STATE v BRETZ

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No. 12906 I N T E SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O M N A A H F H F OTN THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , L. R. BRETZ and GLORIA EUSEK CARDEN, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: F o r Appellant : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Asst. Montana Richard Dzivi, s p e c i a 1 / ~ t t o r n e yGenera 1, Helena, Montana Dona l d E n s tman, s p e c i a l l A ~ 6 r n e ~ General and John P. Atkins argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: S a n d a l l , Moses and Cavan, B i l l i n g s , Montana Charles F. Moses argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: Fi led : APbi t 6 19[S A p r i l 10, 1975 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s i s an a p p e a l by t h e s t a t e from an o r d e r g r a n t i n g r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion f o r a change of venue from Cascade County t o Lewis and Clark County. I On September 16, 1974, respondent B r e t z , defendant i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t , was charged i n Cascade County w i t h f i f t y - e i g h t f e l o n y counts. Ten days l a t e r he f i l e d a motion f o r change of venue i n two p a r t s : (1) That Lewis and Clark County i s t h e proper p l a c e f o r t r i a l r a t h e r than Cascade County, and (2) t h a t he could n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l i n Cascade County by reason of a d v e r s e p u b l i c i t y i n t h e community. Oral argument on t h e motion was h e l d October 15, 1974. Bretz d i d n o t p r e s e n t any evidence i n s u p p o r t o f , and i n f a c t abandoned, p a r t (2) of h i s motion. He r e l i e d on p a r t ( I ) , a r g u i n g t h a t Lewis and C l a r k County was t h e proper p l a c e f o r t r i a l . In granting the motion f o r change of venue, t h e d i s t r i c t judge observed t h a t he hoped a n a p p e a l t o t h i s Court would s e t t l e t h e venue i s s u e p r i o r t o a long t r i a l . The s t a t e r a i s e d s i x i s s u e s on a p p e a l , however, we f i n d i t n e c e s s a r y t o d i s c u s s b u t two. F i r s t : Was Cascade County a county o f proper venue? Chapter 4 , T i t l e 95, Montana Code of Criminal Procedure, prov i d e s t h e answer i n simple d i r e c t terms. S e c t i o n 95-401, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s t h e t r i a l s h a l l b e i n t h e county where t h e o f f e n s e was committed. S e c t i o n 95-402, R.C.M. 1947, provides t h a t where two o r more a c t s a r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e commission of an o f f e n s e , t r i a l may b e i n any county i n which any o f such a c t s occur. R.C.M. S e c t i o n 95-408, 1947, provides "Where a person o b t a i n s p r o p e r t y by l a r c e n y , robbery, f a l s e p r e t e n s e s o r embezzlement, he may be t r i e d i n any county i n which he e x e r t e d c o n t r o l over such property." Respondent was charged w i t h f i f t y - t w o o f f e n s e s i n v o l v i n g e i t h e r grand l a r c e n y , l a r c e n y by b a i l e e o r o b t a i n i n g money by f a l s e p r e tenses. He was a l s o charged w i t h f o u r c o u n t s of f o r g e r y and two c o u n t s of p r e p a r i n g f a l s e evidence. With r e s p e c t t o t h e l a r c e n y and f a l s e p r e t e n s e s c h a r g e s , i t was a l l e g e d t h a t respondent e x e r c i s e d c o n t r o l over t h e p r o p e r t y i n Cascade County. With r e s p e c t t o t h e f o r g e r y and p r e p a r i n g f a l s e evidence c h a r g e s , i t was a l l e g e d t h a t a t l e a s e some of t h e a c t s r e q u i s i t e t o t h e o f f e n s e s charged occurred i n Cascade County. C l e a r l y Cascade County was a proper county f o r t h e c a s e t o be t r i e d . Some o f t h e elements of t h e o f f e n s e s charged may have occurred i n whole o r i n p a r t i n o t h e r c o u n t i e s . However, t h a t does n o t a f f e c t t h e problem of whether cascade County was a proper county for trial. Venue was proper i n Cascade County. Second: Was i t e r r o r f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o o r d e r t h e t r i a l moved t o Lewis and Clark County, a county i n which venue was a l l e g e d l y a l s o proper a s t o some o f t h e c o u n t s ? W e hold i t was e r r o r and r e v e r s e t h e o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . I n S h i e l d s v. S h i e l d s , 115 Mont. 146, 139 P.2d 528, a c i v i l c a s e , t h i s Court under s i m i l a r circumstances h e l d t h a t i f t h e county i n which t h e a c t i o n i s brought and t h e one t o which i t i s sought t o have i t t r a n s f e r r e d a r e both c o u n t i e s of proper venue, t h e a c t i o n must s t a y where t h e complaint was f i l e d . p r i n c i p l e applies i n a criminal case. That same I f no p r e j u d i c e o r o t h e r l e g a l r e a s o n i s shown and t h e complaint o r information i s f i l e d i n a county of proper venue, t h a t i s where t h e t r i a l i s t o b e held. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was i n e r r o r i n o r d e r i n g t h e t r i a l moved t o Lewis and Clark County. O o r a l argument respondent advanced, f o r t h e f i r s t time, t h e n t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s e c t i o n s 95-402 and 95-408, R.C.M. 1947, vio- l a t e t h e S i x t h Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and Article 11, Sec. 24, of the 1972 Montana Constitution. The latter guarantees a right to trial in I t the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." that an offense can only be committed, i,e. 1t His argument is consummated", at the one point in time at which all the elements of the crime have occurred and, thus, there can be only one county of proper venue. We do not agree and would not so define the word "committed", Cases have long recognized that statutes such as sections 95-402 and 95-408, R.C.M. 1947, do not violate constitutional guarantees. Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392, 400, 32 S.Ct. 812, 56 L.Ed. 1136; Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 636, 81 S,Ct. 358, 5 L ed 2d 340; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93,120, affd. 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 90 L.Ed. 1575; State v. Coon, 242 . La.1019, 141 S.2d 350; State v Harrington, 128 Vt. 242, 260 A.2d 692; State v. Moore, 189 Wash.680, 66 P.2d 836; 18 U.S.C. 53237. The order of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconststent with this Opinion, Justice We Concur: \

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