OLSON v KAYSER

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No. 12069 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA OR F F 1972 BEVERLY J , OLSON, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant a s t o Defendant S h a e f e r Plumbing and Heating, JAMES KAYSER and SHAEFER PLUMBING AND HEATING, Defendants, James Kayser t h e Appellant a s t o P l a i n t i f f Beverly J. Olson. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana. G. Page Wellcome argued, Bozeman, Montana. Brown and G i l b e r t , Bozeman, Montana. Gene I. Brown argued, Bozeman, Montana, For Respondent: Berg, ~ ' C o n n e l l , Angel and Andriolo, Bozeman, Montana, Charles I?. Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana. Submitted: September 18, 1972 Decided : JAN 1 81 9 n M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e f i f t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Madison. P l a i n t i f f , Beverly J. Olson ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d p l a i n t i f f ) brought s u i t a g a i n s t defendants James Kayser ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d Kayser) t h e property owner, and Shaef er Plumbing and Heating ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d Shaefer) t h e c o n t r a c t o r . P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e d she was i n j u r e d i n a f a l l on August 29, 1969, occasioned by stepping i n t o a h o l e which appeared on Kayser's property a s t h e r e s u l t of e i t h e r n e g l i g e n t excavation, c o n s t r u c t i o n o r maintenance of a d i t c h , o r t h e n e g l i g e n t b a c k f i l l i n g and compaction of t h e s o i l i n t h e d i t c h , which allowed t h e h o l e t o appear a s s o i l s e t t l e d i n the ditch. The c a s e was t r i e d t o a j u r y and a t t h e c l o s e of a l l t h e evidence t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t i n favor of Shaefer on February 4 , 1971. T h e r e a f t e r , t h e c a s e was submitted t o t h e j u r y on t h e question of t h e l i a b i l i t y of t h e property owner Kayser, and on t h e same day t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f and i n favor of Kayser. Upon motion of p l a i n t i f f , t h e t r i a l c o u r t on March 1, 1971, entered an order g r a n t i n g p l a i n t i f f a new t r i a l a s t o Kayser, b u t denied p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Shaefer. Kayser appeals from t h e c o u r t ' s order g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l t o plaintiff. P l a i n t i f f appeals t h e c o u r t ' s order denying p l a i n - t i f f ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Shaefer. Kayser purchased t h e property i n question on A p r i l 1, 1969, The property i s l o c a t e d i n Ennis, Montana, and c o n s i s t s of two b u i l d i n g s with f o u r u n i t s , two of which were occupied by r e n t e r s , One of t h e r e n t e r s a t t h e time Kayser bought t h e property was Deborah Herman, daughter of p l a i n t i f f . Due t o s e p t i c tanks which would n o t d r a i n and water contamination, Kayser decided t o have t h e u n i t s connected with t h e c i t y water and sewer. Shaefer, The plumbing work was c o n t r a c t e d t o The work r e q u i r e d a trench be dug from t h e b u i l d i n g s , through a driveway and parking a r e a , t o t h e c i t y s t r e e t t o connect t h e c i t y s e r v i c e s . After t h e pipes were i n s t a l l e d , t h e trench was r e f i l l e d and tamped i n t h e a r e a where p l a i n t i f f claims t o have f a l l e n . The agreement between Kayser and Shaefer was described a s a c o s t p l u s job o r on a time and m a t e r i a l b a s i s . Shaefer s t a r t e d t o work on t h e p r o j e c t around J u l y 1, 1969, and completed i t on J u l y 9 , 1969, a f t e r which Shaefer moved h i s equipment and men o f f t h e premises. On t h e d a t e of completion t h e f r o n t p a r t o f t h e property, which was a parking a r e a adjacent t o t h e s t r e e t , was f i l l e d i n and made l e v e l . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e expected normal f i l l settlement i n t h e d i t c h , Kayser wanted t o r a i s e t h e parking a r e a with g r a v e l , due t o t h e mud condition t h a t followed r a i n y periods caused by t h e parking area being lower than t h e s t r e e t . Kayser f i r s t attempted t o o b t a i n g r a v e l f o r h i s premises sometime around August 1, 1969, by c o n t a c t i n g Shaefer again b u t was n o t i f i e d by Shaefer t h a t i t could n o t do t h e job because i t d i d not have t h e equipment nor a g r a v e l p i t , T h e r e a f t e r , Kayser contacted a Steve Hubner who owned a g r a v e l p i t and asked him i f he could b r i n g i n t h e gravel. Hubner agreed t o b r i n g i n t h e g r a v e l and spread i t i n t h e parking