PETITION OF MEIDINGER

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 1J09b IN L'HE 5UPREN6 JOUK'I' OF THE STAfE 3P XONrJ'ANA LN THE LNAI"L'EK d h ' 1:HE !'J3Tl'I'ION LEON 0. MEIDINGER, OF Petitioner. i o u ~ l s e lof Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : Moses, Kampfe, T o l l i v e r dnci W r ~ g h r , 8 i l l i n g s , Pfontana Yruce Barnard a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana Thomas A . Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , Helena, Montana 'idilllam K r u t z f e l d t , County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , M i l e s C i t y , Montana Submitted: ! ) a i d e d: li'i led : >LY 'I J August 9 , 1975 SEP 1 1 ?9/5 M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding wherein p e t i t i o n e r seeks a w r i t of habeas corpus. Upon t h e f i l i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n t h i s Court ordered an a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g t o be h e l d on J u l y 30, 1975, and t h a t copy of t h e p e t i t i o n , memorandum i n s u p p o r t , and copy of t h e o r d e r s e t t i n g t h e h e a r i n g be s e r v e d upon t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l and t h e d i s t r i c t judge b e f o r e whom t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t proceedings were had. Such a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g was h e l d and a p e r i o d of t e n days g r a n t e d c o u n s e l f o r submission of b r i e f s . The b r i e f s have been f i l e d and t h e m a t t e r i s now b e f o r e t h e Court f o r d e c i s i o n . P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s t h a t on J u l y 9 , 1973, he was conv i c t e d of t h e crime of b u r g l a r y i n t h e f i r s t d e g r e e , and sentenced t o e i g h t y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p e n i t e n t i a r y , a l l b u t two y e a r s b e i n g suspended. The s e n t e n c e commenced on November 1, 1971, and w i t h good time earned a t t h e p r i s o n h i s p r o b a t i o n was due t o e x p i r e on May 5 , 1979. As h e r e a f t e r a p p e a r s i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , p e t i t i o n e r was p r e v i o u s l y t r i e d f o r t h e same crime, c o n v i c t e d , and sentenced b u t t h a t c o n v i c t i o n was s e t a s i d e by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t and on t h e 1973 c o n v i c t i o n he was g i v e n c r e d i t f o r t h e time s e r v e d on t h e previous c o n v i c t i o n from November 1, 1971. P e t i t i o n e r was placed on p r o b a t i o n under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e Board of Pardons and P a r o l e and was a s s i g n e d t o t h e s p e c i f i c s u p e r v i s i o n of M r . P h i l i p E. Sanderson, a p a r o l e and p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r from B i l l i n g s . O March 17, 1975, Sanderson f i l e d a v i o l a t i o n r e p o r t n a l l e g i n g c e r t a i n v i o l a t i o n s of t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s of p r o b a t i o n had been committed by p e t i t i o n e r . That r e p o r t of v i o l a t i o n of t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s of h i s p a r o l e were: S t a t e Rule #l 1) - Respect and obey law - O 12/8/1974, n he p l e d g u i l t y t o a c h a r g e of d i s t u r b i n g t h e peace a t B r i d g e r , Montana, and was f i n e d $100. 2) permission S t a t e Rule #3- Departure from a s s i g n e d d i s t r i c t w i t h o u t - O 1/4/1975 he was a r r e s t e d i n Elko, Nevada, and n d i d n o t have permission from h i s p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r t o l e a v e t h e state. O 2/22/1975 he was i n t h e c i t y of Santa Monica, C a l i f o r n i a , n when he was supposed t o be i n C l o v i s , New Mexico, a s s t a t e d on h i s t r a v e l permit which was i s s u e d by h i s p a r o l e o f f i c e r f o r t r a v e l by a i r , b u t i n s t e a d he took h i s own c a r . (Noteworthy h e r e , when a r r e s t e d i n Santa Monica he had t h i r t y - f i v e $100 b i l l s ) . 3) S t a t e Rule #5 d e a d l y weapons - - Possession of b u r g l a r y t o o l s o r O 2/22/1975, when he was a r r e s t e d by t h e Santa n Monica p o l i c e i n h i s room were an i n s t r u m e n t f o r l i s t e n i n g t o p o l i c e c a l l s , one handgun c a s e , s e t of a l a r m jumper c a b l e s , one Ace Lock Pick and one Ace Hollow B i t . 4) - liquors S t a t e Rule #6 - Use t o e x c e s s of b e e r o r i n t o x i c a t i n g O 3/6/1975, he r e p o r t e d t o h i s p a r o l e o f f i c e r n o t i c e a b l y n i n t o x i c a t e d , smelled of l i q u o r on h i s b r e a t h , and h i s speech was slurred. 