RESNER v N P RAILWAY

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No. 12104 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN CHAROLETTE L. RESNER, A d m i n i s t r a t r i x of t h e E s t a t e o f H e r b e r t R e Resner, Deceased, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , THE NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY, a Wisconsin Corporation, Defendant and Respondent, Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable J a c k L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Daniel J. Shea argued, Missoula, Montana. For Respondent: G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana. J. C. G a r l i n g t o n appeared and Lawrence F. Daly, argued, Missoula, Montana. Submitted: Decided : Filed: J N 12 1973 A September 20, 1972 JAN 1 2 197. K r r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This a p p e a l a r o s e o u t of a wrongful d e a t h a c t i o n brought under t h e F e d e r a l ~ m ~ l o ~ e L isa 'b i l i t y A c t , 45 U.S.C.A. r seq. 5 51 e t H e r b e r t R. Resner and h i s s e c t i o n foreman, Benny Adams, w e r e k i l l e d when t h e t r a c k motor c a r on which they were r i d i n g c o l l i d e d w i t h a Northern P a c i f i c f r e i g h t t r a i n on August 1 5 , 1967. T h e c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d between A l b e r t o n and Cyr, Montana, be- tween Mileposts 158 and 159 on t h e Northern P a c i f i c t r a c k s . At t h e time of t h e i r d e a t h , b o t h Resner and Adams were employees of t h e defendant r a i l r o a d company and were a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e scope of t h e i r employment. C h a r o l e t t e L. Resner, widow of H e r b e r t R. Resner and a d m i n i s t r a t r i x of h i s e s t a t e , brought t h i s a c t i o n f o r h i s wrongful d e a t h on b e h a l f of h e r s e l f and t h e i r c h i l d r e n . T r i a l w i t h a j u r y was h e l d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e f o u r t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Mineral County, Hon. J a c k L. Green, p r e s i d i n g . By s p e c i a l v e r d i c t , t h e j u r y found Northern P a c i f i c Railway n e g l i g e n t i n two ways: (1) F a i l u r e t o e n f o r c e , observe and obey t h e s a f e t y r u l e s of t h e r a i l r o a d f o r o b t a i n i n g and u s i n g t r a i n l i n e u p s and o p e r a t i n g t r a c k motor c a r s , and (2) f a i l u r e , by and through i t s a g e n t Adams,to and avoid t h e c o l l i s i o n . contributorily negligent. s e e and observe t h e approaching t r a i n Resner was found t o be t e n p e r c e n t The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n - t i f f i n t h e amount of $175,000. I n answer t o s p e c i a l v e r d i c t q u e s t i o n s , t h e j u r y found f i v e p e r c e n t t o b e a r e a s o n a b l e r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n wages and p r i c e s t o determine f u t u r e damages, and ECve p e r c e n t t o be a r e a s o n a b l e r a t e of d i s c o u n t t o be used i n determining t h e p r e s e n t worth of f u t u r e damages. The evidence concerning f u t u r e e a r n i n g s was i n t r o d u c e d through t h e testimony of p l a i n t i f f ' s w i t n e s s D r . George B. H e l i k e r , a recognized e x p e r t i n t h e f i e l d of l a b o r economics. He gave s e v e r a l o p i n i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o f u t u r e damages a s concerns t h i s case. One opinion was t h a t Herbert Resner could reasonably have expected an annual f i v e p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n wages d u r i n g t h e remainder of h i s work l i f e expectancy. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t s i n c e World War I1 wages have i n c r e a s e d a t l e a s t f i v e p e r c e n t p e r y e a r and t h a t a s a p p l i e d t o Resner, h i s wages a s a s e c t i o n man k e p t pace w i t h t h e i n c r e a s e s o f s e c t i o n men throughout t h e United S t a t e s . Too, wages f o r s e c t i o n men continued t o i n c r e a s e a f t e r Resner ' s death. h i s d e a t h was $2.6699. t o $3.4444. Resner ' s b a s e h o u r l y wage a t t h e time of By December 1970, t h i s r a t e had i n c r e a s e d This testimony was n o t c o n t r o v e r t e d a t t r i a l by defendant r a i l r o a d company, D r . H e l i k e r a l s o t e s t i f i e d e x t e n s i v e l y on t h e d i s c o u n t r a t e t o be a p p l i e d i n reducing f u t u r e e a r n i n g s t o p r e s e n t worth, The p r o c e s s of d i s c o u n t i n g involved t a k i n g t h e product o f t h e b a s e e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y p l u s t h e growth r a t e of wages and a p p l y i n g a d i s c o u n t r a t e t o reduce t h o s e amounts t o p r e s e n t worth. As a r e s u l t of h i s c a l c u l a t i o n s , h e concluded t