STATE v TAYLOR

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No. 13035 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTN 1975 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, BRUCE ELMER TAYLOR, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Edward D u s s a u l t , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: R o b e r t J. Campbell a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana F o r Respondent : Hon. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , Helena, Montana R i c h a r d P. Heinz, County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , P o l s o n , Montana Submitted: September 1 0 , 1975 Decided: o C T 1. 0 {- Filed: $-t *-- 3 >- 55 . . " r 1375 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from t h e d - i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lake County, from a c o n v i c t i o n of t h e charge of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. P r i o r t o t r i a l defendant challenged t h e j u r y p a n e l , which c h a l l e n g e was denied. verdict. A j u r y t r i a l followed r e s u l t i n g i n a " g u i l t y " Judgment was e n t e r e d sentencing defendant t o twelve y e a r s i n t h e Montana s t a t e p r i s o n w i t h s i x y e a r s suspended. Defendant a p p e a l s from t h a t judgment and sentence. The i s s u e presented f o r determination i s whether o r n o t t h e s e l e c t i o n of j u r o r s f o r a c r i m i n a l t r i a l under s e c t i o n s 931301(4) and 93-1402, R.C.M. 1947, t h e procedural s t a t u t e s f o r s e l e c t i n g j u r o r s f o r t h e j u r y panel, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e r e b y d e p r i v i n g defendant of an i m p a r t i a l j u r y and v i o l a t i n g A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , which guarantees t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws and p r o h i b i t s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n based on s o c i a l o r i g i n o r condition. O June 26, 1974, an Information was f i l e d charging den fendant w i t h s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent under s e c t i o n 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947. A t t h a t time defendant pled n o t g u i l t y . O February 24,1975, defendant moved t o d i s c h a r g e t h e j u r y n panel. The motion was considered and denied a t t h e time of t r i a l on March 10, 1975. Following a v e r d i c t of " g u i l t y " , d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l based upon a l l e g e d improper j u r y s e l e c t i o n was denied a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g on March 24, 1975. Judgment was e n t e r e d and defendant a p p e a l s . Defendant c i t e s and argues a number of United S t a t e s Supreme Court c a s e s and c a s e s from t h i s Court i n support of h i s p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n s 93-1301(4) and 93-1402, X.C.M. 1947, a r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because t h e j u r y panel was taken from t h o s e persons "Assessed on t h e l a s t assessment r o l l of t h e county on p r o p e r t y belonging t o him o r h e r . " such a Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t1 r e s t r i c t i v e drawing" d e p r i v e s him of t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e law thereby v i o l a t i n g t h e Fourteenth Amendment o i t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Defendant f u r - t h e r argues t h a t t h i s p r o t e c t i o n has been extended i n the I972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n by A r t i c l e 11, Section 4 , which s p e c i f i c a l l y d e c l a r e s what d i s c r i m i n a t o r y f a c t o r s a r e p r o h i b i t e d . Section 4 reads : o "The d i g n i t y of t h e human being i s i n v i o l a b l e . N person s h a l l be denied t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws. N e i t h e r t h e s t a t e n o r any person, f i r m , c o r poration, o r i n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l discrimin;-te against any person i n t h e e x e r c i s e of h i s c i v i l o r p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s on account of r a c e , c o l o r , s e x , c u l t u r e , s o c i a l origin o r condition, o r p o l i t i c a l o r religious ideas. II I n support of h i s argument defendant r e l i e s on S t a t e v. Hay, 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232; S t a t e v. P o r t e r , 125 Mont. 503, 242 P. 2d 984; Allen v. S t a t e , 110 Ga.App.56, Southern P a c i f i c Co., 328 U.S. 137 S.E.2d 711; T h i e l v. