o n s from your w i f e ? A. Right. And from t h e t i m e you l e f t t h e Wrangler t o t i m e of t h e happening of t h e c o l l i s i o n , w e r e d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y engaged i n any b u s i n e s s C i t y Motors C h e v r o l e t Company? A. I would no. "Q. Would it be c o r r e c t i f I s a i d you were on your way home t o have s u p p e r ? A . Right. "Q. R e l a t i v e t o t h e d e m o n s t r a t o r program--and I r e f e r t o t h e f a c t t h a t you w e r e p r o v i d e d w i t h a demonstrator--was t h a t d e m o n s t r a t o r always used i n t h e c o u r s e of C i t y C h e v r o l e t b u s i n e s s ? A. No." Respondent a l s o s t r e s s e s t h e f a c t t h a t w h i l e a t t h e r e s t a u r a n t P h i l l i p s met w i t h o n e C h a r l e s P l a n t , who had p r e v i o u s l y l e d s e v e r a l c u s t o m e r s t o him. However, t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e i r v i s i t on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n w a s anything but s o c i a l . Had a l l t h e s e t h i n g s been f a i r l y con- s i d e r e d and weighed, r e s p o n d e n t may w e l l have found--as we do-- u n e q u i v o c a b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t P h i l l i p s was a c t i n g o u t s i d e t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e of h i s employment a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t . Beyond t h i s , we d e t e c t a r e c u r r i n g theme i n r e s p o n d e n t ' s reasoning: t h e mere f a c t t h a t a d e m o n s t r a t o r on t h e s t r e e t i s of b e n e f i t t o t h e d e a l e r i s enough t o make t h e d e a l e r answer f o r t h e f a u l t s of h i s salesman who d r i v e s it. T h i s a s k s t o o much, f o r it would h o l d t h e d e a l e r r e s p o n s i b l e a t a l l t i m e s . W are e n o t aware of any r u l e o r p o l i c y of agency law r e q u i r i n g s u c h a sweeping a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of r e s p o n d e a t s u p e r i o r . Moreover, t h e l a w i n Montana i s s e t t l e d on t h e p o i n t t h a t where a n employee u s e s t h e m a s t e r ' s c a r on a m i s s i o n of h i s own, some s l i g h t i n c i d e n t a l b e n e f i t which may t h e r e b y a c c r u e t o t h e master is i n s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant holding t h e master l i a b l e f o r t h e e m p l o y e e ' s n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n of t h a t v e h i c l e . S t a n d a r d Motor Co., Monaghan v . 96 Mont. 1 6 5 , 173, 29 P.2d 278. Cases i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s a r e i n agreement. 192 N . C . 760, 135 S.E. See: Grier v . G r i e r , 852; S l a t t e r y v . O'Meara, 1 2 0 Conn. 465, 1 8 1 A. 610; and S u l l i v a n v. A s s o c i a t e d D e a l e r s , 4 Vlash,2d S i n c e r e s p o n d e n t h a s shown no f a c t s a d e q u a t e t o s u p p o r t t h e r e q u i s i t e agency r e l a t i o n s h i p between P h i l l i p s and r e l a t o r a t t h e t i m e i n q u e s t i o n , w e a p p l y t h e p r e v a i l i n g r u l e of law a s d e c l a r e d by t h i s C o u r t i n Monaghan: " I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t even though t h e d r i v e r o f a c a r i s t h e s e r v a n t of t h e owner of t h e c a r , t h e owner i s n o t l i a b l e u n l e s s a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t t h e d r i v e r was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of h i s a u t h o r i t y and i n r e g a r d t o h i s m a s t e r ' s business. " To t h e same e f f e c t s e e : H a r r i n g t o n v . H. D. Lee M e r c a n t i l e Co., 97 Mont. 4 0 , 33 P.2d 553; Wilcox v . Smith, 103 Mont. 182, 62 Did r e l a t o r n e g l i g e n t l y e n t r u s t a d e m o n s t r a t o r motor vehicle t o Phillips? The g i s t of r e s p o n d e n t ' s argument h e r e i s t h a t r e l a t o r , by n o t o b t a i n i n g a copy o f P h i l l i p s ' d r i v i n g r e c o r d from t h e Montana Highway P a t r o l , f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e proper c a r e i n s e l e c t i n g P h i l l i p s f o r i t s s a l e s force. As to t h i s t h e o r y , r e l a t o r knew from P h i l l i p s ' j o b a p p l i c a t i o n t h a t h e had had no motor v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t s d u r i n g t h e p r e c e d i n g f i v e y e a r p e r i o d and t h a t he p o s s e s s e d a v a l i d Montana d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . A a f e d t t e s t i f i e d t h a t p e r s o n s h i r e d f o r s a l e s , a s opposed t o drivers p o s i t i o n s w e r e investigated f u r t h e r with r e s p e c t t o t h e i r g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r and s a l e s a b i l i t y , b u t n o t h i n g more. What else c o u l d reasonably be expected of relator u n d e r the circumstances? Respondent c e r t a i n l y h a s n o t p r e s e n t e d any hard f a c t s t o i n d i c a t e r e l a t o r knew o r s h o u l d have known P h i l l i p s had a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a good d r i v i n g r e c o r d . W e t h i n k t h a t r e l a t o r , upon d i s c o v e r i n g P h i l l i p s t o be a d u l y l i c e n s e d motor v e h i c l e o p e r a t o r , prima f a c i e was e n t i t l e d t o r e l y on h i s competency a s a d r i v e r . 3$16' a . 3 $-P 463, 136 A. 787. Piquet v. Wazelle, T h a t r e l a t o r i n q u i r e d even f u r t h e r o f P h i l l i p s bears out i t s contention t h a t every reasonable e f f o r t was made t o d e t e r m i n e P h i l l i p s ' f i t n e s s a s a n employee. To i n s i s t t h a t r e l a t o r was under a n a f f i r m a t i v e d u t y ko a s c e r t a i n o r keep a b r e a s t of P h i l l i p s ' d r i v i n g r e c o r d would be t,o p l a c e upon r e l a t o r and o t h e r s s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d a burden u n j u s t i f i e d by e i t h e r i t s own n e e d s o r t h e p u b l i c good. L e t a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l a s prayed f o r i s s u e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h o u r holdi';lg h e r e i n . J ' ; it Chief J u s t i c e W concur: e -, , 8

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