ESTATE OF DAUENHAUER

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No. 12856 I N T E SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O MONTANA H F H F 1975 I N THE M T E O THE ESTATE ATR F NO O DAUENHAUER , A T N DAUENHAUER F e t a l . , Deceased. KAREN MILLER and JERRY DAUENHAUER, P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, D R T Y DAUENHAUER , CHERALEE JOHNSON, OOH CHRISTOPHER DAUENHAUER, DENISE MAZZUCCA, ROMONA PLANT, and ALLEN KELLER, Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s , Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants : M,Gene McLatchy argued, Missoula, Montana H , J. P i n s o n e a u l t , Missoula, Montana J u l i e A. Herak, S e a t t l e , Washington For Respondents: C h r i s t i a n , McCurdy, Ingraham and Wold, Polson, Montana Douglas J. Wold argued, Polson, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed: MAY 8 61 'g i? A p r i l 10, 1975 MAY Z 1 m Chief J u s t i c e James T . H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Mr. T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lake County, which d e c r e e d t h a t t h e o n l y h e i r s of Anton Dauenhauer a r e Dorothy Dauenhauer, s p o u s e , K a r l e n e M i l l e r , d a u g h t e r , and J e r r y Dauenhauer, son. Anton Dauenhauer, a l s o known a s Tony Dauenhauer, d i e d i n t e s t a t e on December 4 , 1971. He was a r e s i d e n t of Montana and l e f t a n e s t a t e o f r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y s i t u a t e d i n Montana. The s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e , Dorothy Dauenhauer, was a p p o i n t e d a d m i n i s tratrix. I n h e r P e t i t i o n f o r L e t t e r s of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , s h e a d v i s e d t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t t h a t t h e h e i r s c o n s i s t e d of h e r s e l f , K a r l e n e M i l l e r and J e r r y Dauenhauer, d e c e d e n t ' s c h i l d r e n by a p r e v i o u s m a r r i a g e which t e r m i n a t e d i n d i v o r c e i n 1944. Subse- q u e n t l y , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t r i x a d v i s e d t h e c o u r t t h e r e were f i v e add i t i o n a l c h i l d r e n e n t i t l e d t o s h a r e i n t h e e s t a t e , namely Ramona P l a n t , A l l e n K e l l e r , C h r i s t o p h e r Thorngren, C h e r a l e e Johnson and Denise Mazzucca. T h e r e a f t e r , p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a complaint t o d e t e r m i n e h e i r s h i p under s e c t i o n 91-3801, R.C.M. 1947. During p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s , a d e f a u l t judgment was e n t e r e d a g a i n s t Ramona P l a n t and A l l e n K e l l e r and a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t was e n t e r e d i n f a v o r of Dorothy Dauenhauer, K a r l e n e M i l l e r and J e r r y Dauenhauer. A t t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t s C h r i s t o p h e r Thorngren, C h e r a l e e Johnson and Denise Mazzucca, s o u g h t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r h e i r s h i p . Proof w a s p r e s e n t e d by which t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d l i v e d w i t h t h e i r mother, Mildred Thorngren, t h e n known a s Mildred Dauenhauer, a s man and w i f e i n C a l i f o r n i a from 1947 t o 1951 and t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d was t h e i r f a t h e r . Decedent c e a s e d l i v - i n g w i t h Mildred Thorngren i n 1951, and n e v e r l i v e d w i t h h e r o r defendants again. I n i t s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and judgment, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t concluded t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r e n o t h e i r s of t h e decedent, Anton Dauenhauer, and that defendants "failed to show that (1) they, or any of them, are legitimate children of the decedent, or (2) that the decedent acknowledged, in a writing signed by the decedent in the presence of a competent witness, that said Defendants, or any of them, were illegitimate children of said decedent, or (3) any other facts sufficient to establish and perfect a claim of heirship from this decedent.'I On appeal these issues are presented for review: (1) Whether the local law of Montana or that of California is to be applied to determine defendants' legitimacy? (2) If the law of California is to be applied to the legitimacy issue, whether defendants are legitimate or have been legitimated pursuant to that law? (3) If defendants are illegitimate, whether the decedent, during his lifetime, complied with the requirements of section 91-404, R.C.M. 1947? First, we note it has not yet been determined that defendants are, in fact, the children of the decedent. Although the record would support such a finding, nothing we say herein should