LUJAN v DISTRICT COURT
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No. 12371 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTN 1972 CLIFFORD JEROME LUJAN, Petitioner, THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O THE STATE O F F MONTANA, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel o f Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : T e r r y A. Wallace, Missoula , Montana. Richard P. Heinz , County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , P o l s o n , Montana. Submitted: ~ eided : c December 4 , 1972 JAN 2 4 1973 Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. T h i s i s an original proceeding seeking a w r i t of prohibition t o prevent further prosecution of second degree a s s a u l t charges against petitioner in the d i s t r i c t court of the fourth judicial d i s t r i c t , Lake County. P e t i t i o n e r , who was 17 years, 11 months old a t the time of the alleged a s s a u l t b u t reached his 18th birthday p r i o r t o the t r a n s f e r hearing here involved, contests the v a l i d i t y of the proceedings in the juvenile court resulting in the t r a n s f e r of his case t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r a d u l t criminal prosecution. P e t i t i o n e r is Clifford Lujan, an Indian t r a i n e e a t the Kicking Horse Job Corps Center i n Lake County a t the time of the alleged a s s a u l t on Benito Ochoa. The alleged a s s a u l t occurred s h o r t l y a f t e r midnight on August 10, 1972, a t the scenic turnout on Highway #93 about two miles south of Ronan i n Lake County. a Ronan policeman. scious condition. Petitioner and the victim were found there by The victim had been badly beaten and was in an unconH was taken t o a Ronan hospital by the policeman and e petitioner. Following an investigation by the Lake County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , petitioner was arrested and lodged in the Lake County j a i l i n Polson. On August 16, 1972, a p e t i t i o n was f i l e d i n the juvenile court charging Lujan w i t h the offense, and on the same day the county attorney f i l e d a motion f o r leave t o f i l e an information i n the d i s t r i c t court charging Lujan w i t h the crime of second degree a s s a u l t . Citation was issued and served; and the matter was s e t f o r hearing i n the juvenile court on August 30. After two continuances, one a t the request of counsel f o r Lujan and one a t the request of the county attorney, a preliminary hearing was held i n the juvenile court on September 20 pursuant t o section 10-603(c), R.C.M. 1947, f o r the purpose of determining whether Lujan should be prosecuted a s an a d u l t i n the d i s t r i c t court on the second degree a s s a u l t charge. Four witnesses were called by the county attorney and crossexamined by counsel f o r Lujan. Additionally, written statements of Clifford Lujan and his brother, Arthur, and photographs of the scene of the alleged assault were offered in evidence and considered by the Court. No evidence was offered on behalf of Clifford Lujan. In general, the evidence before the court implicated Clifford Lujan in the beating of Ochoa, and in particular the written statement of Clifford Lujan, admitted in evidence over objection, contains an admission that he hit the victim. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge of the juvenile court granted the motion of the county attorney for leave to file an information charging Lujan with second degree assault in the district court. The instant proceeding followed to test the validity of that ruling. An order to show cause was issued, the county attorney filed a return thereto and supporting brief, and oral argument was heard on behalf of both parties. Petitioner cites three errors in support of his claim that the transfer proceedings were inval id: (1 ) Petitioner's statement was improperly admitted in evidence, (2) petitioner was denied "due process" in that his counsel was refused an opportunity to make a presentation on behalf of petitioner, and (3) the case was transferred to the adult criminal court without a proper determination that such transfer was in the best interests of the state. The first alleged error requires no extended discussion. Upon oral argument, counsel for petitioner conceded that sufficient "probable cause" existed without petitioner's statement. The record at the hearing amply demonstrates "probable cause" by independent evidence unrelated to petitioner's statement. Thus the claimed error, if any, in admitting peti tionerts statement in evidence is harmless and affects no substantial right of petitioner . Accordingly, it furnishes no basis for rendering the proceeding invalid. Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P. In the second issue for review, petitioner claims he was denied "due process" because his counsel was refused the opportunity to make a presentation on petitioner's behalf. Petitioner contends the judge of the juvenile court treated the transfer hearing strictly as an evidentiary hearing and denied petitioner's counsel the opportunity to argue the case or to be heard otherwise, thereby infecting the hearing with an arbitrariness condemned as a violation of "due process" and fundamental fairness in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L ed 2d 84. Let us examine the facts. At the conclusion of the county attorney's presentation, the court stated: "NOW, Mr. Wal lace, the court will hear you. " Thereupon counsel for petitioner moved to dismiss the county attorney's petition and asked the court to rule on the question of whether probable cause had been established. The court declined to do so in the following language: "THE COURT: If I am going to rule there is probable cause that is the end of the discussion, and I am not going to rule on anything until I hear you fully; and if you want to be heard further the court will hear you. I' Thereupon the fol 1 owing occurred: "Mr. Wallace: What I have to say now will get into the intent of the