5) S t a t e Rule #7. - Steady employment. - He r e f u s e d t o f i l l o u t monthly r e p o r t s showing h i s s o u r c e s of income. At no time h a s h i s p a r o l e o f f i c e r known of h i s h o l d i n g a j o b , b u t s t i l l manages t o s u p p o r t h i s family. Be s t a t e d t o t h e o f f i c e r t h a t h i s w i f e was t h e owner of a b a r and s h e was s u p p o r t i n g him. The p a r o l e o f f i c e r recommended p e t i t i o n e r ' s suspended s e n t e n c e be revoked. The county a t t o r n e y f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r t h e i m p o s i t i o n of f i n a l judgment and s e n t e n c e based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g r e p o r t . A motion t o d i s m i s s was f i l e d by p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel; a h e a r i n g was s e t f o r May 7, 1975, continued a t t h e r e q u e s t of p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel t o May 19. O May 19 a t t h e r e q u e s t of p e t i t i o n e r ' s n counsel i t was a g a i n continued t o June 4. O t h a t day t h e h e a r i n g n was h e l d , p e t i t i o n e r and h i s counsel were p r e s e n t . A t t h e con- c l u s i o n of t h e h e a r i n g t h e m a t t e r was taken under advisement and t h e r e a f t e r on June 20, 1975, t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r and sent e n c e revoking t h e suspended sentence of s i x y e a r s , g i v i n g c r e d i t f o r 618 days t h e r e o n , and d e p r i v i n g him of c e r t a i n s p e c i f i e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s d u r i n g t h e remaining term of h i s sentence. The c o u r t a l s o made and e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law. The f i n d i n g s were: "I. Defendant was sentenced on J u l y 9, 1973, on a g u i l t y plea t o t h e crime charged, b u r g l a r y , t o e i g h t y e a r s i n t h e S t a t e P e n i t e n t i a r y . The term was t o commence November 1, 1971; and s i x y e a r s of t h e sentence was suspended. The s e n t e n c e was d r a f t e d i n t h a t f a s h i o n so t h a t t h e defendant would b e given c r e d i t f o r time s p e n t i n t h e p e n i t e n t i a r y , on a previous c o n v i c t i o n of t h e same crime which was s e t a s i d e by t h e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t Court, and would n o t have t o s e r v e any p r i s o n time on t h i s c o n v i c t i o n . "11. That s a i d defendant v i o l a t e d t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s of s a i d p a r o l e i n t h a t he: "1. F o r f e i t e d 'a $100.00 bond t o a charge of d i s t u r b i n g t h e peace i n B r i d g e r , Montana, on December 8 , 1974. "2. Left the of h i s p a r o l e t h a t he drove was t o f l y t o 1975. S t a t e without t h e p r i o r permission o f f i c e r on January 4 , 1975, and t o C a l i f o r n i a when h i s permission C l o v i s , New Mexico, on February 22, "IV. That defendant was charged w i t h o t h e r v i o l a t i o n s of t h e r u l e s of p a r o l e , b u t proof of such t e c h n i c a l v i o l a t i o n s a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y r e v o c a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s suspended sentence. r 1 The conclusions of law were: "I. That d e f e n d a n t ' s conduct v i o l a t e d t h e terms of h i s suspended s e n t e n c e and h i s p a r o l e should be revoked. I l As a b a s i s f o r h i s p e t i t i o n Meidinger contends t h a t t h e o r d e r revoking h i s suspended sentence should i t s e l f be revoked because : (1) He was n o t a f f o r d e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o a preliminary h e a r i n g t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause f o r t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n f o r imposition of f i n a l judgment and sentence. (2) That s e c t i o n 94-9831, R.C.M. 1947, (95-3213), i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s t h e r e a r e no e s t a b l i s h e d g u i d e l i n e s f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a v i o l a t i o n and, due t o i t s vagueness, he could n o t adequately defend himself. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e same s t a t u t o r y s e c t i o n s do n o t r e q u i r e nor a f f o r d him a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause. (3) The o r d e r signed by t h e judge d i d n o t s e t f o r t h t h e reasons and f i n d i n g s of f a c t upon which t h e f i n a l r e v o c a t i o n o r d e r was i s s u e d a s r e q u i r e d by t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n a s s e t f o r t h i n Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L ed 2d 484 and Gagnon v. S c a r p e l l i , 411 U . S . 778, 93 S. C t . 1756, 36 L ed 2d 656. (4) The c o u r t cannot c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y impose f i n a l judgment and sentence simply because he f a i l e d t o have s t e a d y employment. P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s h i s c o n t e n t i o n s a r e based on t h e Fourth, F i f t h , S i x t h and Fourteenth Amendments t o t h e United Scates C o n s t i t u t i o n ; S e c t i o n s 17, 24, and 27, A r t . 