McGUIRE v NELSON

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No. 12851 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA. 1975 DOUGLAS R. McGUIRE, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , -vs - HOWARD NELSON e t a l . , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E i g h t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. L e s s l e y , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Recording : For Appellant : B e r g e r , Anderson, S i n c l a i r and Murphy, B i l l i n g s , Montana R i c h a r d Anderson a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana F o r Respondent: B e n n e t t and B e n n e t t , Bozeman, Montana Anderson, Symmes, F o r b e s , P e e t e & Brown, B i l l i n g s , Montana Rockwood Brown a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: March 5 , 1975 U Decided : J M Filed : JuR 3.3 7975 1 3 1975 Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Plaintiff Douglas R. MeGuire appeals from a judgment entered in the district court, Gallatin County, when, after presentation of plaintiff's case in chief, the court granted a motion for a directed verdict in favor of defendant American Honda Company. The action was brought by plaintiff to recover damages suffered as a result of a motorcycle accident involving a motorcycle owned by plaintiff and manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff, while riding the motorcycle with his wife behind him, began a descent down an incline in an area near Bozeman, Montana used by motorcyclists and known as the "Pits", when his front wheel locked resulting in his being thrown over the handlebars onto the ground. He received a broken pelvis; his wife was not injured. Plaintiff originally brought a negligence action against the local Honda dealer, Howard Nelson, d/b/a Harmony House, alleging the dealer negligently sold plaintiff's wife the wrong size tire for the Honda. a CT200 90 C.C. The particular model owned by plaintiff was trail bike and had the unique design feature which required a 2 . 5 0 x 17 tire in the front and a 2.75 x 17 tire in the rear. Nelson sold plaintiff's wife a 2.75 x 17 tire which was mounted on the front wheel. While going down the hill plaintiff alleges the tire was forced up against the fender of the Honda causing the Honda to stop, throwing both plaintiff and his wife from the Honda, resulting in the injuries to plaintiff. The jury in that action found for plaintiff and awarded him $45,000. Nelson appealed that verdict to this Court challeng- ing the in court demonstration by plaintiff's expert witness. The witness was allowed to perform a demonstration in the presence of the jury which was designed to demonstrate that force applied to the front wheel suspension system would bind the front wheel and how the oversized tire might have locked the wheel and caused the accident. The witness was allowed to suppress the suspension by the use of a furniture clamp on one side of the wheel. On appeal, this Court in McGuire v. Nelson, 162 Mont. 37, 508 P.2d 558, held there was no foundation to show that the force used in the demonstration was similar to the conditions and the force applied to the front suspension by two persons on the bike at the time of the accident. The cause was returned to the dis- trict court for a new trial. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint naming American Honda Company as an additional defendant. The complaint against Honda is a strict liability case alleging that Honda marketed a dangerously defective product, negligently designed it, and negligently failed to warn against the consequences of misuse. The case was tried to a jury on June 4, 1974. When plain- tiff rested his case both defendants moved for a directed verdict. Hondals motion was granted and judgment entered. The matter was settled between defendant Nelson and plaintiff on a covenant not to sue, for the amount of $3,750. Several issues are presented for review on appeal. The dispositive issue concerns the exclusion of the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, Roy Prussing, as to his opinion concerning the design of the suspension system and its relation to the fender and tire and ultimately the safety of this design and/ or its defects; also the matter of proof of causation of the accident. Witness Prussing was duly qualified as an expert witness. His testimony shows that he was a graduate of Utilities Engineering Institute of Chicago and was a registered professional engineer in the states of Montana, Wyoming and Minnesota; that he has been a p r o f e s s i o n a l e n g i n e e r s i n c e 1944 and been i n t h e e n g i n e e r i n