RANARD v O NEIL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 12683 I N THE SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O MONTANA O R F H F 1975 JERRY RANARD, a minor, by and through h i s Guardian, C a r l M. Ranard, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , -vs - K T Y O'NEIL, AH Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. B e n n e t t , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant : P a t r i c k F. Hooks argued, Townsend, Montana Smith and Harper, Helena, Montana C h a r l e s A. Smith 111, appeared, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Ronald F. Waterman argued, Helena, Montana Submitted : Decided: Filed : Clerk Janua r y 16, 1975 FEB 10 1975 Mr. ~ u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a summary judgment g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t i n a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y a c t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lewis and C l a r k County. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d : ** "* t h e d e f e n d a n t , Kathy O ' N e i l , i s ent i t l e d t o summary judgment, a s a m a t t e r of law, f i n d i n g t h a t p l a i n t i f f , J e r r y Ranard, was g u i l t y of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r of 12w and defendant Kathy O r N e i l had no ' l a s t c l e a r chance' a s a m a t t e r of law". The summary judgment was g r a n t e d on t h e p l e a d i n g s , answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s by b o t h p a r t i e s , and a d e p o s i t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f . These documents d i s c l o s e t h a t , on December 7 , 1972, p l a i n t i f f was s t r u c k and i n j u r e d by an automobile d r i v e n by d e f e n d a n t . The i n d i d e n t o c c u r r e d on a Helena c i t y s t r e e t a t approximately 9:00 p.m. The s t r e e t was snow packed and i c y ; i t was i l l u m i n a t e d by s t r e e t lights . P l a i n t i f f , whose e i g h t h b i r t h d a y was on t h e day f o l l o w i n g t h e a c c i d e n t , was on h i s way home from a boxing l e s s o n . H i s instructor had d r i v e n p l a i n t i f f and h i s b r o t h e r t o t h e s t r e e t i n f r o n t of t h e i r home, double-parking a c r o s s from t h e i r home. The b r o t h e r , who was a y e a r o l d e r than p l a i n t i f f , r a n a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t , followed almost immediately by t h e younger boy. A s p l a i n t i f f reached t h e middle of t h e s t r e e t , he saw d e f e n d a n t ' s h e a d l i g h t s , stopped, and t h e n r a n i n an a t t e m p t t o avoid b e i n g struck. Defendant, upon s e e i n g t h e boy, a p p l i e d h e r b r a k e s b u t was u n a b l e t o avoid h i t t i n g him. P l a i n t i f f was h o s p i t a l i z e d f o r s e v e r a l weeks and c o n t i n u e d t o wear a c a s t on h i s broken r i g h t l e g f o r some time t h e r e a f t e r . P l a i n t i f f , i n a d e p o s i t i o n taken some e i g h t and one h a l f months a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , a d m i t t e d t h a t he had n o t looked b e f o r e he r a n i n t o t h e p a t h of d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e . Although he a d m i t t e d t h a t he knew he should check f o r t r a f f i c , he s a i d t h a t he had j u s t f o r g o t t e n . Although t h e d e t a i l s a r e n o t c l e a r , p l a i n t i f f d i d admit t o having r e c e i v e d some i n s t r u c t i o n on p e d e s t r i a n s a f e t y , i n c l u d i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s t o p , look and l i s t e n . He could n o t r e c a l l where he had r e c e i v e d i t , o r p r e c i s e l y when i t was t a u g h t . The complaint a l l e g e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s were proxi m a t e l y caused by d e f e n d a n t ' s n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n o f h e r automobile. The answer denied t h a t a l l e g a t i o n and a f f i r m a t i v e l y a l l e g e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s own n e g l i g e n c e was t h e proximate cause of h i s i n j u r y . I t a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f had knowingly assumed t h e r i s k of i n j u r y and, i n a l a t e r amendment, t h a t defendant had been conf r o n t e d w i t h a sudden emergency. Following d i s c o v e r y , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r summary judgment, on t h e grounds s t a t e d i n t h e o r d e r quoted a t t h e beginning of t h i s opinion. P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from t h a t judgment, a l l e g i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g t h e motion. The r u l e governing summary judgments i s Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., which p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : * * The judgment sought s h a l l be r e n d e r e d "(c) * f o r t h w i t h i f t h e p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e show t h a t t h e r e i s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a m a t t e r of law. II Defendant, t h e moving p a r