a r e a and by subsequent c o n t a c t s with Shaefer, Shaefer was t o h e l p spread t h e g r a v e l t o f i l l o t h e r h o l e s on t h e property. However, before t h e g r a v e l was brought t o t h e property, p l a i n t i f f f e l l and sustained t h e i n j u r i e s which a r e t h e b a s i s of t h i s a c t i o n . On t h e n i g h t of August 29, 1969, approximately two days be- f o r e t h e g r a v e l was spread on t h e property, p l a i n t i f f while going t o v i s i t h e r daughter, Deborah Herman, stepped i n a h o l e i n t h e driveway, pitched forward, and s t r u c k h e r f a c e on t h e edge of a cement sidewalk. The a r e a of t h e f a l l was u n l i g h t e d , except f o r a c i t y s t r e e t l i g h t which was obstructed by a l a r g e t r e e i n f u l l summer f o l i a g e . Varying d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e h o l e a r e found i n t h e testimony. P l a i n t i f f described t h e h o l e a s being t h e depth of t h e length of h e r l e g , o r a t l e a s t p a s t h e r knee, and somewhat l a r g e r than t h e diameter of h e r l e g . Kayser t e s t i f i e d he was on t h e property a week before t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e r e was no such hole. Steve Hubner, who d e l i v e r e d g r a v e l t o t h e premises two days a f t e r t h e f a l l , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he'*not see any such hole. Marilyn Olson, another daughter of p l a i n t i f f , t e s t i f i e d she observed a h o l e approximately eighteen inches deep i n t h e a r e a . The Ennis n i g h t marshal1 Fred Rankin, who i n v e s t i g a t e d the a r e a a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , t e s t i f i e d t o seeing a h o l e and described i t a s being e i g h t and possibly t e n inches deep. From a l l i n d i c a t i o n s , t h e h o l e appeared from t h r e e t o four days o r possibly a week b e f o r e p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l . Fred Rankin t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e apparent cause of t h e hole. He s t a t e d t h e r e was a period of heavy r a i n s e v e r a l days before p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l , and i t was h i s opinion t h e hole was caused by t h e r a i n . His explanation i s n o t i n c o n f l i c t with Kayser's testimony--that he was l a s t on t h e property a week before t h e accident and a t t h a t time t h e r e was no hole. Additionally, an kin's explanation i s given f u r t h e r credence by t h e testimony of Marilyn Olson, who was l i v i n g with h e r s i s t e r Deborah a t t h e time, and who d i d observe t h e hole b u t t e s t i f i e d t h a t two weeks p r i o r t o t h e accident t h e r e was no hole. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s order g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Kayser stated: "The motion of t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r a new t r i a l a s t o t h e defendant James Kayser i s granted. "The b a s i s f o r g r a n t i n g t h i s motion i n t h e opinion of t h e Court i s t h a t : "1. The evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y the v e r d i c t . "2. The v e r d i c t i s a g a i n s t t h e law of t h e case. If The t r i a l c o u r t ' s order denying p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Shaefer s t a t e d : "The motion of t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r a new t r i a l i s denied a s t o t h e defendant Shaefer Plumbing and Heating . "The reasons f o r t h e r u l i n g a r e a s follows: "On J u l y 9 , 1969, defendant Shaefer Plumbing and Heating Company had completed t h e work f o r M r . Kayser and on t h a t day removed h i s men, m a t e r i a l s and equipment from t h e job. Said defendant had r e f i l l e d t h e trench h e had dug completely from t h e f r o n t l i n e of t h e property of Mr. Kayser back t o t h e second s e p t i c tank using a l l t h e m a t e r i a l s excavated from t h e trench i n doing so. The f r o n t p o r t i o n of t h e trench where t h e a c c i d e n t occurred was by him completely f i l l e d and compacted. Both Mr. Kayser and M r . Shaefer r e a l i z e d t h e trench ground 'would s e t t l e , 1 "Mr. Kayser accepted the Shaefer Plumbing and Heating Company work completed on J u l y 9, 1969, and upon p r e s e n t a t i o n of a b i l l paid him f o r h i s work, machine use and m a t e r i a l s . "~ifty days l a t e r t h e accident t o t h e p l a i n t i f f occurred on August 28, 1969, There i s no evidence t h a t Shaefer Plumbing and Heating incurred any l i a b i l i t y between J u l y 9 , 1969, and August 28, 1969, t h e d a t e of t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s a c c i d e n t . There was t h e r e f o r e no i s s u e f o r t h e jury. Moreover t h e r e was no c o n f l i c t i n g evidence and t h e r e was b u t one conclusion t o be drawn from t h e evidence. 