g b u s i n e s s s i n c e 1936; t h a t f o r 1 0 - 1 2 y e a r s he worked a s a n e n g i n e e r f o r an I n d i a n Motorcycle f i r m and d u r i n g h i s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h a t company he had a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o work w i t h many d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of m o t o r c y c l e s ; t h a t he a l s o had e x t e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n a l experience. There was no c h a l l e n g e of h i s c r e d e n t i a l s a s a n e x p e r t w i t n e s s by d e f e n d a n t Honda Company o r d e f e n d a n t Howard Nelson. During t e s t i m o n y i t was e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t P r u s s i n g had examined t h e machine i n v o l v e d h e r e and t h e t e r r a i n where t h e a c c i dent occurred. He had examined p r i m a r i l y t h e d e s i g n f e a t u r e s of t h e f r o n t s u s p e n s i o n ; t h e method employed i n s u s p e n d i n g t h e f r o n t wheel; t h e c l e a r a n c e b u i l t i n t o t h e s u s p e n s i o n system; and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s u c h a s l i m i t s of t r a v e l c l e a r a n c e , e t c . He e x p l a i n e d t h e working p a r t s and how t h e t i r e and wheel f u n c t i o n e d w i t h t h e suspension. H e e x p l a i n e d t o t h e j u r y t h e meaning of t h e two t i r e s i z e s involved i n t h e case. I t seems t h a t t h e e n g i n e e r e x p e r i - mented w i t h t h c c o r r e c t tire f o r t h e f r o n t wheel and i n t e r p o l a t e d clearance figures t o t h e l a r g e r tire t o a r r i v e a t h i s opinion a s i t concerned t h e problem a t hand. O b j e c t i o n was e n t e r e d and t h e j u r y w a s e x c u s e d . Prussing e x p l a i n e d h e had used two f u r n i t u r e clamps t o d e p r e s s t h e suspens i o n system t o a v o i d any b i n d i n g e f f e c t and t h e p u r p o s e was t o e s t a b l i s h t h e p o i n t a t which t h e s u s p e n s i o n system was f u l l y dep r e s s e d and/or l e t t h e s u s p e n s i o n s y s t e m go t o t h e l i m i t o f i t s travel. T h i s would p e r m i t t h e e n g i n e e r t o e s t a b l i s h c l e a r a n c e between f e n d e r and f o r k w i t h i n t h e d e s i g n l i m i t s of t h e suspens i o n system. A t t h i s p o i n t t h i s t e s t i m o n y was had: "THE COURT: Ask him t h e s i x t y - f o u r d o l l a r q u e s t i o n . Are t h e t e s t s s i m i l a r t o r i d i n g t h i s under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e c a s e , under McGuirels t e s t i m o n y ? W r e a l l y h a v e n ' t g o t t h a t i n , b u t we e know what h i s t e s t i m o n y was, t h a t lie was r i d i n g it out on the pits and suddenly it froze. "Q. Did the use of the furniture clamps on tne machine in question, Mr. Prussing, duplicate the up and down action of the suspension? "MR. LYMAN H. BENNETT, JR.: Objected to as calling for a conclusion of this witness without any foundation laid at all in the light of the fact that the witness can't-"THE COURT: I don't know that it is or not. Overruled, at this time. "MR. LYMAN H. BENNETT, JR.: question on voir dire? May we ask him a "THE COURT: Wait a minute until we get this out. You can voir dire. You can cross him, as a matter of fact. "Q. Did the use of the furniture clamps, Mr. Prussing, in your opinion, merely duplicate the up and down action of the flection as it depresses over bumps in the terrain over which the bicycle was ridden? A. It did. It establishes the limits of travel. "Q. And did it cause the suspension to do anything other than what it would do in normal use on the trail? A. It did not. We merely held it there so I could take measurements. "Q. And then you released them? leased them. A. Then I re- " 2 . A11 right. " Under cross-examination, he testified: "MR. BROWN: Now, Mr. Prussing, I will hold you to your scientific standing. Can you state with any scientific accuracy that the pressure applied with the clamp was the same that you would experience in the field, with any reasonable scientific certainty? "THE WITNESS: The clamps applied pressure to that suspension system to the point where it bottomed out or reached the end of its travel. This same thing would happen in the field under field conditions. " There followed a great deal of testimony designed to diminish the accuracy of the engineer's tests. He freely admitted he did not measure pressure in foot pounds but seemed to indicate he could establish from the evidence at hand and his experiments, that the