STATE EX REL CITY OF HELENA v DIS
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No. 13021 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA OR F F 1975 T E STATE O M N A A on t h e r e l a t i o n of H F OTN, t h e C i t y of Helena, Montana, a municipal corporation, Relator, T E DISTRICT C U T O THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, H OR F I N AND FOR T E COUNTY O LEWIS AND CLARK, and t h e H F HONORABLE PETER G. MELOY, Judge of s a i d Court, ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record : For Rela t o r : P. Keith K e l l e r argued, Helena, Montana C. W. Leaphart, Jr. , Helena, Montana For Respondents : H a r r i s , Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana Robert Murdo argued, Helena, Montana Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Loble, P i c o t t e and Pauly , Helena, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed : 4 L !2 C 1975 1)? May 14, 1975 J U N 1 0 1975 Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is a petition by the City of Helena for a writ of supervisory control alleging that the district court, Lewis and Clark County, erred in denying defendant petitioner's motion for summary judgment, in cause No. 36440, entitled Morland P. Branning, Plaintiff, versus Rick McCullough, the State of Montana, acting by and through its State Highway Commission, and the City of Helena, Montana, Defendants. Petitioner argues the denial of its motion necessitates a trial on the merits, even though petitioner cannot be held liable as a matter of law, and that supervisory control is the only effective remedy available. The lawsuit involves an intersection collision which occurred in the City of Helena on the evening of April 28, 1972. The following diagram approximates the appearance of that intersection: "OLD" 11th. B M S - Branning - Stop Signs Point of collision - McCullough x - I 3 x Rickey P. McCullough was d r i v i n g e a s t on " o l d " E l e v e n t h Avenue when h i s v e h i c l e c o l l i d e d w i t h one b e i n g d r i v e n s o u t h on Fee S t r e e t by Morland P. Branning. McCullough and ~ r a n n i n g b r o u g h t n e g l i g e n c e a c t i o n s a g a i n s t e a c h o t h e r , and b o t h j o i n e d t h e C i t y of Helena and t h e S t a t e of Montana a s d e f e n d a n t s , a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n was n e g l i g e n t l y d e s i g n e d , r e g u l a t e d and m a i n t a i n e d . The c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e were d i s - missed a s b a r r e d by t h e d o c t r i n e of s o v e r e i g n immunity. his p e t i t i o n i s b r o u g h t by t h e C i t y of Helena, s e e k i n g r e v i e w of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of summary judgment i n i t s f a v o r . The p e t i t i o n r a i s e s two i s s u e s n e c e s s a r y t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h i s c a s e : 1. A r e t h e r e g e n u i n e i s s u e s o f m a t e r i a l f a c t which p r e - c l u d e summary judgment under Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.? 2. Does t h e a b s e n c e of j u r i s d i c t i o n o r c o n t r o l o v e r t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n by t h e C i t y , i f e s t a b l i s h e d h e r e , p r e c l u d e l i a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of t h e C i t y ? T h i s Court h e l d i n Roope v . Anaconda Co., 159 Mont. 2 8 , 32, 494 P.2d 922: "The burden o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e a b s e n c e o f any i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t i s on t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g summary judgment. Byrne v . P l a n t e , 154 Iqont. 6 , 459 P.2d 266, and c i t a t i o n s h e r e i n . But where, a s h e r e , t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s no g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e burden i s upon t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e of a m a t e r i a l and s u b s t a n t i a l n a t u r e r a i s i n g a g e n u i n e i s s u e of f a c t . F l a n s b e r g v . Montana Power Co., 154 Mont. 53, 4 6 0 P.2d 263, and authorities cited therein." The d e p o s i t i o n s i n t h e r e c o r d h e r e i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n was, a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , a p a r t of t h e S t a t e Highway System and t h e F e d e r a l Aid Primary System. Respondent d i s t r i c t c o u r t acknowledges t h e u n a n i m i t y among t h e deposed w i t n e s s e s , b u t a r g u e s t h a t no r e c o r d s have been produced which conc l u s i v e l y confirm those statements. I t c i t e s Live S t o c k Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 303 I11.App. 445, 25 N.E.2d 613, as establishing the necessity for such documentary evidence in a case such as this. Without those records, it claims that a factual dispute remains which bars entry of summary judgment on the City's motion. That argument ignores the evidence contained in this record. Not only do the deposed witnesses all support the City's claim of no jurisdiction or control, but exhibits to those depositions likewise support the claim. Employees of the State Highway Department who were deposed claimed that the intersectidn was within the department's jurisdiction. Among the exhibits is an agreement between the State and the City which refers to construction known as "Federal Aid Project No. F. 9999(2)11, expressly including this portion of Eleventh Avenue. That agreement also pro- vides that the City will not erect any traffic control devices giving preference to "local routes" without the express written permission of the State. One exhibit is a pencil abstract indicating the entire intersection is owned