h a t a f i v e p e r c e n t d i s c o u n t r a t e was most r e a s o n a b l e . i t was If I n s o f i n d i n g , h e noted t h a t s t r i c t l y a c c i d e n t a l f f t h a t t h e wage growth r a t e equaled t h e discount r a t e . He f u r t h e r concluded t h a t f u t u r e economic l o s s e s could b e s t be e s t i m a t e d by p r o j e c t i n g them on a f l a t r a t e b a s i s , t h a t i s , no i n c r e a s e f o r wage growth and no d e c r e a s e f o r discount. On February 23, 1971, defendant f i l e d a motion f o r e n t r y of judgment, r e q u e s t i n g t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t be reduced, The motion s t a t e d (1) i t was erroneous f o r t h e j u r y t o be allowed t o s p e c u l a t e on f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s and t o o f f s e t t h o s e i n c r e a s e s a g a i n s t t h e d i s c o u n t t o p r e s e n t worth, (2) by t h e wording of t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s t o t h e j u r y t h e f u t u r e damages would be i n c r e a s e d , by f a i l u r e t o apply t h e d i s c o u n t r a t e , t o a f i g u r e n o t s u p p o r t a b l e by t h e evidence. On A p r i l 20, 1971, Judge Green g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r e n t r y of judgment and recomputed t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s award t o be $91,740.49, plus c o s t s . denied, A number of p l a i n t i f f ' s motions were O A p r i l 30, 1971, defendant s e n t p l a i n t i f f a check n ror t h e amount of t h e judgment, p l u s c o s t s . P l a i n t i f f refused t e n d e r and r e t u r n e d t h e check t o defendant. On May 3, 1971, p l a i n t i f f moved t o a l t e r o r amend t h e judgment, s t a t i n g t h a t t h e defendant had p r e v i o u s l y agreed t o have t h e i n t e r e s t on t h e judgment run from February 1 0 , 1971, and t h a t i n t e r e s t was n o t included i n t h e check. Defendant d e p o s i t e d t h e check f o r t h e amount o f t h e judgment p l u s c o s t s i n a savings account i n p l a i n t i f f ' s name a t t h e Southside National Bank, Missoula, Montana on Play 19, 1971. Defendant contended t h e d e p o s i t of t h e check i n t h e bank c o n s t i t u t e d compliance w i t h s e c t i o n 58-423, R.C.M. 1947, r e l a t i n g t o t h e e x t i n c t i o n of money o b l i g a t i o n s , and t h e r e b y t h e i n t e r e s t on t h e judgment was terminated. P l a i n t i f f , on t h e o t h e r hand, maintained t h a t s i n c e t h e defendant d i d n o t d e p o s i t t h e amount of i n t e r e s t on t h e judgment along w i t h t h e judgment, t h e s t a t u t e was n o t s a t i s f i e d and t h e i n t e r e s t d i d n o t t e r m i n a t e . Defendant conceded t h a t i t had been p r e v i o u s l y agreed t h a t i n t e r e s t should run from February 1 0 , 1971. The c o u r t r u l e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f should r e c e i v e i n t e r e s t from February 1 0 , 1971 through May 2 4 , 1971, and l a t e r o v e r r u l e d p l a i n t i f f ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e c o u r t deducting t e n p e r c e n t f o r Herbert R e s n e r ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence. O June 2 1 , 1971, f i n a l judgment f o r $91,740.49, p l u s n c o s t s and i n t e r e s t was e n t e r e d by t h e c o u r t . P l a i n t i f f appeals from t h a t f i n a l judgment and a l l r e l a t e d r u l i n g s . The b a s i c i s s u e h e r e i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t was c o r r e c t In granting i n g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r e n t r y of judgment, t h e motion, t h e c o u r t recomputed t h e j u r y ' s award, reducing i t considerably. A t t h e h e a r i n g on p l a i n t i f f ' s motion t o amend, May 2 8 , 1971, t h e c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e r e a s o n f o r n o t u s i n g t h e f i v e p e r c e n t f i g u r e deduced by t h e j u r y t o be a r e a s o n a b l e f i g u r e f o r determining f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s was t h a t m a t t e r of law * 9~ II as a t h e q u e s t i o n of i n f l a t i o n i s s p e c u l a t i v e , c o n j e c t u r a l , u n c e r t a i n , and i s an improper element of damages , , " " # , ", ' ., I W h o l d t h e t r i a l c o u r t was i n e r r o r i n g r a n t i n g dee f e n d a n t ' s motion. The j u r y was allowed t o c o n s i d e r e x t e n s i v e e x p e r t testimony on t h e s u b j e c t of f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s . D r . Heliker t e s t i f i e d a t l e n g t h concerning f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s . Based on h i s a p p r a i s a l of p a s t economic h i s t o r y of t h i s c o u n t r y , h e i n d i c a t e d why wages and p r i c e s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o r i s e i n t h e f u t u r e : lIJc L . 