11 I n t h e f i r s t appeal, p l a i n t i f f seeking a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Shaefer, t h e law on t h e s u b j e c t of c o n t r o l of premises was s t a t e d by t h i s Court i n Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 354, 12 P.2d 856, and most r e c e n t l y reaffirmed i n Hannifin v. C a h i l l Mooney Construction Co., M nt o . 9 - P. 2d , 29 S t . Rep. 493, 496. I n Ulmen, p l a i n t i f f drove an automobile i n t o an open excavation and a g a i n s t a concrete c u l v e r t , which p l a i n t i f f supposed was a r e g u l a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d and used highway. There were two defendantq the g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r and a subcontractor f o r t h e c o n c r e t e work. A t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t t h e concrete work was complete, b u t had not been accepted by t h e g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r o r t h e s t a t e highway commission. A judgment of $10,000 was entered a g a i n s t both defendants and they appealed. This Court i n affirming a s t o the general contractor, but reversing a s t o t h e subcontractor, Roscoe, held: "It i s a l s o unimportant t h a t Roscoe's work had n o t been 'accepted'. I t was completed and he had withdrawn a l l c o n t r o l over i t , so t h a t i t was a t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t but an i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e unfinished highway, no p a r t of which would be accepted u n t i l ~ c h w i e g e r ' s [general c o n t r a c t o r ] e n t i r e c o n t r a c t had been f u l l y executed. "'The general r u l e i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t an independent c o n t r a c t o r i s n o t l i a b l e f o r i n j u r i e s t o t h i r d persons, occurring a f t e r t h e c o n t r a c t o r has completed t h e work and turned i t over t o t h e owner o r employer and t h e same has been accepted by him the l a t t e r i s substituted a s the responsible p a r t y . The reason f o r t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of l i a b i l i t y i s found i n t h e g e n e r a l d o c t r i n e t h a t an a c t i o n f o r negligence w i l l n o t l i e u n l e s s t h e defendant was under some duty t o t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y a t t h e t i m e and place where t h e i n j u r y occurred which he omitted t o perform.' (14 R.C.L. 107)". *** Ulmen contains an i n depth discussion with c i t a t i o n s i n support of t h e holding which was r e i t e r a t e d verbatim i n Hannifin, decided by t h i s Court June 30, 1972. I n Hannifin, t h e defendant, Cahill-Mooney Construction Company, was given a c o n t r a c t by t h e S t a u f f e r Chemical Company t o remove c e r t a i n equipment from a b u i l d i n g a t i t s p l a n t n e a r Butte, Montana. Following termination of t h e work and approxi- mately two months following C a h i l l - ~ o o n e y ' s departure from t h e premises, p l a i n t i f f Hannifin, an employee of S t a u f f e r Chemical Company, f e l l through a h o l e i n f l o o r i n g which had been c r e a t e d a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e removal of equipment. This Court h e l d , c i t i n g Ulmen, t h a t t h e duty t o p r o t e c t t h i r d persons a t t a c h e s t o independent c o n t r a c t o r s "only when he has such c o n t r o l over the property a s t h e master o r c o n t r a c t e e would otherwise have. II I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s order of March 1, 1971, made t h e c l e a r observation t h a t t h e accident occurred f i f t y days a f t e r defendant Shaefer surrendered c a r e of t h e premises t o Kayser. Shaefer incurred no l i a b i l i t y following i t s d e p a r t u r e from t h e premises and t h e r e was no i s s u e f o r t h e jury. Accordingly, t h e t r i a l c o u r t properly denied p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Shaefer. The c o u r t ' s order g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l a s t o defendant Kayser i s very b r i e f and a s s i g n s two grounds: "1. The evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e verdict "2. The v e r d i c t i s a g a i n s t t h e law of t h e case. I I . A f t e r b r i e f s and argument, i t can only be concluded t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t considered i t s e l f i n e r r o r when i t i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury a s t o t h e duty t h e defendant landowner owed t h e p l a i n t i f f . There were four r e n t a l u n i t s and one driveway and parking a r e a f o r t h e use of t h e t e n a n t s . The f a c t t h a t only two t e n a n t s were i n r e s i d e n c e , and one d i d n o t use t h e f a c i l i t y a v a i l a b l e t o t h e t e n a n t s , does not a l t e r t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t t h e r e was a common a r e a f o r t h e use of t h e t e n a n t s . The a l l e g e d i n j u r y occurred i n t h i s a r e a and t h e arguments concerning t h e l a c k of proof of common usage o r t h a t p e d e s t r i a n t r a v e l was allowed i n t h e a r e a does n o t r e s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n , a s t h e r e was likewise no proof t o t h e contrary. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 14 properly i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y i n regard t o an i n v i t e e without using t h e term i t s e l f : 11 A owner who l e a s e s o r r e n t s a p o r t i o n of h i s n property and r e t a i n s c o n t r o l of another p a r t which a tenant i s e n t i t l e d t o use i n connection with t h e p o r t i o n leased o r rented t o him, i s s u b j e c t t o l i a b i l i t y t o o t h e r s lawfully on t h e premises with t h e consent of t h e t e n a n t f o r i n j u r i e s caused by a dangerous c o n d i t i o n e x i s t i n g on t h e p a r t of t h e premises under t h e owner's c o n t r o l i f , by t h e e x e r c i s e of reasonable c a r e , h e could have discovered t h e condition and made it safe. "An owner i s not l i a b l e t o o t h e r s lawfully on t h e premises with t h e consent of t h e t e n a n t f o r i n j u r i e s r e s u l t i n g from a condition of t h e premises t h e danger of which i s known t o t h e person lawfully on t h e premises o r i s obvious, u n l e s s t h e owner should a n t i c i p a t e t h e harm d e s p i t e such knowledge o r obvious danger. 11 See Lake v. Emigh, 121 Mont. 87, 190 P.2d 550; Callahan v. Buttrey, 186 F.Supp. 715 (D.C.Mont. 1960). I n s t r u c t i o n s No. 26 and No. 27 were i n e r r o r : "INSTRUCTION NO. 26. One of t h e i s s u e s t o be d e t e r mined by you i n t h i s c a s e i s t h e duty of c a r e owed t o P l a i n t i f f a t t h e time and p l a c e t h e accident occurred. Determination of t h i s i s s u e depends upon whether p l a i n t i f f was a l i c e n s e e o r an i n v i t e e . II A l i c e n s e e i s a person who, f o r h i s own p l e a s u r e , convenience, o r b e n e f i t , e n t e r s o r remains upon premises i n t h e possession of another with express o r implied permission of t h e possessor. If A i n v i t e e i s a person who e n t e r s upon land i n n t h e possession of another a t t h e i n v i t a t i o n of t h e possessor o r f o r t h e common i n t e r e s t o r mutual advantage of both t h e possessor and t h e person e n t e r i n g . I t "INSTRUCTION NO, 27. If you f i n d t h a t p l a i n t i f f was a l i c e n s e e , then I i n s t r u c t you t h a t t h e only duty owed t o h e r was t o r e f r a i n from w i l l f u l o r wanton a c t s of misconduct, o r a c t i v e negligence a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from passive negligence, o r t o warn p l a i n t i f f of any hidden o r concealed dangers, i f any. If I f you f i n d t h a t p l a i n t i f f was an i n v i t e e , then t h e duty owed t o h e r was t h a t of ordinary c a r e . 11 Duty i s a l e g a l question t o be determined by t h e t r i a l c o u r t and submitted t o t h e j u r y , under proper i n s t r u c t i o n s , I f t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t i n t h e f a c t s t h a t would change o r a l t e r t h e duty owed t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , depending on which f a c t s t h e j u r y a c c e p t s , then t h e c o u r t must i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t o make a f a c t determination and then apply t h e c o r r e c t duty o r standard furnished by t h e c o u r t . That was n o t done i n t h i s case, W do n o t r e j e c t defendant Kayser's argument based on e B e r t h e l o t e v. Loy O i l Co,, 95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d 187, however, t h e e r r o r h e r e does a f f e c t t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e moving party. Tigh v. College Park Realty Co., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d The determination by t h e t r i a l c o u r t on a motion f o r a new t r i a l involves t h e e x e r c i s e of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n and may n o t be d i s t u r b e d on review, unless i t i s c l e a r l y shown t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t manifestly abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . This has n o t been shown h e r e . Accordingly, t h e o r d e r s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t appealed from a r e affirmed. / Associate J u s t i c e 4 ................................ Associate Justices.

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