juvenile court act as promulgated. "THE COURT: I am not interested or concerned with that, Mr. Wallace. As far as I know, any jurisdiction or discretion in that matter, the law is there and the court is required to follow it as well as it can. You are in the appellant court, as long as you preserve, as you have here from time to time, the points you want to raise of that nature. You have done all you have had to do, all you are required to do, so far as I know, in defense of this man at this point." Further coll oquy occurred between petitioner Is counsel and the court from which it is apparent that petitioner's counsel sought to argue his interpretation of the intent and purpose of the Juvenile Court Act, the required findings of the court in transfer proceedings, and related legal arguments. The court refused to permit this argument. At the time the court granted leave to the county attorney to file an information in the district court charging petitioner with second degree assault, the court made the following findings: "The court finds specifically that probable cause for bringing this defendant to trial does exist, and that the probable cause is of such nature that failure to bring this defendant t o t r i a l on the charge of second degree assault would f a i l to preserve the best and necessary i n t e r e s t of the people of the State of Montana as recited i n t h e i r criminal laws and in the juvenile code both." W are aware of no "due process" and fundamental fairness requiree ment in Kent, in the United States or Montana Constitutions, or in Montana s t a t u t e s t h a t requires the juvenile court t o permit oral legal argument i n support of counsel ' s objections. Here there was no denial of the r i g h t of counsel to s t a t e his objections f o r the record t o the extent necessary f o r a meaningful appellate review. There was no denial of an opportunity to present evidence in opposition to transferring the case from juvenile court t o adul t criminal court f o r prosecution pursuant t o section 10-603 ( c ) , R.C.M. 1947. In the instant case, there was simply a refusal by the judge of the juvenile court to permit extended oral argument by p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel on legal questions concerning the philosophy, intent, and purpose of the Juvenile Court Act, the legal requirements relating t o juvenile court transfer proceedings, and similar matters. Permitting oral argument on such matters is necessarily discretionary with the court, and w find no e abuse of t h a t discretion. Proceeding t o the final issue f o r review, petitioner contends t h a t the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was waived and the case transferred t o adult criminal court for prosecution without a proper determination t h a t such waiver and transfer was in the best i n t e r e s t s of the s t a t e . Petitioner argues t h a t the juvenile court determined t h a t waiver and transf e r was i n the best i n t e r e s t s of the s t a t e solely because there was probable cause t o believe petitioner had committed a felony. Petitioner claims the waiver and transfer here was in violation of section 10-603(c), R.C.M. 1947, and unconstitutional under the -decision. Kent The relevant provisions of section 10-603(c), R.C.M. "(c) when the juvenile court has jurisdiction of any child sixteen (16) years of age, or over, who i s accused of committing * * * assault in the f i r s t or second degree * * * then the county attorney may 1947 s t a t e : request the juvenile court to be permitted t o f i l e an information against the juvenile in d i s t r i c t court, *** "Before making such an order the juvenile judge must hear the matter by an informal preliminary hearing t o determine f i r s t , i f there i s probable cause t o believe the juvenile has committed the felony, and second, t o determine whether under the circumstances i t appears necessary f o r the best i n t e r e s t of the s t a t e that the juvenile be held t o answer the information in d i s t r i c t court." In the instant case, i t i s conceded t h a t the hearing established probable cause to believe the juvenile had committed a felony, viz: crime of second degree assault on Benito Ochoa. the Petitioner contends, however, t h a t the second requirement of the s t a t u t e , properly construed, requires a finding t h a t the juvenile court apparatus cannot effectively deal with the particular juvenile involved, which was n o t made in the ins t a n t case. Petitioner points out that the above s t a t u t e was amended in 1969 t o make transfer of second degree assault proceedings t o the adult criminal court optional rather than mandatory, and that the express legisl a t i v e purpose of the present Juvenile Court Act i s a s stated in section 10-601, R.C.M. 1947: " * * * as f a r as practicable, any delinquent child shall be treated, not as a criminal, b u t as misdirected and misguided, and needing a i d , encouragement, help and assistance". W decline t o so construe the s t a t u t e . e 10-6036-) , R.C.M. The language of section 1947, requires the juvenile court "to determine whether under the circumstances i t appears necessary f o r the best i n t e r e s t of the s t a t e " t h a t the juvenile be prosecuted in adult criminal court. Not in the abstract, b u t under the circumstances of the individual case being considered. Not exclusively f o r the immediate benefit of the juvenile, b u t what i s i n the best i n t e r e s t of the s t a t e , i . e . the people of the s t a t e as a whole, including Lujan. What are the circumstances in the instant case? A juvenile by l e s s than one month a t the time of comission of the alleged offense, who became an adult in the eyes of the criminal law before the transfer hearing was held. An accusation of a brutal, aggravated, senseless felony without semblance of provocation. A victim s t i l l hospitalized. An accused f a r removed from the influences of family, home, and normal adult supervision. An alien environment