5: because p r i c e s have been i n c r e a s i n g , t h e v a l u e of money h a s been d e c r e a s i n g o r d e c l i n i n g . I t i s n e c e s s a r y t o pay h i g h e r wages i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n purchasing power and because o u t p u t p e r man hour h a s been i n c r e a s e d s t e a d i l y , you s e e i t [man's p r o d u c t i v i t y ] h a s been r i s i n g t h e e n t i r e period very s t e a d i l y a t a steady r a t e . A t the p r e s e n t t i m e , i t i s r i s i n g around about 3 p e r c e n t per y e a r , which means t h a t even i f p r i c e s d i d n ' t i n c r e a s e a t a l l , t h a t wages would t e n d t o r i s e about 3 p e r c e n t p e r y e a r simply because l a b o r i s more a c t i v e . I t t u r n s out more p e r man h o u r , s o i t i s p o s s i b l e t o pay h i g h e r wages. Two r e a s o n s why wages w i l l go up i s because p r o d u c t i v i t y i n c r e a s e s and t h e y go up a l s o because i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e y go up, p r i c e s go up, I I *** T h i s Court, a s w e l l a s o t h e r s , h a s allowed t h e testimony of a c t u a r i e s and economists t o produce testimony on f u t u r e e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t such testimony removes c o n s i d e r a b l e s p e c u l a t i o n and c o n j e c t u r e from t h e j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n , Krohmer v, Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 495, 402 P.2d 979; Scruggs v . Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 320 F.Supp. 1248, 1251; M a g i l l v. Westinghouse E l e c t r i c C o r p o r a t i o n , 327 F.Supp. 1097, 1105. The j u r y determined t h a t f i v e p e r c e n t was a r e a s o n a b l e f i g u r e t o determine f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s . It apparently accepted D r . ~ e l i k e r ' stestimony i n f u l l on t h a t p o i n t , which i t had a r i g h t t o do. Defendant d i d n o t produce e x p e r t testimony demon- s t r a t i n g a d i f f e r e n t f i g u r e t o be more a p p r o p r i a t e . e x p l a i n e d how h e a r r i v e d a t t h e f i v e p e r c e n t f i g u r e : ''I?ow a c t u a l l y i f you add t o g e t h e r t h e r a t e s of i n c r e a s e o f p r i c e s and p r o d u c t i v i t y i n post-war p e r i o d s , post-second World War p e r i o d , you add them t o g e t h e r , you would g e t j u s t about e x a c t l y t h e r a t e of i n c r e a s e of wages t h a t we have had Dr. Heliker over t h i s p e r i o d s i n c e t h e second World War and i n c r e a s e d p r i c e s between 1 and a h a l f t o 2 p e r c e n t , much h i g h e r a t t h e p r e s e n t time. Over t h a t whole p e r i o d , i t h a s averaged somewhere around 1 and a h a l f t o 2 percent. Productivity has increased a t somewhere around 3 t o 3 and a h a l f p e r c e n t . '"ow i f you add t h o s e two t h i n g s t o g e t h e r and you g e t j u s t about e x a c t l y t h e r a t e of i n c r e a s e c ~rom wages, about 5 p e r c e n t o r a l i t t l e more. 11 Dr. H e l i k e r ' s computations were e x t e n s i v e and i n v o l v e d , b u t e s s e n t i a l l y he s a i d : "* * fc h e r e i s what happened i n t h e p a s t and, a s f a r a s I can s e e , t h i s same t h i n g i s going t o happen i n t h e f u t u r e . +C +C "'I ,. A t t h e same time D r . H e l i k e r p r e d i c t e d a f i v e p e r c e n t wage growth r a t e , he foresaw f i v e p e r c e n t t o be a r e a s o n a b l e discount r a t e . Although t h e wage growth r a t e and t h e d i s c o u n t r a t e were b o t h f i v e p e r c e n t , t h e f i g u r e s were a r r i v e d a t independently. I n s e l e c t i n g t h e f i v e percent f i g u r e , D r . Heliker r e j e c t e d t h e h i s t o r i c a l f o u r p e r c e n t f i g u r e used a s a d i s c o u n t rate. As a r e s u l t , t h e wage growth r a t e equaled t h e d i s c o u n t r a c e , t h e r e b y c a n c e l i n g each o t h e r . Of n e c e s s i t y , t h e e f f e c t would have been t h a t t h e j u r y ' s s p e c i a l v e r d i c t would o n l y be reduced by R e s n e r ' s t e n p e r c e n t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e . How- e v e r , t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s r u l i n g a f t e r t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t was r e t u r n e d t h a t i n f l a t i o n was s p e c u l a t i v e and n o t a p r o p e r element o f damages, removed t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n e f f e c t . The judgment ignored t h e f i v e p e r c e n t f u t u r e wage growth r a t e , b u t used t h e f i v e percent discount r a t e . Defendant r e p e a t e d l y a s s e r t e d i n i t s motion f o r e n t r y of judgment and i n i t s b r i e f b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , t h a t f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s a r e s p e c u l a t i v e and c o n j e c t u r a l . This i s n o t enough. This C o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n i n a F e d e r a l ~ r n ~ l o ~ e L isa' b i l i t y Act c a s e r i s clear. I n Lavender v . Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed 916, 923, a F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y c a s e , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s a i d : II I t i s no answer t o s a y t h a t t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t involved s p e c u l a t i o n and c o n j e c t u r e . Whenever f a c t s a r e i n d i s p u t e o r t h e evidence i s such t h a t Fair-minded men may draw d i f f e r e n t i n f e r e n c e s , a 740, measure of s p e c u l a t i o n and c o n j e c t u r e i s r e q u i r e d on t h e p a r t of t h o s e whose d u t y i t i s t o s e t t l e t h e d i s p u t e by choosing what seems t o them t o be he most r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e . Only when t h e r e i s a complete absence of p r o b a t i v e f a c t s t o s u p p o r t t h e c o n c l u s i o n reached does a r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r a p p e a r . But where f: 9 t h e r e i s an e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s f o r : the jury's v e r d i c t , the jury i s f r e e t o discard o r d i s b e l i e v e whatever f a c t s a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s c o n c l u s i o n . And t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n i s exhausted when t h a t e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s becomes a p p a r e n t , i t b e i n g i m m a t e r i a l t h a t t h e c o u r t might draw a cont r a r y inference or f e e l t h a t another conclusion i s more r e a s o n a b l e . " (Emphasis added). Here, t h e e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s f o r determining t h e d i s c o u n t r a t e and t h e f u t u r e wage growth r a t e i s a p p a r e n t t o u s , and most c e r t a i n l y i t was t o t h e j u r y . Furthermore, t h e testimony of D r . H e l i k e r was n o t t h e only e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s on which t h e j u r y could make i t s award, There was o t h e r evidence e q u a l l y a s c o n v i n c h g . For example, c e r t a i n wage agreements, n o t y e t f i n a l i z e d a t t h e d a t e of t r i a l , p e r t a i n i n g t o c o n t r a c t s between t h e Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees and B u r l i n g t o n Northern Railway, were i n t r o d u c e d i n t o evidence. The wage i n c r e a s e s i n t h o s e c o n t r a c t s have now been scheduled and i n d i c a t e s u b s t a n t i a l wage growth over even a s h o r t p e r i o d of time. Such evidence o f f e r e d t h e j u r y an e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s f o r i t s d e c i s i o n , independent of D r . ~ e l i k e r ' stestimony. I t would be s u f f i c i e n t t o r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e b a s i s of Lavender a l o n e . However, s i n c e b o t h p l a i n t i f f and defendant r a i s e i s s u e s concerning f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s , we s h a l l determine them. W a r e aware t h a t f e d e r a l law governs e damages i n a F e d e r a l ~ m p l o ~ e r L'i a b i l i t y Act c a s e . s Further, a s defendant p o i n t e d o u t , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court h e l d i n Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. K e l l y , 241 U. S. 485, 4-91, l Ifc - ik t h a t when f u t u r e payments o r o t h e r pecuniary b e n e f i t s a r e t o be a n t i c i p a t e d , t h e v e r d i c t should b e made upon t h e b a s i s of t h e i r p r e s e n t v a l u e only. 1 1 Defendant r e l i e d h e a v i l y on Kelly and on t h e more r e c e n t c a s e o f Sleeman v . Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 414 F.2d 305, 307, wherein t h e c o u r t s a i d : "To d a t e [ t h e Kelly c a s e ] h a s n o t been amended o r o v e r r u l e d , and i t was e r r o r t o f a i l t o apply i t t o t h e computation of f u t u r e e a r n i n g s . ' 1 However, t h e r e t h a t c o u r t went on t o p o i n t o u t : "As t o t h e i n f l a t i o n a r y t r e n d o f f s e t , t h i s r e c o r d provides no e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s f o r t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Judge." (Emphasis added). That cannot be s a i d i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e ; c l e a r l y , t h e r e was an e v i d e n ~ i a r y a s i s f o r t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g of f i v e p e r c e n t t o be b a r e a s o n a b l e r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n f u t u r e wages. T h e r e f o r e , we f i n d