1 1 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ; S e c t i o n s 94-9831, 95-3212, 95-2227 and 95-1503, R.C.M. 1947; and Morrissey and Gagnon. P e t i t i o n e r c i t e s two United S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s which s e t f o r t h t h e law t o b e followed by t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e s , a s w e l l a s by t h e f e d e r a l j u d i c i a l system. The f i r s t i s Morrissey. I n t h i s d e c i s i o n , i n an opinion w r i t t e n by Chief J u s t i c e Berger, i t was h e l d t h a t t h e minimum requirements o f due process i n revoking p a r o l e s i n c l u d e : (a) w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e claimed p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n s ; (b) d i s c l o s u r e of t h e evidence a g a i n s t him t o t h e p a r o l e e ; (c) o p p o r t u n i t y t o be heard i n person and t o p r e s e n t w i t n e s s e s and documentary evidence; (d) t h e r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t and cross-examine adverse w i t n e s s e s ( u n l e s s t h e h e a r i n g o f f i c e r s p e c i f i c a l l y f i n d s good cause f o r n o t allowing c o n f r o n t a t i o n ) ; ( e ) a n e u t r a l and detached h e a r i n g body such a s a t r a d i t i o n a l p a r o l e board, members of which need n o t b e j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s o r lawyers; and ( f ) a w r i t t e n statement by t h e f a c t f i n d e r s a s t o t h e evidence r e l i e d on and reasons f o r revoking p a r o l e . The second c a s e r e l i e d on i s Gagnon where i t was h e l d t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r was e n t i t l e d t o both a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g t o determine whether t h e r e was probable cause t o b e l i e v e t h a t he had v i o l a t e d h i s probation and a f i n a l h e a r i n g p r i o r t o t h e u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n whether h i s probation should be revoked and t h a t t h e s t a t e was n o t under a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l duty t o provide counsel f o r i n d i g e n t s i n a l l probation r e v o c a t i o n c a s e s . W have no q u a r r e l w i t h t h e minimum due process r e e quirements e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e two c i t e d c a s e s b u t a s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between t h o s e c a s e s and t h i s c a s e . Both Morrissey, d e a l i n g w i t h p a r o l e r e v o c a t i o n , and Gagnon, d e a l i n g w i t h probation r e v o c a t i o n , involved d e c i s i o n s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e boards such a s ~ o n t a n a ' sBoard of Pardons. The i n s t a n t c a s e however, i n v o l v e s a probation which was revoked by t h e o r i g i n a l sentencing judge a s a u t h o r i z e d by s e c t i o n 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947. That d i s t i n c t i o n i n i t s e l f provides an i n h e r e n t s o r t of f a i r n e s s which i s n o t achieved through a s o l e l y a d m i n i s t r a t i - v e process. One of t h e requirements s e t out by Morrissey II a I n e u t r a l and detached' h e a r i n g body such a s a t r a d i t i o n a l p a r o l e board, members of which need not be j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s o r lawyers", demonstrates t h a t t h e method used i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e f u r n i s h e s much more than what t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court c o n s i d e r s of due process". II minimum s t a n d a r d s P e t i t i o n e r c o n t e n d s t h a t he s h o u l d have had n o t i c e of t h e time and p l a c e of a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g and which c o n d i t i o n s o f p r o b a t i o n h e was a l l e g e d t o have v i o l a t e d and t h a t h e was denied due p r o c e s s b e c a u s e of t h e f a i l u r e of t h e s t a t e t o do s o . However, we do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n s i n M o r r i s s e y and Gagnon were i n t e n d e d t o b e i n f l e x i b l e r u l e s t o b e a p p l i e d t o e v e r y r e v o c a t i o n a c t i o n w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e f a c t s a t hand. A s t h e Court s t a t e d f o l l o w i n g i t s l i s t of minimum due p r o c e s s , II W have no t h o u g h t t o c r e a t e an i n f l e x i b l e s t r u c t u r e f o r p a r o l e e revocation procedures. 