i l l suited to rehabilitation. What i s the best i n t e r e s t of the s t a t e in the instant case? Is the juvenile court apparatus equipped t o deal with an individual such as r Lujan? O i s the criminal court process and machinery preferable? What about considerations not d i r e c t l y related t o his own immediate s e l f - i n t e r e s t such as deterrence, the safety and protection of the public, and justice in i t s broadest sense? These are some of the d i f f i c u l t questions the judge of the juven i l e court must answer in arriving a t his determination. In the instant case, w cannot say the f a c t s indicate an abuse of discretion on the judge's e part in determining pursuant t o the s t a t u t e that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court should be waived in favor of adult criminal court proceedings. Additionally, and perhaps most important, counsel f o r Lujan contends the constitutional requirements i n Kent were violated in the instant case, rendering invalid the transfer of his case to the adult criminal court. Counsel f o r Lujan argues the constitutional requirements of due process, assistance of counsel, and fundamental fairness required by -were not Kent observed in t h a t counsel was refused an opportunity t o make a presentation on Lujan's behalf; t h a t the waiver and transfer were made solely upon the finding of probable cause; that the transfer order contained no reasons therefor; and because the judge did n o t apply the c r i t e r i a s e t forth in Kent in ordering the transfer. The record does not bear out Lujan's claim t h a t his counsel was denied the opportunity t o make a presentation in his behalf for the reasons heretofore stated. Nor was the judge required to apply the considerations s e t forth in the policy statement of the D i s t r i c t of Columbia Juvenile Court, quoted in the appendix t o t h a t decision. T h a t policy statement a t most i s no more than a rule of t h a t court concerning the standards t h a t particular court would apply i n determining waiver and transfer under the D i s t r i c t of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act. A Montana juvenile court i s in no way bound t o apply the same standards under the Montana Juvenile Court Act. The real thrust of p e t i t i o n e r ' s argument i s that constitutional due process and fundamental fairness were denied in the instant case by f a i l u r e of the court t o give any reasons f o r i t s transfer order, thereby precluding a meaningful appellate review of i t s exercise of discretion i n ordering transfer of the case t o adult criminal court. Corollary t o t h i s argument i s petitioner 's contention that the transfer order was based solely on a finding of probable cause without consideration of whether the best i n t e r e s t of the s t a t e required such transfer. Kent -clearly requires a statement of reasons for a waiver and transfer order under constitutional "due process" and "assistance of counsel" requirements. The purpose of t h i s i s t o insure careful consideration and the exercise of discretion by the juvenile court in determining whether waiver and transfer should be ordered, together with a meaningful review by the appellate court of any abuse of discretion by the juvenile court. W do not construe the provisions of the Montana Juvenile Court e Act as requiring conventional findings of f a c t or an express, formal s t a t e ment of the reasons for ordering the waiver and transfer. I f the reasons motivating the exercise of the juvenile c o u r t ' s discretion in ordering the waiver and transfer sufficiently appear in the record of the hearing to permit meaningful appellate review of the discretion exercised, constitutional requirements are s a t i s f i e d . Here, the juvenile court made an express finding of the existence of probable cause and an express finding "that the probable cause i s of such nature that f a i l u r e to bring t h i s defendant to t r i a l on the charge of second degree assault would f a i l t o preserve the best and necessary i n t e r e s t of the people of the State of Montana as recited in t h e i r criminal laws and in the juvenile code both." During the course of the hearing the judge of the juvenile court specifically pointed out to counsel for petitioner the nature of the alleged crime and the admissions of the defendant, together with corroborating evidence. The judge speci f i c a l l y inquired concerning the gravity of the victim's injuries and the prospects of the victim's survival. The judge clearly indicated t h a t under the circumstances of t h i s particular case he considered the nature and enormity of the crime of which Lujan was accused, and of which the judge found probable cause t o e x i s t , outweighed any other considerations. The judge specifically stated a f t e r reviewing the admissions in the evidence a t Lujan's transfer hearing: "There i s clearly and obviously, on any experience I have--whatever i t has been m privilege or misfortune y t o have over the years--probable cause. If there i s probable cause there clearly i s an involvement of the best i n t e r e s t of the State that the accused be treated f o r these purposes as an adult and not as a juvenile.'' W hold t h a t the record indicates the reasons for the waiver and e transfer w i t h sufficient s p e c i f i c i t y t o s a t i s f y constitutional and statutory requirements. W further hold t h a t in the exercise of his discretion in e juveni 1e transfer proceedi ngs under the present Montana Juveni 1e Court Act, the judge of the juvenile court i s e n t i t l e d t o consider the nature and enormity of the alleged crime, the serious personal injuries inflicted on the victim, and the absence of provocation as the controlling determinants in ordering waiver and transfer t o adult criminal court for prosecution. The order t o show cause heretofore issued i s vacated and the petition dismissed. c o n a1 Associate Justice
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