STATE v JACK

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 12881 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A OR F F OTN 1975 STATE O M N A A F OTN, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -VS - DONALD JACK, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Chester Lloyd Jones, County Attorney, Virginia C i t y , Montana Clayton Herron argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Larry D. Whitman argued, West Yellowstone, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Longan, Holmstrom and Vicki W. Dunaway, B i l l i n g s , Montana Vicki W. Dunaway argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: May 6, 1975 Decided : - er M r . Chief J u s t i c e H a r r i s i o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. The s t a t e of Montana a p p e a l s from an o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Madison County, g r a n t i n g summary judgment t o defendant Donald Jack. Donald. Jack i s a r e s i d e n t of t h e s t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a charged w i t h v i o l a t i n g s e c t i o n 26-909, R.C.M. 1947, ~ o n t a n a ' s Resident Guide Law, which provides: 11 Licensed o u t f i t t e r o r guide r e q u i r e d f o r n o n r e s i d e n t hunting-exception f o r landowner-waiver. (1) It s h a l l be unlawful f o r any n o n r e s i d e n t t o hunt game animals on any land w i t h i n any n a t i o n a l f o r e s t w i l d e r n e s s a r e a , n a t i o n a l game r e f u g e , o r s t a t e game range w i t h i n t h e s t a t e of Montana u n l e s s accompanied by a l i c e n s e d o u t f i t t e r , p r o f e s s i o n a l guide o r r e s i d e n t guide and t h e n o n r e s i d e n t hunting l i c e n s e must b e a r t h e s i g n a t u r e and l i c e n s e number of t h e o u t f i t t e r o r r e s i d e n t guide who accompanies him except a s noted below. "(2) A landowner o r agent may guide n o n r e s i d e n t o r r e s i d e n t h u n t e r s on land owned by, o r land l e a s e d t o him without a guide l i c e n s e ; o r he may a u t h o r i z e n o n r e s i dent o r r e s i d e n t h u n t e r s t o hunt without a guide on land owned by, o r land l e a s e d t o , such landowner, l e s s e e o r a g e n t . The n o n r e s i d e n t h u n t e r ' s hunting l i c e n s e must b e a r t h e s i g n a t u r e of t h e r e s i d e n t landowner, l e s s e e o r agent on whose fenced p r o p e r t y he i s hunting a s evidence t h a t permission has been obtained. "(3) The Montana f i s h and game commission s h a l l have a u t h o r i t y t o waive guide requirements f o r h o l d e r s of B-2, B-5 and B-6 l i c e n s e s i n s p e c i a l d e e r and a n t e l o p e a r e a s d u r i n g t h e period B-5 and B-6 l i c e n s e h o l d e r s may hunt . II Guide requirements may n o t be waived i n a r e a s open t o a g e n e r a l hunting season on any game animal o t h e r than d e e r and a n t e l o p e . 1l Donald Jack was convicted on November 19, 1973, and f i n e d f i f t y d o l l a r s by a j u s t i c e of t h e peace. His c o n v i c t i o n was based on a s t i p u l a t i o n of f a c t s which can be summarized a s : 1. Defendant Donald Jack was a n o n r e s i d e n t of t h e s t a t e of Montana a t t h e time o f t h e o f f e n s e charged. 2. A t such time, i n Madision County, Montana, defendant was hunting b i g game w i t h i n a n a t i o n a l f o r e s t . 3. That he was, a t t h e time and p l a c e , unaccompanied by any r e s i d e n t guide. 4. Except a s may be s t a t e d above, defendant was i n compliance w i t h a l l f i s h and game laws of t h e s t a t e of Montana. Defendant's s o l e d e f e n s e a t a l l l e v e l s of t h e s e proceedings h a s taken t h e form of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e t o t h e s t a t u t e he a d m i t t e d l y offended. I n support of t h i s c h a l l e n g e he u r g e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d e n i e s him e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment and A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . H e a l s o contends t h e s t a t u t e t o b e an undue burden on i n t e r s t a t e commerce, c o n t r a r y t o t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 8 of t h e United S t a t e s Constitution. The q u e s t i o n of whether a s t a t u t e encroaches upon t h e p r o t e c t i o n s o f f e r e d by t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e depends d i r e c t l y on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h r e e b a s i c i s s u e s : 1 ) whether t h e s t a t u t e i s a l e g i t i m a t e and proper e x e r c i s e o f governmental a u t h o r i t y ; 2) t h e b a s i s of t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e persons covered t h e r e u n d e r ; and 3) t h e p r o p e r s t a n dard of review o r scope of j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y r e g a r d i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and t h e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e law. There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t a s t a t e h a s t h e power t o pres e r v e and r e g u l a t e i t s w i l d l i f e . I n t h e n i n e t e e n t h centfry, i t was commonly h e l d t h a t t h i s power d e r i v e d from t h e common law concept of 11 s o v e r e i g n ownership". Under t h a t d o c t r i n e , t h e ownership of w i l d l i f e was h e l d by t h e s t a t e i n t r u s t f o r i t s people. McCready v. V i r g i n i a , 94 U.S. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct.600, 391, 24 L.Ed 248; Geer v. 40 L. Ed. 793. Under more modern t h e o r y , t h e power h a s been h e l d t o l i e w i t h i n t h e purview of a s t a t e r s p o l i c e powers. 31, 29 S.Ct. S i l z v. H e s t e r b e r g , 211 U.S. 10, 53 L. Ed. 75; Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Dept.of N a t u r a l Resources, 30 F.2d 111. Montana r e c o g n i z e s b o t h t h e d o c t r i n e o f s o v e r e i g n owners h i p (Rosenfeld v. Jakways, 67 Mont. 558, 216 P. 776), and t h e p o l i c e power t h e o r y ( S t a t e e x r e l . Nepstad v. Danielson, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689). W need n o t d e c i d e which of t h e s e e d o c t r i n e s should now p r e v a i l i n t h e s t a t e of Montana. In the a r e a of w i l d l i f e r e g u l a t i o n , i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e may impose such terms and c o n d i t i o n s a s i t s e e s f i t , a s long a s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s a r e n o t i n f r i n g e d . S t a t e ex r e l . V i s s e r v. F i s h and Game Comm., 150 Mont. 525, 531, 437 P.2d 373. The n e x t s t e p i s t o determine t h e b a s i s f o r t h e l e g i s l a t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and determine what persons o r groups of persons a r e a f f e c t e d by i t . By drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n between r e s i d e n t and n o n r e s i d e n t sportsman, we f i n d t h e s t a t u t e d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s a t l e a s t f o u r d i s t i n c t groups of persons. First, are of c o u r s e t h e t r u e n o n r e s i d e n t s who merely e n t e r t h e s t a t e f o r t h e purpose of hunting. But t h e broad language of t h e law must a l s o be construed a s a p p l y i n g t o persons l i v i n g i n t h e s t a t e f o r a p e r i o d of time i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y t h e l e g a l r e s i d e n c y requirements ( s e c t i o n 26-202.3, R.C.M. 1947); t o former r e s i d e n t s o f t h e s t a t e who s t i l l r e t u r n t o h u n t ; and t o persons who own land w i t h i n t h e s t a t e b u t maintain t h e i r l e g a l r e s i d e n c e s e l s e where. Defendant i s a member of t h i s l a t t e r c l a s s , a s he a c t u a l l y owns land i n Madison County. A h e a r i n g was h e l d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o a f f o r d t h e s t a t e an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t evidence r e g a r d i n g t h e purpose of t h e s t a t u t e . On t h e b a s i s of t h a t evidence, t h e s t a t e con- t e n d s t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s i n mind when t h e s t a t u t e was enacted: 1. That t h e s a f e t y o f n o n r e s i d e n t h u n t e r s i s promoted by p l a c i n g them i n t h e company of r e s i d e n t s who a r e more l i k e l y t o be f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e l o c a l t e r r a i n and weather c o n d i t i o n s . 2. That s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n s and t e r r a i n a r e more l i k e l y t o be obeyed and r e s p e c t e d on t h e assumption t h a t r e s i d e n t s a r e more f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e laws and more j e a l o u s a s t o t h e maintenance o f t h e l o c a l environment. 3. That landowners a r e b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e improper u s e of t h e i r l a n d . 4. That t h e law a f f o r d s s t a t e o f f i c i a l s b e t t e r en- forcement c o n t r o l . F i n a l l y , we determine t h e proper s t a n d a r d of review o r scope of j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y t o be a p p l i e d . Over t h e y e a r s , t h e c o u r t s have developed two main approaches, c o n d i t i o n i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n on t h e n a t u r e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge. Where t h e c h a l l e n g e extends only t o t h e more g e n e r a l l e g i s l a t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , t h e j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y must be l i m i t e d t o determining whether t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i s j u s t i f i e d by a r a t i o n a l b a s i s . Stated another way, we can determine only whether t h e law has a s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a s o n a b l e r e l a t i o n t o a proper l e g i s l a t i v e purpose s o a s n o t t o be deemed a r b i trary. S t a t e v. Safeway S t o r e s , I n c . , 106 Mont. 182, 76 P.2d 81; Great F a l l s National Bank v. McCormick, 152 Mont. 319, 448 P.2d 991. I n connection w i t h t h i s s t a n d a r d , a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n having some r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s does n o t deny e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n merely because i t i s n o t made w i t h p r e c i s e mathematical n i c e t y o r r e s u l t s i n some i n e q u a l i t y , One who a t t a c k s t h e l e g i s l a t i o n has t h e burden of proving t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o be a r b i t r a r y . Lindsley v. N a t u r a l Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 8 1 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed.2d 393. But when t h e c h a l l e n g e extends t o c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s which a f f e c t "fundamental r i g h t s " o r c e r t a i n 11 suspect c r i t e r i a " t h e scope of j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y i s correspondingly i n c r e a s e d . purposes of t h e law must s e r v e a I1 The compelling governmental i n t e r e s t 1 ' and a heavy burden i s placed on t h e s t a t e t o j u s t i f y i t s c l a s s i fication. Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F.Supp. 1175. Defendant a l l e g e s and argues t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n i n f r i n g e s upon h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o t r a v e l i n an e f f o r t t o persuade us t o apply t h e s t r i n g e n t "compelling governmental interest" test. And, i t i s t r u e t h e r e c o r d tends t o i n d i c a t e t h e c o s t s of h i r i n g a r e s i d e n t guide a r e q u i t e h i g h , and t h a t many more n o n r e s i d e n t h u n t e r s e n t e r t h e s t a t e each y e a r than could be reasonably accommodated by t h e e x i s t i n g number o f While we recognize a p o s s i b i l i t y licensed professional guides. t h e r e s i d e n t guide law a f f e c t s t h e r i g h t t o i n t e r s t a t e t r a v e l , we do not base our d e c i s i o n on t h o s e grounds. Thompson, 394 U.S. See Shapiro v. 618, 638 n o t e 21, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L ed.2d 600. The s t a t u t e does n o t appear t o be p a t e n t l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on i t s f a c e , But i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e f e c t s a r e r e v e a l e d when reviewed i n l i g h t of i t s p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n . a l l e g e d l y designed t o promote s a f e t y f o r h u n t e r s , The s t a t u t e was yet it i s an e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t t h a t t h e requirements of t h e law have been waived a s t o d e e r and a n t e l o p e , i n t h o s e hunting d i s t r i c t s comp r i s i n g t h e e a s t e r n one t h i r d of t h i s s t a t e . While t h e r e may b e a marked d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e t e r r a i n i n t h e two g e n e r a l a r e a s , we f i n d no reason t o assume t h a t one a r e a i s l e s s dangerous than t h e o t h e r . F u r t h e r , t h e dangers i n h e r e n t t o hunting a n t e - l o p e o r d e e r would c e r t a i n l y n o t d e c r e a s e a s t o t h o s e who might hunt e l k o r moose. The s t a t u t e p u r p o r t s t o promote adherence t o t h e game laws and r e s p e c t f o r t h e environment, b u t no r e a sonable connection has been e s t a b l i s h e d between t h i s g o a l and the legislative classification. Even assuming t h e e x i s t e n c e of such a connection, i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r purpose becomes more remote when a p p l i e d t o former Montana r e s i d e n t s and n o n r e s i d e n t landowners, as defendant. The s t a t e f u r t h e r contends t h e law f o s t e r s b e t t e r p r o t e c t i o n f o r p r i v a t e landowners and more e f f e c t i v e law enforcement. Yet t h e evidence completely f a i l s t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t more nonr e s i d e n t s than r e s i d e n t s a r e found t o b e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e law, o r t h a t h u n t e r s a s a group a r e l e s s law a b i d i n g than fishermen o r o t h e r outdoor sportsmen. Even i f t h e s t a t u t e d i d o p e r a t e promote t h e s e g o a l s , c e r t a i n l y t h e people i n t h e e a s t e r n one t h i r d of t h e s t a t e a r e a s deserving of t h i s p r o t e c t i o n a s a r e our western c i t i z e n s . Certainly a l l nonresident hunters a r e * to s u b j e c t t o j u d i c i a l s a n c t i o n and l i a b i l i t y f o r v i o l a t i o n s and t o r t s committed w i t h i n t h e s t a t e . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s t a t u t o r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and i t s l e g i t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e s i s tenuous and remote, and t h e r e f o r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e i n e q u i t i e s i t has engendered. The judgment i s a f f i r m e d . I .' 4 , ad *' . --;dd2-dz&~~+&--k*-L---~~---*---k-x--2%~ % "' ,$ ' 1 ** Chief ~ u L t i c e W Concur: e Justices.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.