1l I n Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 559-561, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 4 1 L ed 2d 935, 953, 954, t h e Supreme Court o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s commented: II Following t h e d e c i s i o n i n M o r r i s s e y , i n Ga.gnon v , S c a r p e l l i , 411 U.S. 778, 36 L Ed 2d 656, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973), t h e Court h e l d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f due p r o c e s s e s t a b l i s h e d f o r p a r o l e r e v o c a t i o n were a p p l i c a b l e t o probation revocation proceedings. "* 7': * II W a g r e e w i t h n e i t h e r p e t i t i o n e r s n o r t h e Court e of Appeals: t h e Nebraska p r o c e d u r e s a r e i n some respects constitutionally deficient but the M o r r i s s e y - S c a r p e l l i p r o c e d u r e s need n o t i n a l l r e s p e c t s b e followed i n d i s c i p l i n a r y c a s e s i n s t a t e prisons. " e have o f t e n r e p e a t e d t h a t ' [ t l h e v e r y n a t u r e o f W due p r o c e s s n e g a t e s any c o n c e p t o f i n f l e x i b l e p r o c e d u r e s u n i v e r s a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o every imaginable s i t u a t i o n . 1 C a f e t e r i a Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. a t 895, 6 L Ed 2d 1230. ' [ C l o n s i d e r a t i o n of what p r o c e d u r e s due p r o c e s s may r e q u i r e under any g i v e n s e t of c i r c u m s t a n c e s must begin with a determination of t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e of t h e government f u n c t i o n i n v o l v e d a s w e l l a s of t h e p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t t h a t h a s been a f f e c t e d by governmental a c t i o n . t I b i d . ; M o r r i s s e y , 408 U.S., a t 481, 33 L Ed 2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Viewed i n t h i s l i g h t i t i s immediately a p p a r e n t t h a t one c a n n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y apply procedural r u l e s designed f o r f r e e c i t i z e n s i n an open s o c i e t y , o r f o r p a r o l e e s o r p r o b a t i o n e r s u n d e r only limited r e s t r a i n t s , t o t h e very d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n p r e s e n t e d by a d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o c e e d i n g i n a s t a t e prison. "In s t r i k i n g t h e b a l a n c e t h a t t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e demands, however, we t h i n k t h e major c o n s i d e r a t i o n m i l i t a t i n g a g a i n s t adopting t h e f u l l range of procedures s u g g e s t e d by Y o r r i s s e y f o r a l l e g e d p a r o l e v i o l a t o r s i s t h e very d i f f e r e n t s t a k e t h e S t a t e has i n t h e s t r u c t u r e and c o n t e n t o f t h e p r i s o n d i s c i p l i n a r y h e a r i n g . That t h e r e v o c a t i o n of p a r o l e b e j u s t i f i e d and based on an a c c u r a t e a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e f a c t s i s a c r i t i c a l matter t o the State a s well a s the parolee; b u t t h e p r o c e d u r e s by which i t i s determined w h e t h e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p a r o l e have been breached do n o t themselves t h r e a t e n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t s t a t e i n t e r e s t s , parole o f f i c e r s , the police, o r witnesses--at l e a s t no more s o t h a n i n t h e c a s e of t h e o r d i n a r y c r i m i n a l t r i a l , II Under t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n t h e r e i s no p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g a preliminary hearing b e f o r e proceedings f o r revocation , ~ p a r o l e o r suspended s e n t e n c e a r e i n s t i t u t e d . i s c a t e d i n r e P e t i t i o n o f Doney, Mont . A s t h i s Court 522 P.2d 92, 3 1 St.Rep. 442, d e a l i n g w i t h c o u n s e l a t a r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g , a l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d i s fundamental f a i r n e s s and t h e r e c o r d establishes t h a t here. Here, p e t i t i o n e r Meidinger was n o t under a r r e s t a t any rune f o r p r o b a t i o n v i o l a t i o n and i n f a c t was n o t a r r e s t e d u n t i l a bench w a r r a n t was i s s u e d p u r s u a n t t o t h e f i n a l o r d e r of r e v o c a - c i o n made by Judge Coate on June 20, 1975. volved i n b o t h t h e M o r r i s s e y and Gagnon The i n d i v i d u a l s i n - d e c i s i o n s had been p l a c e d under a r r e s t and d e t a i n e d by t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r s ~ r i o r o any o f f i c i a l a c t i o n t a k e n toward r e v o c a t i o n . t In that p e r s p e c t i v e i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g was n e c e s s a r y t o i n s u r e t h a t some n e u t r a l body c o u l d h e a r t h e e v i d e n c e and p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t s o f t h e a c c u s e d i f t h e c h a r g e s were p a t e n t l y f a l s e o r u n j u s t . Where no d e t e n t i o n i s i n - v o l v e d , no such purpose c a n be s e r v e d . P e t i t i o n e r n e x t a l l e g e s t h a t s e c t i o n 94-9831 (95-3213), 9.i.Y. 1947, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague f o r n o t e s t a b l i s h i n g s u i d e l i n e s f o r "establishing a violation". The r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g i s n o t a c r i m i n a