HASBROUCK v KRSUL

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No. 12958 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTN 1975 W. EARL HASBROUCK, d / b / a GREAT FALLS TERMINAL W R H U E COMPANY, AEOS Plaintiff, -vs JOHN C. KRSUL, SHERIFF, Defendant and Third Party P l a i n t i f f , -vs and Appellant D O R M WILSON, Third P a r t y Defendant, and E. F. GIANOTTI, A d d i t i o n a l t h i r d P a r t y Defendant, and Respondent. - - Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record : For Appellant: G r a y b i l l , Ostrem, Warner and C r o t t y , Great F a l l s , Montana Donald Ostrem argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Smith, Emmons and B a i l l i e , Great F a l l s , Montana William L. B a i l l i e argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: September 24, 1975 Decided: NCjV x, Filed :, , '>. 5 - 2- 1 ;/3 1975 M. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. r This i s an appeal from an o r d e r dismissing a t h i r d p a r t y complaint f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f may be granted. M.R.Civ.P., Rule 12(b)c6). The order was made i n an a c t i o n brought t o recover c e r t a i n s t o r a g e f e e s i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Cascade County, Judge R. J. Nelson presiding. Appellant, t h i r d p a r t y p l a i n t i f f , S h e r i f f John C. Krsul was defendant i n an a c t i o n brought by one Hasbrouck f o r t h e s t o r age of goods i n t h e amount of $775.50. Appellant S h e r i f f had l e v i e d on t h e goods pursuant t o a w r i t of execution i s s u i n g upon a c i v i l judgment obtained by respondent's c l i e n t , Dorla Wilson. MIS, Wilson, who i s admittedly judgment proof, was made a t h i r d p a r t y defendant i n t h i s a c t i o n by a p p e l l a n t . Subsequently a motion f o r summary judgment was granted Hasbrouck a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t Krsul f o r $775.50. The a p p e l l a n t next joined respondent a t t o r n e y E. I?. G i a n o t t i a s another t h i r d p a r t y defendant. Respondent then moved t o dismiss t h e t h i r d p a r t y complaint f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted t h e motion t o dismiss from which a p p e l l a n t has appealed. I n i t i a l l y w e consider whether such motion t o dismiss i s appealable. While t h i s i s s u e was n o t b r i e f e d nor argued by counsel, p a s t d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court can be found both denying and allowing appeals from t h e g r a n t i n g of motions dismissing complaints f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim. Payne v. Mountain S t a t e s Tel. & T e l . , 142 Mont. 406, 385 P.2d 100; Rambur v. Diehl Lumber Co., 143 Mont. 432, 391 P.2d 1 ; P r e n t i c e Lumber Co. v. H u k i l l , 161 Mont. 8 , 504 P.2d 277. W t h i n k t h e view expressed i n P r e n t i c e Lumber Co. t o e be a p p l i c a b l e h e r e , because t h e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r i s t o leave a p p e l l a n t without opportunity f o r f u r t h e r j u d i c i a l r e l i e f , j u s t a s i f judgment had been rendered a g a i n s t him. Therefore, t h e order of Judge Nelson i s properly before t h i s Court on appeal. I n judging t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h a t order we apply t h e s t r i c t standard f o r Federal Rule 12, a f t e r which ~ o n t a n a ' sRule 12, M.R.Civ.P., I n Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, was p a t t e r n e d . "* * * a complaint should n o t be dismissed f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim u n l e s s i t appears beyond doubt t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f can prove no set of f a c t s i n support of h i s claim which would e n t i t l e him t o r e l i e f . " See a l s o discussion of Rule 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) , M.R.Civ.P., i n Duffy v. Butte ~ e a c h e r s 'Union, No. 332, e t a l . , our cause No. 13938, handed down October 31, 1975, M nt o . P.2d 9 Appellant argues t h a t a s p e c i f i c Montana s t a t u t e s e c t i o n 2-212(1), R.C.M. 1947, a u t h o r i z e s a claim a g a i n s t an agent of a d i s c l o s e d p r i n c i p a l i n c e r t a i n l i m i t e d circumstances. W e agree. S p e c i f i c a l l y , s e c t i o n 2-212(1) provides: 1I One who assumes t o a c t a s an agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h i r d persons a s a p r i n c i p a l f o r h i s a c t s i n t h e course of h i s agency, i n any of t h e following c a s e s , and i n no o t h e r : "1. When, with h i s consent, c r e d i t i s given t o him personally i n a transaction". (Emphasis added. ) . I n t h e f a c e of t h i s s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e , t h e amended comp l a i n t of S h e r i f f Krsul, a s t h i r d p a r t y p l a i n t i f f , a g a i n s t a t t o r n e y G i a n o t t i , a s t h i r d p a r t y defendant, makes i t c l e a r t h a t t h e S h e r i f f knew t h a t a t t o r n e y G i a n o t t i was an agent and t h a t c r e d i t was not extended t o him personally. That complaint, i n each i n s t a n c e , r e c i t e s both t h e p r i n c i p a l and h e r a t t o r n e y , b u t nowhere a l l e g e s t h a t personal c r e d i t was given independent of t h e p r i n c i p a l . Under t h e s e circumstances t h e s t a t u t e c o n t r o l s and t h e t r i a l c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n dismissing t h e complaint f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim. W a f f i r m t h e o r d e r of dismissal. e We c o n c u r : 8 . 4 ' ,,- - ..- , %c ? , . e " m , - Ch' f Justice . ... -- d R A d F -- Justices; d

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