wheel under field conditions of the day of the accident would make c o n t a c t w i t h t h e f e n d e r h o u s i n g . Then t h i s t e s t i - mony was had: "MR. BROWN: So, you c a n ' t t e l l by y o u r t e s t whether o r n o t t h i s t i r e a c c u r a t e l y l o c k e d up, s e i z e d , o r bound. You c a n m e r e l y s t a t e t h a t it rubbed, i s t h a t r i g h t ? "THE WITNESS: T h a t ' s r i g h t . The d e g r e e o f cont a c t I c o u l d n o t s a y a t t h a t t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t what it was. "MR. BROWN: NOW, i s n ' t it t r u e , M r . P r u s s i n g , t h a t t h e r e a l answer t o t h a t . s i x t y - f o u r d o l l a r q u e s t i o n o f whether i t would s e i z e o r b i n d a s clamped i n t h i s c a s e would be what i s c a l l e d a dynamic t e s t , t h a t i s , a t e s t i n t h e f i e l d , a c t u a l l y o p e r a t i n g t h e machine u n d e r s i m i l a r conditions? "THE WITNESS: T h a t would be a dynamic t e s t ; r i g h t . "MR. BROWN: W e l l , my q u e s t i o n i s : Is i t n o t t r u e t h a t a dynamic t e s t would be t h e o n l y way which you c o u l d d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t i r e on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s u s p e n s i o n would, i n f a c t , b i n d o r seize a s a l l e g e d ? "THE WITNESS: I d o n ' t t h i n k s o . I t h i n k t h a t c o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d s t a t i s t i c a l l y , a l s o . "MR. BROWN: W e l l , you p r e v i o u s l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t you d o n ' t know from your t e s t whether i t d i d , and c o u l d n o t t e l l from t h e t e s t t h a t you t o o k ; i s that right? "THE WITNESS: I d i d n o t make t h a t t e s t m y s e l f . I made measurements, and by c a l c u l a t i o n s , i n my o p i n i o n , it would r u b and make c o n t a c t . B u t , you a r e n o t w i l l i n g t o s t a t e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y beyond t h a t t h a t i t would r u b o r make contact? "MR. BROWN: "THE WITNESS: I t would make c o n t a c t . I t would r u b . To what e x t e n t i n f o o t pounds, I am n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o say. "MR. BROWN: You, y o u r s e l f , d i d n o t c o n d u c t a n y dynamic t e s t s o r t e s t s i n t h e f i e l d ? "THE WITNESS: I did not." P l a i n t i f f t h e n proposed a h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n t h a t i n c l u d e d d e s i g n , d e f e c t and c a u s a t i o n , b a s e d o n r e a s o n a b l e c e r t a i n t y a s e s t a b l i s h e d by m e c h a n i c a l d e s i g n s t a n d a r d s and knowledge. o b j e c t i o n s by b o t h d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , t h e c o u r t r u l e d . After ' 0 : Taking t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n by i t s f o u r c o r n e r s , and assuming f o r t h e purpose 3f m r u l i n g t h a t a l l of t h e f a c t s a l l e g e d and y s e t o u t i n t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n c o u l d be proved o r would be a m a t t e r of r e c o r d i n t h i s cause, t h e Court i s s t i l l going t o s u s t a i n t h e o b j e c t i o n . I t h i n k t h a t t h e c o u r t , t h e Supreme Court has i n d i c a t e d t o t h i s t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e must be r e l a t e d t o t h o s e P i t s and t o what a c t u a l l y o c c u r r e d o u t t h e r e . And I t h i n k t o a l l o w t h i s , t o go i n on t h e q u e s t i o n of d e s i g n , now, q u e s t i o n of d e s i g n i s a q u e s t i o n of d i s c r e t i o n . I t i s a q u e s t i o n o f d i s c r e t i o n among d e s i g n e n g i n e e r s . T h a t i s why we have d i f f e r e n t d e s i g n s and s i t u a t i o n s . I t i s a q u e s t i o n of c u t t i n g and c o v e r i n g . I t i s a q u e s t i o n of economics. I t i s a f i g h t between t h e e n g i n e e r and t h e p r o d u c t i o n d e p a r t m e n t . I t i s a f i g h t between t h e e n g i n e e r and t h e d e s i g n i n g e n g i n e e r a s t o how much t h e y c a n a f f o r d t o spend on d e s i g n i n o r d e r t o produce t h i s o r t h a t . And w e g e t i n t o a m u l t i p l i c i t y of problems h e r e . And I am g o i n g t o s u s t a i n the objection. "NOW, do you want t o u s e t h i s w i t n e s s f o r anything else? "MR. ANDERSON: I would, w i t h o u t g o i n g i n t o exa c t l y what h i s e x a m i n a t i o n i s , a s k him i f , based upon s u c h e x a m i n a t i o n of t h