l t r i a l b u t a sunurlary h e a r i n g t o e s t a b l i s h a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p r i s o n e r ' s probation. The p r o b a t i o n e r a l r e a d y s t a n d s c o n v i c t e d of a crime no m a t t e r what t h e grounds f o r r e v o c a t i o n may b e , whether i t i s t h e commission of a n o t h e r crime o r unauthorized travel. S e c t i o n 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s : II Any judge who h a s suspended t h e e x e c u t i o n of a s e n t e n c e o r d e f e r r e d t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a s e n t e n c e of imprisonment under t h i s s e c t i o n , o r h i s s u c c e s s o r . i s - a u t h o r i z e d t h e r e a f t e r , i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , during t h e period of such suspended s e n t e n c e o r d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n o f s e n t e n c e t o revoke such suspension o r impose s e n t e n c e and o r d e r such person committed, o r may, i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , o r d e r t h e p r i s o n e r placed under t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e s t a t e board of pardons a s provided by law, o r r e t a i n such j u r i s d i c t i o n - w i t h t h i s c o u r t . P r i o r t o t h e r e v o c a t i o n of an o r d e r suspending o r d e f e r r i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e , t h e person a f f e c t e d s h a l l be given a h e a r i n g . I' (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . W w i l l not overturn a d i s c r e t i o n a r y decision without a e showing of an abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . N such showing has o been made h e r e , A s t o t h e f a i l u r e of t h e o r d e r suspending s e n t e n c e t o enumerate t h e r i g h t s which p e t i t i o n e r would be deprived of a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-2227, R.C.M. 1947, t h i s s t a t u t e became e f f e c t i v e January 1, 1974, a s a p a r t of t h e new Montana Criminal Code. The Code provided t h a t a l l i t s p r o v i s i o n s a p p l i e d t o a l l o f f e n s e s a l l e g e d t o have been committed on o r a f t e r t h a t d a t e . The o r d e r complained of h e r e was made on J u l y 9 , 1973. As t o t h e complaint t h a t t h e f i n a l o r d e r d i d n o t c o n t a i n t h e r e a s o n s and f i n d i n g s of f a c t , Judge C o a t e ' s f i n a l o r d e r i n c l u d e d an a t t a c h e d document e n t i t l e d "Findings o f Fact". In t h a t document t h e judge s t a t e d two r e a s o n s f o r revoking Meiding e r ' s p r o b a t i o n a r y s t a t u s : (1) f o r f e i t u r e of a $100 bond i n R r i d g e r , P,lontana, f o r d i s t u r b i n g t h e peace; and ( 2 ) u n a u t h o r i z e d t r a v e l o u t s i d e t h e s t a t e of Montana. Both f i n d i n g s were supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence produced a t t h e h e a r i n g i n which p e t i t i o n e r was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l . I t i s n o t e v i d e n t why t h e judge used t h e term " f o r f e i t e d bond1' i n l i g h t of t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t proceedings which makes i t c l e a r t h a t Meidinger pled g u i l t y t o t h a t charge. I n any e v e n t , i t i s c l e a r t h e judge was s a t i s f i e d a s t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s guilt i n that action. Since t h e c o n d i t i o n s of Meidinger ' s probation included t h e s t a n d a r d r u l e t h a t he "obey t h e laws of t h e United S t a t e s and of t h e s t a t e of ~ o n t a n a " , and one of Judge C o a t e ' s r e a s o n s f o r r e v o c a t i o n was ~ e i d i n g e r ' sproven g u i l t of a new crime, d i s t u r b i n g t h e peace, t h e r e i s no doubt whatsoever a s t o what v i o l a t i o n was charged and r e l i e d upon f o r r e v o c a t i o n . R e f e r r i n g t o t h e l a c k of s t e a d y employmeqt, nowhere i n t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r i s t h i s used a s a ground f o r r e v o c a t i o n . There were many a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s contained i n t h e p a r o l e o f f i c e r ' s r e p o r t of v i o l a t i o n s and t h e c o u r t h e l d i n Paragraph I V of i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t t h a t t h e "proof of such t e c h n i c a l v i o l a t i o n s a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y r e v o c a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s suspended sentence. 1I It i s our opinion t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t observed t h e requirements of Morrissey and Gagnon and t h a t p e t i t i o n e r had a f a i r h e a r i n g , r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel a t every s t e p . The w r i t of habeas corpus i s denied. W Concur: e - -J-y------------------..-----Hon. Jack L. Green, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.