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L ed 1181; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S . C t . Wkitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S . C t . 667, 98 L ed 866; 643, 17 L ed 2d 599; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L ed 2d 567; Phoenix v. K o l o d z i e j s k i , 399 U.S. 523; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 204, 90 S . C t . 522, 95 S . C t . 1900, 26 L ed 2d 692, 42 L ed 2d W have no disagreement w i t h t h e c a s e a u t h o r i t y c i t e d by e defendant nor t h e law e s t a b l i s h e d by t h a t a u t h o r i t y , however t h e case authority c i t e d i s not applicable t o the i n s t a n t case. Here, defendant r a i s e d no r a c i a l i s s u e s and t h e j u r y panel of Lake County c o n s i s t e d of both w h i t e and Indian c i t i z e n s . I n most of t h e c a s e s c i t e d and r e l i e d on by defendant t h e c h a l l e n g e was t o t h e Fourteenth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n involving r a c i a l r i g h t s i n e l e c t i o n s , o f f i c e h o l d i n g , o r v o t i n g r i g h t s i n bond and school board e l e c t i o n s . The c i t e d c a s e s a r o s e i n p a r t s of t h e United S t a t e s where members of minority r a c e s were prevented from exercising their rights . I n t h e Montana c a s e , S t a t e v. Hay, 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232, t h i s Court found t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d in p i c k i n g a d d i t i o n a l n e e d d j u r o r s from j u r y box No. 3 , persons l o c a t e d i n t h e c i t y of Helena, and i n so doing deprived t h e a p p e l l a n t of a j u r y drawn countywide. Such i s n o t t h e i s s u e i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . To put t h e i s s u e i n proper p e r s p e c t i v e we w i l l examine t h e t h r e e b a s i c elements fundamental t o t h e r i g h t t o an i m p a r t i a l j u r y . (1) Was t h e j u r y drawn from a c r o s s s e c t i o n of t h e community? ( 2 ) Was some s i g n i f i c a n t o r i d e n t i f i a b l e group excluded? ( 3 ) Was defendant prejudiced by t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e Montana s t a t u t e s governing j u r y s e l e c t i o n 7 F i r s t , was t h e j u r y drawn from a c r o s s s e c t i o n of t h e community? I n Montana, u n t i l t h e 1975 l e g i s l a t u r e amended s e c t i o n 93-1402, R.C.M. 1947, j u r y l i s t s were drawn from t h o s e persons a s s e s s e d on t h e l a s t assessment r o l l of t h e county of p r o p e r t y belonging t o him o r h e r . Court, Mon t S t a t e ex r e l . Bennick v. D i s t r i c t . , 538 P.2d 1369, 32 St.Rep. 793. Here, defendant a l l e g e s t h a t such a procedure d i s c r i m i n a t e s a g a i n s t poor people and d e p r i v e s them of an i m p a r t i a l j u r y because t h e l i s t from which t h e j u r y was chosen was composed only of persons who pay property taxes. Does t h i s v i o l a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e law? W answer i n t h e n e g a t i v e . e A i m p a r t i a l j u r y i s described i n t h e numerous c i t e d c a s e s n a s one i n which t h e p o t e n t i a l membership i s drawn from a s e c t i o n of t h e community". Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 1r cross T h i e l v. Southern P a c i f i c Co., s u p r a ; 128, 130, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L ed 84; Glasser v. United S t a t e s , 315 U.S.60, 62 S . C t . 457, 86 L ed 680. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n i t s most r e c e n t c a s e c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n , Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S . C t . 692, 42 L ed 2d 690, 43 Lid 4167,4169, f u l l y reviews t h e numerous c a s e s and makes t h e s e comments on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u i d e l i n e s from t h e s e cases : 1 ) Smith v. Texas, supra: I" [ i ] t i s p a r t of t h e e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d i t i o n i n t h e u s e of j u r i e s a s i n struments of p u b l i c j u s t i c e t h a t t h e j u r y be a body t r u l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e community. 