by the State of Montana. Other exhibits, while less persuasive, also support the factual proposition that the intersection is owned by the State and remains a part of the State's jurisdiction. Given this evidence, we find the City has met the burden required before it can secure summary judgment, and respondent, to prevail, must demonstrate "evidence of a material and substantial nature, raising a genuine issue of fact." Roope, supra. The only evidence which might be viewed as controverting that produced by the City is contained in an amended answer to Branning's Interrogatory Number 9, wherein the City stated: "Inasmuch as the intersection is within the corporate limits of the city, i.ts use is policed by the city. Accordingly, the city performs removal of automobiles and obstructions and injured p e r s o n s on a n emergency b a s i s o n l y . Routine maintenance was, and i s , performed by t h e S t a t e of Montana. The C i t y of Helena, however, performs s a n d i n g on t h e s t r e e t . " B r a n n i n g s ' d e p o s i t i o n c o n t a i n s p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s which t e n d t o c o n f i r m t h e s a n d i n g of t h e s t r e e t by t h e C i t y . T h i s e v i d e n c e , i n o u r view, p r e s e n t s no g e n u i n e i s s u e of material fact. Montana's l e g i s l a t u r e h a s e x p r e s s l y d e c l a r e d i t s i n t e n t i o n t o "make t h e d e p a r t m e n t of highways c u s t o d i a n of t h e f e d e r a l - a i d and s t a t e highways." 1947. S e c t i o n 3 2 - 2 2 0 2 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. E l e v e n t h Avenue's s t a t u s a s a f e d e r a l a i d highway i s e v i d e n c e d by t h e d e p o s i t i o n s and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h e C i t y - S t a t e agreement e a r l i e r r e f e r r e d t o . Its s t a t u s a s a s t a t e highway i s c l e a r under t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n a s ' ' [ a l n y p u b l i c highway p l a n n e d , l a i d o u t , a l t e r e d , c o n s t r u c t e d , r e c o n s t r u c t e d , i m p r ~ v e d ~ r e p a i r e d , a i n t a i n e d , o r abandoned by t h e d e p a r t m e n t . ' ' m S e c t i o n 3 2 - 2 2 0 3 ( 2 8 ) , R.C.M. 1947. W e f i n d nothing i n t h e C i t y ' s s a n d i n g of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n which r a i s e s a g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o t h e u l t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n o f S t a t e c o n t r o l and j u r i s d i c t i o n . T h a t f i n d i n g r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n of whether o r n o t t h e C i t y c a n be h e l d l i a b l e f o r a l l e g e d l y n e g l i g e n t d e s i g n , r e g u l a t i o n o r maintenance of t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n , even though i t had no p o s s e s s o r y o r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l powers o v e r i t . W e f i n d t h a t it cannot. I n r e a c h i n g t h a t c o n c l u s i o n , w e a r e a i d e d by t h e d e c i s i o n i n H a r l a n v . C i t y of Tucson, 82 A r i z . ,11, 309 P.2d 244, 249. In t h a t c a s e , an a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of a s t a t e highway w i t h a c i t y s t r e e t i n Tucson. The S t a t e o f Arizona had j u r i s d i c t i o n , c o n t r o l o v e r , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e maintenance of t h a t highway. The C i t y o f Tucson o c c u p i e d a s i m i l a r s t a t u s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f r o n t a g e r o a d s and c o n n e c t i n g c i t y s t r e e t s . The c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d t h e C i t y was n e g l i g e n t i n c o n s t r u c t i n g , o r a l l o w i n g t o be c o n s t r u c t e d , a d a n g e r o u s i n t e r s e c t i o n , and i n f a i l i n g t o g i v e warning of t h e d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n . The C i t y moved f o r summary judgment on the ground that the intersection was within the jurisdiction of the State, and thereforethe City could not be found negligent, as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the granting of that motion: "There being no jurisdiction or control in the city over the intersection involved, it follows there could be no duty, and without a duty in the matter there can be no actionable negligence." The Court there reached that determination in spite of the performance of some traffic control and maintenance of the intersection by the City. The Arizona statutes quoted in that opin- ion are, in many respects, similar to Montana's, and we find no reason for a different result in the instant case. For other pertinent authority, arriving at similar conclusions, see: Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 553, 225 P.2d 522; McNulty v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 314 F.Supp. 1274; 19 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., B 54.25~. Petitioner here also raises an issue concerning alleged failure to satisfy the notice requirements of Section 11-1305, R.C.M. 1947. In finding that summary judgment should have been granted on the grounds already stated, we need not consider this additional issue. As in State ex rel. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. District Court, 159 Mont. 295, 496 P.2d 1152, a writ of supervisory control is proper here as the sole means by which petitioner can avoid the substantial prejudice of being forced to defend a suit where, as a matter of Law, liability cannot be established. Sunmary judgment should have been granted to petitioner, and it is so ordered. Justice // Chief Justice
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