DEPT OF S R S v HULTGREN

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No. 12966 I N T E SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A H F F OTN 1975 I N THE STATE O M N A A by and through t h e F OTN DEPARTMENT O SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION F SERVICES, and t h e DEPARTMENT O REVENUE, F P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, ROXANNE HULTGREN , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable J a c k D, Shanstrom, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record : For Appellant: J. Dennis Moreen argued, Helena, Montana Swandal and Douglas, L i v i n g s t o n , Montana For Respondents : Margaret L. Borg, argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed: NDV -' $475 September 24, 1975 N O V - 3 1975 Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the district court, Park County. On September 28, 1969, defendant Roxanne Hultgren applied for and began receiving Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) payments through the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS), stating her children were without support. On February 29, 1972, defendant was divorced from her husband, Paul Arnold Hultgren. The divorce judgment and decree required Hultgren to pay defendant $50 per month for the support and maintenance of each of the seven minor Hultgren children, with payments to commence March 15, 1972. Hultgren made no pay- ment and defendant continued to receive ADC payments through SRS. On May 1, 1973, defendant initiated proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), section 932601-41 et seq., R.C.M. 1947, to recover back due child support from her former husband, then a resident of Wyoming. The URESA claim was settled by an agreement that Hultgren would pay the sum of $4,900. This sum was deposited with the Park County district court pending a determination as to whether SRS or defendant is entitled to the money. Defendant demanded release of the claim to the money by SRS and was refused. Hultgren made his first current support payment in October 1973, and remained current. At the time he began regular support payments, Hultgren was responsible for 19 months back-due support, totaling $6,650. Defendant received ADC payments from March 1972 through October 1973, totaling $6,188. The State, acting through SRS and the Department of Revenue, brought suit in the district court to recover the deposited money. Judgment was granted for the State; defendant appeals. The issue presented to this Court is whether the district c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g judgment t o t h e S t a t e . The S t a t e a l l e g e s it h a s t h e r i g h t t o t h e URESA p r o c e e d s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 93-2601-48, R.C.M. 1947: " I f a state o r a p o l i t i c a l subdivision furnishes s u p p o r t t o a n i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e it h a s t h e same r i g h t t o i n i t i a t e a p r o c e e d i n g under t h i s a c t a s t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of s e c u r i n g reimbursement f o r s u p p o r t f u r n i s h e d and o f o b t a i n ing continuing support." This section c l e a r l y gives t h e S t a t e t h e r i g h t t o i n i t i a t e URESA p r o c e e d i n g s and i n f e r e n t i a l l y g i v e s t h e S t a t e t h e r i g h t t o j o i n i n any such p r o c e e d i n g s i n i t i a t e d by t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e , b u t t h i s s e c t i o n c a n n o t s e r v e a s t h e b a s i s f o r an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e o v e r sums r e c o v e r e d under URESA. The S t a t e d i d n o t choose t o i n i t i a t e a URESA p r o c e e d i n g o r j o i n i n d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e it c a n n o t now c l a i m t h e b e n e f i t o f t h i s s e c t i o n t o r e c o v e r from d e f e n d a n t , h a v i n g v o l u n t a r i l y waived t h e r i g h t granted thereunder. The S t a t e a r g u e s s e c t i o n 61-115, R.C.M. S t a t e t h e r i g h t t o r e c o v e r t h e URESA p r o c e e d s . 1947, g i v e s t h e The s t a t u t e r e a d s : " I f a p a r e n t n e g l e c t s t o p r o v i d e a r t i c l e s nece s s a r y f o r h i s c h i l d under h i s c h a r g e , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a t h i r d p e r s o n may i n good f a i t h s u p p l y s u c h n e c e s s a r i e s , and r e c o v e r t h e r e a s o n a b l e v a l u e t h e r e o f from t h e p a r e n t . " The S t a t e m a i n t a i n s it i s a " t h i r d p e r s o n " which s u p p l i e d necess a r i e s i n t h e form o f ADC payments, t h e r e f o r e it h a s t h e r i g h t t o r e c o v e r under s e c t i o n 61-115. A " t h i r d p e r s o n " i s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 1 9 - 1 0 3 ( 1 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, t o : " * * * i n c l u d e all who are n o t parties to t h e o b l i g a t i o n o r t r a n s a c t i o n c o n c e r n i n g which t h e phrase i s used." I f t h e S t a t e i s a " p e r s o n " , it would c l e a r l y q u a l i f y a s a " t h i r d p e r s o n " i n t h e c o n t e x t of s e c t i o n 61-115, Montana s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 19-103, R.C.M. R.C.M. 1947. 