1 1 1 2) Glasser v. United S t a t e s , supra: "'Jc Jc ? our n o t i o n s ; o f what a proper j u r y i s have developed i n harmony w i t h our b a s i c concepts of a democratic system and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government' and r e p e a t e d t h e C o u r t ' s unders t a n d i n g t h a t t h e j u r y ' b e a body t r u l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e community i? " and n o t t h e organ of any s p e c i a l group o r c l a s s . I 1 1 * 3) Brown v. A l l e n , 344 U.S.443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L ed 469: I" [ o l u r duty t o p r o t e c t t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of a l l does n o t mean we must o r should impose on s t a t e s our conception of t h e proper source of j u r y l i s t s , s o long a s t h e source reasonably r e f l e c t s a c r o s s - s e c t i o n of t h e population s u i t a b l e i n c h a r a c t e r and i n t e l l i g e n c e f o r t h a t c i v i c duty. I l l 4) Williams v. F l o r i d a , 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, i k 26 L ed 2d 446, on t h e u s e of a s i x man j u r y : t h a t t h e number of persons on t h e j u r y should 'be l a r g e enough t o promote group d e l i b e r a t i o n , f r e e from o u t s i d e a t t e m p t s a t i n t i m i d a t i o n , and t o provide a f a i r p o s s i b i l i t y f o r o b t a i n i n g a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c r o s s - s e c t i o n of t h e community. 1 I ' "* * The Supreme Court noted i n Taylor t h a t s i n c e Smith v. Texas, s u p r a , t h a t i t has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t t h e s e l e c t i o n of a p e t i t j u r y from a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c r o s s s e c t i o n o f t h e community i s an e s s e n t i a l component of t h e S i x t h Amendment. Montana has followed t h e f a i r c r o s s s e c t i o n requirement a s fundamental t o a t r i a l guaranteed by t h e S i x t h Amendment. S t a t e v. P o r t e r , supra. S t a t e v. Hay, s u p r a ; F u r t h e r , t h i s Court has held t h a t a de- fendant i s e n t i t l e d t o an i m p a r t i a l j u r y , n o t a p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r . N o c l a i m i s made h e r e t h a t defendant d i d n o t have an i m p a r t i a l j u r y . S t a t e v. Hay, s u p r a ; P e t i t i o n of Eoe, 156 Mont. 303, 481 P.2d 45; S t a t e v. Gates, 131 Mont. 78, 307 P.2d 248; S t a t e v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777; Ehni v. Northern P.Ry.Co., 152 Mont. 373, T h i s Court i s convinced, under t h e f a c t s s e t f o r t h i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h a t t h e f a i r c r o s s s e c t i o n requirement was n o t violated. While no t e c h n i c a l evidence was o f f e r e d o r r e c e i v e d , t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e c o u r t c o n t a i n s d i s c u s s i o n s , n o t d i s p u t e d , of c e r t a i n l e g a l s t a t i s t i c s and f a c t s . These f i g u r e s and f a c t s were used by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o f i n d n e i t h e r p r e j u d i c e nor d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . A t t h e time t h e j u r y was drawn from t h e l a s t completed assessment r o l l , 1974, i t c o n t a i n e d more names t h a n d i d t h e l i s t of r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s . The assessment r o l l i n 1974 provided a l i s t of 11,637 p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s , w h i l e t h e number of r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s was 8,497. The o f f i c i a l 1970 census showed a t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n i n Lake County of 14,445. Using t h e above f i g u r e s , i t i s a p p a r e n t approximately 80% of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of t h e county were p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1975, w h i l e approximately 59% of t h e popul a t i o n was c u r r e n t l y r e g i s t e r e d . In addition, i t i s estimated t h a t a g r e a t number of t h e 2,808 persons i n Lake County who a r e n o t on t h e assessment r o l l s a r e j u v e n i l e s , s o t h a t t h e c l a s s of people who pay no p r o p e r t y t a x e s i s n o t such a d e f i n a b l e c l a s s a s t o provide a b a s i s f o r o b j e c t i o n on an e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n ground. Too, a l l persons who do n o t pay t a x e s a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y poor. Recent r e v e l a t i o n s on t h o s e who do n o t pay t a