Sleeman n o t a p p l i c a b l e . W a r e n o t persuaded by t h e c a s e s c i t e d by defendant h o l d i n g e f u t u r e wage growth a s s p e c u l a t i v e . I n Scruggs v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 320 F.Supp. 1248, 1250, 1251, a F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act c a s e c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f , t h e o p p o s i t e p o i n t of view i s taken. There t h e c o u r t s a i d : "Courts have s p l i t on t h e q u e s t i o n whether j u r i e s should be allowed t o c o n s i d e r f u t u r e t r e n d s i n t h e purchasing power of money. "The q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h e j u r y was t h e pecuniary l o s s which would be s u f f e r e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f and h e r son i n t h e f u t u r e . The p r o b a b i l i t y of i n c r e a s e s i n d e c e d e n t ' s income was c e r t a i n l y r e l e v a n t t o t h a t i s s u e . I t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n w i l l be any l e s s v a l i d from having heard t h e testimony o b j e c t e d t o , and t h e y may be much more c o r r e c t t h a n o t h e r w i s e . I n f l a t i o n i s a t o p i c of almost u n i v e r s a l d i s c u s s i o n and i t seems improbable t h a t t h e j u r y could a v o i d t a k i n g i t i n t o account even i n t h e absence of any testimony about i t . The defendant cross-examined D r . Sandridge and a l s o argued i t s a n a l y s i s of t h e t r e n d s , which t h e j u r y a p p a r e n t l y d i d n o t a c c e p t . Each day j u r i e s a r e r e q u i r e d t o a s s e s s damages f o r f u t u r e p a i n and s u f f e r i n g , which a r e a l s o somewhat s p e c u l a t i v e , and t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e defendant was n o t u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d by t h e admission of D r . s a n d r i d g e ' s testimony. I I W f i n d t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Scruggs and t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t o be e analogous. Also, we f i n d f u r t h e r s u p p o r t f o r a l l o w i n g t h e j u r y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s t a n d undiminished i n Grunenthal v . Long I s l a n d K.Co., 393 U.S. 156, 89 S.Ct. 331, 21 L ed 2d 309, 312, 313. i n t h e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n , 292 F.Supp. There, 813, 815, t h e p l a i n t i f f moved t o amend t h e ad damnum c l a u s e of t h e complaint t o i n c r e a s e i t i n conformity w i t h t h e h i g h e r v e r d i c t rendered by t h e j u r y . In g r a n t i n g t h e motion, t h e judge i n d i c a t e d t h e r e was a l i k e l i h o o d , on t h e b a s i s of t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d , t h a t t h e d i s c o u n t r a t e may be s e t o f f by f u t u r e i n c r e a s e s . nloi-iy went u n r e f u t e d . As i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e t e s t i - I n a 2 t o 1 d e c i s i o n , t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s remanded t h e c a s e f o r a new t r i a l u n l e s s t h e p l a i n t i f f agreed t o a c c e p t a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e amount of t h e award. Long I s l a n d R.Co., Grunenthal v . 388 F.2d 480,484. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court, on t h e o t h e r hand, agreed with t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e c i s i o n and r e v e r s e d t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s . Judge Brennan, d e l i v e r i n g t h e opinion f o r t h e c o u r t , noted t h a t t h e t r i a l judge c o n s i d e r e d t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s p r e s e n t s a l a r y "plus l i k e l y i n c r e a s e s over a l i f e expectancy of 27.5 y e a r s " and then went on t o say: "The t r i a l judge 9 J; -?; a p p r a i s e d t h e evidence on ; f u t u r e e a r n i n g s a s s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t an award of $150,000 f o r l o s s of f u t u r e wages i n l i g h t of t h e I convincing testimony n o t r e f u t e d J demonstrating ; t h e s t e a d y wage i n c r e a s e s i n r e c e n t time f o r work e q u i v a l e n t t o t h a t rendered by p l a i n t i f f , and t h e s t r o n g l i k e l i h o o d t h a t s i m i l a r i n c r e a s e s would conI t inue . " e cannot s a y t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s view t h a t t h e W j u r y might p r o p e r l y have awarded $150,000 f o r l o s s of f u t u r e e a r n i n g s i s w i t h o u t s u p p o r t i n t h e evidence. II The c o u r t more than t a c i t l y approved a c a l c u l a t e d and e x p e r t i n v e s t i g a t i o n of f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s t o be a proper and necess a r y element i n awarding f u t u r e damages. ignore r e a l i t y . To do o t h e r w i s e i s t o Here, defendant would have t h i s Court t a k e t h e p o s i t i o n of an o s t r i c h w i t h h i s head i n t h e sand. Economic r e a l i t y r e q u i r e s us t o c o n s i d e r n o t only what t h e p l a i n t i f f i s t o r e c e i v e i n theory, but i n f a c t . A b s t r a c t r u l e s of law a r e of l i t t l e com- f o r t t o a p l a i n t i f f whose i n j u r i e s remain u n r e q u i t e d . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court h a s recognized t h a t where competent e x p e r t testimony supported by mathematical d a t a i s p r e s e n t e d concerning f u t u r e damages, more c e r t a i n t y i s added t o t h e j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n . I n Krohmer v . Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 496, 402 P.2d 979, t h i s Court recognized t h a t II t h e testimony of a s p e c i a l i s t [ i n economics] p r e s e n t e d the j u r y a r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s llpvn which ilo -.sti~naLewith some degree of c e r t a i n t y t h e probable f u t u r e e a r n i n g s of t h e deceased. 11 I n Krohmer, t h e Court c i t e d w i t h approval t h e New 5 , 212 P.2d 1041, 1047, Nexico c a s e of T u r r i e t t a v . Wyche, 54 N.M, wherein i t was s a i d 11 t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s [a man's f u t u r e e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y ] i n c r e a s e o r d e c r e a s e i n t h e f u t u r e ought t o be admitted." jury. I f i t i s a d m i t t e d , i t ought t o be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e S u r e l y h e r e , t h e defendant had a s much o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e f u t e t h e f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e of a r a i l r o a d s e c t i o n hand a s t h e p l a i n t i f f had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o prove i t . The Alaska Supreme Court i n a r e c e n t non-Federal Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act c a s e , Beaulieu v . E l l i o t t , (Alaska 1967), 434 P.2d 665, 671, c o n s i d e r e d t h e s u b j e c t of f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e : "Annual i n f l a t i o n a t a v a r y i n g r a t e i s and h a s been w i t h us f o r many y e a r s . There i s no reason t o e x p e c t t h a t i t w i l l n o t be w i t h us i n t h e f u t u r e . This r a t e : ~ d e p r e c i a t i o n o f f s e t s t h e i n t e r e s t t h a t could be f earned on government bonds and many o t h e r 1 s a f e ' i n vestments. As a r e s u l t t h e p l a i n t i f f , who through no f a u l t of h i s own i s given h i s f u t u r e e a r n i n g s r e duced t o p r e s e n t v a l u e must, i n o r d e r t o r e a l i z e h i s f u l l e a r n i n g s and n o t be p e n a l i z e d by r e d u c t i o n of f u t u r e e a r n i n g s t o p r e s e n t v a l u e , i n v e s t h i s money i n d n t e r r i s e s , o t h e r t h a n t h o s e which a r e c o n s i d e r e d ' s a f e i n v e s t m e n t s , which promise a r e t u r n i n i n t e r e s t Jr d i v i d e n d s g r e a t e r t h a n t h e o f f s e t t i n g r a t e of a n n u a l inflation. II no There can b e l q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e award i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e I: was a generous one, b u t n o t so generous a s t o t a k e i t o u t of t h e realm of p o s s i b i l i t y p r e s e n t e d by t h e evidence. It i s not f o r t h i s Court t o determine t h e award t o be g i v e n t o p l a i n t i f f , b u t only whether t h e j u r y had a r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s , supported by t h e e v i d e n c e , t o award t h e sum. W b e l i e v e t h e j u r y had t h a t b a s i s . e P l a i n t i f f contends d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o c e r t a i n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s waived t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o l a t e r complain. The s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s r e f e r r e d t o were (1) I n s t r u c t i o n No. 26, r e g a r d i n g what t h e j u r y might c o n s i d e r i n awarding damages, and ( 2 ) I n s t r u c t i o n No. 34, t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t form. Defendant awaited t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t b e f o r e a s s e r t i n g , i n d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r e n t r y of judgment, t h a t t h e j u r y should n o t have been allowed t o s p e c u l a t e on f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s and t h a t t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s were improperly worded. I t i s fundamental t h a t f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o t h e g i v i n g of i n s t r u c t i o n s a t t r i a l p r e c l u d e s r a i s i n g t h e i s s u e on a p p e a l . I n t h i s c a s e defendant r a i s e d t h e i s s u e t o t h e t r i a l judge a f t e r t h e j u r y had rendered i t s v e r d i c t . W cannot a l l o w defendant t o wager on t h e outcome of t h e j u r y ' s e d e l i b e r a t i o n b e f o r e a v a i l i n g i t s e l f of t h e proper p r o c e d u r a l remedies. Since t h e o b j e c t i o n cannot be r a i s e d on a p p e a l , t h e n , l i k e w i s e , i t cannot be r a i s e d a t t h e p o s t - t r i a l l e v e l . P l a i n t i f f r a i s e s t h e i s s u e of i n t e r e s t on t h e judgment contending t h a t s i n c e d e f e n d a n t ' s d e p o s i t i n t o t h e bank account d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h e i n t e r e s t from February 1 0 , 1971, a s a g r e e d , t h e n t h e d e p o s i t d i d n o t s a t i s f y t h e s t a t u t e and i n t e r e s t cont i n u e d t o run. The s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 58-423, R.C.M. 1947, r e a d s : II A o b l i g a t i o n f o r t h e payment of money i s exn t i n g u i s h e d by a due o f f e r of payment, i f t h e amount i s immediately d e p o s i t e d i n t h e name of t h e c r e d i t o r , w i t h some bank of d e p o s i t w i t h i n t h i s s t a t e , of good r e u t e , and n o t i c e t h e r e o f i s ~ i v e n o the creditor. t R ? l a i n t i f f r e l i e s on t h e word o b l i g a t i o n , implying t h a t i t s d e i i n i t i o n i n c l u d e s a l l i n t e r e s t t o t h e d a t e of d e p o s i t . Plain- t i f f h a d , p r i o r t o t h e d a t e of d e p o s i t , r e f u s e d t e n d e r of t h e dep o s i t e d amount on t h e same ground--that i n t e r e s t from February 1 0 , 1371 was n o t i n c l u d e d . P l a i n t i f f , however, i s merely a r g u i n g r h e t o r i c , Uefendant i n good f a i t h made an a t t e m p t a t s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with t h e s t a t u t e i n o r d e r t h a t f u t u r e i n t e r e s t would n o t c o n t i n u e t u increase. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n t h e f i r s t amended judgment, t h a t t h e defendant pay i n t e r e s t on t h e $91,740.49, from February 1 0 , 1971 t o Nay 24, 1971, s h a l l remain i n e f f e c c , The r e s u l t i s t h a t a l l i n t e r e s t on t h a t amount t e r m i n a t e d on May 24, 1971, by t h e terms of t h e s t a t u t e and by o r d e r of the t r i a l c o u r t . Our d e c i s i o n r e i n s t a t e s t h e j u r y ' s award of $175,000, l e s s t e n p e r c e n t f o r R e s n e r ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e , r e s u l t i n g i n a judgment of $157,500. The r u l e s f o r i n t e r e s t on judgments were c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d by t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court i n Stockton T h e a t r e s , I n c . v. Palermo, 55 Cal.2d 439, 1 Cal.Rptr. 1 580, 582, 360 P.2d 76: "A judgment b e a r s l e g a l i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e of i t s e n t r y i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t even though i t i s s t i l l subject t o d i r e c t attack. : 9 When a judgment i s modified upon a p p e a l , whether upward o r downward, t h e new sum draws i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e of e n t r y of t h e o r i g i n a l o r d e r , n o t from t h e d a t e o f t h e new judgment. 9; On t h e o t h e r hand, when a judgment i s r e v e r s e d on a p p e a l t h e new award s u b s e q u e n t l y e n t e r e d by t h e c r i a l c o u r t can b e a r i n t e r e s t o n l y from t h e d a t e of e n t r y of such new judgment. 1 I * ; I < -. f db T h e second r u l e e n u n c i a t e d i s a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . This cause i s r e t u r n e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o compute t h e i n t e r e s t t o be g r a n t e d i n accordance w i t h t h e law, n o t i n consistent with t h i s decision. / ' / Chief Justice ................................. Associate J u s t i c e s . / y s o c i a t e Justice Mr. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d i s s e n t i n g : L dissent. The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n s t a t e s t h a c t h e j u r y r e r u r n e d a v e r d i c t i n t h e amount of $175,000. 