i s machine and t h e a c c i d e n t s c e n e , he h a s any o p i n i o n a s t o whether t h e f r o n t suspension design i s a s a f e one." Immediately t h e r e were o b j e c t i o n s which were s u s t a i n e d by t h e c o u r t . The w i t n e s s w a s n o t a l l o w e d t o g i v e h i s o p i n i o n a s it concerned s a f e d e s i g n . There h a s been a g r e a t d e a l s a i d a b o u t t h e h o l d i n g o f t h i s C o u r t i n t h e f i r s t c a s e , McGuire v . Nelson, s u p r a . W exe c l u d e d t h e r e a n i n c o u r t d e m o n s t r a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e r e was no foundation. I t was a n e g l i g e n c e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d e a l e r who s o l d t h e t i r e t o p l a i n t i f f ' s wife. The i n s t a n t c a s e i s one t h a t t h e c o u r t and d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c h a r a c t e r i z e a s s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y - d e f e c t i v e product--negligent design--failure t o warn. There h a s been no p r o h i b i t i o n d e c l a r e d a g a i n s t s t a t i c t e s t s o r u s i n g clamps i n c o n n e c t i o n t h e r e w i t h , i f t h e r e i s a p r o c e s s used o r a n e x p e r t t h a t c a n u s e t h e s e p r o c e s s e s t o e s t a b l i s h c a u s a t i o n and i n t h i s c a s e t h e d e s i g n problems. When p l a i n t i f f r e s t e d h i s c a s e i n c h i e f Honda moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on two p r i n c i p a l grounds: (1) t h e r e was no proof of any d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n i n t h e Honda CT200 which would be u n r e a s o n a b l y d a n g e r o u s t o t h e u s e r ; and (2) no c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n h a s been e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s c a s e between t h e c l a i m e d c o n d i t i o n o f t h e o v e r s i z e d , wrong s i z e d t i r e and t h e a c c i d e n t . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e directed verdict. I t h a s l o n g been h e l d by t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e law d o e s n o t f a v o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t s and t h e e v i d e n c e t h e r e f o r e w i l l be viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o a p p e l l a n t s , a s h a v i n g proved what it t e n d s t o p r o v e . R . Co., Johnson v . Chicago, M. 71 Mont. 390, 394, 230 P. 52. & S t . P. T h i s Court h a s a l s o l o n g h e l d t h a t c a s e s s h o u l d n o t be withdrawn from a j u r y u n l e s s r e a s o n a b l e and f a i r - m i n d e d men c o u l d r e a c h o n l y one c o n c l u s i o n from t h e facts. I n r e E s t a t e o f H a l l v . M i l k o v i c h , 158 Mont. 4 3 8 , 492 P.2d 1388. Honda Company, i n s u p p o r t of t h e d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , a r g u e s t h a t n e i t h e r p l a i n t i f f nor h i s w i f e a c t u a l l y s a w t h e f r o n t wheel a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e r e f o r e , t h e y were u n a b l e t o s t a t e p r e c i s e l y what happened i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f r o n t t i r e a t t h e time. The o n l y o t h e r e v i d e n c e p l a i n t i f f c o u l d o f f e r a s i d e from t h e t e s t i m o n y of P r u s s i n g r e g a r d i n g h i s t e s t and t h e s a f e t y of t h e d e s i g n , was t h e t e s t i m o n y of p l a i n t i f f , h i s w i f e and h i s c o u s i n , George B a r c l a y , who a f t e r a n o u t i n g t e n months a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d , o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e f r o n t wheel rubbed when t h e y r o d e o v e r r o c k s o r jumped on t h e f r o n t f o r k . A s t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n Brandenburger v . Toyota Motor S a l e s , 162 Mont. 506, 517, 513 P.2d 268, c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t and o f t e n t i m e s n e c e s s a r y i n a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y c a s e t o prove c a u s a t i o n . I n Brandenburger t h e C o u r t quoted from Lindsay v . McDonnell Douglas A i r c r a f t Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 639: " ' T h e r e would be l i t t l e g a i n t o t h e consuming p u b l i c i f t h e c o u r t s would e s t a b l i s h a form of r e c o v e r y w i t h o n e hand and t a k e it away w i t h t h e o t h e r by e s t a b l i s h i n g i m p o s s i b l e s t a n d a r d s of p r o o f . The proof