x e s seem t o i n c l u d e many of t h e l i s t e d wealthy. Perhaps t h a t i s how t h e y become wealthy. Even i f a c l a s s of poor people can be s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d , and i t was n o t i n t h i s c a s e , by i t s absence from t h e assessment r o l l s , such a c l a s s i s s o s m a l l a s t o b e i n s i g n i f i c a n t a s compared t o t h e f a c t s i n Taylor where 53% of t h e persons e l i g i b l e f o r j u r y d u t y was female and no more than 10% of t h e persons on t h e j u r y wheel of t h e p a r i s h was female. Such a d i s c r e p a n c y was found t o v i o l a t e a f a i r c r o s s s e c t i o n requirement by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t . The second element---was some s i g n i f i c a n t o r i d e n t i f i a b l e group excluded from j u r y s e r v i c e , we a l s o answer i n t h e n e g a t i v e . Counsel f o r defendant d i d n o t s e t f o r t h c a s e a u t h o r i t y on t h e p h r a s e 11 s y s t e m a t i c and i n t e n t i o n a l e x c l u s i o n of a c l a s s of persons from j u r y duty" t h a t i s a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . )luch r e l i a n c e was put upon t h e c a s e of Turner v. Fouche, s u p r a , where t h e Supreme Court h e l d t h a t a s t a t u t o r y system t o s e l e c t j u r i e s and s c h o o l boards was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e s t r i c t e d t o f r e e holders. I n Turner 60% of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of t h e county was Negro y e t t h e system of s e l e c t i n g j u r y commissioners from t h e l i s t of f r e e h o l d e r s who i n t u r n s e l e c t t h e grand j u r y which, i n i t s turn s e l e c t e d t h e members of t h e s c h o o l board, r e s u l t e d i n a m i n o r i t y of Negroes on t h e grand j u r y and none on t h e s c h o o l board. Turner a s w e l l a s o t h e r c a s e s r e l i e d on by defendant h e r e , t u r n e d on t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s b e f o r e t h e c o u r t i n each c a s e , and a s we r e a d Turner t h e h o l d i n g was i n t e n d e d o n l y t o c o n s t i t u t e a judgment on t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d and d i d n o t i n d i c t any system based on t a x r o l l s . The u s e of t a x l i s t s f o r s e l e c t i n g j u r o r s h a s been s p e c i f i c a l l y upheld by f e d e r a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n s . supra. Brown v. A.llen, I n Roach v. Mauldin, 391 F.2d 907, 908, t h e C i r c u i t Court r e l i e d on Brown i n h o l d i n g t h a t : I t J , * i n t h e absence of r a c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h e u s e of t a x d i g e s t s , which n e c e s s a r i l y exclude nonproperty owners, seems t o have been s e t t l e d a s n o t prima f a c i e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l fc * . I ' * Many o f t h e c i t e d c a s e s n o t e t h a t any system used would r e s u l t i n t h e e x c l u s i o n of some names. To hold t h e Montana system un- c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , we would have t o be shown t h a t an i d e n t i f i a b l e and s i g n i f i c a n t c l a s s of people had been excluded. There i s no evidence i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u p p o r t such a f i n d i n g . The t h i r d element f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s whether t h e defendant was p r e j u d i c e d by t h e o p e r a t i o n of Montana s t a t u t e s governing j u r y s e l e c t i o n . W hold he was n o t . e Defendant has f a i l e d t o show any p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t him o r any i n j u r y a f f e c t i n g h i s r i g h t t o an i m p a r t i a l j u r y r e s u l t i n g from any d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e of j u r y s e l e c t i o n . Much d i s - c r e t i o n i s l e f t t o t h e s t a t e s , a s i t should b e , i n t h e v a r i o u s methods used i n j u r y s e l e c t i o n s . Brown v. A l l e n , s u p r a . ~ o n t a n a ' ssystem of j u r y s e l e c t i o n "reasonably r e f l e c t s a c r o s s s e c t i o n of t h e population" and defendant h a s f a i l e d t o meet t h e burden of showing he was denied t h e b e n e f i t of an i m p a r t i a l j u r y a s guaranteed by t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . / 2 hief J u s t i \1 Justice /

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