t y , h a s t h e burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e absence of any i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t s h e i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a m a t t e r of law. , , - t. Mon - t. Mon See, e . g . Meech v. Cure, 525 P.2d 546, 3 1 St.Rep. 637; B e i e r l e v. T a y l o r , 524 P.2d 783, 3 1 St.Rep. 554. With t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n mind, we t u r n t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h i s a p p e a l . (1) They a r e : Did t h e p l a i n t i f f have t h e c a p a c i t y t o be c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negligent ? (2) I f s o , was p l a i n t i f f c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t under t h e f a c t s here? (3) Was t h e p l a i n t i f f c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t a s a m a t t e r of law because of v i o l a t i o n of s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s governing p e d e s t r i a n conduct ? A t t h e o u t s e t , we observe t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had n o t h i n g b u t t h e c o l d r e c o r d upon which t o b a s e i t s d e c i s i o n - - t h e same r e c o r d which i s b e f o r e u s f o r review. I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was n o t a i d e d i n i t s assessment of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a p a c i t y by an o p p o r t u n i t y t o view h i s demeanor i n c o u r t , s i n c e he d i d n o t appear. Our t r e a t m e n t of t h e f i r s t two i s s u e s i s guided by two Montana cases: Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., 99 Mont. 372, 383, 43 P.2d 896; and Graham v. Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 277, 435 P.2d 263. Both d e a l w i t h a l l e g e d c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e by boys between e i g h t and nine years old. I n Lesage t h e p l a i n t i f f , a boy aged e i g h t y e a r s and n i n e months, was s t r u c k by an automobile a s he played f o o t b a l l i n a c i t y s t r e e t . The p l a i n t i f f a d m i t t e d t h a t he had n o t s e e n t h e c a r t h a t s t r u c k him, b u t c o u l d have i f he had looked. There was testimony t h a t p l a i n t i f f r a n i n f r o n t of t h e c a r when i t was a t a d i s t a n c e of o n l y t e n o r twelve f e e t . The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of t h e p l a i n t i f f and defendant appealed c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t should e i t h e r have n o n s u i t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f o r d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t a s a m a t t e r of law. T h i s Court a f f i r m e d , f i n d i n g evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a v e r d i c t f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f . The f o l l o w i n g t e s t was suggested i n Lesage f o r t h e determination of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e by a minor over t h e age of seven: "Did he o r d i d he n o t e x e r c i s e t h e d e g r e e of c a r e t h a t can o r d i n a r i l y be expected of c h i l d r e n of t h e same a g e , t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e , i n t e l l i g e n c e and c a p a b i l i t i e s ? " The t e s t was recognized a s one which o r d i n a r i l y should be submitted t o the jury. I n Graham, an e i g h t and one-half y e a r o l d boy was k i l l e d when s t r u c k by an automobile w h i l e r i d i n g h i s b i c y c l e on a c i t y s t r e e t . The o n l y eyewitness who t e s t i f i e d was t h e d e f e n d a n t , whose v e r s i o n of t h e e v e n t s was found t o b e s o i n c o n s i s t e n t a s t o w a r r a n t l i t t l e credence. The r e l e v a n t i s s u e was whether o r n o t t h e d i s t r i c t c n u r t e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y t h e p l a i n t i f f was i n c a p a b l e of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence a s a m a t t e r of law. I n Graham, t h i s Court s e t f o r t h a f u r t h e r t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a c h i l d ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence. A dual inquiry i s required covering : "(1) The c a a c i t of a p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d i n a given Ic a s e t o + c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t ; and (2) t h e e e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n f a c t of t h e p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e under t h e circumstances of a given c a s e . 