1-egally a c c u r a t e . This i s n o t R a t h e r , t h e j u r y answered a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t 4 q u e s t i o n i n t h a t amount. And, a s t h e t r i a l c o u r t c a r e f u l l y p o i n t e d o u t i n i t s c l o s i n g remarks, t h e j u r y was t o answer o n l y Che s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s posed i n t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t . The c o u r t , n o t t h e j u r y , was t o make t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of f i n a l damages and e n t e r judgment a c c o r d i n g l y . A s provided i n t h e Montana Rules o f C i v i l Procedure, i f a m a t t e r i s submitted t o t h e j u r y i n t h e form of a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t an i s s u e n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y i n c l u d e d i n the s p e c i a l v e r d i c t may be decided by t h e c o u r t , and each p a r t y i s deemed t o have waived i t s r i g h t t o t r i a l by j u r y on t h a t specific issue. The v i c e of t h e m a j o r i t y opinion i s t h a t i t approves speculative, highly speculative, i n f l a t i o n trends f o r t h i r t y y e a r s a s t o f u t u r e wage i n c r e a s e s . S p e c u l a t i o n on t h e f u t u r e of r a i l r o a d s , much l e s s t h e f u t u r e of j o b s and wage i n c r e a s e s , i s a never-never l a n d . Except f o r one F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t Court c a s e , Scruggs v . Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 320 F.Supp. 1248, I have been unable t o f i n d any F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i 1 i . t ~ Act c a s e t o s u p p o r t t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n . I believe the correct law t o be t h a t s t a t e d by t h e 6 t h C i r c u i t i n 1969 i n Sleeman v . Chesapeake 6 Ohio Railway Company, 414 F.2d 305,308, where t h a t c o u r t sai.d: I1 Nor do we encourage t h e t r i a l c o u r t s of our c i r c u i t t o e x p l o r e such s p e c u l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e s on f u t u r e damages a s i n f l a t i o n and d e f l a t i o n . " O f c o u r s e , t h e n a t i o n ' s economic h l s t o r y s i n c e t h e 1 9 3 0 ' s would appear t o make t h e u s e of p r e s e n t wages a s t h e s t a n d a r d f o r l o s s of f u t u r e e a r n i n g s somewhat u n f a i r t o p l a i n t i f f s 8 u t a s t o t h e f u t u r e , t h e i n f l a t i o n v e r s u s deElation debate rages inconclusively a t the h i g h e s t p o l i c y l e v e l s of our government, i n n a t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l campaigns, i n l e a r n e d eco110mi.c j o u r n a l s and i s e x e m p l i f i e d i n t h e d a i l y s y r a t i o n s of t h e s t o c k markets. The d e b a t e seems u n l i k e l y t o b e r e s o l v e d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . i n one p e r s o n a l t n j u r y t r i a l . And i r t e s t i monial r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s f a c t o r b e a r i n g on t h e f u t u r e i s a t t e m p t e d , t h e door i s opened t o s i m i l a r l y s p e c u l a t i v e and d e b a t a b l e o f f s e t s tending i n other d i r e c t i o n s . See McWeeney v. N w York N.H. & H.R.R., e 282 F.2d 34 (2d C i r . 1 9 6 0 ) . If I n Sleeman t h e c o u r t found t h e f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n from 2 H a r p e r & James, The Law of T o r t s , 5 25.11, t o be a p p l i c a b l e : 11 1 F u t u r e t r e n d s i n t h e v a l u e of money a r e necess a r i l y unlcnown and so always r e n d e r such damages s p e c u l a t i v e i n a way we cannot escape. I f t h e estimates represent a s t r a i g h t - l i n e projection of present l i v i n g c o s t s , they w i l l be f r u s t r a t e d by f l u c t u a t i o n s e i t h e r way. I f prophecy of change i s heeded, f r u s t r a t i o n w i l l f o l l o w i f no change, o r t h e o p p o s i t e change, occurs. When c o u r t s have con~c~ously grappled w i t h t h e problem t h e y have e i t h e r found a l l prophecy t o o s p e c u l a t i v e and s o , p e r f o r c e , have t a k e n t h e e q u a l l y s p e c u l a t i v e c o u r s e of b e t t i n g on a continuance of t h e s t a t u s quo; o r t h e y have made i n t u i t i v e and n o t always v e r y wise judgments t h a t p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s r e p r e s e n t a d e p a r t u r e from some imaginary norm t o which they thinlc we s h a l l r a p i d l y r e t u r n . It i s n o t a t a l l c l e a r t h a t c o u r t s would be w i l l i n g t o h e a r e x p e r t s on t h e m a t t e r , o r t h a t t h e y would g e t much r e a l h e l p i f t h e y d i d . For t h e most p a r t che problem--which i s i n e v i t a b l y p r e s e n t i n e v e r y c a s e of f u t u r e l o s s - - i s n o t analyzed and t h e p r e s e n t v a l u e of money i s assumed t o be t h e proper b a s i s . 1 I1 Sleeman was confirmed by t h e 6 t h C i r c u i t i n 1970 i n P e t i c i o n of United S t a t e s S t e e l C o r p o r a t i o n , 436 F.2d 1256, 1280: "It i s e q u a l l y w e l l s e t t l e d i n t h i s C i r c u i t t h a t t h e p r o s p e c t of a f u t u r e d e c l i n e i n t h e purchasing power of t h e d o l l a r may n o t be used t o o f f s e t t h e reduction t o present value. I1 L would a f f i r m t h e judgment. ~ s s o c i b d e ustice. J

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