be construed as to require such a finding. That is a mat- ter to be determined by the district court on remand. For purposes of succession, the law of Montana distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate children of a decedent. Section 91-404, R.C.M. 1947. Our initial inquiry must be to deter- mine whether the law of Montana or California is to be applied in the determination of whether defendants are the legitimate or illegitimate children of the decedent. Defendants were born in California and are, to this day, California domiciliaries. The relationship between the decedent and defendants' mother occurred solely in California. Other than this lawsuit, defendants have had no contact with Montana. Certainly it cannot be intimated that the mere fact that decedent later traveled to Montana and died here, in and of itself, renders defendants legitimate. We hold the local law of California governs the issue of defendants' legitimacy. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, S S 137-141; 1 Restatement of Conflict of Laws 2d, S 6; 2 Restatement of Conflict of Laws 2d, S S 287, 288. Defendants contend Montana decisions in In re Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 540, 19 P.2d 1051; and In re Wehr's Estate, 96 Mont. 245, 253, 29 P.2d 836, require that we apply Montana law to the legitimacy issue. We disagree and find these two decisions to be consistent with our holding today. In Wray's Estate, the child was born illegitimate in Nebraska. The father later moved to Wyoming and the mother and father intermarried there. in Montana. The father subsequently died domiciled On the subject of the legitimation of the child, this Court looked to Wyoming law, stating: " * * * upon the marriage of the father and mother, the law of the domicile of the father is controlling. I' This Court applied the predecessor of section 61-123, R.C.M. 1947, "A child born before wedlock becomes legitimate by the subsequent marriage of its parents" solely because there was an absence of proof as to the Wyoming law and it was presumed to be the same as Montana's. Section 61-123, R.C.M. 1947, being a statute of legitimation, the Court properly looked to the law of the place where the legitimating act occurred, In Wehr's Estate, the illegitimate child of the decedent was born and domiciled in Germany. Before moving to Montana, in a writing executed in Germany, the decedent acknowledged the illegitimate child as his own. This Court held the acknowledgment sufficient under the predecessor of section 91-404, R.C.M. 1947, to entitle the child to share in the decedent's estate and nominate an administrator. The portion of section 91-404 pertaining to acknowledgments being a statute of succession, the Court properly looked to local Montana law. While this Court stated there that "the question of status for the purpose of inheritance depends upon the laws of the domicile of the intestate as to property there situated" that statement must be viewed as mere dictum, being broader than the issue at hand. Here, it is apparent from the record that the district court never considered the issue of whether the defendants could be either legitimate or legitimated under California law, despite the failure of decedent and their mother to enter into any formal marriage ceremony. The district court, and the attorneys too, for that matter, apparently believed that such failure rendered defendants, per se, illegitimate. We find it necessary to remand this cause to the district court for a determination of whether defendants are legitimate or have been legitimated under California law. From 1933 to 1969, California Civil Code, § 85, read: "The issue of a marriage which is void or annulled or dissolved by divorce is legitimate." From 1945 to date, California Civil Code, S 55, now Civil Code, S 4100, reads: "Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to which the consent of the parties capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by the issuance of a license and solemnization as authorized by this code * * *." In In re Filtzer's Estate, 33 Cal.2d 776, 205 P.2d 377, 379, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of a reasonable allowance for support and maintenance to the child of the decedent father. The mother and father had entered into a cere- monial Mexican marriage, and thereafter lived together as man and wife. The father was, at all times until his death, legally married to another woman. The validity of the Mexican marriage was not relevant to the child's claim for the support allowance, the Court stated: " * * * in order to legitimate the issue of a bigamous marriage--as is here involved--under statutes identical with or similar in wording to section 85 of the Civil Code, it must appear that at least one of the parties to such attempted marriage contracted in good faith, believing it to be a valid marriage. See