r e q u i r e d i n a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y c a s e must be r e a l i s t i c a l l y t a i l o r e d t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s which c a u s e d t h e form of a c t i o n t o be c r e a t e d . ' " I n c a s e s , s u c h a s t h e i n s t a n t o n e , where no one c a n t e s t i f y he a c t u a l l y saw t h e t i r e b i n d w i t h t h e f e n d e r , circums t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e must be a l l o w e d o r t h e c o u r t would be t a k i n g away t h e r i g h t of p l a i n t i f f t o r e c o v e r on a. s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y I t would be u n r e a l i s t i c t o e x p e c t t h e r i d e r s of t h e action. Honda t o a c t u a l l y o b s e r v e t h e f r o n t t i r e b i n d f o r them t o proceed under a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y t h e o r y of d e s i g n d e f e c t . Here, t h e r e was t e s t i m o n y from s u b s e q u e n t r i d e r s t h a t t h e t i r e c a u g h t when i t went o v e r l a r g e r o c k s . There w a s a l s o t e s t i m o n y of r u b marks i n s i d e t h e f r o n t f e n d e r and gouge marks on t h e tire. The Honda e n g i n e e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r u b marks c o u l d have been l e f t by t h e o v e r s i z e d t i r e . A l l t h a t t e s t i m o n y , com- b i n e d w i t h P r u s s i n g l s t e s t i m o n y a s t o whether o r n o t h e c o n s i d e r e d t h e d e s i g n t o be d a n g e r o u s , had it been a l l o w e d i n t o t e s t i m o n y , would have been s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o a l l o w t h e c a s e t o go t o t h e jury, although it i s a l l c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence. I n f a c t , his Prussing i n h i s testimony, i n d i c a t e d that/testimony could lend s u p p o r t t o c a u s a t i o n as w e l l a s d e s i g n d e f e c t . Viewing t h e c a u s a - t i o n i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f , a s we must, r e a s o n a b l e and f a i r minded men c o u l d r e a c h d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s . W e have a n impasse on t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e e n g i n e e r a s t o t h e design defect, e t c . The d e f e n s e m a i n t a i n s it i n v a d e s t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y and t h e c o u r t h e l d it t o be improper e v i d e n c e , i n any c a s e . Of c o u r s e , t h e r e w a s a g r e a t d e a l of d i s c u s s i o n a b o u t t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y . I n Frumer and Friedman, P r o d u c t s Liability, V.1, $12.02[2] [a], p. 246, quoting from Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646, 655, it is stated: "The modern tendency of the courts everywhere is to take a more liberal and rational view respecting the admissibility and scope of such testimony. This court early announced that in all proceedings involving matters of a scientific, mechanical, professional, or of like nature, requiring special study, experience or observation, or where the connection between the cause and effect was a matter of specialized knowledge, not within the knowledge of laymen in general, expert opinion testimony was admissible to aid the court or the jury in arriving at a correct determination of the litigated issue. There are many matters of scientific investigation and specialized knowledge in the fields of the professions, trades, business, industry, art, and other endeavors where the minds of those not learned therein necessarily grope but blindly. Expert opinion in such cases is indispensable to aid the jurors in reaching a correct conclusion, and the fact that the matter inquired about is a vital and controlling fact in the trial, or is even the ultimate fact, which the jury are to pass upon and determine, is no reason why the opinion should not be received." Product liability is a relatively new branch of the law, and the role of the expert witness in this field has become more important. This Court stated in Brandenburger, quoting the Hawaii Supreme Court in Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240, 243, as to the acceptable type of evidence to be used by a plaintiff to prove a defect in a manufacturer's or distributor's product, in a strict liability case: "'The nature and quality of evidence used in products liability cases to show the defect and the nexus between the defect and the accident naturally varies. The most convincing evidence is an expert's pinpointing the defect and qiving his opinion