1947, p r o v i d e s : " * * * the word person includes a corporation as well as a natural person * * * I 1 . Since the State is not specifically included in this statutory construction language, we must look further to determine whether the State is a person in the context of section 61-115. The general rule of statutory construction is set out in 82 C.J.S. Statutes 8317, p. 554: "The government, whether federal or state, and its agencies are not ordinarily to be considered as within the purview of a statute, however general and comprehensive the language of act may be, unless intention to include them is clearly manifest, as where they are expressly named therein, or included by necessary implication." This is the rule followed in the 1912 case In re Beck's Estate, 44 Mont. 561, 574, 121 P. 784, in which this Court stated: "Therefore, the rule to be observed in the construction of statutes is, that the state is not included by general words therein creating a right and providing a remedy for its enforcement. " Subsequent to Beck, there has been a trend to include the state within the general language of a statute beneficial to the state. This trend is referred to in 82 C.J.S. Statutes 8317, p. "On the other hand, it has been said that the general rule has been relaxed in modern times. Accordingly, the state may have the benefit of general laws; and the general rule has been held not to apply to statutes by which the government or a part or agency thereof is given powers rather than deprived of them, or where no impairment of the sovereign powers will result * * *". This rule has been applied in a growing number of states, including California, wherein it was stated in In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 31 Cal.2d 580, 191 P.2d 752, 756, quoting from Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Com'rs, 21 Cal.2d 399, 132 P.2d 804, 806: "'Where, however, no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction [the general rule stated above] ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held t o have i n t e n d e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e a p p l y t o governm e n t a l b o d i e s even though it used g e n e r a l s t a t u t o r y language o n l y . ' " See a l s o : West Norman Timber v . S t a t e , 37 Wash.2d 467, 224 P.2d 635, which c o n t a i n s a n e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r e l a x a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l r u l e , c i t i n g c a s e s from many f e d e r a l and s t a t e courts. I n c l u d i n g t h e S t a t e a s a " p e r s o n " i n t h e c o n t e x t of s e c t i o n 61-115, would be b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e S t a t e and g e n e r a l p u b l i c by p e r m i t t i n g t h e S t a t e t o r e c o v e r t o a l i m i t e d e x t e n t amounts p a i d t h r o u g h ADC f o r t h e s u p p o r t and n e c e s s a r i e s o f children. T h e r e f o r e , w e f i n d t h e S t a t e may p r o p e r l y be h e l d t o be a " p e r s o n " f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f s e c t i o n 61-115, R.C.M. 1947. The S t a t e , a s a t h i r d p e r s o n , may, p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 61-115, r e c o v e r t h e r e a s o n a b l e v a l u e f o r t h e n e c e s s a r i e s pro- v i d e d from t h e p a r e n t who n e g l e c t s t o p r o v i d e t h e n e c e s s a r i e s . The l i t i g a t i o n g i v i n g rise neglectful parent. t o t h i s appeal, does not involve t h e H u l t g r e n i s r e q u i r e d t o make s u p p o r t pay- ments p u r s u a n t t o t h e d i v o r c e judgment and d e g r e e . had t h e r i g h t under s e c t i o n 93-2601-48, R.C.M. The S t a t e 1947, t o i n i t i a t e o r j o i n a n URESA p r o c e e d i n g , b u t v o l u n t a r i l y waived t h i s r i g h t by t a k i n g no a c t i o n . Defendant d i d commence a n URESA a c t i o n . The S t a t e c a n n o t r e l y on s e c t i o n 61-115 t o r e c o v e r t h e URESA p r o c e e d s from d e f e n d a n t , a s s e c t i o n 61-115 o n l y p r o v i d e s f o r r e c o v e r y from H u l t g r e n , t h e n e g l e c t f u l p a r e n t . The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o c e e d s s h o u l d be r e c o v e r a b l e by t h e S t a t e under t h e d o c t r i n e o f e q u i t a b l e s u b r o g a t i o n . S u b r o g a t i o n i s a c r e a t u r e o f e q u i t y , it i s a n e q u i t a b l e r i g h t and n o t a l e g a l r i g h t . 580. 83 C.J.S. 83 C.J.S. S u b r o g a t i o n 56, p. i t s equitable nature: S u b r o g a t i o n 5 2 , pp. 578, 594, s t a t e s t h a t due t o "The o r d i n a r y e q u i t y maxims a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e e q u i t a b l e remedy o f s u b r o g a t i o n . Thus, s u b r o g a t i o n i s n o t a l l o w e d where t h e r e i s a n a d e q u a t e remedy a t law * * *". The S t a t e d i d have t h e r i g h t t o i n i t i a t e a n URESA p r o c e e d i n g under s e c t i o n 93-2601-48, o r t h e S t a t e c o u l d have b r o u g h t d i r e c t a c t i o n a s a t h i r d p e r s o n a g a i n s t H u l t g r e n under s e c t i o n 61-115. The S t a t e c h o s e n e i t h e r o f t h e s e means o f re- c o v e r y , t h u s it c a n n o t r e c o v e r under a n e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e what it v o l u n t a r i l y c h o s e n o t t o r e c o v e r under t h e l e g a l r e m e d i e s provided i n t h e s t a t u t e s . The judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s r e v e r s e d and t h i s c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o o r d e r t h e r e l e a s e and payment o f t h e URESA proceeds, now b e i n g h e l d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , t o d e f e n d a n t , Roxanne, H u l t g r e n . . ----------------1A----------------- Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: ............................... Justices Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Here the State having supported a family by ADC payments during a period when the father failed to make support payments is denied an opportunity of partial reimbursement, following a USERA recovery, on what I believe to be a technical failure to join in the USERA action against the husband. The majority state that the litigation does not involve a neglectful parent. I disagree. If the father had lived up to his obligations, as provided for in the divorce decree, then ADC support would not have been required, nor would a USERA action have been necessary. In my opinion the results here call for legislative action similar to that in California, to protect the already overburdened taxpayer. In the interim every county attorney in this State should note the result and join every USERA action filed. ............................. Justice

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