annotation, 84 A.L.R. 499, 501 * * *." While the opinion states the trial court found that the mother and father thereafter "lived together * husband and wife", that finding appears to have been of mere evidentiary value. For reasons not pertinent here, defendants in the district court relied on a purported common law marriage between the decedent and their mother. California. Common law marriages are not valid in Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 54 P. 143, However, in attempting to establish a common law marriage between the decedent and their mother, defendants placed into evidence certain facts which indicated the mother, Mildred Thorngren, believed that she and decedent were validly married. Just as the validity of the Mexican marriage in Filtzer's Estate was not determinative of the issue of good faith, likewise the validity of the attempted union between decedent and defendants' mother in California and whether or not it would be a valid common law marriage under the laws of Montana, is not determinative of this appeal. If the district court, on remand, finds that the mother of defendants believed in good faith that she and decedent were validly married, then the children of that union are legitimate. The law of California further provides in its Civil Code "The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, t h e r e b y a d o p t s i t a s s u c h ; and s u c h c h i l d i s t h e r e u p o n deemed f o r a l l p u r p o s e s l e g i t i m a t e from t h e t i m e of i t s b i r t h . " A number of C a l i f o r n i a c a s e s have h e l d t h a t t h e f a t h e r of a n i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d may a d o p t p u r s u a n t t o S 230, s o t h a t it w i l l be deemed l e g i t i m a t e , though t h e f a t h e r i s n o t m a r r i e d t o t h e mother, by r e c e i v i n g i t i n t o h i s home and o t h e r w i s e f u l f i l l i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s though t h e home i n t o which he r e c e i v e s it i s one i n which he and t h e mother a r e l i v i n g . In r e M c G r e w , 183 C a l . 1 1 7 , 190 P. 804; Serway v . G a l e n t i n e , 75 Cal.App.2d 8 6 , 170 P.2d 32. Here, t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d , i f believed, i s s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant a f i n d i n g t h a t decedent, w i t h r e s p e c t t o C h e r a l e e Johnson a n d / o r C h r i s t o p h e r Thorngren, f u l f i l l e d tile r e q u i r e m e n t s of C i v i l Code g 230 and l e g i t i m a t e d them. Should t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , on remand, s o f i n d , t h e n t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o a n i n t e s t a t e s h a r e of d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e . Denise lllazzucca i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o t h e b e n e f i t of t h i s s t a t u t e s i n c e t h e e v i d e n c e shows t h a t d e c e d e n t l e f t t h e mother t h r e e weeks p r i o r t o Denise's b i r t h . While t h e e x a c t p o i n t h a s n o t been d e c i d e d by t h e Supreme C o u r t of C a l i f o r n i a , t h a t C o u r t ' s l i b e r a l i t y i n f i n d i n g l e g i t i macy, a s e x e m p l i f i e d by t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n , l e a d s u s t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t would f o l l o w t h e r e a s o n i n g e n u n c i a t e d i n Clark-The Law of Domestic R e l a t i o n s , pp. 132,133, (West 1968) : "A l a r g e r number of s t a t e s have e n a c t e d b r o a d e r s t a t u t e s of a second t y p e , which s i m p l y p r o v i d e t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n of v o i d o r v o i d a b l e m a r r i a g e s o r of m a r r i a g e s deemed n u l l i n law a r e l e g i t i m a t e . A t f i r s t g l a n c e t h i s s o r t o f s t a t u t e a p p e a r s r e a s o n a b l y s a t i s f a c t o r y , b u t it t o o r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s of c o n s t r u c t i o n which any well-drawn s t a t u t e o u g h t t o a v o i d . The t e r m ' v o i d a b l e m a r r i a g e s ' i s c l e a r enough and c a u s e s no t r o u b l e . But what i s meant by ' v o i d m a r r i a g e ' ? * * * d o e s i t l e g i t i m i z e t h e c h i l d r e n of a p u r p o r t e d common law m a r r i a g e which i s i n v a l i d because t h e s t a t e d o e s n o t r e c o g n i z e cornmon law m a r r i a g e ? O r d o e s i t l e g i t i m i z e t h e c h i l d r e n of a l i a i s o n which was c o n c e d e d l y n o t a m a r r i a g e , b u t which was t h o u g : ~ t by some f r i e n d s of t h e p a r t i e s t o be a m a r r i a g e , and which l a s t e d f o r a n a p p r e c i a b l e t i m e ? * * * I f words a r e g i v e n t h e i r u s u a l meaning, a void marriage i s a non-existent marriage. T h i s b e i n g s o , t h e l i t e r a l meaning of t h e s t a t u t e s i s t h a t a l l c h i l d r e n of n o n - e x i s t e n t m a r r i a g e s a r e l e g i t i m a t e . Presumably no c o u r t would s o c o n s t r u e t h e s t a t u t e s . The most s e n s i b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and t h e o n e most i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y p u r p o s e , i s t h a t of t h e S a n t i l l c a s e [ S a n t i l l v . R o s s e t t i , 178 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio Com. P1. 