on the precise cause of the accident after a thorouqh inspection.'" (Emphasis added.) The fact that Prussing's qualifications as an expert was n3ver questioned and his experience in the field as a mech- anical engineer; considering his experience working with motorcycles; and considering that Prussing inspected the particular Honda model involved in the accident and was familiar with the design both from personal observation and from studying schematics of the suspension system supplied by the Honda Company, it is apparent that Prussing was well qualified to give his opinion as to the alleged defect in the design of the Honda model in question and whether it could or did cause the accident, as alleged. We can find no difference between that testimony and the testimony this Court allowed in Brandenburger where an expert witness was allowed to testify as to the defect in the design of the roof of the Toyota Land Cruiser. Counsel for Honda argues that such testimony invades the province of the jury. Admittedly Prussing's testimony would in- volve the ultimate conclusion which the jury was required to determine. This, however, does not of itself furnish a basis for its rejection. Although there are authorities which indicate that the appropriate test should be whether the opinion invades the province of the jury, it would seem that the better reasoned cases reject this as the test. In VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed. 51920, Professor Wigmore in his criticism of the rule states: " * * * because the witness, in expressing his opinion, is not attempting to 'usurp' the jury's function; nor could if he desired. He is not attempting it, because his error (if it were one) consists merely in offering to the jury a piece of testimony which ought not to go there; and he could not usurp it if he would, because the jury may still reject his opinion and accept some other view, and no legal power, not even the judge's order, can compel them to accept the witness' opinion against their own. * * * " Wigmore's views have been widely adopted in the United States. Bridges v. Lintz, 140 Col. 582, 346 P.2d 571; Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., supra; Schweiger v. Solbeck, 191 Ore. 454, 230 P.2d 195, 29 ALR2d 435. Rule 409 of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, p. 210, expressly states that a witness may draw an inference "whether or not any such inference embraces a n u l t i m a t e i s s u e t o be d e c i d e d by t h e t r i e r o f fact * * *I1. T h i s Court h a s r e p e a t e d l y h e l d t h a t e x p e r t o p i n i o n e v i dence i s a d m i s s i b l e i n e x p l a i n i n g t h e c a u s e o f a p a r t i c u l a r a c c i dent. 766. Pachek v . Norton C o n c r e t e Co., 1 6 0 Mont. 1 6 , 2 1 , 499 P.2d The o p i n i o n of a w i t n e s s on a m a t e r i a l q u e s t i o n of s c i e n c e , a r t , o r t r a d e i n which he i s s k i l l e d i s a d m i s s i b l e i n e v i d e n c e . S e c t i o n 93-401-27, 1947. R.C.M. There a r e a m u l t i t u d e of c a s e s a l l o w i n g e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y on t h e u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h e jury. See a n n o t a t i o n : 62 ALR2d 1426. The t r u e t e s t would seem t o be whether t h e s u b j e c t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y complex s o a s t o be s u s c e p t i b l e t o o p i n i o n e v i d e n c e , and whether t h e w i t n e s s i s p r o p e r l y q u a l i f i e d t o g i v e h i s o p i n i o n . Here, t h e r e i s no d o u b t t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e s u s p e n s i o n system of t h e f r o n t wheel of a C T 2 0 0 90 C.C. Honda t r a i l b i k e t o i t s t i r e s i z e would n o t be common knowledge t o members o f t h e j u r y , b u t a q u e s t i o n of mechanical e n g i n e e r i n g . A l s o , t h e r e i s no d o u b t t h a t P r u s s i n g i s w e l l q u a l i f i e d t o t e s t i f y on t h e m a t t e r . I n view of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e jury can e i t h e r r e j e c t o r accept t h e e x p e r t w i t n e s s ' o p i n i o n o r g i v e l i m i t e d w e i g h t t o i t , we f a i l t o s e e how t h e a d m i s s i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e h e r e c o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a u s u r p a t i o n of t h e j u r y ' s f u n c t i o n . The judgment of t h e d i s t r e v e r s e d and t h e c a u s e remanded f o r a new t r i a l . Justice W c o n c u r : ,. e /" ., i " .... ". . a . S + . 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