11 Applying t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h e t e s t , we h e l d t h a t r e a s o n a b l e men could d i f f e r a s t o p l a i n t i f f ' s c a p a c i t y t o be c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t , and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had e r r e d i n removing t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n from t h e j u r y . The evidence showed only t h e b o y ' s a g e , h i s grade i n s c h o o l , h i s a b i l i t y t o r i d e a b i c y c l e , and h i s r e s i d e n c e i n t h e immediate neighborhood of t h e a c c i d e n t . The r u l e s e s t a b l i s h e d by Lesage and Graham j e c t i v e standard. i n d i c a t e a sub- Each c a s e must b e measured by i t s own f a c t s , and t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e d a r e d i f f i c u l t t o summarize i n a g e n e r a l rule. I n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e c a p a c i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d i s h i s a b i l i t y t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e danger, e i t h e r t o himself o r o t h e r s , of t h e a c t a l l e g e d t o be n e g l i g e n t . That c a p a c i t y i s determined by h i s a g e , e x p e r i e n c e , i n t e l l i g e n c e and c a p a b i l i t i e s . His n e g l i g e n c e i n f a c t can only be determined by f i n d i n g a f a i l u r e t o conform h i s conduct t o a s t a n d a r d of c a r e which he can reasonably observe, given t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of h i s c a p a c i t y . I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , p l a i n t i f f ' s responses t o t h e q u e s t i o n s recorded i n h i s d e p o s i t i o n a r e commonly phrased i n a s i n g l e word. While t h i s might be t y p i c a l f o r a c h i l d of h i s age, when s u b j e c t e d t o an u n f a m i l i a r d e p o s i t i o n p r o c e s s , i t s a y s l i t t l e o r n o t h i n g about h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e . There i s evidence of p l a i n t i f f ' s experience -- he a t t e n d e d school and was i n s t r u c t e d i n c e r t a i n r u l e s of s a f e t y f o r p e d e s t r i a n s . P l a i n t i f f could n o t remember when t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was r e c e i v e d , where i t was r e c e i v e d , nor i t s i n t e n s i t y . W e are p r e s e n t e d w i t h , some evidence of experience, but the remainder an only be assumed / by comparison with others in his age group. Finally, there is little evidence of plaintiff's capabilities. Related to intelligence, this attribute would determine whether plaintiff was likely to forget instruction received in pedestrian safety; whether he was self-reliant or tended to rely on his older brother's judgment, e.g. in the context of relying on his older brother's decision to cross the street; what his attention span was; and many other relevant considerations, too numerous to detail here. The record contains insufficient evidence to support a finding that plaintiff had the capacity for contributory negligence as a matter of law. This precludes summary judgment. plaintiff's actions cannot be found negligent until they are measured by some standard. Plaintiff's standard of care could not be determined until his capacity for contributory negligence was found. While the evidence produced in the district court might support a jury verdict that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, it cannot support such finding as a matter of law. Reasonable men could differ on the facts presented and thus the requirements of Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., governing summary judgments, are lacking. However, defendant asserts that plaintiff violated Montana statutes regulating the conduct of pedestrians, and therefore he was contributorily negligent, as a matter of law. Her argument is that section 32-2178, R.C.M. 1947, sets the standard for determining the care which must be exercised by any pedestrian. That section provides, in pertinent part: Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point "a () other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway." That statute makes no express exceptions for anyone, and certainly not for children. Pedestrians are defined as I Iany person afoot" and persons include "every natural person". R.C.M. 1947. Section 32-2111, Authorities recognize the inconsistency inherent in a standard which imposes adult guidelines on children who violate statutes, but applies a lesser-than-adult standard to a child's conduct outside statutory regulation. See Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. 5 36, n.13. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5 288A, p. 32, uses this language: "1 () An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation is not negligence. "2 ( ) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit such excuse, its violation is excused when " a the violation is reasonable because of the () actor's incapacity". This illustrative comment in 5 288A is particularly pertinent here: "2. A statute provides that pedestrians shall not step into the street without looking in both directions for approaching traffic. A, a boy eight years of age, dashes into the street without looking, in pursuit of a ball. A's violation of the statute may be found not to be negligence if his conduct was reasonable for a child of similar age, intelligence, and experience.1 1 The statutory violation may thus be excused if the plaintiff lacked the capacity for compliance. The summary judgment for defendant is vacated. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Justice We Concur: .,
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