1 9 6 1 ) ] , namely, t h a t s u c h s t a t u t e s l e g i t i m i z e t h e c h i l d r e n of a l l d e f a c t o m a r r i a g e s , o f a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p s which l o o k l i k e m a r r i a g e s and i n which t h e p a r t i e s behave a s husband and wife. " The r e c o r d i n t h e i n s t a n t a p p e a l i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g t h e r e was a d e f a c t o m a r r i a g e between d e c e d e n t and def e n d a n t s ' mother. T h e r e f o r e , i f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h o u l d , on remand, f i n d d e f e n d a n t s a r e t h e i s s u e of s u c h a d e f a c t o marr i a g e , t h e n t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o be t r e a t e d a s l e g i t i m a t e h e i r s of d e c e d e n t . Defendants n e x t c o n t e n d t h a t , even i f t h e y be found t o be i l l e g i t i m a t e , t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o i n h e r i t from d e c e d e n t bec a u s e of h i s compliance w i t h s e c t i o n 91-404, R.C.M. 1947, which reads : "Every i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d i s a n h e i r of t h e p e r s o n who, i n w r i t i n g , s i g n e d i n t h e p r e s e n c e of a competent w i t n e s s , acknowledges h i m s e l f t o he t h e f a t h e r of s u c h c h i l d * * *". I n s u p p o r t d e f e n d a n t s i n t r o d u c e d a copy of a n a p p l i c a t i o n r e c o r d f o r t h e U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a H o s p i t a l o u t - p a t i e n t d e p a r t m e n t . On t h e f a c e of t h e document was t h e name o f t h e p a t i e n t , M i l d r e d B e r n i c e Dauenhauer, and l i s t e d members of t h e household a s ' ' ~ o n yh u s b " , " C h e r a l e e dau 16 mos.", C h r i s was born August 26, 1950. and " C h r i s Son ( h o r n 8-26-51)". The a p p l i c a t i o n was d a t e d "9-8-48". A t t h e l i n e e n t i t l e d " I n f o r m a t i o n Given by" was t h e s i g n a t u r e "Tony Dauenhauer". Mildred Thorngren t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e a p p l i - c a t i o n was s i g n e d by t h e d e c e d e n t i n h e r p r e s e n c e on September 8 , 1948, w h i l e s h e was a t t e m p t i n g t o g e t o b s t e t r i c a l c a r e w h i l e pregnant with Cheralee. A t t h a t t i m e , none of d e f e n d a n t s were y e t born. There i s no e v i d e n c e a s t o when t h e e n t r i e s "Chera- l e e dau 16 mos." and " C h r i s Son ( b o r n 8-26-51)" were made b u t i t must have been a t some d a t e s u b s e q u e n t t o September 8 , 1948. Thus i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t d e c e d e n t , by t h i s document, d i d n o t m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f s e c t i o n 91-404, R.C.M. 1947. W do e n o t h o l d t h a t d e c e d e n t c o u l d n o t have acknowledged C h e r a l e e a s h i s c h i l d p r i o r t o h e r b i r t h , m e r e l y , t h a t by t h i s document, he d i d n o t do so. For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h i s c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r proceedings not i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s o p i n i o n and f o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f (1) whether any o r a l l of t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r e c h i l d r e n of d e c e d e n t ; ( 2 ) whether any o r a l l o f d e f e n d a n t s a r e l e g i t i m a t e b e c a u s e of C a l i f o r n i a C i v i l Code 5 85 and t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p l a c e d t h e r e o n by t h e C a l i f o r n i a courts; ( 3 ) whether C h e r a l e e and/or C h r i s t o p h e r have been l e g i t i - mated b e c a u s e of C a l i f o r n i a C i v i l Code S 230 and t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p l a c e d t h e r e o n by t h e C a l i f o r n i a C o u r t s ; and ( 4 ) whether any I o r a l l of d e f e n d a n t s a r e t h e - l e g i t i m a t e i s s u e of a d e f a c t o m a r r i a g e . Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: ................................ Justices

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